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FBIS-SOV-89-074 CONTENTS *19 April 1989*

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

- Akhromeyev on Correlation of Forces, Tactical Arms *[PRAVDA 19 Apr]* 1
- Foreign Ministry Official on Tactical Weapons *[TASS]* 2
- Bogachev on Tactical Forces in Europe *[TASS]* 3
- NATO Meetings To Discuss Modernization *[Kozyakov on Moscow International]* 3
  - Levin on Planning Group Session *[Moscow Radio]* 4
- Article Views NATO Modernization Plans *[Pustov in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Apr]* 5
- Soviet-U.S. INF Control Body Meets in Geneva *[Moscow Radio]* 6
- Moiseyev Urges West To 'Adjust' Troop Cuts Stance *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 15]* 6
- General Outlines Troop Withdrawal From GDR *[TASS]* 9
- Vienna Delegates Hold News Conference *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 13]* 9
- Physicist Views Decision on Uranium Production *[Moscow Radio]* 10
- U.S. Seen Blocking Chemical Arms Convention *[PRAVDA 17 Apr]* 11
- States Call for Ban on Nuclear Tests *[PRAVDA 11 Apr]* 12

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

- Briefings Held at Foreign Ministry 14
  - Statement on Lebanon *[TASS]* 14
  - Baker Statement on Ties Noted *[TASS]* 14
  - Article on 'Special Troops' Decried *[TASS]* 14
  - UN 'Concern' on Afghanistan Shared *[TASS]* 15
- Gerasimov on NATO Arms Modernization, Georgia *[London TV]* 15
- Ryzhkov Meets With UN Secretary General *[TASS]* 16
- Observer Views UN Role in Afghanistan *[Biryukov on TASS]* 16
- Further Reportage on Submarine Accident 17
  - Chronology of Sinking *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 15]* 17
  - Survivors Interviewed at Hospital *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 12 Apr]* 17
- 'Observers Roundtable' on Gorbachev Visits *[Kobysh, Shishlin, Charikov on Moscow Radio]* 20
- Thatcher Addresses London Information Forum *[TASS]* 24
- Conflict Seen Within Cocom on Liberalization *[IZVESTIYA 15 Apr]* 24
- Gorbachev Sends Message to Palme Commission *[PRAVDA 13 Apr]* 25
- Conference on Nuclear Stations Held in Rovno *[PRAVDA UKRAINY 1 Mar]* 25

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

- New Thinking 'Absent' From Bush Detroit Speech *[Chernyshev on TASS]* 26
- Bush, UK's Howe View Ties, NATO Modernization *[TASS]* 26
- Bush Signs Bill for Humanitarian Contra Aid *[TASS]* 26
- Radio Liberty Nagorno-Karabakh 'Slander' Decried *[Konstantinov on TASS]* 27
- U.S.-Soviet Trade Relations 'Unsatisfactory' *[Matyash on TASS]* 27
- Georgia Forum Views Soviet Reform, U.S. Trade *[PRAVDA 15 Apr]* 28
- Trade Agreement With U.S. Consortium Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 14 Apr]* 29
- Businessman Loses Case Against IZVESTIYA *[IZVESTIYA 14 Apr]* 29
- House Ethics Investigation of Jim Wright Viewed *[Charikov on Moscow Radio]* 30
- U.S. Gives Russian Empire Documents to USSR *[TASS]* 30
- Rostrapovich 1990 Visit to USSR Viewed *[PRAVDA 14 Apr]* 31

Northeast Asia

- No Danger From Supposed Japanese AES Leak *[SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 13 Apr]* 31
- Atomic Power Forum in Tokyo; Chernobyl Viewed *[PRAVDA 15 Apr]* 32
- Soviet Opinion Poll on Japan Relations Cited *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 16 Apr]* 32
- New Soviet Economic Research Institute in Tokyo *[Moscow International]* 33
- Japanese Businessman Views Trade With USSR *[Moscow International]* 34
- Japanese 'Mir' Space Flight Candidates Screened *[Moscow International]* 34
- DPRK Ends ROK Talks After Mun Ik-hwan Arrest *[TASS]* 35

Near East & South Asia

- Afghan Foreign Minister Meets Press in Moscow *[Kabul Radio]* 35
- Kabul Situation, Najibullah's Image Viewed *[IZVESTIYA 17 Apr]* 35
- Food Convoy From Kabul Reaches Jalalabad *[TASS]* 36
- Military, Supply Situation in Jalalabad Viewed *[PRAVDA 10 Apr]* 36
- Alleged Afghan Rebel Massacre Described *[PRAVDA 17 Apr]* 39
- Afghan Says U.S., Pakistan Violate Geneva Pact *[Moscow TV]* 39
- Pakistani 'Saboteur' Arrested in Afghanistan *[TASS]* 40
- PTI Says Pakistan Recruiting Sikh Extremists *[Moscow International]* 40
- New Indian Envoy Lauds Arms Control, Ties *[Moscow TV]* 41
- Soviet Bloc-India Trade Seminar Held in Delhi *[SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 11 Apr]* 41
- Bangladesh Foreign Minister Lauds Soviet Policy *[IZVESTIYA 13 Apr]* 42

Sub-Saharan Africa

- UN's 'Special Plan' for Namibia Viewed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 9 Apr]* 42
- Nigerian, Soviet Ministers Hold Talks *[TASS]* 44
- RSA's Slabbert Meets Solidarity Members in Moscow 44
  - Discusses Apartheid System, ANC *[Moscow International]* 44
  - Holds News Conference on USSR Role *[Moscow TV]* 45
- Mauritius Leader Receives CPSU Delegation *[PRAVDA 13 Apr]* 45
- Envoy to Liberia Urges Peace Moves in Afghanistan *[Monrovia International]* 45

East Europe

- Gorbachev, CSSR's Jakes Hold Talks 18 Apr *[PRAVDA 19 Apr]* 46
  - Jakes Addresses News Conference *[PRAVDA 19 Apr]* 47
  - Jakes Responds to Questions *[Prague Radio]* 47
  - More on Jakes News Conference *[Prague TV]* 49
- Ryzhkov in Luxembourg for Jubilee, Official Visit 50
  - Departs Moscow 18 Apr *[PRAVDA 19 Apr]* 50
  - Ryzhkov, Vranitzky Hold Talks *[PRAVDA 19 Apr]* 50
  - Ryzhkov, France's Rocard Meet *[TASS]* 50
  - Ryzhkov, FRG's Kohl Meet *[TASS]* 50
  - Ryzhkov Interviewed on Elections *[TASS]* 51
  - Luxembourg Prime Minister Notes Ties *[Moscow TV]* 52
- Gorbachev Meeting With UK Businessmen Reported *[EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA No 16]* 52
- 'Successful Start' for Joint British Trade Month *[TASS]* 56
- Swiss Military Chief Leaves Moscow for Home *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 16 Apr]* 56
- Brutents, French Socialist Party's Mauroy Confer *[PRAVDA 15 Apr]* 56
- Yeltsin Reportedly Not Visiting Finland *[Helsinki Radio]* 56
- Turkey's Interest in Changing Soviet Society Viewed *[PRAVDA 11 Apr]* 57
- TASS Signs Agreement With Greek News Agency *[TASS]* 58

Latin America & Caribbean

- Communist Newspaper Editors Confer in Havana *[PRAVDA 15 Apr]* 58
- Continuing Fighting in Haiti Reported *[IZVESTIYA 9 Apr]* 58

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political & Social

- Central Committee Plenum Planned for 25 Apr *[Paris LE MONDE 19 Apr]* 59
- Gorbachev Speaks to Media Representatives *[TASS]* 59
- Gumbaridze Sees Off Shevardnadze, Razumovskiy *[Moscow TV]* 59
- Reports on Georgian Republic Developments Continue 60
  - Toxic Gases Allegedly Used *[Rome International]* 60
  - Student Mood Calmer; Rumors Denied *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 18 Apr]* 60
  - Disturbances Carry High Cost *[PRAVDA 18 Apr]* 61
  - Paper Ponders Tbilisi Events *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 18 Apr]* 62
  - Lifting of Curfew 'Sensible' *[TASS]* 63
  - Rumors Hampering Normalization *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 19 Apr]* 64
- Clubs Used Against Ryazan Rally Participants *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 15 Apr]* 64
- Tretyakov Examines 'Boris Yeltsin Phenomenon' *[MOSCOW NEWS 16 Apr]* 66
- More on People's Deputy Elections Results, Process 69
  - 26 Mar Leningrad Elections Viewed *[TASS]* 69
  - Kiev Party Assesses 26 Mar Defeats *[PRAVDA 8 Apr]* 69
  - Lessons Drawn From Elections *[TRUD 7 Apr]* 70
  - Peace Committees' New Candidates *[TRUD 7 Apr]* 74
  - Academy Prepares for Runoff Elections *[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 13 Apr]* 74
  - Estonian 26 Mar Election Results *[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA 28 Mar]* 75
  - Estonian Bureau Views Elections *[SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA 28 Mar]* 78
- Recent Changes to Law on State Crimes Examined 79
  - Legal Expert Interviewed *[LITERATURNAYA GAZETA 12 Apr]* 79
  - Supreme Court Official on Law *[SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 13 Apr]* 80
  - 'Puzzling' Provision Questioned *[SOVETSKAYA KULTURA 13 Apr]* 81
  - Academician Discusses Criminal Code *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 14 Apr]* 81
- Gorbachev Aide on 'Intellectual' Leadership Style *[Rome LA REPUBBLICA 16-17 Apr]* 83
- Journal Publishes Excerpts From Khrushchev Memoirs *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 13]* 85
  - Second Part of Excerpts Published *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 14]* 86
- Monthly Publishes 1974 Solzhenitsyn Essay *[XX CENTURY AND PEACE No 2]* 88
- Armenian Party Discusses Housing Shortage *[Yerevan Radio]* 91
- Emphasis on Well-Constructed Buildings in Armenia *[TASS]* 91
- Construction Work Criticized in Disaster Areas *[Yerevan Radio]* 91
- Housing Distribution Rumors in Armenia Discounted *[Yerevan Radio]* 91
- Arutyunyan Briefs Women on Armenian Reconstruction *[Yerevan International]* 92
- Arutyunyan, Yerevan Students Exchange Views *[Yerevan International]* 92
- Culture Minister Visits Armenian Earthquake Zone *[Yerevan International]* 92
- 'Mass' Arrests of Armenian Students Denied *[Yerevan KOMMUNIST 29 Mar]* 93
- Armenian Law Enforcement Measures Discussed *[Yerevan Radio]* 93
- Armenia's Catholicos Vazgen I Awarded Medal *[Yerevan International]* 93
- Yerevan Commandant on 13 Apr Curfew Violations *[Yerevan Radio]* 94
- Baku Commandant on 9 Apr Curfew Violations *[Baku Radio]* 94
- Customs Official Visits Azerbaijan, Meets Vezirov *[Baku Radio]* 94
- Azerbaijan Komsomol Group Elects Officers *[Baku Radio]* 94
- Lenkoran Gorkom Plenum Critical of Health Care *[Baku Radio]* 95
- Azerbaijan Central Committee Meets 12 Apr *[Baku Radio]* 95
- NKAO Administrator Holds Meeting in Stepanakert *[Yerevan KOMMUNIST 24 Mar]* 95
- Nagorno-Karabakh 'Philanthropic' Society Formed *[Yerevan KOMMUNIST 15 Mar]* 96
- Moldavia Youth Poll Reveals 'Few Illusions' *[London DAILY TELEGRAPH 18 Apr]* 96
- Conference on Party Political Management Opens *[Moscow TV]* 97
- Historian on Limitations of World Revolution *[ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No 14]* 97
- Reform of Legal Investigative Procedures Delayed *[IZVESTIYA 6 Apr]* 100
- Internal Affairs Ministry Cuts Discussed *[IZVESTIYA 7 Apr]* 102
- Purpose of New MVD Media Unit Explained *[IZVESTIYA 1 Apr]* 103
- Leaders Sign Obituary of Ballet Dancer Liyepa *[PRAVDA 31 Mar]* 103
- Zaykov Offered Condolences on Death of Son *[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 5 Apr]* 103
- Mazurov Receives Friendship of Peoples Order *[IZVESTIYA 8 Apr]* 103
- Biryukova Receives UNESCO Delegation *[TASS]* 103

Official Discusses Nuclear Power Industry Safety
[SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA 8 Apr] 104
Consumer Society Established in Alma-Ata *[Moscow Radio]* 107
St Casimir's Remains Returned to Archcathedral *[GIMTASIS KRASTAS No 10]* 107
Mosques Returned to Believers in Central Asia *[TASS]* 107
Uzbek Television Beamed to Turkmenistan *[PRAVDA 3 Apr]* 108
IZVESTIYA To Be Printed in Gomel, Belorussia *[IZVESTIYA 4 Apr]* 108

Economic

Finance Minister Gostev Holds News Conference *[Moscow TV]* 108
Article Opposes Tyumen Petrochemical Complex *[IZVESTIYA 4 Apr]* 110

Scientific

'Mir' Cosmonauts Conduct Medical Research *[TASS]* 113
Arguments For, Against Space Program Cited *[TRUD 12 Apr]* 113

Military

Roundtable Discussion Examines Army Reductions *[Moscow TV]* 115

Akhromeyev on Correlation of Forces, Tactical Arms

PM1804163189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
19 Apr 89 First Edition p 4

[Interview with Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev, adviser to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium chairman, by unnamed PRAVDA correspondent; place and date not given: "Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Superiority or Equality?"]

[Text] [Correspondent] The leaders of the NATO bloc states claim that the Warsaw Pact has many times more tactical nuclear missiles in Europe than their military alliance. In particular, a few days ago NATO Secretary General M. Woerner, following a meeting with U.S. President G. Bush, plainly stated that the Warsaw Pact has in Europe "14 times more short-range nuclear missiles than NATO" and proposed that the Warsaw Pact start to reduce these armaments unilaterally. If our advantage is so great, why do we not accept this proposal?

[Akhromeyev] The NATO bloc leaders, including Mr Woerner, are deliberately substituting another concept—"short-range nuclear missiles in Europe"—for the concept of "tactical nuclear weapons in Europe," on which there must be negotatiions. Tactical nuclear weapons are a kind of "triad," comprising tacical missiles, strike aircraft, and artillery with their nuclear components.

The correlation of these facilities belonging to the two military alliances in Europe is characterized by the following data:

Types of Arms	Warsaw Pact Quantity of Arms	Correlation of Forces	NATO Quantity of Arms
Tactical missiles (range up to 500 km)	1,608	12:1	136
Artillery systems (range up to 50-60 km)	more than 6,000	1.1	more than 6,000
Front aviation strike aircraft (range up to 1,000 km)	2,783	1:1.5	4,.075
Total	more than 10,000	1:1	more than 10,000

All these enormous forces are stationed in Europe and constitute the nuclear might of the two alliances in that region. Anyway, NATO is reluctant to consider the sides' total military might in Europe since it is approximately equal for both military alliances. If these forces are vast in terms of quantity and nuclear might, then naturally there is a need to start talks first on a sharp reduction in these nuclear means on a bilateral basis, and then on their complete elimination. NATO is opposed to the reduction of these means and, consequently, it is opposed to talks. Therefore, from the totality of tactical nuclear weapons it deliberately extracts for consideration only those missiles of which the Warsaw Pact does indeed have 1,500 more units and demands that the Warsaw Pact reduce them unilaterally.

Why then are strike aircraft, which serve as delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons and of which NATO has 1,300 more, not to be subject to reductions? Is an aircraft which serves as a delivery vehicle perhaps less dangerous than a missile? Its range is 2-2.5 times greater and, as distinct from a land-based missile, it carries serveral air-launched nuclear missiles or bombs.

There is only one reason: The objective examination of all the sides' tactical nuclear means taken together destroys NATO's claim about the Warsaw Pact's superiority in these means and confirms the need to open talks on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

[Correspondent] NATO leaders are claiming that the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact as a whole, while opposing the so-called modernization of NATO's tactical nuclear missiles, have themselves already carried out such a modernization of their own missiles, and are misleading the public in an effort to align it against the NATO bloc. What is the real state of affairs?

[Akhromeyev] These claims do not correspond to reality. The Soviet Union and its allies have carried out no such modernization. General data about the state of tactical nuclear missiles are cited in the Warsaw Pact defense ministers committee statement of 30 January 1989. As regards individual types of missiles, they are as follows:

Type of Missile	Quantity	Range	Time of Entry Into Service
Luna (Frog) missile	658	up to 70 km	1964
Tochka (SS-21) missile	289	up to 70 km	1975
R-17 (Scud-B) missile	661	up to 300 km	1962
Total:	1,608		

So the Warsaw Pact armies are equipped with missiles created between 15 and 27 years ago.

It is true that the Soviet Army has a modern missile with a range of up to 500 km. This is the SS-23 missile, which became part of the arsenal in the eighties. However, it is being eliminated in accordance with the U.S.-USSR Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. The Soviet Union deliberately took this step so as to ensure that by eliminating missiles of this type there would be no more nuclear missiles of this range in any country.

An examination of the state of the sides' nuclear aviation means and artillery in Europe reveals that the situation is approximately the same. NATO strike aircraft became part of the arsenal even later than those of the Warsaw Pact.

This is the actual state of affairs as regards modernization. It is important now to break out of the vicious circle "modernization—response to modernization" and so on, which serves as the mainspring of the arms race.

[Correspondent] What is the Soviet SS-23 shorter-range missile which is being eliminated under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-and Shorter-Range Missiles like? How does it differ from the U.S. "modernized Lance" missile which the United States is planning to deploy instead of the present Lance missile, and the French Hades missile which is to be deployed instead of the present Pluton missile?

[Akhromeyev] The Soviet land-based shorter-range nuclear missile Oka (known by NATO as the SS-23) is a missile with a range of less than 500 km. During the talks with the United States on the signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-and Shorter-Range Missiles, its range was no secret to the U.S. representatives at the talks. Now, however, completely unembarrassed by the fact that the U.S. representatives at the talks sought the elimination of the SS-23 missile, the United States intends to deploy in Europe a "modernized Lance" nuclear missile with a range (up to 450 km) virtually equal to the range of the Soviet Oka missile being eliminated. The question of France deploying a new missile with an equivalent range is also being discussed. The Soviet Union cannot agree with this. This whole undertaking of the NATO countries' deployment of land-based nuclear missiles with a range close to 500 km—a new generation of missiles—is not modernization but an actual buildup of nuclear might which runs counter to the spirit of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles. As M.S. Gorbachev said 7 April at the Guildhall (in London), the Soviet Union is a determined opponent of such modernization and we have no intention of engaging in this ourselves, as long as we are not forced to take such a step. But if we are forced to do this, we will find a way to respond to the NATO actions.

[Correspondent] What is the Soviet position on the problem of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe?

[Akhromeyev] Our position is that neither the NATO bloc nor the Warsaw Pact has any need to engage in the "modernization"—which is, in fact, the creation of new systems—of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. In any case, it would only lead to a new nuclear arms race. We must begin talks between the two military alliances on a radical reduction of tactical nuclear weapons. The enormous nuclear arsenal must be reduced, and this is possible, using, among others, the asymmetrical method of reduction.

In this respect the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons must not be approached on a selective basis, with talks held only on missiles. All these systems—land- and air-based missiles, aerial bombs, and artillery equipment—are battlefield systems.

We have dwelt in more detail on questions connected with land-based nuclear missiles simply because they are the subject of the sharpest argument. However, in our opinion there should be no buildup of nuclear land-based missiles, airborne tactical nuclear means, or nuclear artillery. We are prepared for a considerable reduction on a mutual basis of all these systems, and, ultimately, their total elimination. Proposals on this question were put forward on 12 April by the Warsaw Pact foreign ministers committee in Berlin.

We should also bear in mind that tactical nuclear weapons are the least verifiable. Even more than strategic weapons they could become the cause of an unsanctioned nuclear conflict, with all the attendant consequences for mankind....

Foreign Ministry Official on Tactical Weapons

LD1804154489 Moscow TASS in English 1528 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—The task of making the Warsaw Treaty and NATO exclusively defensive organisations cannot be resolved if tactical nuclear weapons continue to be a "closed subject" for talks, Konstantin Mikhaylov, member of a Soviet delegation at a session of the foreign ministers committee of the Warsaw Treaty member states, deputy head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry department on arms limitation an disarmament, has told TASS. This is why a propasal was put forward on April 11 at the session of the foreign ministers committee to start separate talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

The Soviet diplomat said that this proposal should not be regarded in such a way as though we want to bring into a single knot problems connected with conventional armed forces and those connected with tactical weapons, although, of course, they are interconnected, in a way

The preservation and especially the buildup of tactical nuclear weapons possessing a great destructive potential and an ability to be used in the first strike will make an ever more destabilising impact on the military-strategic situation in Europe, Mikhaylov said. The so-called "modernisation" of this type of weapons not only runs counter to the spirit of the Vienna talks, but also can turn into a factor hampering them, into a roundabout manoever leading to the growth of military rivalry in the continent and not to its reduction.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is not modernising its tactical nuclear missiles, Konstantin Mikhaylov stressed. The USSR is not replacing old missiles with SS-21 missiles, as it is often asserted in the West. It is clear, however, that the Soviet stand presupposes reciprocal restraint.

The Soviet diplomat believes that the allegations spread in the West on some Soviet superiority in tactical nuclear weapons are wrong. They are based on the artificial singling out of only one type of armaments—tactical nuclear missiles. It is true that the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Treaty member states have more missiles of this type than NATO countries, while the latter have a perceptible advantage in other components of tactical nuclear weapon systems.

Mikhaylov said that the Soviet side was ready to give up its superiority in tactical nuclear missiles and to fully eliminate them together with all the nuclear weapon systems. This process will probably be carried out by stages. Opportunities and prospects of the realisation of this process should be discussed at talks. Warsaw Treaty member countries propose to start preparations for them with consultations between the parties concerned.

Bogachev on Tactical Forces in Europe

LD1804190489 Moscow TASS in English 1835 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—By TASS observer on military issues Vladimir Bogachev:

Ahead of a series of NATO meetings starting in Brussels which will discuss the modernisation of U.S. nuclear weapons in Western Europe, Washington's and London's official representatives put forward a long list of arguments which are to convince the world public of the necessity and, consequently, the inevitability of the realisation of U.S. military plans.

In conditions of approximate parity of the military might of the two opposing blocs, the Warsaw Treaty and NATO, NATO officials lay emphasis on those component parts of the armed forces in which the Warsaw Treaty has an advantage, and at the same time they hush up the figures concerning those armaments in which superiority is on the side of NATO. For example, when assessing the tactical nuclear weapon potentials, the Pentagon prefers to speak only of launching installations for small-range missiles in which the Soviet Union really has an advantage.

However, missiles are only one of the components of the nuclear "Triad" which also includes strike warplanes and nuclear artillery. By tactical warplanes capable of carrying nuclear weapons, NATO's superiority is obvious: 4,075 against 2,783. By nuclear artillery the two sides' potentials are almost equal. Apart from it, NATO has a tremendous advantage in aircraft carriers, ships with cruise missiles on board and landing ships deployed in the seas around Europe.

Many NATO officials show affected concern over the "overwhelming superiority" of the Warsaw Treaty in tactical nuclear weapons. However, strange as it may seem, they do not find it necessary to hold talks on their reduction and subsequent elimination.

Geoffrey Howe, British secretary of state for foreign and commonwealth affairs, again supported the implementation of U.S. plans of the modernisation of nuclear weapons in Western Europe. In a BBC interview Howe justified U.S. plans by the assertion that the Soviet Union had carried out full modernisation of its tactical nuclear weapons in the past ten years.

The real situation, however, is as follows: The USSR has not modernised its ground-based tactical nuclear missiles since January 1, 1987. At present the Soviet Union has two classes of old tactical missiles—those with a range of 300 km produced in 1965 and those with a range of 70-100 km, produced in 1975.

In 1986 the USSR started the deployment of new missiles with a range of 500 km. Now they are subject to destruction under the INF Treaty. A strange situation is taking shape: While the Soviet Union is eliminating its 500-km missiles, NATO is going to deploy practically identical missiles with a range of 480 km under the pretext of modernisation.

These actions taken by the U.S. and NATO look very much like casuistry in the interpretation of the spirit of the INF Treaty.

The Warsaw Treaty member states came up with a proposal to start soon separate talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including dual-purpose weapons systems. The Warsaw Treaty is ready to examine any other measures aimed at reducing and eliminating tactical nuclear weapons, as well as at strengthening stability in the continent.

NATO has not given an official answer so far to these initiatives put forward by socialist countries.

NATO Meetings To Discuss Modernization

LD1904002189 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] On 19 April, the defense ministers of the NATO countries open their 2-day long meeting in Brussels within the framework of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. Vladislav Kozyakov of our staff has this comment:

[Kozyakov] The meeting will take place in a new atmosphere. As President Bush remarked speaking in Detroit on 17 April, the winds of change are shaping a new European destiny. He spoke about the need to fully end the cold war. And when he met the British Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe on the same day, he spoke about the need to have a broad vision of the future of Europe and the Atlantic alliance.

How will the participants in the forthcoming meeting of the Nuclear Planning Group be taking into account this new atmosphere that has developed under the influence of restructuring in the Soviet Union, Poland, and other Eastern European countries? This question is all the more topical since the participants in the NATO meeting have to consider the new proposal put forward by the Soviet Union and its allies to immediately open consultations over the holding of talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Hardly had the news about the new propsoal of the Warsaw Treaty countries reached Washington when the American secretary of defense, Richard Cheney, hurried to express his negative attitude to it. In an interview given for the press, he said it was important for Europe to preserve and modernize short-range nuclear missiles. Many Europeans, however, hold a different view. The British newspaper GUARDIAN writes that millions of ordinary people in Western Europe have grown tired with living on a potential nuclear battlefield. These people do not understand why, now that East-West relations are improving, all the plans to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons are to be renounced and instead programs for their build-up are to be approved.

One of the main arguments used by Washington and London, who are particularly insisting on modernizing plans, is as follows: Talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe if they are to start, may lead to a third zero variant, that is to the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. And this means that NATO's doctrine of flexible response and its thesis about mutual intimidation will be put in jeopardy. But East and West have now reached mutual understanding concerning the need to deal with the cold war completely, and this means there is a need to fully give up the doctrines borne out of that war.

As it has been reported in West European capitals, West Germany and Belgium intend to put forward within NATO a proposal for opening negotiations with the Warsaw Treaty countries over tactical nuclear weapons and postponing the decision to modernize them. Other countries such as Greece, Denmark, Spain, Luxembourg, Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey are inclined to support the stand taken by West Germany and Belgium, in relation to the need to postpone the modernization.

Levin on Planning Group Session

LD1904015789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] A 2-day conference of NATO's Nuclear Planning Group is opening in Brussels tomorrow. This is one of the bloc's leading bodies. Judging by press reports, the issue of plans for modernizing tactical nuclear weapons will be the center of attention. I hand the microphone over to my colleague Viktor Levin.

[Levin] Issues of modernizing tactical nuclear weapons have been debated within NATO for more than a month. To all appearances, however, a decision must now be drafted, which will be submitted to the NATO council summit session scheduled for late May. The bloc's leaders believe that the time for debates is over and that decisions should follow. There are no doubts about how the United States and Great Britain understand the word "decision." They favor modernization. At the same time, a number of NATO member-states, primarily the so-called small countries, would obviously prefer to reject such modernization.

The FRG favors postponing defining its position. The FRG public does not want the modernization, while the government does not dare provoke the population's wrath. Opinion polls show that the recent reorganization of the federal cabinet, in the process of which Defense Minister Scholz, an overzealous champion of modernization, was dismissed, did not raise the government's prestige. More than 60 percent of those polled doubt that the reshuffle among the ministers could impart the goverment with greater dynamics. The Social Democratic Party [SDP] opposition enjoys increasing popularity, and rejection of the modernization is one of the SDP's main demands.

The proposals put forward by the Warsaw Pact member states to start separate talks on reducing tactical nuclear weapons clearly make the work of the Nuclear Planning Group even more complicated. THE GUARDIAN thinks that, I quote, Gorbachev and his Warsaw Pact friends have used their method again. They have met the West more than halfway, thereby putting it in an awkward position, unquote. True, it must be said that the British Government has hastened to reject the proposal on talks. A spokesman for the British Foreign Ministry said that Britain would be against the talks on tactical nuclear weapons because the two alliances had not agreed on any general concept for such talks. The Warsaw Pact member states, however, suggest that before starting the talks, they should discuss all the necessary issues.

So, in my view, it is impossible to simply disregard the initiative of socialist countries without running the risk of getting into an even more awkward situation. Will the proposals of the Warsaw Pact be discussed by the Nuclear Planning group? It is clear that it is impossible to muffle the weighty word pronounced by socialist countries by hasty rejections. One would very much like NATO countries at long last to start thinking not in the categories of increasing armaments but in those of the new political thinking.

Article Views NATO Modernization Plans

PM1804104189 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Apr 89 First Edition p 3

[Article by observer Vasiliy Pustov under the rubric "World Today: Problems and Opinions": "NATO: Will There Be Nuclear 'Modernization?'"]

[Text] This week events took place on both sides of the Atlantic reflecting the differing approach of the two largest military alliances toward European problems. A routine session of the committee of foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact states was held in the GDR's capital while in the U.S. capital talks were held between NATO Secretary General M. Woerner and President G. Bush.

The mass media have published detailed reports on the session of the committee in Berlin. Put with the utmost brevity, it discussed the further improvement of the situation in Europe and the world, the development of the disarmament process, and the weakening of military confrontation on our continent.

Everything took place differently in Washington. Washington, like the NATO military-political leadership and official London, seems not to see any task more important now than achieving "modernization," or to be more precise the adoption of new, more accurate tactical nuclear weapons with a longer range in Europe. This, to judge by Western press reports, was one of the main topics of the talks between G. Bush and M. Woerner.

In contrast to the quite recent past, the question of nuclear "modernization," which gives rise to quite fierce debates even within NATO countries and between them, is now being discussed in a rather different situation: It has become known that the U.S. Administration has decided, without waiting for its allies to agree, to begin production of new nuclear missiles which it intends to use to replace the "Lance" missiles stationed in the West European countries. This is being justified by references to the fact that the Warsaw Pact has more tactical missile launchers than NATO. Yes, there is a superiority. But attempts to reduce all calculations to missiles alone are unfounded. As is well known, the tactical nuclear weapons of the Warsaw Pact and NATO represent a "triad" consisting not only of land-based missiles but also of strike aircraft (tactical aircraft with nuclear weapons) and nuclear artillery. For nuclear artillery the forces of the two sides are approximately equal. As for strike aircraft, NATO's superiority is undisputed: 4,075 strike aircraft as against the Warsaw Pact's 2,783. As we can see, overall the tactical nuclear systems are entirely comparable in terms of their combat capability.

The NATO leaders' claims that the Soviet Union has already modernized its land-based missiles are totally unfounded. The USSR has two types of these missiles in service: a missile with a range of 300 km first produced in 1965, and a missile with a range of 70-100 km first produced in 1975. Competent USSR military circles have reported that since 1 January 1987 (that is for over 2 years now) nothing has been done or is being done to modernize Soviet tactical nuclear weapons. Thus the "arguments" cited by the champions of a strong-arm policy of "nuclear deterrence" in favor of the adoption of new tactical nuclear weaponry in NATO do not withstand serious criticism.

Disputes and debates in the West over this policy and the nuclear "modernization" which stems from it are conducted in an atmosphere in which the magnetic power of the Soviet peace initiatives is continuing to grow. As is well known, these initiatives were supplemented by one more major step in this direction—the decision announced by M.S. Gorbachev during his visit to Britain to halt the production of highly enriched uranium for military purposes this year. In addition to the industrial reactor for the production of weapons-grade plutonium closed down in 1987, it is planned to close down a further two such reactors this year and next and not to commission new capacities in their place. This news was welcomed with approval by the Western public.

The figures for the military potentials of the Warsaw Pact and NATO, announced for the first time and attesting to the existence of approximate parity, did not go unnoticed either. As of 1 January 1989 the total numerical strength of the armed forces was 5,300,000 in the Warsaw Pact and 6,528,000 in NATO, there were 10,500 combat aircraft in the Warsaw Pact and 14,100 in NATO, 4,200 combat helicopters in the Warsaw Pact and 14,000 in NATO, 80,000 tanks in the Warsaw Pact and 40,300 in NATO, 160 large submarines in the Warsaw Pact and 673 in NATO, including 4 aircraft-carrying submarines in the Warsaw Pact and 25 in NATO.

Thus the fears which have spread in the West over the "military threat from the East" are unfounded. It is indicative in this connection that it was none other than the well known U.S. politician and diplomat G. Kennan, who developed the notorious "deterrence" doctrine during the "cold war," who is now declaring it to be obsolete. An understanding of the need for a different deterrence—the deterrence of the race in nuclear and other arms—is growing in the world. But the actions of the NATO leaders show their unreadiness and reluctance to overcome the force of inertia in their blatantly obsolete, confrontationist thinking. This too cannot fail to give rise to concern in broad circles of the world public. "NATO," the West German newspaper KOLNER STADT-ANZEIGER notes, "is losing in the competition for initiatives in the disarmament field. It is not new missiles which are needed but NATO's ability to respond with its own new thinking to the changes taking place in the East.... The NATO countries must help to ensure that confrontation gives way to a system of cooperation and joint security."

In their propaganda the champions of a strong-arm policy are seeking to make extensive use of NATO's 40th anniversary in April. The official festivities are scheduled for 29-30 May, when the meeting of heads of state and government of the NATO countries takes place in Brussels. But in the meantime NATO propaganda is vainly trying to impart to the alliance the semblance of seething, peacemaking activity. The sharp and critical items, not devoid of sarcasm, which are appearing in the Western press are in sharp contrast to these unfounded assertions. Here is one of these items. "At the age of 40," the London newspaper THE OBSERVER writes, "NATO runs the risk of playing the part of an aging mistress. It is afraid of being spurned and is trying to attract attention, demanding new baubles, primarily modernized short-range missiles."

The anniversary celebrant is persistently seeking, to paraphrase the well-known saying, to gain "nuclear capital" and to maintain innocence. A new NATO strategy, allegedly taking into account the changes taking place in the USSR and the other socialist countries, is being elaborated for the summit meeting in late May. The bloc's leading circles are calling it "the alliance' strategy for the nineties and the 21st century," "a guide for the West's security questions," "a global concept in the field of disarmament and arms limitation," and even "a bible of disarmament." Speculation on the bible prompts us to remember the biblical injunction to guard against wolves in sheep's clothing. Because the peace-loving phraseology of the new strategy is designed to prove what cannot be proved—the need to "modernize" NATO's nuclear weapons which would continue to be the material basis of the "from a position of strength policy."

You ask: But how will events develop in the future? What can we expect from the NATO summit meeting at the end of May? It seems to me that much will depend on whether Washington, London, and the NATO upper echelons succeed in breaking the resistance of a number of West European countries, primarily the FRG, which are objecting to the hasty adoption of a specific decision on "modernization." According to THE WASHINGTON POST, the U.S. Administration is leaning toward a "tough line" with regard to the opponents of the siting of new nuclear weapons in Europe. At the same time the antinuclear movement in, for instance, West Germany, is acquiring such strength that it is universally recognized that to yield on the question of "modernization" threatens the Christian Democratic Party, which forms the basis of the government coalition headed by H. Kohl, with defeat at the upcoming parliamentary elections in December 1990.

Indeed, other NATO countries are also considering the impact of Soviet foreign policy, which is destroying the "image of the enemy," and are guarding against agreeing to the siting of new U.S. nuclear missiles. There too there is a growing understanding of the real target of the document "A study of nuclear weapons requirements for 1991-1998" elaborated by NATO Supreme Commander in Europe General J. Galvin. The new missiles with a range of up to 500 km which it propagandizes are designed to play a part close to that played by the Pershings and cruise missiles whose destruction in accordance with the treaty on intermediate- and shorter-range missiles generated a sigh of relief, so to speak, in Europe. The proposed replacement of some missiles by others is a not so cunning means of undermining the first real agreement on nuclear disarmament reached between the USSR and the United States. It is not nuclear weapons, the French newspaper L'HUMANITE stresses, but NATO policy which is in need of a modernization aimed at rejecting the policy of force, overcoming Europe's division, disbanding military alliances, and strengthening security and peace.

The situation in Europe and the world as a whole remains complex and contradictory. Fully resolved to continue to seek its fundamental normalization, the Warsaw Pact members state that the conservation, modernization, and, especially, the further buildup of nuclear weapons would exert increasingly destabilizing influence on the military-strategic situation in Europe.

The Warsaw Pact states are suggesting to the NATO states that they begin in the very near future individual talks on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including the nuclear component of dual-purpose systems. Practical measures in the field of the reduction both of conventional arms and of tactical nuclear arms would mutually supplement and reinforce each other in the process of lowering the level of the two sides' military antagonism. This vitally important initiative is being put forward in the hope that common sense will ultimately prevail in NATO too.

Soviet-U.S. INF Control Body Meets in Geneva

LD1804142589 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] Another—the fourth—meeting of the special control commission set up in connection with the U.S.-USSR Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles has opened in Geneva. A number of legal and technical questions relating to the practical implementation of the treaty were examined at the meeting.

Moiseyev Urges West To 'Adjust' Troop Cuts Stance

18070609 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 15, 15-21 Apr 89 pp 1-2

[Interview with Army General M.A. Moiseyev by V. Voytenko: "On Positions of Real Disarmament"; date, place not given]

[Text] A decision of the USSR to reduce its armed forces unilaterally by 500,000 men in essence confirms the content of the new Soviet military doctrine. Along with a decrease in troop numerical strength, there is a change in troop structure; the number of military districts and armies is being decreased, and the number of combined arms divisions will be cut almost in half.

Our correspondent V. Voytenko interviewed Army General M.A. Moiseyev, chief of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.

[Voytenko] How will the problem of verification of the withdrawal of our troops be resolved? Where is the guarantee that this is a real reduction and not, as is sometimes asserted in the West, a redeployment of forces? How will verification of the inactivation of tank units be implemented?

[Moiseyev] The reduction of our armed forces is a unilateral action by the Soviet Union and it should not be legally subject to any kind of verification. However, demonstrating an act of goodwill, we decided that the reduction of troops, including their withdrawal from the GDR, CSSR, Hungarian People's Republic, Polish People's Republic, and the Mongolian People's Republic, and the inactivation of large units [soyedineniye] and units [chast], including tank units, would be conducted under conditions of maximum possible openness and glasnost. To ensure this, a decision was made to create a "public observation group" which will consist of representatives of many public organizations.

Measures will be implemented and briefings and news conferences will be held on behalf of this group that are associated with drawing the attention of the Soviet and foreign public and mass media to the performance of the unilateral measures of the Soviet Union in reducing its armed forces.

As for the USSR Ministry of Defense, it will provide the group with active practical assistance in its activity.

[Voytenko] What kinds of tanks will be eliminated—old or new?

[Moiseyev] It depends on what is meant by "old" and "new." In the first place, of course, tanks of earlier models and year of manufacture will be eliminated.

[Voytenko] After the new reductions, will you have any kind of superiority in conventional weapons in Europe, about which so much is said in the West?

[Moiseyev] The fantasies that are being spread in the West about Soviet military superiority are intended to justify their own military programs and modernization plans and to continue the arms race. But reality rejects these fantasies.

The declaration of the committee of defense ministers of the Warsaw Pact members "On the Relative Strengths of the Armed Forces and Weapons of the Warsaw Pact Organization and the North Atlantic Union in Europe and Adjacent Water Areas" gives an objective picture of the relative military capabilities of the two unions, and it concludes that an approximate military balance exists in Europe. Historically formed unbalances are shown: For example, the OVD [Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization] has an advantage in tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers, and NATO has an advantage in tactical strike aircraft, combat helicopters, large surface ships, and armed forces numerical strength. These unbalances do not give one or the other side the possibility of counting on decisive military superiority.

The unilateral reduction of the armed forces of the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries eliminates not fully but to a significant degree the existing edge on our side in the indicated weapons. At the same time, NATO's edge is maintained. This arouses our concern, the more so because no desire can be seen on the part of the West to take steps that reciprocate our initiative.

[Voytenko] We began the reduction of our arned forces in a unilateral way. Where is the limit to such unilateral moves? Anxiety is expressed in the letters of some of our readers: Will not the security of the USSR suffer as a result?

[Moiseyev] I think that the limit is determined by maintaining reasonable sufficiency for ensuring the reliable security of the country. It cannot be approached unilaterally; the existing situation has to be taken into account. I will give an example. We adhered to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing for a year and a half. This was the limit. A further continuation of the moratorium under conditions when the United States was speeding up nuclear testing could have damaged our security and defensive capability.

We carefully weighed our decision on the reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces by 500,000 men. In evaluating the factors that affect our security, we repeatedly considered: Will this not affect the reliability of our defense against possible aggression against the USSR and its allies on the part of the NATO bloc? Thus, I can say with full responsibility: The Soviet Armed Forces are in constant readiness to defend their motherland and our allies reliably and to repel any aggression no matter where it comes from.

We will not permit the defensive capability of our country to be damaged. We will maintain it at a level that ensures our freedom, independence, and the realization of our restructuring plans.

[Voytenko] How will the reduction of the armed forces by 500,000 men affect the nature of conscription?

[Moiseyev] First of all, and this is the main thing, there will be a substantial reduction in the size of the annual call-ups into the ranks of the armed forces. For it is precisely in this way that we plan to reduce the number of servicemen on compulsory terms of service—sergeants, master sergeants, and soldiers and sailors.

The qualitative makeup of conscripts will also change in a definite way. Apparently, starting this year, we will no longer see students of day (full-time) higher educational institutions among those called into the Army or Navy. The resolution of this important problem, which has caused concern in wide sections of our society, simply would not have been possible without a reduction in the sizes of the annual call-ups.

As for the longer-range prospects, by the middle of the 1990's, given an improved international climate and the general demographic situation in the country, there can be an examination of the question of extending the practice of granting deferments from call-up to military service to various categories of citizens, for example, those working in the rural economy of the country or in construction.

[Voytenko] What are the proportions of reductions in command and enlisted personnel?

[Moiseyev] Of the 500,000 reduction in servicemen, about 100,000 are officers, and about 50,000 are warrant officers and petty officers. The rest are servicemen on compulsory terms of service.

[Voytenko] How will the question of job placement for servicemen be resolved in connection with the contemplated reductions?

[Moiseyev] Servicemen on compulsory terms of service will be able to return to their normal civilian life and continue their work or education. As for officer personnel, the majority of officers of the Army and Navy have a higher engineering education that is suitable for a large number of training programs at civilian VUZ's [higher educational institutions]. Therefore, we expect that they will be able to apply their knowledge and experience at enterprises of the national economy.

At the same time, it is impossible not to see that for these years the Ministry of Defense, together with party and soviet organs and public organizations, will have to resolve a number of serious social questions, including those associated with job placement for discharged servicemen. Work is already being carried out in this direction. The Ministry of Defense jointly with the USSR Goskomtrud [State Committee for Labor and Social Problems] have developed a plan for retraining discharged servicemen and for members of their families. The Ministry of Defense and the Goskomtrud are also charged with the responsibility of monitoring their job placement.

These measures, however, are not enough to resolve all questions fully. The Ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of 21 March of this year "Concerning the Reduction of the USSR Armed Forces During the Years 1989-1990" speaks directly about the fact that the local soviets of people's deputies must adopt the necessary measures on job placement and the provision of dwelling space for officer personnel, warrant officers, petty officers, and extended-term servicemen being transferred into the reserve or retired. On its part, the Ministry of Defense in the course of 2 years will build more than 100 60- to 80-apartment houses in various regions of the country for servicemen who are transferred into the reserves after the reduction. It is also necessary to increase sharply the effectiveness of the work of special committees on job placement and housing arrangements, set up at all ispolkoms [executive committees] of the soviet's of people's deputies, for those officers discharged from the armed forces and their families.

[Voytenko] It was announced almost 2 years ago that a real military budget of the Soviet Union will be published. When will this occur, and what kind of work is being conducted in this respect?

[Moiseyev] I think that information on the USSR defense budget will be published soon. We are by no means being delayed here by considerations of secrecy, but by real difficulties associated with the necessity for an objective comparison of our expenditures for defense with the military expenditures of the countries of the West. Work on these questions is still continuing.

[Voytenko] How are the negotiations in Vienna proceeding? What is delaying their progress?

[Moiseyev] The first session of the negotiations took place in a businesslike atmosphere. Some similar points surfaced in Warsaw Pact and NATO positions. Thus, both parties agree to reduce weapons in the first phase to equal "ceilings" which would be below the lower levels the parties have. The Warsaw Pact countries propose a reduction from the lower levels by 10-15 percent, but the NATO countries, by 5-10 percent. There appeared to be an attempt to avoid a numbers discussion and to concentrate on the coordination of the categories of armed forces and weapons that were subject to reductions, general criteria, and methods of calculating them. Views generally coincide on verification, including on-site inspection without the right of refusal.

At the same time, the principal disagreements that could delay the progress of the negotiations became apparent. The principal question is that the NATO countries included only tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers in the category of weapons to be reduced; that is, those weapons in which the Warsaw Pact countries have an advantage. Intentionally excluded were strike aircraft, combat helicopters, and also the numerical strength of the armed forces, in which the advantage lies on the NATO side.

The Western approach is characterized by an unrealistic inquiry calculated on a reduction of only those weapons in which the Warsaw Pact has superiority. The NATO members refuse to examine strike aircraft and combat helicopters only because they have an advantage in them. In our estimates, NATO surpasses the Warsaw Pact in strike aircraft by a factor of 1.5, combat helicopters by a factor of almost 2, and numbers of troops by almost 100,000 persons.

The Western proposal to divide the entire area from the Atlantic to the Urals into four regions is designed to lead the Warsaw Pact countries to a unilateral weapons reduction and to disrupt their armed forces grouping in Europe, while the grouping of the NATO armed forces virtually will not change. Such an approach does not correspond to the statement of the mandate that the reductions should not exert a negative influence on the security of any state.

The regional approach obviously deserves examination in principle, but on condition that if restrictions will be applied simultaneously—for example, in Central Europe and Southern Europe—then depot weapon stores will also be taken into account. Moreover, all destabilizing weapons should be subject to restrictions—tactical strike aircraft, combat helicopters, tanks, artillery, and BTR's [armored personnel carrier] and also numerical troop strength.

I think that the position of the West needs to be adjusted on the side of bringing it closer to the position of the Warsaw Pact. The main thing that has to be overcome to achieve progress in the negotiation is that the NATO countries should abandon planned attempts to achieve military superiority, recognize what is happening in the world, and take a position of real disarmament.

General Outlines Troop Withdrawal From GDR

LD1704103889 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0940 GMT 17 Apr 89

[Text] Wuensdorf (GDR), 17 Apr (TASS)—"The first military echelon with personnel and military equipment will leave for the motherland strictly according to schedule, on 11 May," Army General Boris Snetkov, commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, told TASS correspondents Yuriy Kornilov and Oleg Moskovskiy in an interview in connection with the upcoming start of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the GDR.

"In addition to a tank division stationed in the town of Jueterbog and the first to start the movement—the general commented—another tank division located in the town of Vogelsang, as well as individual tank training regiments, assault-landing and assault-crossing units with weapons and military equipment, will also be withdrawn from the territory of the GDR and disbanded [rasformirovany] in the USSR by 15 August. Tactical nuclear systems will be dispatched to the Soviet Union. As we see, we are unilaterally withdrawing from the GDR chiefly our offensive weapons."

"There will be considerable changes in the structure of the other Soviet divisions which remain in the GDR," the general stressed. "As a result of redesignation [pereformirovaniye], they will acquire a qualitatively new, defensive structure. Thus, individual tank regiments will be turned into motor-rifle regiments. In the divisions of the new organization, instead of tanks, there will be an increase in the number of antitank weapons, means of setting up obstacles and laying minefields, and engineering equipment for camouflaging positions. In other words, with a purely defensive function."

"Measures are being taken on cadre questions. A proportion of officers whose period of service has expired will be discharged from the army into the reserve according to the set procedure. The rest will receive assignments to continue their service in domestic military districts," General Snetkov went on.

"By the middle of August, more than 10,000 personnel, about 1,000 tanks, about 330 artillery pieces and mortars, and about 5,000 motor vehicles will have been withdrawn from the territory of the GDR. The disbanding of divisions will take place in Krivoy Rog in the Ukraine. In the future all the tanks will be sent beyond the Urals. Some of them will be mothballed, and others will be used in the national economy after modifications," General Snetkov said in conclusion.

Vienna Delegates Hold News Conference

18070582 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 13, 1-7 Apr 89 p 3

["At the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Center"]

[Text] The Soviet delegation to the Vienna negotiations held a news conference in the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs press center on 29 March. Participants were Ambassador O. Grinevskiy, who headed the delegation, Major General V. Tatarnikov, and Doctor of Historical Sciences A. Vasiliyev, department head at the Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

[Correspondent] Is the fact taken into consideration at the negotiations that enormous stocks of weapons are being accumulated in other regions of the planet—Asia and Africa? While the USSR supports reductions and destroys its weapons, the Western countries are transferring them to other states. How would you comment on this?

[O. Grinevskiy] This question is within our field of view. There is a whole series of agreements proposed by the USSR that concerns the creation of a security system in Asia, the Far East, the Near East, and other regions.

[Correspondent] Aircraft and helicopters are a powerful type of offensive weapon. How does the American side explain why it does not desire to look into aviation at these negotiations?

[V. Tatarnikov] Actually, member states of the Warsaw Pact convincingly showed at the negotiations what strike aviation represents. If the power of one gun is taken as a unit then, correspondingly, a tank constitutes 4-5 such units; a helicopter, 6-9 units; and a strike aircraft, 10-12 units. On the whole, representatives of NATO countries declared that they will consider aviation at the negotiations, and this is a change for the better.

[Correspondent] One highly placed American diplomat declared that if the USSR carries out a reduction in weapons, then even in this case there will be a balance in favor of the Warsaw Pact. Is this so?

[V. Tatarnikov] As far as is known from published data, the numerical strengths of the force groupings in Europe are now approximately equal. We decided on a unilateral reduction of 500,000 persons. This step was taken so that the dialogue would start. It would be incorrect to say that after this the Warsaw Pact would surpass NATO. The data that the NATO countries produced (in their own announcement, and not for negotiations) is not entirely accurate and was sometimes used for propaganda purposes. We are once again exchanging more accurate data at the negotiating table.

Physicist Views Decision on Uranium Production

LD1804202589 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] During a recent visit to the United Kingdom, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev announced that a decision had been made in our country to stop the production this year of highly concentrated uranium used for military purposes. In addition to shutting down the industrial reactor that manufactures plutonium for military purposes it is planned to shut down another two reactors this year and next year. It was also announced that the USSR would not commission new capacities to replace them. The Soviet proposals have provoked lively reaction throughout the world. Our correspondent Andrey Sontsov talks with well-known scientists Academician Vitaliy Iosifovich Goldanskiy about the significance of these proposals.

[Begin recording] [Sontsov] The new Soviet initiatives have been proposed as part of the attempts to lessen nuclear danger. What is their main feature?

[Goldanskiy] It is of course a very important step in the right direction. Ending the production of fissile nuclear substances is one of the most important issues that the international scientific community considers it must deal with in the coming years. This includes the isotope of uranium, uranium-235, and plutonium. I want to stress that this does not yet mean liquidation but the ending of the arms race. However, before one can turn back, one must first stop. Such steps are aimed at ending the arms race.

In my opinion the production of plutonium, no matter where it is on this planet, is now a totally senseless process, both in the economic sense and from the military point of view, because plutonium has a life of 24,000 years. This is a physical constant. It is already known that there is enough plutonium stockpiled to create nuclear warheads with a destructive capacity of three tons of explosives per head of the earth's population. This is enough to kill every inhabitant of the planet 10, 20, 100 times over.

I think that the trend toward ceasing the production of fissionable material not only corresponds to public demands but to those of common sense. The proposals made by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev in London refer exactly to the hot spots of contemporary disarmament.

[Sontsov] It is now obvious that there is more than enough nuclear material in the world today. Can the nuclear material already manufactured for military purposes be utilized in the national economy?

[Goldanskiy] There are a number of projects that show how the uranium-235 and plutonium that has been stockpiled can be used for peaceful purposes. This is literally turning swords into ploughshares. It is a question of turning uranium-235 or plutonium into ordinary uranium and thereby enriching the spent uranium to make it fit for use as fuel in nuclear reactors. There is also a variant whereby these isotopes of uranium-235 and plutonium can help make another element, thorium, work to produce nuclear energy. Large quantities of thorium can be found in countries like Brazil and India. This is important for the developing countries' power engineering industries.

[Sontsov] Our unilateral disarmament initiatives are well known. For instance, the USSR's 18-month unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests, the considerable reduction of armed forces and weapons. This is yet another unilateral step.

[Goldanskiy] Each side would like to be both an actor on stage and a spectator in the theater. Obviously a bilateral process is always more effective. Nevertheless, unilateral steps also work for the benefit of mankind because at the end of the day they bear witness to goodwill on the part of the side that has taken the unilateral step.

[Sontsov] The USSR regards as feasible the creation of a safe, nuclear-free world. The path lies through ever greater openness and reliable monitoring. As Comrade

Gorbachev mentioned in London, through strengthening trust the positive reaction of the United States to the USSR proposals would strengthen the overall safety of the world.

[Goldanskiy] These steps must be, and would indeed be, accompanied by a strict mutual monitoring system. This is entirely possible given the combination of scientific and technical resources and political means. This would have a very favorable effect on the international situation and on the creation of international trust.

[Sontsov] Thank you, Vitaliy Iosifovich. In conclusion, I would like to say that as I was preparing this interview, a report was received from Washington that said a group of leading U.S. physicists, including two Nobel Prize winners and several creators of the atomic bomb, called on the Bush administration to postpone the creation of new plants producing fissionable material for nuclear weapons and instead strive to ban their production to keep the arms race in check. This is further confirmation of the importance of feasibility of the Soviet leadership's initiative. As before, the ball is in Washington's court. [end recording]

U.S. Seen Blocking Chemical Arms Convention

PM1804112189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 89 Second Edition p 6

[Aleksandr Lopukhin article under the rubric: "View From Moscow": "Tomorrow May Be Too Late"]

[Text] The ancient Roman saying "Armis bella non venenis geri" ("Fight with weapons, not with poisons") became the practical norm of conduct in the international arena only at the beginning of this century and is already obsolete. The barbarous use of chemical weapons in World War I aroused such a strong protest throughout the world that in 1925 a protocol was signed in Geneva banning the use of chemical and biological weapons. It has now been ratified by almost every country in the world. The Geneva protocol, however, does not ban the production of chemical weapons, which are now possessed by between 10 and 20 countries—there are no precise figures on this score.

At one time chemical weapons seemed to have been forgotten against the background of nuclear weapons, although both types of weapons are means of mass destruction. Furthermore, there is more than enough war gas stockpiled in the world to annihilate mankind. The situation began to change after the 15 January 1986 statement by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which put forward a program for the creation of a nuclear-free world before the end of this century and the elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons.

In recent years our country has taken important steps which have influenced progress in the struggle against the threat of the "silent death": We have ceased the production of chemical weapons, published figures on the size of weapon stocks, and recognized the principles of the all-embracing verification of their elimination.

This year has become an important landmark on the path toward the conclusion of a convention on the complete and universal prohibition of chemical weapons and their destruction. In January Paris staged a conference of states party to the 1925 Geneva protocol on banning the use in war of asphyxiating, toxic, or other similar gases and bacteriological means. The representatives of 149 states did not simply confirm their commitment to the Geneva protocol but also decided to act to ban and eliminate chemical weapons.

Many political commentators are of the opinion that the success of this very important forum was considerably influenced by the new Soviet initiative. In a speech at the Paris conference E.A. Shevardnadze, head of the Soviet delegation, declared the Soviet Union's intention to begin the unilateral elimination of its chemical weapon stocks even before the conclusion of the corresponding international convention. Work on it is being conducted at the disarmament conference in Geneva and, experts believe, it is currently 80-85 percent ready.

However, it would be wrong to overlook the difficulties on this road. They concern primarily the problems of verifying observance of the convention under preparation because modern technology enables chemical weapons to be produced, for example, in buildings which are difficult to distinguish from ordinary apartment blocks on satellite photographs. In addition, Western countries are raising objections regarding the monitoring of private enterprises: If they are open to inspection [inspektsiya], it is claimed, firms' industrial and commercial secrets will become available to their competitors. In that event, it is argued, some firms will suffer as a result, while others will be able to profit.

At the Geneva talks our country has been advocating various methods of verification, including inspections of any site or facility on request with no right of refusal. They must, on the one hand, securely bar the way to the resumption of chemical weapons production but, on the other, also preserve commercial and technological secrets within reasonable limits. It is most important that this problem not be an obstacle to work on a convention on the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

This is just one example showing that the verification problem requires vigorous efforts if it is to be resolved. The initiative here has again been taken by the Soviet Union, which proposed last year an international experiment to test the systematic verification procedures at chemical enterprises. The United States, Britain, the FRG, Italy, Sweden, the GDR, and other countries agreed to take part in the experiment. In the first stage countries conduct the experiment at national level. The Soviet Union completed its part of the experiment last

December at the "Sintez" production association in Dzerzhinsk city, Gorkiy Oblast. In the next stage experts from various countries exchange the results of those experiments within the framework of the disarmament conference, and this could hasten the day when a convention is concluded.

A reliable verification system is also necessary to overcome the distrust and suspicion which have existed since the days of the cold war. The Soviet Union, following the principle of glasnost, has declared the size of its chemical weapon stocks—50,000 tonnes of war gas. Recently, however, "intelligence sources" have been cited as the basis for disinformation that the USSR has stocks of chemical weapons almost six times larger than announced. The source of this "information" is not known. The Soviet Union has stated with the utmost responsibility that its chemical weapon stocks do not exceed 50,000 tonnes. The "concern" being shown by certain military and political figures in a number of NATO countries should be addressed not to the USSR but in the opposite direction—to the United States, which has still not declared its stocks of chemical weapons. According to various estimates, these range from 100,000 to 300,000 tonnes. It is hard to avoid the impression that the disinformation on the Soviet chemical weapon stocks is a deliberate attempt to create distrust of our policy and conceal the U.S. reluctance to disclose statistics on the size of its own chemical arsenal.

Of course, it is possible to find the truth and overcome the differences of opinion. There is a tried and tested method for that: glasnost, verification, and trust. Why don't all the countries exchange the necessary statistics, provide an opportunity to monitor them, and then begin to eliminate this lethal weaponry? Indeed, that is why work is being conducted on a convention on the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. However, this work may also begin before the conclusion of a convention.

The main obstacle to the signing of such a convention is the Pentagon's program for the production of the very latest types of chemical weapons. The production of binary weapons filled with a lethal colorless and odorless mixture has been continuing at the Pine Bluff (Arkansas) plant for almost 18 months. The mixture is formed by combining two chemical components which, on their own, are relatively harmless. It is this very factor which the Pentagon publicizes when claiming that binary charges are safe to store. The United States is planning to produce within 10 years 1 million binary munitions costing $3 billion. The U.S. military's intention to create a chemical superweapon— "penetrating" war gases capable of piercing gas masks and other protective filter systems—also poses the threat of a new spiral in the arms race. More than $30 million has been allocated for this research in the United States in 1990-1991.

True, the United States is promising to destroy its chemical weapons after signing the convention. But why then spend vast sums to produce these weapons if they are going to be scrapped in 1-2 years? It all seems somewhat illogical and is clearly due to the fact there are different views on this problem in both the United States and NATO.

The most unlikely attempts are being made to square the Pentagon's appetite with, for example, the Washington administration's repeated statements on its desire to scrap chemical weapons for good. For instance, Colonel Richard Smith, commander of the Pine Bluff military installation, said recently that binary weapon production is "necessary to keep the pressure on the Soviet Union so as to achieve a ban on chemical weapons." No words will convince people who use logic like that. Clearly, this is a question not of facts but of political convictions mingled with the cult of strength.

Times have changed now, however. The realization by people throughout the world of the danger of chemical weapons is becoming a powerful factor in politics. As a result of the efforts of many countries—the Soviet Union first and foremost—a completely new situation is coming about in the world community and more favorable conditions are being created for resolving one of the fundamental questions—ridding mankind of this brutal means of mass murder. This must be done today. Tomorrow may be too late....

States Call for Ban on Nuclear Tests

*PM1104110989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
11 Apr 89 Second Edition p 5*

[Article by Vitaliy Korionov under the rubric "Viewpoint": "By Everyone, Everywhere, and Forever"]

[Text] The UN secretary general has received a proposal which attests once again to the determination of the peace-loving states and peoples to accelerate the solution of a burning problem of the present day—the elimination of the threat of nuclear war.

It is a case of the letter sent to Perez de Cuellar by the permanent UN representatives of Mexico, Indonesia, Venezuela, Peru, Sri Lanka, and Yugoslavia. They inform him that the 40 states which signed the 1963 Treaty on Banning Nuclear Weapons Test in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water are making a joint request that in accordance with the text of that document, a conference be held to help transform it into a treaty on the all-encompassing prohibition of nuclear tests. The proposal of these countries was actively supported at a news conference in New York by the international "Parliamentarians for Global Actions" organization, which noted that this action would introduce a multilateral component to the bilateral process of disarmament and talks between the USSR and the United States. Addressing the news conference, Alfonso Garcia Robles from Mexico, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, said: The fact that 40 states have already associated themselves with this demand expresses the will of all mankind for the ending of nuclear tests "by everyone, everywhere, and forever."

The reason for the peace-loving forces' concern is obvious. Over 25 years have elapsed since 5 August 1963, when the Soviet Union, the United States, and Britain concluded the Moscow treaty on banning nuclear weapons tests in three environments (the atmosphere, outer space, and under water). A further 114 full members have acceded to it and another 14 states have signed the treaty but not yet ratified it. In August last year a joint Soviet-U.S. experiment was held in Nevada whose aim was to develop more sophisticated methods of monitoring the calculation of the yield of underground nuclear explosions. That experiment, like the tests in September of the same year at the testing range in the region of Semipalatinsk, showed that the countries now have a reliable system of monitoring the yield of nuclear explosions. This convincingly showed the unsoundness of one of the main arguments of the supporters of nuclear weapons, who claimed it was possible to conduct underground tests secretly.

One U.S. specialist once called these tests "an insult to the earth." And with reason. After all, every nuclear explosion is a blow to the planet and to the economic and ecological situation on it. Nonetheless, certain NATO circles are continuing to pray to the nuclear deity, calling nuclear weapons a "means of deterrence," although it is high time we spoke of deterring nuclear weapons themselves. Moreover, a few months before leaving the White House R. Reagan sent Congress a report setting forth the administration's position on the question of nuclear tests, which announced: "We do not view nuclear tests as an evil which should be reduced."

That was a kind of "blessing" to continue to improve nuclear weapons, because that is precisely the aim served by tests of these weapons. And indeed, from the depths of the U.S. Department of Energy, which is in charge of the production of nuclear weapons, there soon came a "leak" of information about the content of a secret document, called "Report 2010." The document is a plan for the further buildup of U.S. nuclear weapons which provides in particular for the installation on the territory of the national laboratory in Idaho of new reactors designed to produce tritium—an important component used in nuclear munitions.

Yet another road has opened up before mankind. The treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, symbolizing the realistic nature of the Soviet program for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons by the start of the new millenium, has become a reality. Speaking at the Guildhall, M.S. Gorbachev announced the decision made by the Soviet leadership to end as early as this year the production of highly enriched uranium for military purposes. In addition to the industrial reactor for the production of weapons-grade plutonium which was closed in 1987, it is planned this year and next to close down a further two such reactors and not to commission new capacities to replace them.

The peace-loving forces' call to remove the nuclear threat from mankind is being heard increasingly loudly on the planet. The ending of all nuclear tests can and must become one more step toward this cherished goal.

Briefings Held at Foreign Ministry

Statement on Lebanon

LD1804151189 Moscow TASS in English 1405 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—The Soviet Union is deeply concerned about the situation in Lebanon and calls on all parties concerned, most notably Lebanese ones, to do everything in their power to restore peace and calm to the long-suffering Arab country, Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuriy Gremitskikh said in a formal statement today.

Delivering it at a news briefing here, he added that the USSR, for its part, will continue actively facilitating this.

Gremitskikh, first deputy chief of the Foreign Ministry's Information Directorate, noted the continuing aggravation of the situation in Lebanon and fierce fighting involving heavy weapons there, despite international appeals for a ceasefire and despite peace-making efforts by the Arab League's committee on Lebanon.

As artillery and rocket barrages are directed at civilian facilities and residential areas, the civilian toll is increasing. The Spanish ambassador in Beirut is among those recently killed.

The latest outbreak of fighting, the Soviet spokesman continued, has graphically underlined the danger of the Lebanese crisis remaining unsettled.

Lebanon's destiny as a non-aligned, sovereign and territorially integral Arab state is at stake, he said.

The continued exacerbation of the situation there may have serious implications for the situation in the Middle East as a whole and so efforts should be directed at ensuring peaceful dialogue in the name of national accord based on a balance of interests, Gremitskikh said.

He added that an immediate end to bloodletting is needed as a first step out of the crisis.

The Soviet Union believes that the formula suggested by the Arab League's committee offers a good chance and that passing it up would be unpardonable, the spokesman went on.

He said that the only things needed are reason and political maturity.

This, Gremitskikh stressed, would certainly pave the way to mutually acceptable compromises and to a solution to the Lebanese problem in general.

Baker Statement on Ties Noted

LD1904101389 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0715 GMT 19 Apr 89

[Text] Moscow, 19 Apr (TASS)—Attention has been focused in the USSR on the speech made by U.S. Secretary of State James Baker during the annual meeting of the U.S. Newspaper Editors Society, which touched on the conceptual problems of world development at present, including the questions of U.S. relations with the USSR.

The USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman today told a TASS diplomatic correspondent that attention has been focused in the USSR in particular on the part of the secretary of state's speech which contains a confirmation of the U.S. Administration's intention to facilitate a further improvement of East-West mutual relations, and which also stated that Washington perceived as positive the concept of the new thinking submitted by the USSR in foreign and defense policy.

Taking into account the Soviet appraisals of the development of world policy and Soviet-U.S. relations, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman stated, what James Baker said appears to be conducive for creating a foundation for fruitful Soviet-U.S. dialogue in Moscow during the U.S. secretary of state's visit to the Soviet capital 10-11 May.

It is impossible not to note here that James Baker's speech had to have recourse to tendentious appraisals of Soviet policies in East Europe, Central America, and other regions, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman stressed.

"Apparently it is the relapses into the old way of thinking and a certain fierce competition of views within the U.S. establishment that are making themselves felt," he said. "One would like to hope that the process of reviewing foreign policy priorities, which, according to the administration's spokesmen, is close to completion, will lead to balanced and realistic conclusions on the whole spectrum of questions of Soviet-U.S. relations and world policy."

Article on 'Special Troops' Decried

LD1904095589 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0615 GMT 19 Apr 89

[Text] Moscow, 19 Apr (TASS)—A spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry termed an article in the April issue of the Austrian journal WIENER about certain "USSR special-purpose troops" a "crude and provocative concoction."

The absurd speculation contained in the article, he noted during a conversation with a TASS diplomatic correspondent today, clearly pursues the aim of distorting the

USSR's foreign policy course, in Europe in particular, and of damaging the friendly Soviet-Austrian relations, making the work of Soviet missions in Austria more difficult.

The article contains allegations that the USSR relies on international terrorism and that it has formed some sort of "special troops" for these purposes. The role of the command center in charge of the operations by these "troops" in Austria is ascribed to the Soviet representatives in Vienna.

Publications such as this one, the USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman noted, are not in keeping with the spirit of the times. He stated that the USSR Embassy in Austria delivered to that country's Foreign Ministry a resolute protest in connection with the WIENER article. The Soviet side expects that the mendacious report will be duly denied by the Austrian authorities and that they will take all the measures to prevent similar actions unfriendly to the USSR from taking place in the future.

UN 'Concern' on Afghanistan Shared

LD1904074789 Moscow TASS in English 0701 GMT 19 Apr 89

[Text] Moscow April 19 TASS—A special statement made by United Nations Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar in connection with the first anniversary of the signing of the Geneva agreements on Afghanistan has been positively regarded in Moscow, a spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry told a TASS diplomatic correspondent today.

Having reaffirmed the U.N. stand in favour of a political settlement of the Afghan problem, the U.N. secretary-general expressed confidence, the spokesman went on to say, that all parties to the Geneva agreements would abide by the letter and spirit of the accords and implement them in good faith in the interests of the entire Afghan people and for the benefit of peace in the region.

The USSR Foreign Ministry spokesman pointed out that the Soviet Union shared the serious concern expressed by Perez de Cuellar over the escalation of military action in Afghanistan and regarded as quite timely his call to all the parties to the Geneva accords as well as to the guarantor countries to ensure an efficient and honest fulfilment of all obligations arising from the documents.

One cannot but welcome the need, emphasized by the U.N. secretary-general, for complete enactment of the mandate of the U.N. Good Offices Mission for Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) within the time frame defined by the Geneva accords, the spokesman said.

The call by the U.N. secretary-general to all Afghans to put an end to the people's suffering and to direct their efforts to the formation of a broad-based government through an inter-Afghan dialogue meets the interests of ending bloodshed in Afghanistan at an earliest date.

It appears, the spokesman for the USSR Foreign Ministry said in conclusion, that the U.N. secretary-general's statement, just as the continuing discussion in the U.N. Security Council of Afghanistan's complaint about Pakistan's interference in its internal affairs show in all obviousness that the United Nations organisation is called upon to play an important role in a settlement of the Afghanistan situation, thereby displaying humanism and concern for the destiny of the people of Afghanistan.

Gerasimov on NATO Arms Modernization, Georgia

PM1804102689 London ITV Television Network in English 1800 GMT 17 Apr 89

[Interview with Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov by anchorman Nicholas Owen in London on 17 April; monitored in progress in the framework of Channel 4 "News"—recorded]

[Text] [Owen] In just over an hour's time, the foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, will meet President Bush in Washington. One of the issues likely to be high on their agenda is the modernization of NATO's short-range nuclear missiles in Europe and the opposition the move faces in West Germany.

Earlier today, Sir Geoffrey criticized President Gorbachev for saying that modernization could undermine recent improvements in East-West relations, saying it was an example of "old-style" Soviet policymaking. A short time ago I discussed this matter and some of the pressing domestic issues facing Mr Gorbachev with Gennadiy Gerasimov, the chief Soviet spokesman, who is visiting London.

First, I asked him how the Soviet Union viewed NATO's proposed missile modernization.

[Gerasimov] Well, as I understand the situation, it must be the united NATO position, so it's your debates, your quarrels, your arguments, and you must settle it—it's not us. But our position is clear: We must decide if we want disarmament or if we want additional armament, and I guess we want—all of us—disarmament. So why should we invent additional nuclear systems and introduce them into Europe when we are talking about reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe?

[Owen] Can we turn now to the matter of Georgia, which has been occupying you since Mr Gorbachev got back to Moscow?

[Gerasimov, interrupting] The whole week—the whole last week.

[Owen] I saw that you said it would be—referring to the troubles reported from there—you said: It will be a great tragedy if perestroyka capsized on the reefs of nationalism. Do you think there is a serious danger of that?

[Gerasimov] Well, first of all, these are old issues, old problems, which are inherited by the current leadership—that's point number one. Point number two, I should say, is that we must study, learn democracy. Our overall political culture is not up to the level of the events, so when people have this freedom, they misuse it: They don't understand that freedom comes with responsibility; they misuse it—what happened in Georgia.

[Owen] But the overreaction by the authorities in Georgia?

[Gerasimov] The overreaction was also there, and the authorities, they accepted the blame, and the secretary of the party of Georgia stepped down; the prime minister stepped down; and the president stepped down—so they all accepted their responsibility.

[Owen] Do you think the trouble in Georgia, the crisis in Georgia, may be passing now?

[Gerasimov] Yes, it is passing, it is passing; and Shevardnadze, he made an interesting speech on Friday, explaining the whole thing: that it was a mistake on the part of the leadership. Actually, the commander of the army, the general there, was against it, so he advised against using troops, but he was outvoted, so to say, so he got his order, and he sent his troops. I think everything is going to be cleared now.

[Owen] Finally, are you confident that this same sort of problem is not going to arise elsewhere? There have been some reports in Western newspapers at the weekend that feelings are running rather high in the Ukraine.

[Gerasimov] I don't know, but of course the danger is always there because of two reasons: One reason is: A lot of problems were put under the rug and now the rug is moved, so to say; and second, we really do not know how to use our freedom with responsibility sometimes.

[Owen] Gennady Gerasimov, the chief Soviet spokesman.

Ryzhkov Meets With UN Secretary General

LD1804192689 Moscow TASS in English 1917 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] Luxembourg April 18 TASS—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, who has arrived in Luxembourg to attend celebrations of the 150th anniversary of the country's independence, met U.N. Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar Tuesday.

The U.N. role in settling regional conflicts and ensuring strict compliance with agreements concluded under the U.N. aegis to politically solve acute international problems, was emphasised.

The sides discussed ways to normalise the situation in Afghanistan and Lebanon and Iraqi-Iranian relations.

Ryzhkov assured the U.N. secretary general that the Soviet Union will continue doing its best for the success of U.N. peace-making efforts.

Observer Views UN Role in Afghanistan

LD1804181389 Moscow TASS in English 1741 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—By TASS political observer Askold Biryukov:

The U.N. Security Council has resumed the discussion of the Afghanistan-related situation which has perceptibly deteriorated of late because of the growing interference from the outside in the internal affairs of that country. The discussion is taking place against the background of the growing demands of the world public that the United Nations Organisation take measures for ensuring the strict observance of the Geneva accords on Afghanistan by all the signatories.

The USSR and the Republic of Afghanistan have fully met their commitments on the Geneva accords, while the United States and Pakistan are openly disregarding their obligations. Weapons, military hardware and detachments of the "irreconcilable" opposition are smuggled from Pakistan to Afghanistan. The "irreconcilable" are trying to capture at least one administrative centre in Afghanistan in order to create there a so-called "transitional government" with the help of Pakistani secret services. Pakistani Army units are taking part in combat operations on the side of the rebels more and more often, and Pakistani career officers act as their commanders. Washington, which seems to have forgotten that it is one of the guarantors of the Geneva accords, is also encouraging the "irreconcilable" opposition to fight "till winning a victory" and overthrowing the legitimate government of Kabul.

Perhaps, this is the reason for a stubborn resistance of the U.S. State Department to the convocation of the U.N. Security Council for discussing gross violations of the Geneva accords by Pakistan and the present attempts to remove this item from the agenda. According to Thomas Pickering, U.S. permanent representative at the United Nations Organisation, the U.S. does not believe that the Security Council can or should play now a more significant part in Afghanistan. So, in his opinion, when the Soviet Union was meeting its commitments under the Geneva accords and withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan, the U.N. was to play this part, while today when the point at issue is the fulfilment of their commitments by the U.S. and Pakistan, or, to be more exact, their gross violation of those commitments, the U.N. and the Security Council should overlook it.

This double standard with regard to the fulfilment of international argeements is inadmissible to the world community. Agreements must be fulfilled, otherwise the world will be dominated by arbitrariness and chaos. This is exactly what the "irreconcilables" are bringing to Afghanistan—utter lawlessness, repressions, massive bloodshed and destruction.

The settlement of the Afghan conflict is a kind of a touchstone for the world community, because people saw in it a precedent for the solution of many regional conflicts worsening the international situation. If the world community finds a way to settling it, people's hopes for the triumph of political methods in the solution of acute regional and international problems will be consolidated. If it fails to do so, these hopes will be undermined with all the serious consequences stemming from it.

Further Reportage on Submarine Accident

Chronology of Sinking

18010566 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 15, 15-21 Apr 89 p 7

[Report compiled by P. Lukyanchenko and Yu. Sigov on the basis of Soviet and foreign publications: "Details Reported"]

[Text] As has already been reported, on 7 April, in the neutral waters of the Sea of Norway, 180 km southwest of the Medvezhiy Island and 490 km off the Norwegian coast, a Soviet torpedo submarine with nuclear power equipment sank. Out of the 69 members of the crew, 27 were saved. This submarine was accepted for service with the Soviet Navy in 1983 and was the only vessel in its series. Missiles and several torpedoes, two of which had nuclear warheads, were carried on board the submarine.

Let us recall the course of events.

11:02 (Moscow time)—fire broke out in the seventh, and subsequently the sixth bay of the submarine. General quarters was sounded. Commander of the vessel Captain First Rank Ye. Vanin reported this to the headquarters of the Northern Fleet. Aircraft were scrambled, and the fastest vessels of the USSR Navy were dispatched to the area of the accident, including the *Kirov* missile cruiser. The hydrographic ship *Kolguyev* and the auxiliary vessel *Aleksey Khlobystov* proceeded from nearby areas in order to render help.

12:25—the submarine began to transmit coded distress signals which could not be picked up by the Norwegian rescue services.

17:00—the Orion reconnaissance aircraft from the base of the Norwegian Air Force at Ando was ordered to the area of Medvezhiy Island to clarify the situation.

17:15—the submarine sank at a depth of about 1,500 meters. The crew, except for the four persons who were killed by the fire, ended up in the water with a temperature of plus 2 ° [centigrade].

17:30—Norwegian Minister of Defense J. J. Holst received information about the fire on the Soviet submarine through his own military channels.

17:50—the Orion arrived in the accident area where it found a life raft with people clinging to it, and two lifeless bodies 100 meters away from it.

18:20—30 sailors who were alive were taken aboard the auxiliary ship *Aleksey Khlobystov*. Three of them died on the way to Severomorsk.

23:30—Norwegian journalists approached the Institute of Radiation Hygiene in Oslo with a request to take samples of water in order to detect radiation in the accident area.

24:00—the American TV company CNN broadcast a report about the event filed by its Pentagon correspondent.

On 8 April at 11:41, TASS reported the accident for the first time.

As USSR Minister of Defense D. T. Yazov stated, the submariners displayed "courage in an effort to rescue their vessel."

However, had everything possible been done to rescue the sailors? Why did the Soviet submarine transmit coded rather than international distress signals? Why did we not approach the Norwegian authorities for help after finding out what was happening? After all, an intergovernmental agreement on rendering assistance to the citizens of the two countries who find themselves in an extreme situation at sea has been in effect for a long time. In light of this, one wonders what the purpose is of the special rescue headquarters in Bodo (Norway) and Murmansk. Why did the headquarters at Bodo learn about what was happening as late as 12 hours after the fire broke out, and 6 and ½ hours after the submarine sank? After all, help could have arrived in as little as 1 and ½ to 2 hours, and casualties among the submariners could have been minimal. As the official press spokesman of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs S. Romundset communicated to us from Oslo, on 11 April the Storting (parliament) discussed the actions of the Norwegian minister of defense who had shown passivity in the situation which emerged.

Survivors Interviewed at Hospital

18010561 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Apr 89 First Edition p 4

[Article by Captain Third Rank P. Intsenko: "Severomorsk. The Military Hospital"]

[Text] I have lived in Severomorsk for many years, and I do not recall another time when the control and check point of the fleet's main naval hospital was under such strict measures: One can enter now only with special permission.

"The strict checkpoint procedures were established exclusively in the interests of the health of the crew members of the sunken submarine who were delivered there," explained the chief of the hospital, Colonel of the medical service N. Serikov, "especially taking into account the increased attention the public and journalists are paying to the rescued submarine crew members. What they need most of all now is rest."

Hardly anyone would say that this is not a good reason for imposing the restrictions on meeting with the patients—this is what the rescued submarine crew members are now called. Incidentally, there are no restrictions for their relatives who are continuing to arrive in Severomorsk.

"For now nobody is regulating their meetings with them," said the hospital's deputy chief for political affairs, Captain First Rank V. Korsanov. "After all, that is also medicine."

Yes, and it is medicine not only for those who were rescued but also for their wives, children, and parents. Who knows how many hearts in our country started beating fast when they heard the TASS report on the destruction of the submarine. Perhaps only after embracing her husband, son, or brother can a woman finally believe that the worst has not happened to him. As Olga, the wife of Lieutenant Captain V. Gregulev, believed it after meeting with him in the ward.

Most of the relatives are expected to arrive on 11 April. In order not to return to this I shall say now that the Northern Fleet command has already made arrangements for their food and housing and taken care of other questions related to their stay in Severomorsk. Many of the submarine crew members were able to telephone home directly from the hospital as soon as they had changed out of their RB (special clothing worn on nuclear submarines) and replaced them with hospital robes. Dispatching of telegrams was organized for those whose friends and relatives do not have telephones.

The surviving submarine crew members were brought to the hospital in the uniform issued to them on the nuclear cruiser *Kirov* when being transported to the main base. Their own clothing along with their personal things went down with the submarine. But what are earthly difficulties compared to single combat in the ocean!

"The submarine crew members submitted an order for necessities and we filled it immediately," I was told by the deputy chief of the fleet trade administration of the political unit, Capt First Rank V. Zhukov, whom I met in the hospital. "Moreover, the consumer service combine is sewing new uniforms for all of them under a rush order. All the necessary minor things are being sold directly in the division."

And now about the main thing. How do the rescued submarine crew members feel, what is the condition of their health? Actually, from what has been said one can conclude without much difficulty that there is no reason for concern or alarm. But the best thing is to let the doctors have their say.

In the office of the hospital chief are the chief of the Navy Medical Service, Maj Gen of the medical service V. Zheglov; the head therapist of the USSR Ministry of Defense, Maj Gen of the medical service V. Ivashkin; the chiefs of the hospital departments, and other medical experts. I asked them a couple of questions: Were there any changes in the condition of the two submarine crew members who were previously classified as "serious"?

"The condition of Senior Lieutenant S. Bogdanov and Warrant Officer E. Kononov has improved," answered the hospital's head therapist, Lt Col of the medical service V. Kovalev. "They are in the intensive care section and individual medical posts have been set up next to them."

Having made sure that the rescued submarine crew members who had suffered the most were getting better, I was interested in what specific therapeutic measures had already been taken in the hospital. Doctor of Medical Sciences, Professor, Major General of the medical service Ivashkin:

"The patients have been given comprehensive treatment. After a careful examination each was diagnosed; as a rule the diagnosis was general hypothermia and asthenoneurotic syndrome to one degree or another. The condition of the patients is constantly monitored and the treatment is altered if necessary. After recovery they will all undergo sanitarium-health resort treatment, and those who are married will take their families with them."

The head therapist of the USSR Ministry of Defense also mentioned the hard, effective work on the part of all the hospital's medical personnel, especially the psychiatrist of the medical service Col V. Kon and the group of specialists from the Military Medical Academy imeni S. M. Kirov. For my own part I can say that the junior medical personnel and the nurses spared no efforts either. They did not go home even after their shift was over; they continued to work, understanding how necessary each pair of hands was at that time.

"How do you rate the quality of the first aid rendered to the survivors on the floating base Aleksey Khlobystov and the nuclear atomic cruiser *Kirov*?" I asked Maj Gen of the medical service Ivashkin. "How do you explain the sudden death on board the floating base of three of the thirty crew members who were brought out of the water?"

"There should be nothing unclear here: The physicians of the ship and cruiser acted correctly and in keeping with established methods," he answered. "But one rarely encounters this kind of pathology, general hypothermia, especially on such a large scale. World medicine does not have extensive experience in rendering aid in such cases. One must also take into account that the submarine crew members had undergone the most severe nervous-psychological and physical strain and were in a condition of deep stress. Thus early and late complications were possible. As regards the actions of the medical workers on the *Kirov*, they, headed by Maj of the medical service A. Chudakov, also did everything necessary to prevent possible complications.

Members of a government commission had visited the hospital's special department the night before. They were interested in how the submarine crew members were feeling and listened to their requests and wishes, many of which had already been satisfied.

But the physicians discussed not only the histories of the illnesses but also the course of the treatment. Having forgotten for a moment their professional impassivity, they truly admired the courage and the best human qualities manifested by their subordinates in the struggle to save the submarine. For instance, the action of the secretary of the ship party organization Capt Lt I. Kalinin who, because of physical exhaustion was unable to climb up the ladder to the navigating bridge of the sunken submarine, thrust his party card up: "Keep this safe...." But his comrades helped him and he survived.

Of course I would like very much to hear all this first hand, as it were. And I was granted this opportunity, first having been instructed as to which questions could not be asked so as not to cause a worsening of the patients' condition. The time for conversation was extremely limited—because of these same considerations.

The quiet hour had just ended in the special department and the submarine crew members looked gloomy. Only a couple of days ago they had looked into the eyes of death and had seen people perish with whom they had come to feel like a unified whole, a crew. I hastened to ask what was essentially my only question: How did they conduct themselves, their comrades both living and dead? And here it was as though they were frozen on the spot.

Capt First Rank B. Kolyada, deputy commander of the submarine unit, the senior man on board the sunken ship:

"Up until the very end the actions of the personnel were skillfully led by the ship commander Capt First Rank Yevgeniy Vanin. Having already climbed up out of the sinking ship, he went back down into the deck hatch to make sure that nobody who was capable of coming up was left down there. Having performed his duty as commander, he was unable to return—he perished along with the ship."

Seaman Yuriy Kozlov, carefully holding his burned hand in front of him in the sling:

"All my life I shall remember Capt Lt Dvorov who led the battle for survival in our compartment. When it became clear that the fire could not be put out and we had to abandon the compartment it was discovered that the door between the bulkheads was jammed shut. The situation was tragic. A. Dvorov was still able to find a way out."

Sitting nearby was Capt Lt Sergey Dvorov himself. Unable to reach the compartment of which he was in charge when the alarm sounded (the door between the bulkheads was already jammed), the officer took over leadership of the struggle for survival in the neighboring compartment. When this compartment had to be abandoned, risking his life, he returned and took two more people out of the smoke and fire, after which he lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness he got his breath on the bridge and returned to the compartment where the emergency was.

The submarine crew members continued their rescue work and mutual assistance even in the decisive moments. During the evacuation there was no panic and they supported one another in the icy water. Later, when they had lost their strength, they started singing "Varyaga"—warming and cheering themselves with a song of their ancestors.

Stretch your imagination and picture this tragic scene: the stormy sea, the waves pouring over the life raft, and the numb people in it. Except for the song, there was nothing left with which they could sustain themselves.

In a conversation with me Captain First Rank Kolyada, wanting to clarify the name of one of the crew members, took out of his pocket a piece of paper that had been folded in fourths and unfolded it. I understood that this was a list of personnel on the submarine. There were certain marks next to the names. Having noticed my questioning gaze, Boris Grigoryevich let it drop:

"We used this list on the raft to record the living and the dead...."

When leaving the hospital I learned that residents of Severomorsk were constantly telephoning here offering their assistance free of charge in caring for the rescued crew members and that representatives of the women's council of navy ships and units were sending them communications, trying to give them support and cheer them up.

During these days I heard repeatedly: Is there any need to write anything at all about the survivors when so many sailors died? I am convinced that it is necessary. Not only because life goes on—let this not sound disrespectful to the memory of those who died. The people have experienced an immense trauma; in essence they were born again. We must support them, give their due to the medical workers who returned them to vigorous life and to all who participated in the rescue of the crew. The discussion of the dead, a difficult and sad discussion, remains for the future.

'Observers Roundtable' on Gorbachev Visits

LD1604154789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 16 Apr 89

["International Observers Roundtable" program with Vitaliy Ivanovich Kobysh, IZVESTIYA political observer; Nikolay Shishlin, international affairs correspondent; and chaired by Igor Pavlovich Charikov, all-union radio commentator]

[Text] [Charikov] Hello, esteemed comrades. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's two trips abroad in the first half of this month, to Cuba and the United Kingdom, continue to attract the close attention of the world public. It's not just a matter of the substance of the meetings and talks, although this are, of course, very important; nor of the documents that were signed. There is an active process of establishing the new political thinking in practicing relations between states. And it is our country that is probably making the most tangible contribution in this sense at the present time. Well, not only our country, but the other socialist states too.

A good deal has been written and said, both here and abroad, about the results of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's trip to Cuba and London; yet there is some point in returning once again to this topic, because events which are developing around the pivotal issues of international relations show their growing urgency and relevance. As for Soviet-Cuban relations, their prospects and state can be judged by the atmosphere in which the visit took place—it was indeed an exceedingly warm and friendly atmosphere—and by the clearly expressed willingness of both countries to develop their mutual relations in qualitatively new and more effective forms and directions, as enshrined in the treaty of friendship and cooperation signed in Havana. As far as the London visit is concerned, here I invite you, Nikolay Vladimirovich, to take over from me and continue the conversation.

[Shishlin] I think that it's worth saying a few more words about the Havana visit, inasmuch as the direction of this work—relations with the socialist countries—has been and remains a priority for Soviet foreign policy. Regarding relations with socialist Cuba, they are naturally surrounded with a certain special revolutionary romanticism; pure, sincere, and deep relations. But what is important is not the accumulation of these emotional epithets, but the substance of the relations. They really are a true example of equal relations between two states living in different conditions and solving similar, but not identical tasks, and of thinking differently at times, as is natural, yet in the most important matters speaking the same language and following essentially the same route: a route determined by the historical and political circumstances of each country, a route inspired by socialist ideals. From this viewpoint it seems to me that the Cuban visit brings Soviet-Cuban relations to a qualitatively new level. Not just because of the treaty which has been signed, but because of the depth of mutual understanding. We can say now that Soviet-Cuban relations are free from unstated elements of any kind, free from any shadow of insufficient understanding of each other's conditions, character, or way of doing things. What the visit has done, really, is to lay a foundation for building up the potential of Soviet-Cuban cooperation. Vitaliy Ivanovich can tell us a lot in this respect, because he was actually in Havana in December when the visit was to take place, but the Soviet delegation had to return home urgently because of the earthquake in Armenia.

[Kobysh] Yes. I get the impression that we've strayed somewhat from the scenario of our broadcast, but perhaps that's a good thing. It's good to talk naturally. Since that's where our conversation has led, let's start with Cuba. Not only was I in Cuba, but I stood at the airport for 2 days with Fidel Castro and the other Soviet and Cuban comrades, seeing off the Cuban planes carrying volunteer rescue workers, doctors and nurses, food and medical supplies and two-thirds of the entire strategic stock of plasma, including a personal contribution of blood from Fidel Castro—because the first thing he did when he heard of the earthquake was to go to the donors center and give blood. I think that was the most convincing answer to all the speculation that tensions of some sort had arisen between Cuba and the USSR. Western propaganda is making much of this at present: that Cuba supposedly disapproves of restructuring and so forth. On this score Comrade Castro said very clearly in his speech during Comrade Gorbachev's visit that each socialist country has its individual character and each country must adopt its own formulas for building socialism. But Cuba is with us, is our loyal friend; and Comrade Gorbachev's visit to Cuba has confirmed this, if confirmation were needed. But the visit transcended the framework of Cuba; it has been of significance for the whole of Latin America. I'd like to draw your attention to a very important paragraph in the statement by the CPSU Central Committee Politburo of 14 April, which says that the trip to Cuba has underlined the importance the Soviet Union attaches to the growing role of Latin America in international affairs. The trip has made it possible to coordinate approaches to questions of the political settlement of regional conflicts, especially in Central America and southern Africa, and so on.

[Shishlin] Well, and now of course let's say something about the visit to Britain. I think the visit to Britain has been one more step in the development of the European policy of the Soviet Union. It goes without saying that attention was focused on bilateral Soviet-British relations, although in themselves the talks in Britain between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Margaret Thatcher were not based, as it were, on prosaic matters, but were, I'd say, conceptual and philosophical in nature. In this connection it has been pointed out that on many positions—and they're very serious ones—Moscow and London hold diametrically opposed views. Take the issue of nuclear deterrence. Britain is staunchly in favor of nuclear deterrence, whereas we see the Europe of the future as nuclear-free and nonviolent. Or take, for instance, the question of the modernization of shorter-range missiles—more precisely, of operational-tactical missiles. We consider that there should be no modernization of any kind and that the operational-tactical missiles themselves should be made the subject of East-West talks.

[Charikov] And this was mentioned, by the way, in the statement of the Warsaw Pact countries...

[Shishlin, interrupting] Yes, quite right.

[Charikov] ...of 12 April, in Berlin. But we'll get back to that.

[Shishlin] Yes. That is the unanimous position of the socialist countries. But the British take a different line—different, incidentally, from that of Britain's Western partners, too. Britain says the operational-tactical missiles must be modernized, that they're obsolete; it's true they're old models. They support their position with the argument: You've modernized your operational-tactical missiles comparatively recently, and ours have lagged behind yours by the order of a magnitude, and now we've got to modernize ours. But in this case you get a rather strange line of reasoning. Suppose the West modernizes its operational-tactical missiles. Can the Warsaw Pact states leave such actions unanswered? Of course not. So that's why we make the proposal: Let us by all means agree to abolish the operational-tactical missiles, modernized or unmodernized. What we're proposing, actually, is a third zero option, if we're speaking seriously. In other words, there have indeed been serious differences in our positions, but no one has made them into a melodrama because these divergences and contradictions can be said, to some extent to be the very cradle in which new ideas are nurtured and born—where new ideas and new initiatives grow.

In this context, I believe the in-depth discussions in London between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and the British prime minister were useful conversations to the highest degree, and, of course, the spectrum of trust and mutual undertanding has been widened. Another very significant thing, it seems to me, is that London demonstrates the whole polarity of attitudes toward restructuring in the Soviet Union. It is very interesting and valuable that Britain's conservative circles, not to mention Labor and other forces in the British political spectrum, see great hope in our restructuring, great hope for a radical improvement of the European and international situation. Britain was extremely important in that—and I don't mean this is some sort of routine compliment to that country—Britain's role is considerable both in European politics and international politics. Britain is not simply some sort of intermediate point between the Soviet Union and the United States. It is an independent number, and this is all the more so in that today it is unthinkable to tackle any problems—be they European or global—by the efforts of two or three states; all the forces in the world community need to be pooled.

I haven't mentioned the practical results of the British visit. I think, overall, that the ground has been cleared for a substantial increase in economic cooperation between Britain and the Soviet Union. I think our humanitarian links will become more intensive too, and this will be valuable to the highest degree. It seems to me that the visit itself ushers in a sort of European year in Soviet foreign policy.

[?Charikov] I've come across that phrase somewhere already, the phrase about a European year being ushered in with the London visit.

[Shishlin] Yes, this is particularly true in that there are visits ahead to the FRG and France, and who is to say what agenda will emerge there? Thus, I think that—and this is how we started our conversation today—of course, the new political thinking today is being put into practice in very specific and practical steps, practical deeds and practical actions, which enable the tendency toward improving international relations that clearly revealed itself last year to be sustained and developed. In this sense, I believe that 1989 will not just be a year of the consolidation of the results obtained in the previous year, but a year in which it is necessary to effect a really new breakthrough to a new quality of international relations—be they East-West or North-South relations or international relations as such, as a whole.

[Kobysh] Nikolay Vladimirovich, I find everything you have said very interesting, and I must say that as a reader, listener, and television viewer, I also interpreted what occurred in London as a very major conceptual dialogue. That is natural. Leaders should not discuss figures. But what worries me a little is that they have gone their different ways, and Western propaganda has now started to function somehow in not quite the right direction. Woerner, the NATO secretary general, met U.S. President Bush the other day and said that since the Warsaw Pact had 14 times more short-range, or—as you called them—tactical, operational-tactical, nuclear missiles, these talks are for the time being impossible, particularly because the Soviet Union has a vast advantage in conventional weapons. In other words, a not very constructive kind of climate is being created. There was an interesting comment: I was in the United States during your stay in Britain, and I heard an interesting comment from experienced political analysts and my journalist colleagues to the effect that Bush is currently playing a waiting game because the Soviet Union—they call Gorbachev the Soviet Union—because Gorbachev is currently collecting points. Bush is currently playing a waiting game in hopes of reducing the influence of the Soviet standpoint in the eyes of world public opinion before starting a serious dialogue with the Kremlin. Washington has so far not evinced any signs of a desire to commence such a dialogue. There are, moreover, signals that it is not ready for such a dialogue, and it is not known when it will be ready.

Please excuse me for mentioning my personal experience, but I traveled to the United States partly for an interview with President Bush. White House representatives said that, no, he is not yet ready to grant such an interview. Admittedly, they said that in a month or 2 he would most likely grant such an interview, but for the time being he is not ready.

[Shishlin] I get a contradictory feeling. On the one hand, I would tend to agree with you because this U.S. hiatus in the dialogue with the Soviet Union is dragging on, although some contacts are being maintained and it cannot be said that a closed season has arrived.

[?Charikov] No, no.

[Shishlin] That has not happened.

[?Charikov] Our inspectors have arrived, and all the agreements are being complied with.

[Shishlin] Yes.

[?Kobysh] Yes, but, excuse me, that is the baggage of previous years.

[Shishlin] Yes, but on the other hand it is probably not worth dramatizing particularly the present period of Soviet-U.S. relations. You have already said that a contradictory sort of team has been formed in the Bush administration, and its formation is still under way, as is the formulation of positions. That is all true. It is also known that Bush has received a report from three U.S. intelligence services—different reports, but all with the same thrust, which, by and large, do not recommend that any dramatic changes be made to the policies inherited from the previous administration. Thus, it seems to me that we can continue to be patient, and the May meeting, in Moscow this time, between U.S. Secretary of State Baker and our Foreign Minister Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze will no doubt essentially show what Washington politicians are ready for in 1989 as far as relations with the Soviet Union are concerned.

[Kobysh] Nikolay Vladimirovich, we can continue to be patient, but the trouble is that people are being killed, you understand, and they do not have time to be patient.

[Charikov] You're talking of Afghanistan?

[Kobysh] I am referring to Afghanistan. Bush put it very well a few days ago when he said that the whole art of management is to be honest. He was repeating a thought uttered by the third U.S. president, Thomas Jefferson. I have no doubt at all about the personal honesty of Bush. I personally have great respect for him, and that includes his businesslike qualities and his personality. But the situation is that in Geneva we agreed on very serious things regarding Afghanistan, but after we pulled out our troops a true and proper war started there, a war that Pakistan is now waging against Afghanistan, with the United States backing Pakistan.

[Shishlin] It is difficult to dispute this view, even though I would not try to put it in such dramatic terms, although perhaps events are prompting you to do so. That is because the civil war in Afghanistan did not arise today, or yesterday. It is another matter that throughout the entire protracted Afghan drama, the United States was, if not a direct and immediate participant, then of course an indirect participant. That is certain. Of course Pakistan's political standpoint today is indubitably a realization of the political aims of the extremist circles in the United States itself. That is the first thing I'd like to note—and not for the sake of arguing, but just to clarify the position. I believe that what is needed now is not to divide one's attention among various different issues—Central America, Afghanistan, the Near East, and so on and so forth.

After all, the Soviet-U.S. agenda is oversaturated, and, regrettably, oversaturated with negative phenomena, precisely those you have mentioned. Soviet-U.S. links are mixed up with negative factors, and the task now—and this is the problem—is to put these links onto a positive footing, a positive basis, and to switch our relations from those between adversaries and rivals to relations between partners. We must seek a field for joint cooperation not just in the context of limiting and curtailing the arms race, but also in the context of a joint search for solutions to the global problems which really brook no delay. From that point of view, time is simply precious. This concerns regional conflicts. It concerns the economic troubles occurring in the contemporary world. Yet I do not think that we have any other way, any choice, any approach other than to work patiently in the direction that has already been laid down, to work patiently on consolidating, developing and enriching the ideas set out in the December speech by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev from the UN rostrum, which were given fresh impetus in his Guildhall speech in London. Thus it is unthinkable that with one leap we can find ourselves in a world of concord and can propel ourselves out of this unsettled, nervous, tense, and dramatic world. So a purely idealistic view in itself is to be welcomed: It is beautiful and serene. But we shall not wrest ourselves from the objective contradictions of contemporary world reality, and we have no other option but to work patiently, to work imaginatively, to work persistently, to work consisently. That means working with the partners that God has granted us, and not with any ideal partners.

[Kobysh] Quite so. I think no one can object to what you said. I simply wish to say that adopted agreements should be complied with.

[Shishlin] That's true.

[Kobysh] There are rules of the game, which have to be followed.

[Charikov] As laid down in Roman law...

[Shishlin, interrupting] [words indistinct]

[Kobysh] Otherwise nothing can be done. Otherwise everything is pointless.

[Charikov] I'd also like to ask you something, Nikolay Vladimirovich. If you are right that it is indeed sensible and necessary to concentrate efforts now, when time is short and precious, on points on which we can reach some kind of progress, what, in that case, is to be done with conflicts that still exist, to mention only Afghanistan, which Vitaliy Ivanovich referred to? Are we to forget them temporarily? Are we to turn our attention toward other things, and let things develop as they will?

[Shishlin] I may not be expressing myself accurately, but I was not proposing this at all. I was not proposing that Afghanistan be forgotten at all. Afghanistan was and remains...

[Charikov, interrupting] No, I'm not asking you in this instance. I'm asking those who are attempting to take it off the agenda, so to speak.

[Kobysh] No, when I said I was a little worried by present developments—take Afghanistan again—I meant that an escalation was taking place that represents a deterioration. Whereas previously Pakistan was a base for the mujahidin, today the regular Pakistani Army is taking part in fighting against regular Pakistani Government troops. The regular army is alrady on the territory.

[Charikov] You mean the Afghan Government.

[Kobysh] Yes, forgive me, I mean the Afghan Government. It is on Afghan territory. This has not happened before.

[Shishlin] You're talking about the militia.

[Kobysh] Yes, the militia and Pakistani armored units are now advancing there. This did not happen before. This was somehow kept undercover; fig leaves of some kind were used. Now all this is being done overtly. At the same time, it must be said that Benazir Bhutto has been invited to the United States in June, and U.S. friendship with Pakistan, policy continuity, and friendship between Pakistan and the United States are being proclaimed. If it is going to be a friendship based on this sort of foundation, there undoubtedly will be no calm in the world for a very long time to come.

[Shishlin] The way I see it is that as far as the Afghan situation is concerned, the United States is acting according to its old recipes and approaches: The worse things are for the Soviet Union and its friends, the better for the United States and its partners. In this particular case the United States is indeed taking an immoral position in supporting, financing, and encouraging the civil war in Afghanistan, at a time when the task of the world community, the responsible members of the world community, is to make it possible for the Afghans to sort out their own affairs. The conditions for this were created by the Geneva agreements; they were created as a result of our troop withdrawal from that country. Every regional conflict has its own appearance, character, and distinctive features. Yet what is important is not only the difficulties—and the difficulties are indeed enormous in every regional conflict—but that these conflicts are in some way beginning to be resolved. That relates also to the situation in Cambodia: It is well-known that the Vietnamese have made an announcement, together with the Phnom Penh government, about the full withdrawal of their troops by September, in September of this year to be more precise. It is well known that the settlement in southwest Africa is taking its first agonizingly difficult steps. That is also on the plus side. Certain ideas are being circulated concerning a Near East settlement; they are of a very positive nature.

[Kobysh] Well, no, there simply are certain concrete steps toward a settlement.

[Shishlin] Indeed. And it goes without saying that precisely those political statements heard from Havana in April, equally from our leader and the Cuban leader—taken by themselves and in combination with the statements made by the Managua government—are also opening up new scope for active steps toward settling the Central American crisis too. So not everything is so bad and hopeless. Everything is indeed difficult, everything is full of drama, but on the whole, if we take a look at the international events of the last few days, the last 10 days, they show that the tendency toward smoothing out international relations, toward improving the international climate, is, after all, steady.

[Kobysh] Indeed, here I agree with you. If, for example, we sum up my impressions from my U.S. trip—I have just returned—I have to say that in the United States the process of establishing new thinking is also taking place. It is taking place in their own way, but they are getting closer to understanding that the world has changed, and in this world we have to live in a new way because we're all in the same boat.

[Charikov] Concluding our program, esteemed comrades, I would like to return again to the documents of the session—the Berlin session—of the foreign ministers committee of the Warsaw Pact member countries. These documents include an appeal timed to coincide with the 50th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II; therefore this document itself is permeated with, I'd say, a kind of sober-minded spirit, a spirit of reasoning about war and peace. I cannot help quoting one sentence from this document which, I think, sounds very concrete precisely today, precisely in the situation we are currently witnessing: Mankind should enter the 21st century, says the document, with confidence in a peaceful future.

To do this, the decisive actions of all states and peoples, of all people, are needed. Joint consideration of what happened in Europe 50 years ago should be a constant stimulus for new, even more effective actions in the name of creating a world without weapons and wars. That was the sort of appeal which issued from Berlin.

[Kobysh] At one time—even quite recently—people in the West would probably have said that this was propaganda, but now this is difficult to say because very many people on earth now think in this way, because you cannot think in any other way. The other way is the way of ruin.

[Charikov] Well, comrades, our program has ended. On behalf of its participants, I thank you for your attention and bid you farewell. Goodbye, all the best.

Thatcher Addresses London Information Forum

LD1804194289 Moscow TASS in English 1710 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] London April 18 TASS—British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, addressing the first plenary meeting of the International Information Forum that opened here today, stressed that the "aim of the forum is to be constructive by encouraging everyone to adopt the basic Helsinki standards for free exchange of information."

"There will only be a common European home if the occupants can mingle and talk freely," she pointed out.

Thatcher highly assessed changes currently under way in the Soviet Union. "This meeting takes place at a time of great hope in relations between East and West," she observed.

"Only two weeks ago we welcomed President Gorbachev once more to Britain.

"He told us of the progress of perestroyka in the Soviet Union. We welcome and support his reforms.

"All this helps to build the trust and confidence between East and West which is the purpose of the Helsinki process."

Conflict Seen Within Cocom on Liberalization

PM1804151389 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Apr 89 Morning Edition p 5

[Yu. Kovalenko dispatch: "Obsolete Barriers"]

[Excerpts] Paris—A 2-day session of the executive committee of the coordinating committee to control exports to socialist countries [Cocom], which embraces all the NATO states (except Iceland) and Japan, has been held behind closed doors in conditions of total secrecy in Paris.

A few lines of information filtered through to the press during the meeting. It follows from this that Australia has joined Cocom. In addition, the need to simplify the existing procedures for issuing export permits was noted at the session. [passage omitted]

The West European states and Japan are increasingly insistently demanding that Washington ease the restrictions on supplying the latest technology to the Soviet Union, reduce the lists of prohibited goods, and do everything to ensure that Cocom ceases to be an instrument of East-West confrontation.

FRG Foreign Minister H. Genscher came out against Cocom policy, which acts as a brake on relations with socialist countries. "Cocom undoubtedly hinders the development of exchanges associated with advanced technology, and we want the restrictions which it set to gradually weaken—this is the stand of the National Council of French Employers [CNPF]," Michel Freyche, president of the French Foreign Trade Bank, who simultaneously heads the USSR Committee of the CNPF, declared in conversation with your correspondent. The M. Thatcher government, which supported various sanctions directed against our country following the introduction of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, today advocates lifting them, the Paris press emphasizes. For their part, Bonn, Rome, and Paris have never been ardent supporters of excessive control over exports to the USSR, newspapers point out.

However, despite the warming of the international climate, the United States would, by all accounts, like Cocom to keep to its old position. According to the newspaper LIBERATION, this boils down to the following: "Today it is still more important than ever to maintain control over exports of technologies to the East. Of course, the Soviets would like Cocom to disappear." And Moscow is said to be pushing Western countries toward this.

I do not think they have any need of such pushing. Proceeding from their own interests, many West Europeans want to remove the restrictions on trade with the East and to be freed from the "tutelage" which Washington exercises with Cocom's help.

According to a British expert cited by LIBERATION, Cocom remains a symbol of the West's attitude toward the Soviet Union, and this at a time when the British Government, for example, regards Moscow as a potential partner, not as a rival.

Informed Paris colleagues explained to me that the Cocom executive committee studied the problem of relations with the East and passed recommendations on whether to remove the barriers—and precisely which ones—from the path of the latest technologies. However, observers believe that no substantial changes should be expected yet. The final decision on all these questions will be adopted later at the ministerial level. In the opinion of some commentators, under pressure from many countries and despite U.S. resistance, the upcoming meeting will make it possible to achieve definite progress. But the situation is complicated by the fact that the new U.S. Administration will by no means have finished formulating its policy with regard to the USSR.

Meanwhile, the campaign for the liberalization of trade with the Soviet Union is being intensified in the United States and other Western countries. Obviously, under these conditions Cocom will be forced to revise and, perhaps, reduce its "blacklists"—in short, to make definite concessions. Time will tell just which ones.

Gorbachev Sends Message to Palme Commission

PM1404132389 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 89 Second Edition p 1

[Undated M.S. Gorbachev message to Palme Commission]

[Text] To the members of the Independent Commission on Questions of Disarmament and Security (the Palme Commission)

I greet you—prominent politicians and public figures of various countries who have gathered for a final session, at which the Palme Commission's activity is to be summed up.

People in the Soviet Union pay tribute to the great work you have done over almost 9 years, honor the memory of its founder—the outstanding politician and humanist Olof Palme—and value highly the ideas and proposals advanced by the commission, consonant as they are with the new political thinking.

Major changes for the better have occurred in the international situation since 1980, when the Palme Commission began its work. It has been possible to avert the threat of war to an appreciable degree, take the first, albeit modest steps toward a nuclear-free world, and limit regional conflicts or move them to the plane of political settlement.

The members of the Palme Commission can feel legitimate satisfaction that their efforts have made a useful contribution to great causes which essentially decide the question of the possibility of mankind's very survival.

The Palme Commission is completing its work, I believe, conscious of a duty fulfilled and satisfied with what has been done. I would like to express the hope that its members—and I personally know many of them—will continue their active work for the sake of peace, disarmament, and international mutual understanding. In this connection accept my best wishes and the Soviet people's gratitude for what the Palme Commission has done.

[Signed] M.S. Gorbachev

Conference on Nuclear Stations Held in Rovno

18000797b Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian 1 Mar 89 p 3

[Article by V. Mazanyy, RATAU correspondent: "International Seminar at Rovno AES"]

[Text] Kuznetsovsk, Rovno Oblast, 28 February—The directors and prominent specialists who manage atomic stations in Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Cuba, Poland, the USSR, Czechslovakia, and Finland became participants in an international seminar which opened today at the Rovno AES [nuclear electric power station]. They are exchanging information on the safety of stations where VVER-440 reactors are in operation.

It is two such reactors that provide power to the Rovno AES. Put into service about 10 years ago, they were the first of a new series, a base. Later, after their successful operation, CEMA countries and Finland became customers for such units. Many specialists of the Rovno station helped set up these stations abroad. Some of them are working abroad now.

Seminar participants will consider a series of reports. They will visit the workplaces of operators of the Rovno AES.

United States & Canada

New Thinking 'Absent' From Bush Detroit Speech

LD1804183389 Moscow TASS International Service in English 1635 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Military observer Vladimir Chernyshev commentary]

[Text] Moscow, 18 Apr (TASS)—Military observer Vladimir Chernyshev writes:

U.S. President George Bush spoke in the municipal town hall of Hamtramck (State of Michigan). This speech was awaited with quite understandable interest, as it had been publicized that it would be devoted to European affairs. Highly significant events are currently underway in Europe: It is here that the shoots of the new thinking are breaking through and possibilities are opening up for an essential reduction in military confrontation between the world's two most powerful military political groups. Expectations were also linked with another feature of the current period: It is time for the new U.S. Administration to elaborate its political course and publish its main provisions.

However, in spite of the expectations, the speech by the head of the U.S. Administration gave voice only to generalities on further improving relations between East and West in all aspects: cutting arms, political relations, trade. The President did not say anything about when he intended to resume the Soviet-U.S. talks on nuclear and space weapons or about the attitude of the new Washington leadership to the talks on conventional armed forces in Europe and to the all-European forum on confidence measures. He also ignored the proposal by the Warsaw Pact member states to begin talks without delay on tactical nuclear weapons on the continent. In a word, it simply remained unclear from Bush's speech how the current U.S. leadership plans to strengthen security and cooperation on the European Continent.

At the same time, one cannot but be amazed at how packed the U.S. President's speech is with cliches that were in vogue on the other side of the Atlantic at the start of the 1980's. The thesis about the "suppression of freedom in Eastern Europe with the assistance of the military might of the USSR," the appeal to the USSR to announce its "renunciation of military intervention as an instrument of its policy," and clearly anticommunist quotations—all of this leads to the thought that the occupant of the White House is ignoring the achievements of the past 4 years in East-West and U.S.-USSR relations.

And although Bush says Washington "sees new thinking in certain aspects of Soviet foreign policy," and although he talks about his sincere wishes for the success of the reforms in the USSR, against the general background of his speech these passages clearly do not sound convincing. The most important thing is that new thinking is absent from the President's speech. It contains more of the striving "to teach a lesson" to the socialist countries, to apply U.S. standards to them, and to interfere in their internal affairs.

One would like to hope that the "careful analysis" of U.S. policy will be completed in the near future and that its concrete conclusions will take account of the new realities in the world and the successes that have already been achieved in recent years in the sphere of strengthening the security and cooperation of states with different social systems.

Bush, UK's Howe View Ties, NATO Modernization

LD1704210189 Moscow TASS in English 1958 GMT 17 Apr 89

[Text] Washington April 17 TASS—TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin:

President of the United States George Bush met on Monday in the White House with British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Geoffrey Howe on a working visit in the U.S.A.

Problems of U.S.-British relations, questions connected with the forthcoming NATO summit, the world situation were discussed during the talks.

According to reports, the British foreign secretary informed the President of the United States of the results of the recent talks of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher with General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev.

Questions of the modernisation of NATO tactical nuclear weapons in Europe came up for discussion during the talks. Alongside the United States, Great Britain remains one of the leading supporters of NATO's modernisation of tactical nuclear forces in Europe, despite the fact that many other NATO countries have doubts about this. In an interview to the NBC Television Network on Monday, the British foreign secretary confirmed the fact that London firmly pursues the course of the modernisation of tactical nuclear weapons. Geoffrey Howe tried to justify this by saying that the USSR, allegedly, fully modernised its short-range (tactical) nuclear weapons over the past ten years, while NATO only intends to replace obsolete systems. The USSR declared more than once that it is not modernising tactical nuclear weapons, nor has it modernised them.

Geoffrey Howe will also meet with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker.

Bush Signs Bill for Humanitarian Contra Aid

LD1904063789 Moscow TASS in English 0631 GMT 19 Apr 89

[Text] Washington April 19 TASS—By TASS correspondent Andrey Fedyashin:

U.S. President George Bush on Tuesday signed legislation, earlier approved by Congress, on implementing the so-called bipartisan agreement on Central America. This accord was the result of the closed talks conducted by administration officials with Democratic and Republican leaders in March, and was announced on March 24.

The present law envisages "humanitarian aid" to the contras, ferrying clothing, food, medicines to the contra bases in Honduras, and what is described in the United States as "a major breakthrough in U.S. policy toward Central America". Aid will be provided until the elections in Nicaragua scheduled for February 28, 1990, following which the administration intends to define itself the extent to which they were democratic and free.

All in all, under the law, the Department of Defence should hand over 66.6 million dollars to the U.S. Agency for International Development. Four and a half million dollars of this sum will be set aside monthly for the purchase of the necessary articles and medicines. Part of the funds will be spent on the shipment of aid and other related expenses.

Bush himself did not conceal that the pivotal goal of the current plan is to keep the contras afloat, to preserve them as a lever for bringing direct pressure to bear on Nicaragua. Bush said at a White House ceremony that U.S. continued aid to Nicaraguan resistance signified the United States' commitment to suport for those who fight for freedom and democracy.

The president also maintained that "thus far, the Sandinistas have refused to negotiate with the opposition regarding the necessary conditions for fair elections" and that "close international scrutinity and sustained pressure will be critical to induce Sandinistas' compliance".

Commenting on the White House ceremony, AP [ASSOCIATED PRESS] news agency noted that the administration and Congress signed at least a temporary truce on the contra aid issue. The agreement bans the backing of any offensive military operations by the contras for the time when the process of political reforms in Nicaragua is continued and stipulates that aid will be cut off if this provision is violated by the administration or the contras. However, the judgement on this will be made again by Washington which, as the previous years showed, is not distinguished by impartiality in the assessment of the contra actions.

The U.S. President alleged that the bipartisan agreement demonstrates U.S. commitment to the peace process in Central America. However, he passed over in silence the agreement signed by the presidents of five Central American countries on February 14, which envisages the elaboration within 90 days of a plan for the demobilization, repatriation and the movement of the contras now headquartered at bases in Honduras. The point at issue is exactly to preserve them as a viable force.

Radio Liberty Nagorno-Karabakh 'Slander' Decried

LD1804171689 Moscow TASS in English 1710 GMT 18 Apr 89

[TASS commentator Grigoriy Konstantinov commentary]

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—By TASS commentator Grigoriy Konstantinov:

There is a saying that slander is like coal: If it does not burn, it stains. This seems to be one of the main principles used at the Azerbaijani-language section of Radio Liberty.

The claims made by the radio station this April to the effect that the special government committee in Nagorno-Karabakh "hinders the improvement of interethnic relations" and that the committee "is striving to disrupt economic ties with Azerbaijan" cannot be qualified as anything but an attempt to rekindle national strife.

In actual reality, life in the autonomous region has been moving towards normalcy with each passing day every since the establishment of special committee for administering Nagorno-Karabakh.

The committee has attached immense importance in its work to issues of normalising interethnic relations. It is closely watching the return of refugees to their homes and work.

A mixed Armenian-Azerbaijani commission has been set up at the committee for daily control over the implementation of this important task.

The first results are encouraging. The special government committee's effort to normalise interethnic relations is evoking a positive response from the region's population, both Armenians and Azerbaijanis.

The committee has inherited a legacy that is far from simple. The tasks it is facing are grave and complex. But its members believe that, with reliance on universal popular support, they can cope with them—despite any provocations.

U.S.-Soviet Trade Relations 'Unsatisfactory'

LD1904020789 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1615 GMT 18 Apr 89

[TASS political observer Vladimir Matyash commentary]

[Text] Moscow, 18 April (TASS)—TASS political observer Vladimir Matyash writes:

The U.S. Administration's approach to trade and economic relations with the USSR must be substantially reviewed. It must be based not on the stereotypes of the past, but on new political thinking with due regard to the realities of today's world. It is this that will enable broad opportunities to be opened for a further general improvement in relations between not only the two great powers, but also the other peoples of the world. This is the main conclusion of an article by former Democratic Senator Adlai Stevenson III and Elton Fry, vice-president of the council for international relations, published by the influential foreign-policy journal FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

The authors describe the discriminatory Jackson-Vanik amendment as a "short-sighted decision" that has brought the United States "no palpable political benefits, while the economic losses have turned out to be very considerable." "It has not only poisoned the atmosphere in economic relations with the Soviet Union and other communist countries, but has also blocked even the holding of a reasonable discussion on the substance of those relations," write Stevenson and Fry.

The main reason for the unsatisfactory situation in trade and economic relations between the USSR and the United States is, in fact, their unjustified politicization by the U.S. side. In its attempts to exert political pressure on the USSR, the United States has resorted, on more than one occasion, to various "sanctions" and restrictions. A discriminatory customs and credit regime remains in force. Any drawing together between the USSR and GATT is blocked.

Yet the U.S. business world shows an interest in the expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation with Soviet partners. Over 50 long-term cooperation projects in the most varied fields and forms are currently under discussion and three joint ventures have been created. The Soviet side believes the USSR and the United States could become really useful to one another by developing broad mutually beneficial trade and economic relations on the basis of equality, stability, and the desire to find points of contact for their interests in that area of bilateral relations.

Economic ties between the USSR and the United States must have a firm, long-term, and stable base. The key to this lies in building them on a foundation of real economic and commercial interests. The Soviet side is creating the necessary conditions for such cooperation. Thus, the Law on Joint Enterprises on the territory of the USSR was adopted in January 1987. Specifically provided for were the simplification of the procedure for deciding on the creation of joint enterprises on the territory of the USSR, the introduction of additional tax incentives for joint enterprises, the development of new forms of economic cooperation with foreign partners, including participation in foreign joint-stock companies and investment activities abroad, and cooperation with regard to the training and retraining of skilled staff.

The development of trade and economic relations on a healthy, stable base could make a great and positive contribution to the creation of an atmosphere of trust between both countries.

Georgia Forum Views Soviet Reform, U.S. Trade

PM1804151789 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
15 Apr 89 Second Edition p 5

[Correspondent V. Gan dispatch: "Is the Train About to Depart? Topical Problems of Soviet-U.S. Dialogue"]

[Text] Athens, Georgia, 14 Apr—For 4 days in April, this university city, drowning in blossoms, was right at the front line of a keen international debate focusing on changes in the Soviet Union.

More than 40 economic experts from various countries concluded their sessions at the Center for East-West Trade Policy Questions set up under the University of Georgia, which is located here. The Soviet delegation included famous scientists O. Bogomolov, N. Shmelev, Yu. Andreyev, and A. Kunitsyn.

The discussions in Athens were unusually frank and productive, I was told by Gary Bertsch, professor of political science and co-director of the university center. The main topic was Soviet restructuring and its importance for the entire international political and economic structure. Participants' speeches revealed differences in emphasis and interpretation, but they were perhaps all united in recognizing the depth of changes occurring in the USSR. It is remarkable in this context that the conference heard quite a few critical remarks against the U.S. Administration, which is totally unable to decide whether the United States should abandon stereotypes in trade and economic discrimination against the Soviet Union and recognize the imperatives of cooperation in an interdependent world. It was correctly remarked by J. Hardt, one of the leaders of the U.S. Congressional Research Service, that Washington's wait-and-see stance is far from innocuous; it essentially represents the same old negative policy. If the United States, he said, were to drag its feet in getting invoved in trade relations with the USSR, it would run the risk of "missing the train" since the volume of Soviet foreign economic relations is growing even without it, especially in light of plans to create a single market in Europe by 1992.

Much attention was given at the conference to the question of the USSR's integration into international economic organizations like GATT. Note was taken of the U.S. unwillingness and even direct opposition to the USSR's membership in this organization, which would only produce gains for the cause of East-West economic ties.

When I asked him to sum up the outcome of the debate, Prof Bertsch was optimistic: "We conducted an exceptionally fruitful exchange of opinions. I personally believe that your country is implementing most important reforms which will create historic prerequisites for the improvement of political relations between the USSR and the United States. I am a political scientist and, in my view, one can now certainly perceive an activeness of political forces in the United States, indicating positive changes in the cause of expanding Soviet-U.S. relations."

When I objected that, judging by the new administration's public statements, these positive changes are rather in the realm of wishful thinking, the professor declared: "A period of political analysis begins whenever a new administration comes to power in our country. This analysis is now basically complete or approaching completion. And I think Washington is getting ready for a more active response to Soviet reforms."

Gary Bertsch has been invited to testify at hearings of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which is due to start examining questions of cooperation with the USSR next week. "I will uphold and recommend a most active approach toward Soviet initiatives," he said.

Trade Agreement With U.S. Consortium Viewed

PM1704162789 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Apr 89 Morning Edition p 1

[M. Berger report under the rubric "Fact and Commentary": "Risk Is an Economic Category"]

[Text] As already reported, a general agreement has been signed in Moscow between a Soviet foreign economic consortium and an American trade consortium. What will cooperation between these two economic giants bring and when?

It is easier to answer the second question: Not soon, relatively speaking. Even given a favorable development of events, we will not see the first fruits of this agreement for 2 or 3 years yet. So what kind of fruits will they be?

We can judge to a certain extent from the names of the firms involved in the project. On our side, they are "Soyuzkhimeksport," the Kazan "Medinstrument" Production Association, the Gorkiy Automotive Plant, the "Kashirskiy" Agro-Industrial Committee, the "Kondrovobumprom" Association, and several other enterprises. On the American side, they are the Chevron Corporation oil company, the food and tobacco giant R.J.R. Nabisco, the Eastman Kodak firm, Johnson and Johnson, the producer of consumer and pharmaceutical goods, and others.

Also proposed is the establishment of a large group of joint enterprises (more than 20), which will manufacture both consumer goods and the means of production. Possibly the most important thing for us is that this complex is oriented toward our domestic market. And only one enterprise (in the petrochemical field) will work for exports, in order to meet the currency needs of the project.

As the editorial office was told by a representative of the USSR Bank for Foreign Economic Activity, questions of financial settlements and the use of profits in terms of the creation of joint enterprises have been adequately considered. The American participants in the consortium consider this agreement to be unprecedented, because, for the first time, they will be able to use profits generated in rubles.

The American side estimates the full cost of the project to be in the area of $5-10 billion, which will be invested over the course of 15-20 years.

It cannot be denied that the project is a grandiose one, beginning a new era of cooperation. For the first time, six major American companies have entered into long-term, capital-intensive cooperation with us. All this is gratifying but also worrying to some extent. After all, we are dealing with a new-generation "project of the century"—such capital is involved, and such a timescale.... What is more, once again we will be investing the raw material sector of our economy, which is already overinvested in comparison to the consumer goods sector.

And will it not be the case that the "petrochemical section" of the project will be implemented earlier and more fully than the other sections? Will it not, by virtue of some "objectively unexpected" circumstances, remain, if not the only element, then the main element of the project?

Not everything is running smoothly. According to Peter Konradi [name as transliterated], REUTER correspondent in Moscow, the Ford company has changed its plans to produce automobiles at the Gorkiy plant just a few days before the signing of the agreement and backed out of the consortium. Whatever the motives for this decision, the very presence of this world famous automobile company made the project particularly attractive. However, perhaps another automobile partner will appear in the consortium equally unexpectedly. The project is only just beginning and the sides are still only just starting to elaborate the technical and economic basis of the project...

In any case, the very fact of this high level of cooperation with such authoritative businesses could generate considerable economic gain. But we—those involved in the realization of the project and those looking forward to the end results—should nevertheless not forget that big business is interested first and foremost in large profits and not in economic patronage.

Businessman Loses Case Against IZVESTIYA

PM1804083589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 14 Apr 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Report by TASS correspondent A. Sidorin: "Court Rejects Suit Against IZVESTIYA"]

[Text] San Francisco, 13 Apr—TASS correspondent A. Sidorin reports: The provocative legal case brought against a number of Soviet organizationms and the newspaper IZVESTIYA by U.S. businessman Rafael Grigorian, which has lasted several years, is closed.

On Wednesday the federal district appeals court in San Francisco found that there were no grounds for the suit filed by the California businessman and rejected all the charges made in the suit.

The story began in 1982, after Grigorian's trading firm, the California International Trade Corporation, a medical equipment supplier, was authorized to open an office in Moscow. However, the businessman used it not to develop honest trade but to import subversive anti-Soviet literature into the USSR. When these facts came to light, IZVESTIYA told its readers about them and the Soviet authorities deprived the businessman and his firm of future accreditation in Moscow.

It was then that the businessmen filed a suit in the U.S. courts against the Soviet side, in which he demanded compensation amounting to $163,000 and a further $250,000 for alleged slander.

At first, exploiting certain features of U.S. legal procedure and the defendants' absence, the entrepreneur managed to secure the support of the district judge in Los Angeles. Without wasting any time, the plaintiff's lawyer took action in 1986 against the IZVESTIYA correspondents' center in Washington: Without any authorization at all, he broke into the correspondents' center premises, accompanied by bailiffs, with the intention of distraining property. But, having been resolutely rebuffed by the paper's correspondent Leonid Koryavin, the lawyer confined himself to willfully removing a typewriter, which, incidentally, was the correspondent's personal property and has still not been returned to its lawful owner.

R. Grigorian then made repeated, unlawful attempts to gain access to the bank accounts of IZVESTIYA and a number of other Soviet organizations with offices in the United States. It took repeated appeals by the Soviet side, intervention by the U.S. State Department, and 3 years of U.S. court hearings to stop this arbitrary behavior.

House Ethics Investigation of Jim Wright Viewed

LD1804145989 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1230 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Igor Charikov commentary]

[Text] The Ethics Committee of the House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress has unanimously found that James Wright, speaker of the House, violated the standards of behavior established for congressmen. The charge against Wright amounts to his receiving expensive gifts from businessmen with interests in the legislative decisions of the Congress. According to the ethics law, gifts worth more than $100 are deemed bribes. Wright completely rejects these charges. Here is our commentary by Igor Charikov:

The story of James Wright, who, according to the Washington order of seniority, as the speaker or chairman of the Congress' House of Representatives is third in rank after the President and the Vice President, began about a year ago. The scandal either flared up or died down, depending on the availability and authenticity of information compromising Wright. But perceptive observers point out that this scandal essentially represents just another upsurge in the interparty struggle on Capitol Hill, as well as a consequence of the confrontation between the White House and the Congress.

Of course, James Wright's involvement in the deposits into his personal account of hefty sums from grateful citizens, which is ethically below standard for a congressman, is easy to prove and we should hardly doubt that it will be done. There is no smoke without fire, as the saying goes. But let us take a look at the situation inside the legislative body and its relations with the administration, at least over the last few years.

Quite recently the Senate, where, just as in the House of Representatives, the Democrats have a majority, rejected John Tower's candidacy for the post of defense secretary recommended by President Bush. Two years ago Robert Bork's candidacy to another important post in the administration—although in the Reagan Administration—was turned down. Bork was recommended for the post of justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Such occurrences in the 200-year history of the U.S. Congress have been far from frequent, and each of them deserves more serious attention than at first appears.

Having an absolute majority in the supreme legislative body, the Democratic Party tries to influence the political decisions made by the White House, which for three consecutive presidential terms now has been held by a representative of the Republican Party. But James Wright, speaker of the House of Representatives, is a member of the Democratic Party, and someone could object to our reasoning. After all how could the Democrats have turned against their own man? But there was little else they could do, as Wright is indeed firmly bogged down in the quagmire of financial violations. Furthermore, having censured one of its own active supporters, the Democratic Party could score points by having demonstrated its desire to purify its ranks. Of course the Wright story—even if he is removed from his post—is not going to change the balance of power in the Congress. But the Democrats' prestige could suffer serious harm. Also, the White House would get some satisfaction following the disrespect shown to the President's opinion.

The influential U.S. weekly TIME magazine in its latest edition forecasts that over the coming 4 years President Bush and his administration face a hard struggle with the Congress on various aspects of domestic and foreign policy.

U.S. Gives Russian Empire Documents to USSR

LD1804203689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1554 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] Moscow, 18 Apr (TASS)—Jack Matlock, U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Valentin Nikiforov, USSR deputy foreign minister, today exchanged notes on handing over for safekeeping in the USSR State Archives documents of Russian Empire consular establishments in North America. The return to their historical home of the first batch of documents, which have been in the possession of the U.S. Government for over half a century, is a worthy completion to the latest meeting of state archives' employees of the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

In his speech, V. Nikiforov called this event a good sign of the improving relations between the two countries. He expressed confidence that the Soviet public will judge it at its true value.

The participants in the archivists' meeting consider the Americans' transfer of materials to be one of the major concrete results of the work of the Soviet-U.S. Commission on Archival Cooperation in the past 2 years. The documents, which contain invaluable evidence not only of the history of Russian-U.S. links, but also of the internal political life of Russia, will be handed over to the Soviet side via diplomatic channels by the end of this year. This was stated the same day by the heads of the Soviet and U.S. delegations—Fedor Vaganov, head of the USSR Main Archive, and D. Wilson, U.S. archivist, director of the U.S. National Archives, when they signed the cooperation plan for 1989-1990. This envisages, in particular, the continuation of preparation for publication of a joint collection of documents "Russia and the U.S.A. The Development of Relations. 1815-1865"; the exchange of archive specialists; and the provision of access to archives for researchers.

Rostrapovich 1990 Visit to USSR Viewed

PM1704135989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 14 Apr 89 Second Edition p 8

[Correspondent V. Gan dispatch: "Mstislav Rostropovich: 'I Am Going With an Open Heart'"]

[Text] Washington, 13 Apr—"This is the most moving moment in my whole life." Mstislav Rostropovich began his speech to journalists with these words. Emotions overflowed; after an enforced separation from his country he is going there again after all. He is going officially as the music director of the U.S. National Symphony Orchestra, which has been invited to tour by the State Concert Association.

An announcement was made about this today at Washington's Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts at a crowded news conference in which Yu.V. Dubinin, Soviet ambassador to the United States, also took part. It was reported to the assembled company that the orchestra, led by Rostropovich, which is recognized as a leading orchestra in the country, will visit the Soviet Union 12-15 February next year. At present two concerts in Moscow and two in Leningrad are planned. The program for the performers in the orchestra, which has reached unprecedented heights in the United States under Rostropovich's leadership, has still not been precisely determined, although the maestro himself mentioned Dvorak and Shostakovich.

However, not much attention was devoted to these details at the news conference. The audience was much more interested in the fact itself of the coming meeting between the great musician and his own people—a musician who, once a totally innocent victim, will go to his native land as the holder of the U.S. honorary title of "Musician of the Year," and dozens of the most prestigious prizes and degrees.

At the news conference there was discussion about restoring Soviet citizenship to Rostropovich and his wife Galina Vishnevskaya, which they lost in 1978 on the basis of ridiculous accusations. "Now," Rostropovich said, "this question is irrelevant. I am going for the concerts, I am going with an open heart and love. You can't do everything at once. The Soviet Union has a great many problems connected with the reforms. People in the West do not really appreciate what merely the right to go to one's native country, to go home means. I did not want to leave and I did not leave: I was expelled on an order signed by L.I. Brezhnev personally. We were called traitors, but we were never that...."

At the news conference confidence was expressed that the time would come when this whole story would finally come to an end, and this would mark the long-awaited triumph of justice.

Northeast Asia

No Danger From Supposed Japanese AES Leak

18220099 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 13 Apr 89 p 2

[Article by S. Glukhov: "There is no Danger"]

[Text] The inhabitants of the Maritime and Khabarovsk krays and Sakhalin Island tightly shut the windows of their houses and did not let their children go outside without head coverings. In kindergartens and preschools, walks were stopped. An avalanche of telephone calls descended on the organizations of the hydrometeorological services and civil defense. Rumors about a large accident at one of the nuclear power plants in neighboring Japan had acquired unbelievable details.

"When the telegram from the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology and Environmental Control [Goskomgidromet] arrived, our network of meteorological stations started increased observations—once every hour—of the radiation background," says A. Gavrilov, chief of the Hydrometeorological Center of the Far East Administration for Hydrometeorology. "No increased background was noted."

The possibility of harmful emissions being carried by air aroused the population's concern.

"Many of our ships were working in the region of the Japanese islands," stated D. Ryabchenko, operational controller of the ship rescue coordinating center for the Far East Maritime Fleet. "Therefore, having received the report about this occurrence we notified our crews and, of course, immediately got in touch with Tokyo. There had been no official report about the danger of radioactive contamination in connection with an accident at an AES [atomic energy station] from the Japanese authorities. The answer from the Japanese coordination-rescue center was reassuring. Nothing unusual had happened at the station. A pump from the cooling system had broken down and one of the nuclear reactors had stopped temporarily. There was no radioactive leakage."

Today it is clear that there is no danger. An order to stop the hourly measurements has been given to the meteorologists and the sanitary-epidemiological services.

Atomic Power Forum in Tokyo; Chernobyl Viewed

PM1804134989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 89 Second Edition p 5

[Special correspondent V. Gubarev dispatch: "Nuclear Power and Its Future"]

[Text] Tokyo, 14 Apr—"I wish to see the cherry trees still blossoming in 5 years' and even 200 years' time, but this will be possible here in Japan only if the nuclear power industry develops much faster than in the previous decades," Kazuhisa Mori, director of the Japanese Nuclear Industry Forum, said. "I realize this might sound somewhat strange now: After all, a wave of protest against nuclear power has swelled in Japan and in many countries in the world, especially since the series of nuclear power station accidents. But I see no alternative; only nuclear power stations are in a position to ensure economic development and simultaneously protect the environment."

Tokyo was the venue for a gathering of 1,200 representatives from 26 countries in the world, those which already have dozens of nuclear power stations in operation and those which are only now taking the first steps in their nuclear power industries. Natural conditions vary between China, Canada, Brazil and Pakistan, Japan and the CSSR, Australia and the Soviet Union; countries have different scientific research and economic potentials; and therefore each one chooses its own way to develop its nuclear power industry. But each and every one of them—and this was emphasized by all speakers at the forum—faces two problems without whose solution progress will be impossible. First, enhancing safety at nuclear power stations, training skilled personnel, and ensuring the absolute reliability of power station operations. Is this possible? Analyses of the tragedy in Chernobyl conducted in different countries and the lessons of past accidents show that nuclear technology today is at a stage where it is already possible to develop and build nuclear power stations where a disaster involving the release of radioactive substances is ruled out in principle.

The second problem mentioned by all speakers at the nuclear forum concerns mutual relations between specialists and the public at large. There is no point in concealing the fact that an abyss opened up between science and the public in the wake of Chernobyl: blame for the tragedy on the one hand, fear of nuclear power on the other. Can this abyss be bridged? Writers and journalists took part in the forum. Their speeches were not always to the liking of some specialists, but it is no longer possible to ignore public opinion. The future of the nuclear power industry depends on the extent to which scientists and specialists will be able to defend various projects and convince people that their lives would become worse without a new nuclear power station. On the other hand, it is necessary to overcome emotion and thoroughly analyze the real situation prevailing on the planet, which is more than 30 years into its nuclear age. And whether we like it or not, a new era has dawned in the history of civilization, an era when it is impossible to manage without space rockets, nuclear power stations, and electronics.

Soviet Opinion Poll on Japan Relations Cited

PM1804114589 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 16 Apr 89 Second Edition p 5

[Article by sociologist F. Sheregi: "Not Haggling, but Cooperation; Soviet People on Relations With Japan"]

[Text] In our life today fewer and fewer topics are closed to free discussion. This process extends to the foreign policy sphere. People want to investigate more deeply the problems that used to be in the shadows of public attention and to impart the thoughts that disturb them.

Soviet people's growing interest and concern regarding the state of Soviet-Japanese relations and, most importantly, the reasons preventing their progress, have been noted recently.

To gain a better knowledge of these feelings and consider them more fully in elaborating our state's foreign policy course, a public opinion poll of the Far East population was held in March. The poll covered about 1,500 people—inhabitants of the Khabarovsk and Maritime krays and Sakhalin Oblast (including Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk and Yuzhno-Kurilsk). They included approximately equal numbers of men and women aged over 20 representing virtually all socioprofessional groups of the population.

The results of the poll attest to great interest in neighboring Japan. This was stated by 93 percent of those taking part. At the same time, the attitude of those polled toward that country is not homogenous. It is above all the painful memories of the conflicts between our countries in the past—the Russian-Japanese war, the Japanese intervention in the Soviet Far East, the clashes on the Soviet Far Eastern border in the thirties, and World War II—which are having an effect here. We agree that it is not simple to surmount such a complex historical legacy in one's consciousness, especially for those for whom it is a living memory. Obviously, it is for that reason that even today 66 percent of those polled believe that Japan's policy to some degree presents a threat to the Soviet Union. (Some 20 percent do not share that opinion). But we cannot fail to draw attention to the fact that only 3 percent of those who replied to the poll expressed hatred for the neighboring country.

Turning to an examination of the assessment given by those polled of the present state of Soviet-Japanese relations, it must be noted that as a whole the level of these relations is described as quite low and failing to accord with the place and role of the USSR and Japan in the modern world. (Some 54 percent call it satisfactory, 26 percent poor, and only 5 percent good). On a scale of one to five those polled assess relations between the two countries as approximately "three." The majority believe that this situation is based on objective differences in sociopolitical systems, the noncoincidence of economic interests, dissimilarity of cultures, and so forth.

The overwhelming majority of those taking part in the poll (94 percent) are in favor of improving Soviet-Japanese relations (2 percent are against). Here 84 percent are supporters of the improvement of relations in all spheres. Named as the most promising is the sphere of trade and economic relations, followed by scientific and technical cooperation, political dialogue, and cultural and humanitarian exchanges.

The question of their approach toward Japan's possible participation in the economic development of their region was obviously of great importance to the inhabitants of the Far East. Some 65 percent of those polled supported the idea, albeit sometimes with reservations, while 24 percent were opposed to it.

In the poll the theme of Japan's territorial claims on the Soviet Union, which has long complicated bilateral relations, was touched on. It emerged that the subject is well known to almost all those who were asked to express their opinion (93 percent). The overwhelming majority of those polled (for instance, 87 percent in Yuzhno-Kurilsk) have a clear idea of exactly what these claims are. Some 80 percent of those polled consider Japan's claims on the USSR to be unfounded and 65 percent consider them absolutely unfounded while 15 percent consider them partly founded and only 2 percent entirely founded. At the same time there is a desire to somehow defuse the existing situation, as is borne out by the fact that 48 percent of those polled suggest seeking mutually acceptable solutions. That includes some people's toleration of the joint economic use of the islands to which Japan lays claim. At the same time, according to the poll, as of today virtually every other inhabitant of the Far East is categorically opposed to the joint economic development of these islands. This idea is rejected primarily by the inhabitants of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (57 percent) and Yuzhno-Kurilsk (60 percent).

The absolute majority (89 percent) of those polled are in favor of concluding a peace treaty between the USSR and Japan and only 4 percent are against.

Considering the sharpened attention with which Soviet people are following the development of events around this question, it seems useful to supplement the poll's dry statistics with the living voices of those who have recently been sending letters direct to the editorial office.

"As a citizen," Yu. Dobrovolskiy from Khabarovsk writes, "I am angered by the claims to our territories. It is clear that the seizure of our lands took place in the past due to the weakness of Tsarist Russia and represented overtly militarist actions on the part of Japan, which were ended by the outcome of World War II. Yet there was also the Japanese intervention in the Soviet Far East and later the attacks on our civilian ships sailing to Magadan, Okhotsk, and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy. As for the present statements by some Japanese, they are a continuation of the old militarist demands. As a whole I believe that in response to the 'struggle for the territories' launched by Japan on a national scale, we should organize our own campaign to explain the history of the Russians' development of these lands so that not only the inhabitants of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands but also the entire Soviet people know that the Japanese claims are unfounded. And if someone in Japan needs a pretext to reject a peace treaty with us, then it can wait."

Letters of this kind are in the overwhelming majority.

At the same time some authors, without casting doubt on the historical and legal justification for the USSR establishing sovereignty over the Kuril Islands, suggest, like some of those taking part in the poll, that an easing of the differences concerning them be sought. In many people's opinions, the most promising avenue is the joint economic development of these islands in conjunction with Japan, the development of tourism, the establishment of business ties at a regional level, and the creation of a free economic zone on the islands with joint Soviet-Japanese fishing and fish processing enterprises and medical treatment and tourist centers.

New Soviet Economic Research Institute in Tokyo
OW1704072689 Moscow in Japanese to Japan
1200 GMT 6 Apr 89

[Text] According to a TASS dispatch from Tokyo, a research institute to study the Soviet and East European economies has been set up in Japan. The purpose of the institute is to provide to Japanese businessmen detailed information on developments in the restructuring of the Soviet economy, the economic situation in other socialist countries, and prospects for forming joint ventures. It also aims at promoting exchanges of views between experts in order to develop trade and economic relations with CEMA countries. The Japan Association for Trade With the Soviet Union and the Socialist Countries of Europe (Sotobo) and the MITI initiated the institute. Well-known Japanese economist and chairman of the Japan Economic Research Center Hisao Kanamori was appointed director.

Sotobo Chairman Toshikuni Yashiro spoke at the official inauguration ceremony of the institute today. He said that the improvement in East-West relations, in the wake of the USSR's restructuring and new political perspective on international relations, will create a more favorable environment for developing trade and economic relations between Japan and the socialist countries.

Japanese Businessman Views Trade With USSR

OW1704123089 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 15 Apr 89

[Text] Recently Moscow Radio's correspondent in Tokyo, Potapov, met with Mr Ogawa, chairman of the Japan Association for Trade With the Soviet Union and European Socialist Countries, and asked him his views on the status of Soviet-Japanese trade and economic relations. Following is a summary of the remarks made by Chairman Ogawa:

A remarkable setback was seen in Soviet-Japanese trade and economic relations in the mid-1980's. This setback was due to various causes. However, last year Japanese-Soviet external trade, including triangular trade, totalled $8.5 billion according to Japanese statistics, and over 3.7 billion rubles according to Soviet statistics. At any rate, both showed the highest figures in the past 2 or 3 years.

Japanese-Soviet trade and economic relations have gradually come out of their state of stagnation and moved faster. To maintain this forward-looking trend, it is necessary for both sides to do whatever they can. Let me cite another statistic. Last year Soviet exports to Japan exceeded 1 billion rubles. These are impressive figures. Efforts should be made not to lower these figures, but further raise them.

The Japanese Government and its Foreign Ministry are now following a policy of inseparability of politics and economics toward the Soviet Union. In other words, they believe that the issue of developing economic relations between the two countries depends on the resolution of the northern territorial issue. Personally, I am critical of this line of thinking. I feel that Japanese financial circles are somewhat dissatisfied with the government and the Foreign Ministry for being unwilling to do away with outdated stereotypes.

For the time being, the discontent among businessmen is not very clearly expressed for various reasons, including their fear of the right wing. However, their voice will become stronger as the number of people who favor a more flexible policy toward the Soviet Union increases.

I believe the Soviet Union is interested in Japan's economic assistance in order to fulfill tasks that have cropped up as a result of its restructuring efforts. The Soviet Union is now putting emphasis on establishing joint ventures. Japan is among the partners in this Soviet effort.

However, I think that ordinary export and import business should not be forgotten. It is said that one of the important tasks set by the CPSU at present is improvement of the people's livelihood. Emphasis is now placed on increasing daily necessities. I think the goods the Soviet Union can use in this area can be imported not only from Europe but also from Japan.

I think the prospects for business relations between Japan and the Soviet Union this year are not bad. Taking into account the recent revitalization of contacts between the Soviet Union and China and between the Soviet Union and South Korea to some extent, it may be necessary for Japan and the Soviet Union to think about a multilateral cooperative formula. Such a formula could be introduced not only in the field of production but also in the sectors of transportation, communications, and aviation. This will have only a beneficial effect and give greater impetus to Japanese-Soviet business relations.

Lasty, I would like to say the following. The Soviet Union is the second largest economic power in the world, but it plays a rather small role in Japan's external trade. In addition, Japan's share in Soviet trade is as small as 1.2 percent. Bilateral trade between the two countries is thus very small. This shows that the two countries are still far from turning their mutual potential into complete reality. I believe that the Soviet Union and Japan have the potential for doubling their trade in the near future and raising it close to, if not equalling, the current trade level between the Soviet Union and West Germany.

Japanese 'Mir' Space Flight Candidates Screened

OW1804111889 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 17 Apr 89

[Text] Selection of candidates for a Soviet-Japanese joint space flight is being carried out in Japan. This space flight will be conducted on a commercial basis and will be participated in by a Japanese TBS journalist.

According to a Moscow Radio Tokyo correspondent, medical examinations of 20 candidates for the space flight will be conducted at Tokai University's affiliated hospital. Soviet specialists will take part in the medical examinations as advisers.

Reports in Japanese will be heard directly from the Soviet orbiting station "Mir" in 1991. Finding out about this space flight plan, however, Soviet journalists have decided to send a Soviet journalist into space before the Japanese journalist. Of course, this decision does not violate the provisions of the accord on the Soviet-Japanese space flight.

DPRK Ends ROK Talks After Mun Ik-hwan Arrest

LD1704123689 Moscow TASS in English 1222 GMT 17 Apr 89

[Text] Pyongyang April 17 TASS—The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has broken off contacts with South Korea going on along various channels, say telephone messages sent on Monday to South Korea by heads of DPRK delegations at meetings held for preparing military-political talks between North and South Korea and talks on the creation of a single Korean sports team to take part in the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing. According to the messages, the reason underlying the decision was the arrest of Mun Ik-hwan, a priest and prominent public figure of South Korea, who made recently an unsanctioned trip to the DPRK.

DPRK representatives stated that the arrest of Mun Ik-hwan who had visited the DPRK for the purpose of discussing problems connected with the unification of the country had created obstacles for the development of a dialogue between the DPRK and South Korea and had demonstrated the lack of sincerity of the South Korea authorities with regard to the unification problem.

The South Korean Government reserves for itself the right to maintain contacts with the DPRK and forbids trips to the North without its permission. Now Mun Ik-hwan is facing the threat of a ten-year prison term on charges of having violated the national security law.

Near East & South Asia

Afghan Foreign Minister Meets Press in Moscow

LD1504221489 Kabul Domestic Service in Pashto 1530 GMT 15 Apr 89

[Text] Afghan Foreign Minister 'Abdul Wakil held a news conference in Moscow yesterday at which he noted that 15 April is the anniversary of the signing of the Geneva accords, which are aimed at the peaceful resolution of the Afghan situation. He added that it had been hoped that the accords would bring peace to Afghanistan, but this goal had not been achieved because of the interfering and aggressive policy of Pakistan, which is one of the signatories to the Geneva accords. 'Abdul Wakil added that only the Afghan and Soviet governments have fulfilled their commitments in this regard, adding that the Soviet forces had completely returned from Afghanistan.

The Afghan foreign minister expressed the hope that the international community and public opinion would bring pressure to bear on the Pakistani militarists and help end Pakistan's aggression against and interference in Afghanistan. 'Abdul Wakil added that Pakistan's repeated violations of the accords had forced Afghanistan to turn to the UN Security Council. He added that the UN Security Council is expected to take the necessary measures to end these violations.

Kabul Situation, Najibullah's Image Viewed

PM1804145189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 17 Apr 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by IZVESTIYA special correspondent V. Sevruk: "An Admission From the Other Side"]

[Text] Kabul—Soviet people who have worked in the Afghan capital are well acquainted with the Kabul district called Kheyr Khaneh, nicknamed "Cosy Quarters" by our compatriots. Kheyr Khaneh is now visited by grief. Yesterday afternoon the "irreconcilables" hit the adobe houses with five rockets. Two Afghan women were killed.

But Kabul's streets are becoming a little busier. Afghan forces cleared the way for a convoy carrying fuel and food from the north, from the port of Hayratan. It was a difficult journey along the Salang Highway. Between Salang and Pol-e Khomri the rebels managed to capture three vehicles together with their loads, and seven trucks were riddled with bullets, and there were casualties among the drivers.

Local public interest was aroused by a BBC radio commentary in Dari which admitted, citing the British newspaper THE GUARDIAN's correspondent in Peshawar, that more than 1,000 mujahidin had been killed in battles near Jalalabad. So-called "foreign minister" of the self-styled government of "irreconcilables" Gulbuddin Hikmatyar initially promised to take Jalalabad within 72 hours, but has now shifted the date to the end of Ramadan, that is, 7 May. According to THE GUARDIAN's correspondent, most Afghans on both front lines are dubious about this forecast.

Witnesses of the fighting, the BBC commentary notes, say that the government forces are superior to the mujahidin in terms of military training and weaponry.

Since the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the British correspondent's interlocutor—one of the leaders of the armed opposition's detachments—said, it is no longer a "jihad," a liberation war on the part of the mujahidin, but fratricide. He also admitted that in the present situation President Najibullah is establishing himself as an Afghan nationalist and patriot and a champion of Islam, sincerely seeking talks not only with the mujahidin but with [former King] Zahir Shah.

Another mujahidin representative who met with the British journalist said the leaders of the "Seven-Member Alliance" and so-called "transitional government" are not an alternative to President Najibullah. It can only be a choice between Najibullah and Zahir Shah, former king of Afghanistan. He suggested that unless the mujahidin manage to radically alter the military-political situation in their favor in the next 2 months, Najibullah could become in his people's eyes a national hero waging a holy war against Pakistani aggression.

Food Convoy From Kabul Reaches Jalalabad

LD1804124689 Moscow TASS in English 1154 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] Kabul April 18 TASS—By TASS correspondent Yuriy Tyssovskiy:

A convoy of 63 trucks with food and ammunition from Kabul has reached the embattled city of Jalalabad, which has weathered another offensive by rebels, Afghan Foreign Ministry spokeskman Nabi Amani told reporters on Monday.

Supported by heavy artillery and rocket fire, opposition forces attempted to push through to the city, capital of Nangarhar Province, but were repulsed, he said.

The spokesman confirmed unofficial reports that armed Dzadran tribal units faithful to the government and fighting alongside regular forces pushed the rebels four kilometers back to the east.

He said that the failure of plans by the Peshawar-based "Alliance of Seven" and their patrons to seize Jalalabad has affected the rebels' morale and that their leaders, seeking to explain the series of defeats, are increasingly floating provocative rumours.

Amani said that these include allegations that Soviet and Indian pilots have been involved in bombing mujahidin positions and claims that rebels are not accustomed to acting against organised defences. The latest explanation for the setbacks, the spokesman noted, has a "humanitarian" flavour: It is being asserted that attacking forces have slackened off because they are "concerned" about high casualty rates among civilians in Jalabadad.

Field commanders have even accused their Pakistani advisers of having rushed them into the offensive for the city to be taken quickly and at all costs, according to Amani.

He noted increasing discontent with Saudi advisers in rebel-controlled Konarha Province where a local tribal regiment has objected to their presence since Saudis insist on under-age marriages for local girls and also disregard other local norms. Fierce fighting is underway between large extremist groups attacking Khowst and the city's defenders, who have so far been able to halt all the offensives.

The opposition has also become more active in Herat and Qandahar provinces but has not been able to score victories, suffering serious personnel and equipment losses there as well.

Security officers in Kabul, in the meantime, have uncovered another arms and ammunition dump, containing heavy weapons and rockets.

The Afghan Foreign Ministry has handed three further notes of protest to UN observers in the capital, listing Pakistani violations of the Geneva agreements.

Military, Supply Situation in Jalalabad Viewed

18010558 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Apr 89 Second Edition p 7

[Article by V. Snegirev, special PRAVDA Jalalabad-Kabul correspondent: "In Besieged Jalalabad"]

[Text] Now that everything is behind us, it can be admitted that from the very first day of the Jalalabad engagement journalists submitted requests to the Afghan leadership to send them closer to the battles. Both Western correspondents living in Kabul and our Soviet colleagues alike persistently asked that a trip be organized to that city so they could see with their own eyes and later tell the world what was really happening in the eastern part of the country.

And so, finally, I was told on the morning of 6 April: "The situation in Jalalabad continues to be complicated, but a decision has been made to make an exception for the PRAVDA correspondent. Takeoff is at 1400 hours."

Now, after returning to Kabul, I can understand that the Afghan comrades, who did not give permission for this trip for a long time, did not at all exaggerate the extent of the danger. In all honesty, the most strenuous assignment in my life was the 49 hours 38 minutes spent in Jalalabad.

The Road

They do not make normal flights to Jalalabad. They break through. Each time is combat, and each flight is like the last.

Inasmuch as the highway was again covered with rebels and the Jalalabad airfield is near the line of defense, the defenders of the city rely entirely on helicopters. They haul munitions, medicines, and products. It would be very bad without them. The extremists know this and are doing everything to disrupt and destroy the "air bridge." The situation is such that the "whirlybirds" can sneak up to the city from only one direction—from the west; everything here is within range of the rebels, and one can expect a burst of lead or a "Stinger" from every hollow. They fire on every, I repeat, on every helicopter.

It is simply my duty to tell about this flight—to pay a debt to the courage and incredible skill of the Afghan pilots that is impossible to describe.

1400 hours. I take a seat in the bowels of the Mi-8, which is filled with boxes with the inscriptions "Medexport." The engines are turned on immediately. Major Farid, the squadron commander, the second pilot, and the flight mechanic carefully strap on their flak vests. A single parachute for everyone dangles alone in the cargo compartment between the windows—frankly, this detail pains me somewhat, but not for long, which I will explain later.

The helicopter, waddling awkwardly over the metal strips of the taxiway, rolls onto the runway. Not one, of course. It is part of a whole convoy: in front, a group of four combat helicopters—frightening vehicles with clusters of missiles—and then a squadron of cargo transport helicopters. They prepare for takeoff for a long time; then they began the takeoff, hover over the airstrip this way and that, literally stretching out the moment of takeoff, as if the ground itself is not letting us go on this journey. But then, it seems we take off. At 1400 hours 17 minutes all helicopters soar into the sky almost simultaneously, immediately making a sharp left turn and quickly increasing speed without gaining altitude.

Below, moving at a furious speed, we fly past the clay huts of Kabul's suburbs, green tufts of fields, the interesting architecture of the Tsuli-Charki prison, reddish clay vacant lots, and half-destroyed kishlaks. We fly so low that the grass sways to the whirling air streams.

A wall of mountains looms up ahead. What now? Shall we climb? Nothing of the kind: I see the combat helicopters in front of us disappear one after the other into some narrow cleft, almost a cave.

What is the need of a parachute; where could one jump when the ground can be seen 5 meters under the belly of the helicopter? And time drags on so slowly...

I hold the dictaphone with sweaty hands and try to record my impressions. My travelling companions exchange glances, and they encourage each other with smiles, but the smiles are somehow unnatural, strained. Will this end unexpectedly?

I see a train of smoke bursts on a gentle slope out front and to the right. The combat helicopters have fired a salvo. We then make a sharp bank to the left and drop into some kind of a ravine .

Suddenly, the mountains end for a moment, and the helicopter literally dives into a wide green valley. And again we note many bursts to the right.

14 hours 52 minutes. Jalalabad is below, a perpetually green and beautiful city. The noise of the engines changes. The combat vehicles started to circle over the city, and we landed safely on vacant land not far from the center of the city. It is the first day of Ramadan—the great Muslim fast.

The City

I await this meeting with Jalalabad with excitement. What has happened to you, the ancient beautiful city? How will you endure the cruel trial that has befallen you.

My memory has retained a picture of the city in all its unusual aspects. In this subtropical kingdom of eternal summer—among date palms, cypresses, mandarin groves, and verdant crimson oleander flowers—life was always seething—exotic, colorful, and bustling .

Together with Captain Khamid, who speaks Russian tolerably, I immediately set out for the center. There the air is always permeated with a warm sunlight and the sound of chirping birds. And that is all. Almost nothing else, I think, is left of the former Jalalabad. Empty streets. The tea houses are closed with green shutters. War is noticeable at every step.

The shelling of the city virtually does not stop even for a minute. Day or night. A growing wail, a hit, and an explosion. At first, not being used to this, you duck your head, cower, and intuitively want to become shorter, and, afterwards, looking at the Afghans, you automatically quickly take hold of yourself. But it is very likely impossible to get used to this. It seems that the shell is heading directly for you every time. If the wail is short, and the explosions become more and more deafening, it is best to get into a shelter—they are dug out here in every yard. We lower ourselves, wait until it is over—and go on further.

In one month, 50,000 shells and mines fell on the city. There was mourning in almost every home.

After stopping at a shop destroyed by a shell, I start to take pictures. An old man in a sports shirt, the owner, comes up to me. "Glory be to Allah, everyone is alive," he says. "But I do not know what the future will bring. There is no bread, no rice. Prices are such that it is frightening just to name them."

There is a mosque across the road. A shell has hit here also: All of the walls are chipped from shell fragments. All in all it is difficult to say where shells have not hit—almost no home has survived, and there is not one window pane in the windows. The famous Sikh temple "Guru Nanak Darbar" has suffered the most damage. "Eresy" [possibly for "raketnyy snaryad": missile shells] disfigure the entire quarter. We are surrounded in the little court of the mosque by a watchful and almost hostile crowd. I turn on the tape recorder; however, at first no one makes a sound in answer to any questions. Then Khamid explains to them in Pashto that I am a journalist and can tell the entire world about the grief that has befallen them. This gets things started! The Sikhs start to vie with each other to relate how, having survived the shelling that began at noon, they came here, where they thought God would protect them. Six thousand persons. At about 0500 in the evening, several shells, one after the other, hit the mosque and exploded here, right into a crowd of people. There were 102 injured and 57 dead.

"Why?" these people ask me with tears in their eyes. "Why are they treating us this way, for we did not take up arms, and we have not done anything bad to anyone. Our mosque has stood here 500 years, and never in all of these years have the walls of our mosque seen such barbarism."

The city hospital is overcrowded: in one month more than a thousand civilians suffered injuries—mainly from flak. A third of them are children. M. Khanif, a 25-year-old surgeon, told me that there were days that they admitted up to 200 injured people.

The city lives under a strict, around-the-clock curfew. Not one enterprise works. It is forbidden to assemble in mosques and walk in the streets without a special need to do so. The party committee has assumed the obligation of looking after the citizens: Active members of the NDPA regularly make the rounds of homes, ask about the needs of the people, and distribute indispensable items.

All traditional trade relations have been disrupted. From where can one expect new commodities? Only the sky can bring them—if the helicopters from Kabul make it through.

The War

On 7 April in the area in which we stayed, 126 shells fell, killing 6 and injuring 16 people. One mosque and 10 homes were badly damaged. The airfield, where the headquarters of the city's defenders is located, underwent a far more intensive shelling.

"And why do you not respond with your own shelling?" I asked Lt Gen M.A. Delavara, the chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan.

The general meets me in a hastily equipped bunker under the airport building, where he spends 24 hours a day guiding the defense of Jalalabad.

"We must make the most of ammunition," Delavar answers. The problem of supply is not the only one that government forces run into. People in the front lines are worn out by continuous battles; the rebels keep them under constant pressure, and shells and mines fall like hail on their heads. It is not possible to withdraw even one company or one platoon to the rear for rest. Every bayonet counts. Indeed, there is no rear anyway...

But credit must be given to the soldiers and officers: No one complains to me about their fate. It seems that all those who lost courage have already laid down their arms (in the first very tense days, cases of desertion and defection to the side of the enemy were noted), and now those who intend to fight to the end are left.

We ride in an armored personnel carrier to dugouts in the forwardmost defensive positions on the eastern side of the airfield. The picture of destruction all around is truly terrifying.

Old soldier Ivoskhan drives us up to an emplacement parapet beyond which enemy soldiers were located in "green cover" about a half mile away. I carefully click the camera, crouching each time there were nearby bursts. "It's all right," Ivoskhan says. "It is good now; it was bad earlier." He points to the burnt fragments of an An-26 aircraft. Its trip to Jalalabad, which ended so tragically, was the last. Aircraft do not land here anymmore. Four of the members of the family of Ivoskhan, who was yesterday a Nangarhar peasant, took to the trenches when the enemy surrounded the city. "Difficult?" "But what is one to do?" the soldier answers my question with dignity. "If we do not defend our own land, then who will?"

No matter to whom you talk—from general to soldier—all emphasize without fail: Pakistan is waging war with Afghanistan. The indignation over the operations of neighbors here is not based on press materials, but on the real facts that can be seen (and heard) by anyone. The military potential of Pakistan, the experience of its staff officers, and the work of its rear services determines the strength of the rebels. General Delavar is convinced that the artillery crews are made up of active duty Pakistani servicemen: This is indicated not only by the high accuracy of fire, but also by radio intercept data. Each night convoys of Pakistani military cargo trucks are unloaded in the area of Ghaziabad.

There are a lot of opinions with respect to the supposed operations by detachments of the opposition. One officer of the security service, referring to recent agent data, told me the rebels have been directed to secretly filter into the city in small groups, thereby creating a "fifth column," and to start a rebellion at a designated time. But this effort can hardly be undertaken because people's militia posts are positioned every 200 to 300 meters. And if you do not know the password, then you cannot cross the road. Apparently, the tactics of the rebels in the near future will stay the same: powerful artillery preparation and attacks from all directions.

In the basement under the airport building staff officers show me a map with grid squares outlining disclosed enemy positions. These squares are most densely drawn to the east of the city, where they literally overlap each other. It is obvious from everything that the extremists have not discarded the idea of first taking the airfield and, later, after using it to receive cargo, to assault the city itself.

On the morning of 7 April, Sasha Shkirando, a Soviet television correspondent, and Vadim Andreyev, his operator, were able to fly through to Jalalabad. It did not go as well for them as it did for me. On that trip, the convoy of helicopters (two combat and two transport) fell into an ambush. A bullet hit Vadim's camera, which saved his life. Shell splinters cut Sasha's hand slightly. An Afghan sitting next to him was wounded in the leg. One helicopter was temporarily put out of action, and another, with numerous shell holes, turned back immediately.

At the same time, local security organs immediately received information from several sources. The information can be summarized as follows: In connection with the forthcoming new Jalalabad offensive, opposition detachments have been ordered to itensify the air blockade and do everything possible so that not one helicopter can penetrate the wall of fire. It is really not necessary to talk about how this distressed the three Soviet correspondents who were required to return to Kabul. But we returned.

Alleged Afghan Rebel Massacre Described

PM1804154189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 89 Second Edition p 5

[Special Correspondent O. Ignatiyev report: "Massacre Near Sherkudubab Village"]

[Text] Kabul, 16 Apr—For 41 days now the defenders of Jalalabad have been successfully repulsing the enemy's attacks. A particularly difficult period for government troops began after March 25, when armed opposition forces blocked the Kabul-Jalalabad road along which freight was flowing into the besieged city.

According to information reaching the capital at that time, it was possible to conclude that the greatest problems in clearing the rebels from the road would be faced between posts 24 and 25, about 25 km from the town of Sarowbi, where the enemy had mined and blocked the road with trucks that had been burned out or blown up. It was presumed that these trucks had belonged to a convoy of vehicles that had left Jalalabad March 25 and, according to the military report of 26 March, had been shelled by mujahidin, resulting in 4 dead and 50 wounded. But as it turned out, this information was far from the whole story.

The story of the destruction of the truck convoy, its drivers, and its passengers did not become known until April 13 when Afghan Army subunits began an operation to clear the blockage and discovered nearby three women who had miraculously escaped from the party in the convoy. Here is their account:

On March 25 a 140-truck convoy was preparing to leave Jalalabad for Kabul. It had brought food and ammunition to Jalalabad and was returning to Kabul empty. Around 130 of the town's inhabitants—women, children, and old people—asked the drivers to take them to Kabul. The convoy was escorted by two armored personnel carriers [APC] and two armored vehicles.

Not far from Sherkudubab Village the convoy was ambushed. In that section the highway passes through a ravine. To the right there is a mountain slope, to the left a precipice. The two APC's that had gone on ahead were blown up by mines planted by the mujahidin. The armored vehicles bringing up the rear of the convoy were knocked out. Groups of armed people came out from their hiding places and ordered the drivers to stop the trucks on the highway in two rows so as to completely block the road. When the drivers had carried out that demand the mujahidin forced them up to the precipice and shot them, all 140 of them. Then they threw their victims' bodies over the edge. Then they began dealing with those who were in the back of the trucks—the old people and the children.

Such was the bloody tragedy that occurred 25 March 1989 near Sherkudubab, a remote village in the Afghan mountains.

Afghan Says U.S., Pakistan Violate Geneva Pact

LD1404201689 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1443 GMT 14 Apr 89

[From "The World Today" program presented by Valeriy Korzin; interview with (Asef Khorami), counsellor at the Republic of Afghanistan Embassy in Moscow, by correspondent Sergey Rybin; date, place not given—recorded; (Khorami) speaks in vernacular with superimposed Russian translation]

[Text] [Rybin] A year has passed since the signing of the Geneva accords, and it is clear today that the agreements are only being half carried out. How do you assess the position adopted by the United States and, particularly, by Pakistan, toward Afghanistan?

[(Khorami)] After Geneva there was the first appearance of a real chance of restoring peace in our country, creating a broadly based coalition government, holding a general election, and starting talks between the country's opposing forces. As for the position of Pakistan and the United States, they are not only failing to honor their commitments, but are also, on the contrary, stepping up the scale of interference and military aid to the opposition. Matters have even reached the point where President Bush has openly announced the supplying of arms to the opposition until the Republic's legitimate government is overthrown. Pakistan has gone even further than the United States by embarking on direct military aggression. Pakistani militia and regular army units—specifically, the 11th and 18th divisions—are taking a direct part in the battles around Jalalabad and Qandahar. We have proof of that. So it is perfectly obvious that the Geneva accords are being violated by Pakistan and the United States, while Afghanistan and the Soviet Union are honorably fulfilling their obligations.

[Rybin] Literally 2 months ago it was being claimed in the West that the Kabul regime would fall as soon as the Soviet troops left.

[(Khorami)] I would reply to that as follows. Why, in fact, must the West always be right? Why must events develop the way the West wants them to? And why must the West decide our fate? Obviously, for 11 years now the West has been doing all it could to support the opposition. It would like to somehow justify that support. Even long before the Soviet troop withdrawal, there were frequent announcements of the fall of our government. These were attempts to prove that it had no support from the people. Today everyone can see that, nearly 2 months after the withdrawal of the Soviet troops, our government is holding firm, going forward, continuing to implement the policy of national reconciliation, and defending the independence of Afghanistan. There is now hope among us that peace will be restored in the country, and the bloodshed ended.

[Rybin] What do you think are the ways of resolving the Afghan problem? What are the prospects for settling it?

[(Khorami)] Both our supporters and the opposition are tired of war. For example, the commanders of the armed groups operating within the country have refused to take part in setting up a so-called transitional government on the territory of Pakistan. The war continues because of some opposition leaders and those countries that seek misfortune for the Afghan people. We are sure that reason will eventually gain the upper hand, and the Afghans will, without being pushed by anyone, sit down at the negotiating table to decide their own destiny by themselves. Our people know both how to fight and how to build a peaceful life. When necessary, they know how to join forces to defend their honor and independence.

Pakistani 'Saboteur' Arrested in Afghanistan

LD1804221689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1710 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] Kabul, 18 Apr (TASS)—TASS correspondent Andrey Greshnov reports: In the south Afghan Province of Qandahar a Pakistani saboteur who infiltrated the country's territory with an extremist group, has been arrested.

"Several days ago, units of the irreconcilable opposition, more than 2,000-men strong, mounted an offensive against government troop positions in the area of Tor Kotal," [place name as received] the TASS correspondent was told by Afghan officer Nur Gol, deputy commander of a military unit stationed near the Pakistan border. "Using armor," he said, "the rebels tried to break through our defenses and penetrate deep into Afghan territory. The offensive was stopped and the mujahidin left 240 dead on the field. Several 'Islamic Party of Afghanistan' fighters were taken prisoner. One of them turned out to be a Pakistani citizen."

The TASS correspondent met the arrested Pakistani and talked to him on the plane from Qandahar to Kabul. Pakistani intelligence officer Khubat Khan said he was sent into Qandahar to mine communications lines, which, in the thinking of his superiors, would help blockade the administrative center of the province. Twenty-five-year-old Khubat Khan had on him a poison capsule in order to "drop out of the game" in the event of capture by the security bodies, but he did not have time to use it.

A spokesman for the Ministry of State Security of the Republic of Afghanistan reports that an investigation has begun concerning the saboteur's mission.

PTI Says Pakistan Recruiting Sikh Extremists

BK1804142089 Moscow in Hindi to India 1400 GMT 17 Apr 89

[Unattributed commentary]

[Text] The PTI [Press Trust of India] news agency has reported from Kabul that several Sikhs who fled besieged Jalalabad said agents of the Pakistani intelligence agency had tried to recruit them. There is a large Sikh community in Jalalabad, and it is not simply by chance that this community has become the focus of their attention. When the mujahidin could not succeed in their direct offensive to capture Jalalabad, they started looking for ways to establish their control over this city.

Most of the Indians living in Afghanistan are businessmen, and they can greatly influence the situation in Jalalabad. The emissaries of the mujahidin have repeatedly urged the citizens of Indian origin in Jalalabad to rise up against the government to facilitate the operations of the armed gangs of the opposition so Jalalabad will fall into their hands. Why is the Pakistani secret agency—the Interservices Intelligence group [ISI]—being blamed for these tricks? An answer to this question can be found if the operation involving the recruitment of agents is examined carefully.

According to reports, representatives of the Sikh extremists, who are trying to separate Punjab from India and form the so-called state of Khalistan, are working in collaboration with the mujahidin. While supporting the campaigns of the Afghan opposition, they are also serving their own interests. They advise the Sikhs living in Jalalabad to come to Pakistan so they can subsequently be sent to India to support the pro-Khalistan groups. The Pakistani secret agency is patronizing the Sikh extremists as well as the Afghan hard-liners. Without its patronage, coordination of their operations could not have been possible, and the plans to use Pakistani soil as a base could not have been prepared. Pakistan's ISI is behind such dirty operations. This can be proved by several other facts. Under its supervision, the Sikh separatists and the mujahidin established contacts in Britain and the United States in 1985 and 1986, when the possibility of a direct collaboration among the terrorists was explored, writes the Indian press. These are tangible facts, but the Pakistani Government refuses to admit its interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs and its support for pro-Khalistan elements. It may be a private affair for the Pakistani authorities to protect their honor, but observers think these political gimmicks may have negative consequences.

Reports have already come in about the collusion between the Khalistan supporters and the terrorist groups in India's Kashmir and Darjeeling. Now, they are increasing their cooperation with the Afghan mujahidin. It seems that someone is deliberately trying to orchestrate these movements to make the task of establishing political stability in this region difficult. The possibility of the supplying of modern Stinger missiles to Sikh separatists is a matter of special concern. Previously, the U.S. used to rule out the possibility of these missiles falling into the hands of the Sikhs by saying that Washington keeps an eye on the missiles it supplies. But now Washington admits it has lost control over the Stinger missiles it had supplied. If these modern weapons reach India, its consequences can very well be imagined. Even civilian planes can become the victims of Stinger missiles.

The Pakistani authorities should clearly understand that by coordinating the contacts between the mujahidin and the Sikh terrorists, they shift onto their shoulders the responsibility of its possible consequences for this region. Their action diminishes the possibilities for normalization of relations between Pakistan and India. It also cannot have any beneficial effect on the efforts for an early solution to the situation in Afghanistan. With their actions the Pakistani authorities are encouraging terrorism and narcotics and arms smuggling, which cannot but affect the national security of (?Pakistan) itself.

New Indian Envoy Lauds Arms Control, Ties

OW1604184689 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2245 GMT 11 Apr 89

[From the "Novosti" newscast; Sergey Alekseyev video report; first, last paragraphs are editorial introduction by unidentified announcer]

[Text] The results of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to Great Britain are being discussed in India. Here is what our correspondent has to say:

[Alekseyev] An Indian-Soviet seminar has been held in the Indian capital in which prominent statesmen and public figures of the Republic and well-known Soviet scientists who are visiting New Delhi participated. The seminar centered around a discussion of the Soviet leader's address in London. [video shows seminar in progress; partly visible sign on wall reads: "...of Change in the USSR—Trends and Prospects; 8 April 1989, New Delhi"; Alfred Gonsalves, Indian deputy foreign minister and new ambassador to the USSR, identified by screen caption, also shown; video cuts to show unidentified correspondent interviewing Alfred Gonsalves, whose voice, apparently recorded over the telephone, can be heard in English, with Alekseyev translating his remarks into Russian]

We share the specific initiatives that were expressed in it. I would highlight the Soviet Union's decision to stop, as early as this year, the production of highly enriched uranium used for military purposes. Like the Soviet Union, we are also confident of the possibility of building a world free from nuclear arms. Concerning British statements about the fact that the modern world requires the existence of nuclear arsenals, well, no one here in India shares these views. Moreover, we are firmly convinced that a real opportunity exists to destroy lethal nuclear weapons as early as the year 2010, which is reflected in the known proposal made by our country. Besides, it is necessary to strive for a reduction in conventional arms, which should be retained exclusively for purposes of defense.

In conclusion, in connection with our congratulations over his appointment as the new ambassador of India to the USSR, Alfred Gonsalves noted: I am very happy over this appointment primarily because the development of Indian-Soviet relations is one of the main trends in Indian foreign policy. I impatiently look forward to becoming acquainted with the Soviet Union.

Soviet Bloc-India Trade Seminar Held in Delhi

18070216 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 11 Apr 89 p 1

[Text] Delhi 10 April (TASS)—The cooperation between India and the Soviet Union and the European socialist countries should be an important part of the new world economic policy based on equality and justice. Such was the main idea of the speeches at the seminar that opened in the Indian capital entitled "Trade and Economic Relations Between India and the USSR, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland, and Czechoslovakia; New Perspectives." Participating in the work of the seminar—which was convened at the initiative of UNCTAD [UN Conference on Trade and Development] and the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (ISIMEO) and the Indian-Soviet Industrial Chamber of Commerce—were representatives of the leading Indian state and private companies, scholars, experts, and representatives of the socialist countries. The Soviet delegation was headed by the Deputy Chairman of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers I.D. Ivanov.

Bangladesh Foreign Minister Lauds Soviet Policy

PM1404134189 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 13 Apr 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Report on interview with Bangladesh Foreign Minister A. Mahmud by N. Paklin and K. Yarovoy in Dhaka: "A. Mahmud: Ways of Resolving Regional Conflicts Have Been Identified"; date of interview not given]

[Text] The policy of the present Soviet leadership is a substantial contribution to change for the better in the world as a whole and in Asia in particular and to East-West rapprochement, Bangladesh Foreign Minister Anisul Islam Mahmud said in conversation with IZVESTIYA and TASS correspondents in Dhaka.

The minister noted that ways of resolving regional conflicts in Asia, in particular the Afghan and Cambodian conflicts, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Near East crisis, have been identified.

"We have an exceedingly high opinion of the steps taken by the USSR leadership when it withdrew Soviet forces from Afghanistan and of other fundamentally new approaches by your country to foreign policy problems," A.I. Mahmud said. "Some people believe that the withdrawal of Soviet forces was a foreign policy defeat for the Soviet Union. In fact, it was a graphic manifestation of the Soviet leadership's new political approach—a bold, farsighted decision. It may be that its consequences will not be felt immediately, but I am sure that in the future they will have an exceedingly important effect on the situation in the region and in the world. By withdrawing its forces from Afghanistan the Soviet Union was contributing to mutual understanding among states and peoples, to improving the political climate in Asia. As for Afghanistan itself, let the Afghans solve their own problems without outside interference, including the question of forming a broad-based government. As is known, Bangladesh has not recognized the 'transitional government' of the mujahidin. Mujahidin spokesman G. Hikmatyar has just been to Dhaka. We had a frank discussion. We told him that the best thing in the present situation is for the Afghans to agree among themselves and set up a broad-based government. We consider this a realistic way to solve the problem. It is easy to say, of course, but not so simple to accomplish."

Talking about the adjustment of Bangladesh's foreign policy, A.I. Mahmud said: "We have very good relations with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. But we would like to deepen them further. We have tangible evidence of the benefit that friendly relations with the USSR and the socialist countries bring, above all in the trade and economic sphere. I believe that there is still considerable untapped potential in this area. We must exploit it."

Sub-Saharan Africa

UN's 'Special Plan' for Namibia Viewed

18070214 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 89 First Edition p 3

[Report by V. Vinogradov: "A Difficult Start for Namibia"]

[Text] Only recently one could not even imagine such a thing. Some Soviet journalists appeared in Windhoek, the administrative center of Namibia, and they were received by the Republic of South Africa [RSA] general administrator in this country, L. Pienaar. Moreover they were informed about the situation in Namibia and received answers to their questions.

Obviously, significant changes are taking place in the world. Under the influence of the positive changes in Soviet-U.S. relations and the general warming of the international climate, the world community has been given a rare opportunity to begin in earnest to untie or at least loosen the tight knots of regional conflicts. The sides, which heretofore appeared to be irreconcilable opponents, are now making attempts to find a common language and arrive at mutually acceptable solutions. Such attempts have not been successful everywhere yet, but with respect to Southwest Africa these joint efforts have produced the desired result.

I recall that from May through December of last year negotiations continued among Angola, Cuba, and the RSA, with the mediation of the USSR and the United States, for regulating the situation in Southwest Africa, and on 13 December the RSA signed the "Brazzaville Protocol" which committed them to beginning the process of granting independence to Namibia, which it occupies, in keeping with Resolution 435 of the UN Security Council.

Confirmed by the New York agreement of 22 December among Angola, Cuba, and the RSA, the date of 1 April 1989 became the official turning point, after which the new—post-colonial—era of Namibia began. From this day on the country began to live according to a special plan developed by the UN which spelled out in detail by the week who was to do what and how. Thus beginning on 1 April troops, also authorized by the UN, comprising the UN group for rendering assistance to Namibia in the transitional period (UNTAG) began to be deployed throughout the country. Their task was to check to make sure that the ceasefire was being observed between the combat detachments of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and the RSA occupation army and that there was disarmament and disbandment of the marionette "RSA territorial forces" (SWATF). They will also have to supervise the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia according to the established schedule and the distribution of the remaining RSA military units and also SWAPO detachments on the bases assigned to them. By the middle of May the number of

RSA troops in Namibia should be reduced from the current 60,000 to 12,000, and by 1 July, when the pre-election campaign officially begins—to 1,500 men. All the military facilities on the Angolan border will be placed under the control of UNTAG.

UNTAG must make sure that the forthcoming elections in Namibia are free and fair. The "transitional government" formed at one time by Pretoria has been disbanded, and power is wielded in the country by the aforementioned RSA general administrator in Namibia, L. Pienaar. But during the course of the elections, which are scheduled for 1 November, a constituent assembly will be elected which is to adopt a constitution and—no later than 1 April 1990—proclaim an independent Namibia.

Observers, guessing even before the beginning of the transition period—that is, before 1 April of this year—which government would win the elections in (Tintenpalast), the government residence in Windhoek, were unanimous in their prediction. SWAPO, which has been waging armed combat for the liberation of Namibia since 1966, has the best chances of coming out the winner. In their opinion, it can win 50-60 percent of the votes. But the SWAPO leaders think that if the elections are actually free and democratic the organization will win no less than 70 percent of the votes. But the SWAPO leadership is aware that victory will not come of its own accord. It has concentrated efforts on political mobilization of the masses in support of its program, which envisions the creation of a democratic state that expresses the will of the people.

Quite understandably, the prospects of a SWAPO victory in the elections are not to the liking of the authorities in Pretoria who even now while leaving Namibia are not abandoning their hopes of retaining control over it, and especially the right-wing forces of Namibia itself. Even before 1 April they waged an active campaign whose goal was to undermine the SWAPO position, to discredit the organization in the eyes of the Namibians, and to prevent its victory in the elections. The country now has up to 40 political parties and groupings created primarily on a national basis. In the meantime pre-election alliances are created and dissolved and then brought together again, but with all this one cannot but see the basic tendency—forces associated with the South African candidate and the local administration and business are trying to form a reliable anti-SWAPO bloc. And therefore it is no accident that the treasuries of these parties and groupings are receiving millions of South African rands.

The maneuvers to which the RSA is resorting in order to reach its goal can by no means be called attractive. Thus L. Pienaar managed to get a resolution adopted to increase the voting age from 18 to 21. And this, according to SWAPO's estimate, can cost it 80 percent of the votes of the young people who support the organization. At the same time the authorities are making "Namibians" out of thousands of members of the anti-Angolan terrorist grouping UNITA [Union for Total Independence of Angola], supplying the appropriate documents for them. The only condition for obtaining such a document is the commitment to vote against SWAPO in the elections. But there are other, more alarming reports. As S. Nujoma reported, the South African Army is setting up warehouses for weapons and ammunition in various regions of Namibia. They intend to use them for an armed uprising in the event that SWAPO wins a victory in the forthcoming elections. And then it will be a matter of support for the rebels from the Republic of South Africa. Plans are also being made for creating a kind of terrorist grouping so that it—again in the event that SWAPO assumes power—can wage an undeclared war against the legal government in the country as UNITA is now doing in Angola or the MNS in Mozambique.

But these are plans. Weapons have already been used in Namibia. This occurred in the northern part of the country where the police controlled by the occupation authorities were the initiators of armed conflicts with SWAPO troops. The authorities in Pretoria were expecting such an incident. They immediately hastened to divert to the north of Namibia about 3,000 military servicemen from the SWATF and they also sent their aircraft and helicopters there.

SWAPO president S. Nujoma most decisively condemned the dispatch of six SWATF battalions to the north of Namibia and denied the assertion of the RSA that 1,200 SWAPO troops had invaded Namibia from Angola. In his words, those who participated in the conflict were on Namibian territory even before the ceasefire agreement went into effect on 1 April of this year. They gathered in groups to move to one of the UNTAG-controlled bases when they were attacked by police formations. SWAPO troops, said S. Nujoma, have the strongest order not to undertake any actions which could impede the implementation of resolution 435 of the UN Security Council. SWAPO, he confirmed, is ready for the closest cooperation with UNTAG.

Of course, nobody expected that the implementation of the UN plan for Namibia would proceed smoothly and calmly; everybody was ready for possible difficulties. But nonetheless the incident in the northern party of the country seriously complicated its implementation. The more so since the chief of the general staff of the RSA armed forces, General (Kh. Geldenkhyus) hastened to announce that Pretoria had already developed a "plan of action" in case the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 435 was interrupted. It is not at all difficult to imagine which "actions" had been envisioned by the Pretoria regime which had occupied Namibia for so long and ruled the roost there as if it were their inherited estate.

UNTAG representatives took steps directed toward preventing the incident from getting out of hand and then eliminating it altogether. The UN secretary general appealed to both countries to display maximum restraint and composure. The agreement on South West Africa which had been reached with such difficulty should not be sacrificed through unreasoned and hasty actions. It should be recalled that with respect to South West Africa an attempt was made—and a fairly successful one—to find an international solution to a regional conflict. Too much money and energy were invested in making the agreement on South West Africa a reality. To undermine it would mean to deal a blow to the new atmosphere of trust in the world.

The UN plan for Namibia should be carried out strictly according to schedule and without excesses. In spite of the difficult start, the million and a half Namibian people will undoubtedly acquire their independence and freedom. As M. S. Gorbachev noted in one of his speeches, now real prospects have opened up for putting an end to the terrible legacy of the colonial period—the enslavement of Namibia. The people of this country will be able to create their own independent state and join the family of equal African states.

There is no doubt that this will open up new possibilities in the matter of further easing the tension in the south of Africa.

Nigerian, Soviet Ministers Hold Talks

LD1204104689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0622 GMT 11 Apr 89

[Text] Lagos, 12 Apr (TASS)—Nigerian Foreign Minister, Ike Nwachukwu, received on Tuesday V.G. Chirskov, president of the "USSR-Nigeria" friendship society and USSR Minister of Construction of Oil and Gas Industry Enterprises, who is here on a visit. During a conversation, held in a friendly atmosphere, the sides exchanged opinions on developing cooperation between the two countries, the situation in Southern Africa and other questions of mutual interest.

The Nigerian minister highly assessed the USSR's foreign policy activity, which immutably comes out on the side of the fighters for freedom, and against apartheid.

V.G. Chirskov spoke of the activity of the "USSR-Nigeria" friendship society for the strengthening traditional relations of friendship between the peoples of the two countries.

RSA's Slabbert Meets Solidarity Members in Moscow

Discusses Apartheid System, ANC

MB0604155089 Moscow in English to Southern Africa 1900 GMT 5 Apr 89

[Interview with Frederik van Zyl Slabbert, director of the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa by unidentified announcer; date, place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Taking part in today's program is Mr Frederik van Zyl Slabbert. He is one of the the directors of IDASA [Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa], professor at Witwatersrand University Business School and the former leader of the South African Progressive Federal Party. For 16 years on end he was a member of the South African parliament. In 1986 he opted out of parliament and engaged in the struggle against apartheid.

We would like to add that Mr van Zyl Slabbert is a tall handsome blond who knows how to produce an impression. He never fails to evoke sympathy on the part of his audiences.

So, our first question: Sir, you are for the first time in the USSR and your visit has just started. What are your impressions of your first days here in Moscow?

[Slabbert] We have had opportunity to talk to the committee of the Solidarity Committee. We have had an opportunity to talk to some of the scientist and research fellows at the Africa Institute and we've had an opportunity to talk to some of our ANC compatriot students at the Patrice Lamumba University.

[Announcer] How, in your regard, do the Soviet people realize the situation in South Africa?

[Slabbert] We are told that you are quite familiar with the broad circumstances in South Africa, and that this is more in the nature of an expert exchange of views rather than us trying to lecture you on the complexities of the South African way of life. Normally speaking, I suppose, one could divide the South African situation between those who are working in the apartheid system and maintaining the apartheid system, and those who are fundamentally opposed to it. The nature of our delegation is to try to show you that it is slightly more complex than that. Yet, here you have [changes thought] would have had if Jakes Gerwel had come, three, four people who are involved in the institutional life of South Africa, but also oppose apartheid from that particular area and to try to show how they link up with the broader democratic struggle, which is being waged by the ANC and other extraparliamentary organization, like the UDF and COSATU, and so on.

[Announcer] Sir, what could you say about the situation in the South African parliament? There is a Labor Party in South Africa. What stand does it take?

[Slabbert] I think the Labor Party finds itself in a very difficult position because it decided as a party to participate in tricameral politics without really consulting in the broader extraparliamentary field. They simply decided that in terms of their own support, they were going to go in, and were going to, in a sense, represent the colored people's point of view on apartheid generally. They did so, as I said, without broader consultation and in that sense became a symbol of the problems of participation in tricameral politics.

Now, in their recent congress that was held in Bloemfontein, also as a result of their own experience within tricameral politics, the Labor Party has decided that they were going to actively seek opportunities to talk to the ANC and to show what negotiation politics is all about. Well, that shows they want to be more confrontationist within the tricameral parliament, but of course for them to be able to do that depends also on the response of the ANC. I don't think that there has been any further progress along that line, except that the ANC initially said, we are not going to respond to this statement of the Labor Party. But my discussions on an informal basis with members of the executive of the ANC is, if this is what they want to do then they must first consult with other extraparliamentary organization before they come and talk to us. In other words, talk to the UDF, affiliates and so on. Find out what their attitudes are towards this and then come and talk to us.

That is the one thing. The other thing is that the Labor Party also has kept a distance from the Progressive Federal Party. I know when I was still leader of the Progressive Party Federal Party, at that stage they didn't want to know anything about us and they were more interested in participating with the government.

[Announcer] Sir, what is your attitude to the ANC constitutional guidelines?

[Slabbert] My own opinion?

[Announcer] Yes, your personal view, please.

[Slabbert] Well, the conference that was held at the end of February in Harare between the legal representatives of the ANC and, I have difficulty in pronouncing his surname, but i have an ANC friend here, Zola or Zola (?Zahile) ... Zola was the leader of that delegation and others were there as well, like Eric Moduda and Sachs and others, Phyllis Naidoo, and a group of, say, approximately 30 law professors from Afrikaans universities, Potchefstroom, Bloemfontein, Stellenbosch, Pretoria, RAU [Rand Afrikaans University], they sat for 5 days talking about the constitutional guidelines of the ANC. And there was an agreement reached by all that the guidelines were acceptable as a basis for negotiating a new constitution. In fact, some of those law professors said they were going to incorporate the guidelines into their teaching courses at their universities. And I have subsequently found out that they have done so.

IDASA itself has run a number of seminars and conferences on the guidelines. We started off first with a conference at Cape Town University on the Freedom Charter, to which about 500 to 600 people came, and we had to close off because we did not have enough space. More people would have come. We then had another meeting at Bloemfontein University which was teargassed by the far-right, but despite that 180 people who signed on for that meeting stayed and had a discussion. And we have now recently had another meeting in Natal, using the guidelines as a basis for discussion. So, to cut a long story short, IDASA is using the guidelines as a basis for creating a discussion on an alternative constitutional model for South Africa.

Holds News Conference on USSR Role

LD1204012189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2113 GMT 11 Apr 89

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] At the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African countries, a press conference was held by a delegation from the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa.

Conditions for settling the conflict inside the country by political means and for holding talks on such a settlement have not yet ripened in the RSA [Republic of South Africa] stated delegation leader Frederik van Zyl Slabbert.

As we saw for ourselves during our visit, the USSR is seeking to play a constructive role and to cooperate with other states in the quest for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in southern Africa. However, in order to achieve such a settlement the RSA Government must free all political prisoners, lift the ban on the activity of banned organizations, end apartheid, repeal the state of emergency, and adopt a truly democratic constitution, Frederik van Zyl Slabbert concluded. [video shows van Zyl Slabbert addressing mixed black and white audience, then answering questions from people sitting around tables]

Mauritius Leader Receives CPSU Delegation

PM1404080589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Visit by Delegation"]

[Text] The visit to Mauritius by a delegation of CPSU party workers headed by O.R. Latsis, first deputy chief editor of KOMMUNIST, has ended. The delegation has been visiting this country at the invitation of the Militant Socialist Movement. The delegation was received by A. Jugnauth, leader of the Militant Socialist Movement and prime minister of Mauritius, who emphasized the importance of the further development of friendly Soviet-Mauritian relations. Meetings were also held with the leadership of the Mauritius Labour Party and the Mauritian Militant Movement.

Envoy to Liberia Urges Peace Moves in Afghanistan

AB1104195389 Monrovia Radio ELWA in English 1709 GMT 11 Apr 89

[Text] The Soviet ambassador to Liberia, Dr Vasiliy Bebko, has called on the United Nations and the United States of America to apply more international pressure to end the bloodshed in Afghanistan. He said since the withdrawal of Soviet troops last February from Afghanistan under the influence of the United Nations and the United States, the situation in that country has become more complicated. Addressing journalists Monday [10 April] at the Soviet Embassy in Monrovia, Ambassador Bebko said the United Nations has everything needed to bring the Afghan fighting under control, just as it did in the Namibian independence struggle.

East Europe

Gorbachev, CSSR's Jakes Hold Talks 18 Apr

*PM1904100589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
19 Apr 89 Second Edition p 1*

[TASS-attributed report on Gorbachev's 18 April talks with Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee General Secretary Jakes; "M.S. Gorbachev's Meeting with M. Jakes"—PRAVDA headline]

[Text] A meeting took place 18 April between M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and M. Jakes, general secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] Central Committee, who was on a working visit in the Soviet Union.

Welcoming the guest, M.S. Gorbachev stressed the special importance and usefulness of meetings and exchanges of views between the leaders of the fraternal parties, now that we have entered an historic phase comprising the radical turning point in the development of socialism and its rejuvenation—taking into consideration both experience already accumulated and the task of adapting to the presentday conditions of the development of world civilization.

Most of the conversation, indeed, was conducted with these ideas uppermost. M. Jakes said that the Communists and people of Czechoslovakia fully support the idea of revolutionary restructuring, and the nature of this process in the two countries has much in common. In our country, he said, this process began with the 17th Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Congress, but since then much has become much clearer to us, specific plans for the transformation of various spheres of public life have been born and the first practical steps have been taken. This is especially the case with regard to the economy, with enterprises transferring to new conditions of management and the election of managers being held. At the same time, overcoming administrative forms of management does not come easily. Many officials are finding it hard to move away from slogans and appeals to work in a new way toward putting these slogans into practice.

M.S. Gorbachev shared the idea that perhaps the most complex thing in restructuring is to overcome the inertia of previous thinking and habits stemming from the period of stagnation. At the first stage of restructuring what had predominated was analysis of the past, discussions concerning the direction to conduct matters, how to solve the acute problems which had accumulated. Such discussions are continuing now too—as of yet we have far from solved all the theoretical questions. And yet it can be said that a new stage has begun, when practical trial of the policy of restructuring is coming to the forefront. This transition is complex, since many people, used to certain procedures, are embarking on the changes indecisively and sometimes even nervously. But the changes are vitally necessary, and this is essentially so in all public spheres.

In our country now industry, the agrarian sector, science, schools and the health service alike are being restructured. And as for people—the working class, the peasantry, intelligentsia, youth, literally all society, in all its sections. During this process quite a few problems arise which need to be tackled urgently. Here the role of the party is a big one, and it must act not by the method of command, as before, but it must be the coordinator, the integrator of the efforts of various public strata, it must channel them to achieve the main aim of restructuring—opening-up socialism's possibilities and improving our people's lives.

M.S. Gorbachev briefed his guest on his assessment of the results of the elections of USSR people's deputies, stressing that these had shown the political maturity of the broad masses of the people and the Soviet people's absolute support for the policy of restructuring. At the same time the electors had unambiguously expressed the desire to achieve practical results more quickly. Ahead of us we have work which is vast in scale and significance, the inception of new supreme organs of power and the adoption of many important laws.

M. Jakes, for his part, discussed the plans for transformations in the political system of Czechoslovak society. In the near future, elections for seats in the CSSR Federal Assembly which become vacant will be held with two or three candidates, and in the general elections planned for 1991, the creation of multiseat constituencies is possible. A whole range of measures is planned aimed at raising the independence and responsibility of parties and public organizations which are members of the National Front. Public groups have already been set up on questions of ecology and the implementation of the Vienna agreements.

We also, the CPCZ leader stressed, attribute great importance to the process of restructuring the party itself, the democratization of its work and the renewal of cadres. Preparations are now getting under way for the CPCZ Congress planned for the spring of next year. It is intended that it will adopt the theses of the party's program and the new rules and that proposals will be worked out for a new CSSR constitution. It is proposed that all draft documents will be put forward for nationwide discussion.

Bringing to an end the conversation concerning policies designed to raise socialism to a new level of development, M.S. Gorbachev stressed that the specific situation of each country presupposes diversity both in the character of these policies and in the choice of the optimal pace for reforms. What is true for everyone is the need constantly to advance, not to lag behind the needs of society and the feelings of the popular masses.

The leaders of the two parties discussed the state of Soviet-Czechoslovak cooperation. They noted that, notwithstanding its general positive development, the pace of establishing cooperative ties did not as yet correspond to the possibilities of our countries. It is necessary to resolutely remove everything that is hampering this important work, and create conditions for direct cooperation between enterprises and scientific research institutes without an unnecessary bureaucratic superstructure.

The participants in the conversation were in full agreement in their assessment of the situation in Europe and the world. The USSR and Czechoslovakia would continue to act together in the interests of the new political thinking making progress in the international arena. The conviction was expressed that, with good will on the part of the West, it would be possible already in the foreseeable future to take new major steps in realizing the concept of a "common European home", to unite efforts for the resolution of global problems

M.S. Gorbachev asked M. Jakes to convey the Soviet leadership's cordial greetings to J. Husak and the other Czechoslovak leaders.

The conversation passed in an atmosphere of cordiality and comradely mutual understanding.

A luncheon was arranged on behalf of the CPSU Central Committee in honor of the guest from Czechoslovakia. At the luncheon were Comrades M.S. Gorbachev, N.N. Slyunkov, A.N. Yakovlev, N.V. Talyzin, and other officials.

Jakes Addresses News Conference

PM1904120989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Friendship, Unity"]

[Text] The meeting with M.S. Gorbachev was very valuable for us. The Soviet Communists' support for the steps which the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] is taking is enabling it to advance more resolutely. M. Jakes, general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, declared this on addressing Soviet and foreign journalists at a news conference in the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center 18 April.

During the meeting, the CPCZ leader continued, there was an exchange of opinions primarily on questions of restructuring and democratization in our countries and the party's role in these processes. An important place was also allocated to the prospects for the development of bilateral relations, particularly economic cooperation involving the use of new, modern forms. This is extremely important for Czechoslovakia, because 42 percent of its foreign trade is linked with the Soviet Union.

Emphasizing the unity of the sides' opinions on international problems, M. Jakes pointed out that the CPCZ fully supports the CPSU's foreign policy founded on the new thinking and the efforts which the USSR is making to resolve all existing international problems by political means.

As for questions of restructuring, the CPCZ Central Committee general secretary continued, our aims here are similar to the CPSU's. Of course, our conditions and the specific nature of Czechoslovakia must be taken into account. The experience of the Soviet Union, which was the first to embark on the path of restructuring, is extremely important for the CSSR. The most important thing now is not to stand still but to continue restructuring. The former potential for the country's development has been exhausted, and the need for intensive development has arisen—which requires the people's broad participation in managing the state. An extensive program of not only economic but also political reform has been drawn up in the CSSR, and power is gradually being decentralized. We see as the chief thing the fact that restructuring must prove socialism's advantages and ensure its development and its magnetic force in the world.

At Moscow's Taganskiy CPSU Rayon Committee [raykom] on the same day M. Jakes familiarized himself with the way the party's rayon link works under conditions of restructuring. Speaking about the rayon and the activity of its party organization, raykom First Secretary R.V. Zhukova emphasized that restructuring has given Communists a wide field for creativity. It is precisely in the spirit of creativity, in the constant quest for nontraditional ways, and in the testing of new methods in practice that the raykom seeks to be active in realizing the economic and political reform. The successes achieved, the mistakes, and the way they are being overcome were also described.

The CPCZ Central Committee general secretary showed great interest in the work of the Communists' rayon staff, noted the usefulness of an exchange of experience for the two countries' Communist Parties, and spoke of the CPCZ's principled approaches to questions of restructuring.

Jakes Responds to Questions

LD1804202389 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 1656 GMT 18 Apr 89

["Substantial Parts" of news conference by CPCZ General Secretary Milos Jakes in Moscow on 18 April—recorded]

[Text] [Announcer] Asked by a Novosti journalist whether and what changes are necessary for efficient cooperation by CEMA states, Comrade Jakes said, among other things:

[Begin Jakes recording] Our point of departure is—and at the moment we do not envisage any change in this approach—that CEMA is not a supranational organization, that is, all we are solving here is an active but mutual agreement. What do we want? What do we want to change? For this we need a political decision in the sense of achieving through a meeting of general secretaries a unified view which would then orientate governments in their further steps. I think the substantial thing is to make a transition to the economic instruments in this cooperation, to put an end to it being a one to one exchange with individual countries; for the most part, to gradually make a transition to convertibility of the ruble in particular, as well as national currencies, to create national markets, which presents a certain problem inasmuch as the majority of markets are difficult, and gradually to make a transition to what had already been approved and set out—that is to create a unified market, a socialist market of CEMA member states. That is the basic approach so that the CEMA's work could improve and correspond to the given state of development. [end recording]

[Announcer] The next question was asked by our permanent Moscow correspondent:

[Begin recording] [Voldan] Czechoslovak Radio, Petr Voldan. Comrade general secretary, you have praised highly the significance of Soviet-Czechoslovak economic cooperation. At the same time it is no secret that our mutual trade exchange is unbalanced—it is known that there are problems at integrative building projects. From this point of view, how do you see further development of this ecoomic cooperation in the next few years?

[Jakes] First, I should like to say that these problems cannot become the cause of slowing down or weakening this cooperation. We are seeking—and we have found—a number of paths which will make it possible to solve this problem. I should like to say in this connection that we see the solution in the development of cooperation and specialization with the USSR. Yes, much has changed; Czechoslovakia also has certain assets, these assets stem from the change of prices—namely the reduction of oil prices in world markets which is creating a 5-year delay in our mutual relations—this has created a temporary situation for certain of Czechoslovakia's assets with the USSR; I stress yet again—temporary situation.

That we have these assets does not bother us as it creates space for further development in this cooperation.

Naturally a number of changes are taking place with which we must cooperate much quicker, as enterprises cooperate between themselves and we do not have all the necessary economic tools. In the past, both in Czechoslovakia and in the USSR, as everything was coming from state funds everybody had a great appetite: Machinery was ordered and then it was not utilized in production. Put quite simply it was not seen as a problem because the economic impact was not felt. Today every enterprise is counting whether it is better to start in Czechoslovakia or abroad, and it will consider the quality of the machinery, whether to buy the machinery in Czechoslovakia or abroad, and it will consider the quality of the machinery. I would say these are problems which make us react faster and produce better goods and put cooperation on an economic basis, which is most important for the mutual beneficial character of this cooperation.

With regard to integrated building projects, we will continue with them according to the concluded contracts. Those contracts are slightly different from their original form as the speed of the projects' implementation is slowing down, their efficiency is under investigation and so on. We want to take part in the USSR in tackling problems which are also our problems by joint participation, because not everything can be produced in Czechoslovakia effectively.

The reduction of arms creates some problems too. You all know that the USSR and our country too have unilaterally reduced our arms.

This creates a need to limit our military production. Naturally this temporarily causes problems, but this forces us to effect structural changes. We must react to this. All in all, the problems which arise here make us deal with the problems of future. Therefore the temporary—I emphasize temporary—unsettled commercial relations change nothing and are not a brake in the development of further cooperation, as the USSR is a partner without which Czechoslovakia cannot manage. This is a vitally important country for our development, I would say, and we have an overriding interest in this cooperation. [end recording]

[Announcer] The correspondent of [word indistinct] Radio and Television asked Comrade Jakes, among other things, how Czechoslovakia wanted to contribute to the construction of the joint European home. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Central Committee general secretary said:

[Begin Jakes recording] I think that Czechoslovakia's contribution to the creation of a European home takes two forms. First there is the initiative on creating a zone of confidence between NATO and Warsaw Pact countries in which the amount of weaponry will be reduced and in which human contacts will be much greater—cultural, economic contacts and so on.

We see this as a certain investment and together with this, joint proposals with the West German Social Democratic Party and the Socialist Unity Party of West Germany, on creating zones without nuclear arms and without chemical weapons. Naturally, if broader agreements are to take place, we fully support such agreements. We strive for cooperation with all European countries and we are involved in one specific issue—solving ecological problems—for two reasons: First because we are the subject of fall out of certain impurities which did not originate in Czechoslovakia, and second we ourselves are a great pollutant in Europe because we burn large amounts of coal containing large amounts of sulphur. We know that ecological problems cannot be solved within the framework of one country only. We have come with an offer that our neighbors should meet and we will tackle this ecological problem together with them. If this is successful it is an important investment for European cooperation in general and provides great possibilities for cooperation in solving these problems, inasmuch as what is involved are the necessary technologies, the production of the necessary equipment and other steps connected with it. For example, Mitterrand, and other politicians with whom we had open talks, visited our country. We talked about the possibility of all-round cooperation, particularly in the cultural and economic spheres, where we are also interested in creating joint enterprises and we have set up the legal prerequisites for this, to provide security for the countries which will be jointly setting up these enterprises. We are also concerned with broad cooperation and specialization: quite simply Czechoslovakia wants to participate in the international division of labor on a much broader scale than before. [end recording]

[Announcer] How can our country be inspired by the restructuring currently taking place in Soviet society? This was the question from Czechoslovak television's Moscow correspondent:

[Begin Jakes recording] I would say that the basic experience is—despite all the problems which are connected with restructuring—to go forward. That is, to implement restructuring and not to be intimidated by the problems. This is the most important and the basic lesson which we are drawing from our own practice, in the long run. The USSR's experience only confirms this approach. Second, it is important that we keep contact and that we apply in time all that is good about restructuring with regard to our conditions and that we oppose in time all that is negative. This is the most important thing; while the main force in the restructuring must be represented by the party, it must be the engine of restructuring. If it is not the party, questions concerning the life of society will be submitted by other forces and they might not necessarily submit them in the direction of strengthening socialism—which is the most important significant aspect of restructuring. And this is the path that we follow in Czechoslovakia. [end recording]

More on Jakes News Conference

LD1804223589 Prague Television Service in Czech 1730 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Excerpt] [Announcer] At 1500, Comrade Milos Jakes met Soviet and foreign journalists accredited in Moscow. On the results of his talks, he said among other things:

[Begin Jakes recording] As to the questions concerning restructuring, I would like to say that our aims are identical to the aims of the CPSU. Naturally, as to instruments and speed, we are taking into consideration our own conditions, and the USSR's experience are for us of exceptional importance.

I would like to say that it was not only the conditions of inspiration by the USSR but also the state of our society, the necessity of carrying out necessary changes in all directions that made us enter the path of restructuring, because what basically happened was that all previous possibilities of developing our country had been exhausted, and the path of intensive development had to be started. Intensive development requires the wide, active participation of the people in dealing with all problems during a changeover from administrative to economic methods of management. Responsibility of lower level of management for achieved results is to be reinforced, and in this connection, the active participation in the administration and management of the state is to be expanded. Therefore, we put much emphasis on the democratization of our society.

We exchanged views on the situation in the world. I would like to reconfirm that there are no differing views here; our specificity rests in the fact that we are a small state and that we could contribute to dealing with European problems to some extent, but in the global issues we fully support the CPSU policy which stems from the new way of thinking, from a new view on dealing with international problems. [end recording]

[Announcer] Comrade Jakes then spoke about the experience which restructuring brought to the USSR and to the other socialist countries. He said in this connection:

[Begin Jakes recording] We look into other countries, too. We naturally keep them in mind in order on the one hand to avoid steps which were not proven right and which resulted in difficulties and on the other hand to use everything that resulted in the appropriate result with regard to the conditions of the development in Czechoslovakia and to Czechoslovak traditions.

I think that the whole visit, the experience which I gained myself and which Comrade Gorbachev told me about and the support on the part of the Soviet Communists for the steps taken by our party, is very important for us. In my view the awareness of this support will help us to advance even more firmly forward.

Therefore, I value very much, I would say, the meeting with Comrade Gorbachev. It is for us an important step towards a firm conviction that we follow the right path, and it is an inspiration for us for the work ahead of us—which will not be simple—which will also be connected with a number of conflicts, because it is not easy to assert new things against the comfortable and easy life that suits the majority of people. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Ryzhkov in Luxembourg for Jubilee, Official Visit

Departs Moscow 18 Apr

PM1904105189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 89 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report under the general heading: "Visit to Luxembourg"]

[Text] N.I. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, left Moscow for Luxembourg 18 April. At the invitation of the Luxembourg Government he will participate in the jubilee measures marking the 150th anniversary of independence for the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. N.I. Ryzhkov will also make a brief official visit to Luxembourg within the framework of this trip.

N.I. Ryzhkov was seen off at the airport by A.N. Yakovlev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; V.S. Murakhovskiy, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; V.M. Kamentsev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; and other officials.

The send-off party included V. Bentink [name as published], Luxembourg charge d'affaires ad interim in the USSR.

Ryzhkov, Vranitzky Hold Talks

PM1904142989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Visit to Luxembourg"]

[Text] Luxembourg, 18 Apr—A meeting took place here 18 April between N.I. Ryzhkov and Austrian Federal Chancellor F. Vranitzky, who are in Luxembourg in connection with the celebration of the country's 150th anniversary. Attention was focused on questions of bilateral relations and also the Vienna talks on conventional arms in Europe. Both sides voiced satisfaction with the ongoing development of Soviet-Austrian cooperation and examined the state of the accords reached during the Austrian federal chancellor's visit to the USSR in October 1988 and the progress in realizing them. The need more widely to attain new forms of cooperation in the trade, economic, scientific, and technical spheres was emphasized. In connection with the question broached by F. Vranitzky of the prospects for relations between Austria and the EC, the Soviet side voiced the hope that the normalization of relations with the EC will not run counter to Austria's commitments under the State Treaty nor harm the country's neutral status in any way.

The meeting passed in a friendly and frank atmosphere.

Ryzhkov, France's Rocard Meet

LD1804192989 Moscow TASS in English 1922 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] Luxembourg April 18 (TASS)—Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov met today with his French counterpart Michel Rocard.

Their conversation focused on Soviet-French cooperation which, as the heads of the two governments agreed, should not lag behind the present-day European and internatioanl standards.

It was stated with satisfaction that bilateral relations were developing at a faster pace recently.

The forthcoming visit by Mikhail Gorbachev to France will become a key event designed to consolidate and develop new constructive trends in cooperation between the two countries.

In the opinion of the interlocutors, there are favourable conditions for constructive interaction between the two countries in handling key problems of world security and disarmament and in fostering regional settlement.

Within this context, they exchanged views on the situation in Lebanon that poses a grave threat to that country's integrity.

Ryzhkov, FRG's Kohl Meet

LD1804191589 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1842 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] Luxembourg, 18 Apr (TASS)—N.I. Ryzhkov, today had a meeting with H. Kohl, federal chancellor of the FRG.

Having noted the growth of positive trends in Soviet-West German relations, the participants in the conversation expressed confidence that the forthcoming visit to the FRG by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, would allow these relations to be raised to a qualitatively new level and would give them new dynamism and scale. Both sides gave a positive assessment of the progress in implementing the accords reached in Moscow last October including those in the sphere of economic links. It was also noted that the strengthening of the whole complex of bilateral relations would be a considerable contribution to the building of a new Europe of mutual understanding and cooperation, to the further development of the European process, and to the solving of problems of security and disarmament.

In connection with the interest shown by H. Kohl, N.I. Ryzhkov spoke in detail of the progress of restructuring in the USSR and explained the importance of the decisions of the March plenum of the CPSU Central Committee for increasing agricultural output and the social development of the countryside and for providing the country with food.

The atmosphere of the meeting was friendly and constructive.

Ryzhkov Interviewed on Elections

LD1904124689 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0553 GMT 19 Apr 89

[Text] Luxembourg, 19 Apr (TASS)—The main political result of the recent elections to the USSR's supreme organ of state authority is that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union's [CPSU] policy towards restructuring "has received powerful popular support in the course of a democratic expression of will." This conclusion was reached by Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, in an interview with Camille Montague, chief editor of the local paper, LE REPUBLICAIN LORRAIN.

In the interview, published here in connection with the head of the Soviet Government's visit to Luxembourg, major attention was devoted to the internal political situation in the USSR and, above all, to the processes of democratization of Soviet society and the economic transformations in the USSR.

Summing up the political results of the elections, Nikolay Ryzhkov noted that the people has supported the CPSU's election program. The essence of this program, he explained, is "to improve the welfare and improve the lives of Soviet people and to ennoble human relationships."

The food problem is a primary one. The head of the Soviet Government recalled that at its Central Committee plenum in March the CPSU "proposed a radical path to solve it which is unrelated to the dogmas of the recent path—by creating new economic relationships in rural areas and transforming the rural worker into the full master on the land." Steps are being taken to increase the output of high-quality industrial goods, to solve the housing problem, to improve pension provision, and to solve other social problems.

Nikolay Ryzhkov stressed that the efforts of the party and government to ensure peaceful living conditions for the present and subsequent generations and to create a safe and nonviolent world has also played a major role in the fact that the CPSU obtained a vote of confidence in the elections.

"I also see the enormous political significance of the elections in the fact that they demonstrated the very wide- ranging possibilities of socialist democracy to express the whole multiplicity of people's opinions, their interests and approaches to acute socio-economic and socio-political problems," the head of the Soviet Government said. "There were many interesting, instructive and—something that is particularly important—constructive and businesslike proposals among those expressed during the election campaign. They make it possible to verify and define more precisely our approaches to a number of problems and they help me, as chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, to see ordinary phenomena which have come about from a fresh perspective."

"The interests of socialism, the needs of people, and public thought ever more insistently demand a deepening of the integration of the political reform and the radical changes in economic relations. Therefore our path is through deepening of democratization toward a healthy, dynamic economy. In the course of the economic reform we intend to unite the plan and the market, to harmonize all the variety of forms of ownership, to create a flexible and effective economic mechanism, giving scope for initiative and enterprise," he explained.

Asked if he could give assurances on a continuation of the course of consolidating the rights and liberties of man in the USSR, Nikolay Ryzhkov replied: "The main guarantee of further progress in human rights in our country is the irreversible nature of our restructuring. A direct result of restructuring is the process of humanization and democratization of all aspects of life of Soviet society. This finds direct reflection also in such a key space as human rights."

The confidence to advance consistently in the chosen direction is linked in the Soviet Union also "with the recently held elections, whose democratic nature has been widely acknowledged, and with the formation shortly in the USSR of the new Supreme Soviet, a legislative assembly that really works."

One of the most important directions of the activities of the renewed Supreme Soviet, Nikolay Ryzhkov added, must be the elaboration and adoption of laws enshrining democratic principles in Soviet society, looking toward international norms and standards, and developing them to the full. Legislative work "will be done in complete conformity with the final document of the Vienna meeting of states participating in the CSCE," the head of the Soviet Government added. Its decisions are recognized in the USSR as obligatory for all Soviet departments and organizations from the time for their adoption on 15 January 1989.

Nikolay Ryzhkov said specifically that the elaboration of a new statute on entry to and exit from the USSR, which will entirely meet existing international standards in this sphere, has been virtually completed.

In addition to measures of the legislative nature, practical steps have been taken in the USSR for the further democratization of Soviet society too, he continued. There is no one in the USSR serving a sentence for their political or religious convictions. The procedure for Soviet citizens to leave for permanent residence abroad has been made considerably easier.

There are considerable advances evident in the solution of matters pertaining to the status of religion in the USSR. In 1988 alone, 1,610 religious associations were registered in the USSR, approximately 1,000 buildings intended for the practice of religious cults were handed over to believers, and 150 new buildings are being constructed for the same purpose.

The Soviet head of government was asked how the concept of the common European home is viewed in the USSR. Europe, Nikolay Ryzhkov said in reply, "is not only a continent stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, but a community of the peoples inhabiting it. Europeans have to a considerable extent common historical and cultural roots. They have one past and just one, common future."

Today Europe "has been given a truly historic task—to break the chain of mutual mistrust and fear in East-West relations and to serve as a model of interstate relations and cooperation of the new type, permeated with the ideals of humanism, equality, and democracy. This is what the common European home, as we understand it, will be," he said.

Nikolay Ryzhkov stressed that building the common European home does not mean destroying the realities which have taken shape in Europe, including its division into alliances and groupings. "When building a common home, it is not obligatory to destroy the walls of apartments which are already inhabited. We need to put over us a common roof and to live as good neighbors. When we talk about the common European home we proceed from the idea that this preserves the differences between individual states and groups of them which have objectively developed. We see the pluralism of the present-day world as a source of its development and further improvement. The European home should be built upon a foundation of respect for the choice made by each European people."

It is essential to preserve everything valuable in today's Europe, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers stressed. "It is clear, for example, that the Helsinki process—a unique achievement in the history of international relations—would be the 'load-bearing structure' of the common European home. While developing Europe-wide cooperation in all directions—political, economic and humanitarian—this should, obviously, be reinforced by the creation of special rapprochement machinery, specifically, between the structures of the organizations of the Warsaw Pact and CEMA, on the one hand, and NATO, the European Communities, the West European Union and the Council of Europe on the other. It is important that the integration processes under way in both parts of Europe should not move in different directions," Nikolay Ryzhkov said.

The Soviet head of government also spoke of his impressions of his stay in Armenia in the first days following the tragic earthquake and answered a question about the role of functions of the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Luxembourg Prime Minister Notes Ties

LD1704222589 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 17 Apr 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] The Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is 150 years old. Here is a report by our correspondent:

[Begin video recording] [Kipras Mazheyka, identified by caption] [passage omitted] What relations do our countries have today?

[Luxembourg Prime Minister J. Santer, identified by caption, in French fading into Russian translation] Friendly ties with your country have indeed stood the test of time. The contacts that were restored over 50 years ago have become deeper and broader in a number of areas. Take, for example, business cooperation. Today, it is being built on the basis of long-term agreements. The number of cultural and scientific exchanges is growing along the same lines, and this evokes a feeling of satisfaction. In this connection, we are happy to welcome tomorrow's visit of Mr Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. The high Soviet visitor will come to attend the celebration of the 150th anniversary of Luxembourg's independence. This fact shows that we intend to strengthen our relations in the future, too, Jacques Santer concluded. [end recording] [video shows Mazheyka and Santer talking in a room]

Gorbachev Meeting With UK Businessmen Reported

PM1904090389 Moscow EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA in Russian No 16, Apr 89 (Signed to Press 13 Apr 89) pp 1, 2

[Unattributed report: "To Meet Each Other Halfway. M.S. Gorbachev's Conversation With Representatives of British Business Circles"]

[Text]**The visit by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, to Britain generated tremendous interest among British business circles. This is only natural. Our countries have a long-standing tradition of trade and economic partnership, and relations between them are now expanding to a new level following the long period of "cold war" which had a negative effect also on business contacts. The climate for bilateral trade and economic ties today is more favorable than ever before.**

There is every reason to assume that bilateral commodity turnover will reach R2.5 billion next year. New progressive forms of cooperation are developing, and joint ventures are being set up.

During the visit the prospects of Soviet-British trade and economic cooperation were the topic of a meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and representatives of Britain's business circles which was organized by Lord Young, British secretary of state for trade and industry, and T. Holdsworth, president of the Confederation of British Industry.

Speaking at the meeting in Lancaster House, M.S. Gorbachev said:

I perceive this meeting as an important item on the program for my visit to Britain.

Our political dialogue with the British Government is expanding. We welcome this and, for our part, are doing everything necessary to ensure that it continues to gather strength. We welcome the level and meaningful nature of the political dialogue. Now that the world is at a crucial stage in its development, when there is a need for collective quest and response to the challenges of the time, it is impossible to overlook the important contribution that could be made by Britain to this process.

Mrs Thatcher and I conversed for several hours today. On this occasion we again spoke about highly substantial questions of world politics. I wish to say that the atmosphere was good and the talks were constructive. This does not mean that Mrs Thatcher and I agreed on everything, but knowledge of each other's viewpoint gives each one an opportunity to ponder different questions in such a way as to seek an alignment of approaches, agreement, and constructive collaboration.

We paid very much attention to questions of disarmament, European questions, and regional conflicts. As regards the recently exacerbated situation in South Africa, we both believe that it is necessary to ensure a process within the framework of the agreement signed under UN auspices.

Generally speaking, we are satisfied with the development of the political dialogue in the last few years. Nevertheless—I am convinced of this—the prospects and fruitfulness of political dialogue are always more reliable and more predictable if there are good relations in the economy, in scientific and technical ties, and in business relations.

This is the basis which imparts durability to the political process and intensifies its fruitfulness. It is no secret that the more countries depend on each other, the more cautious and considered is their pursuit of foreign policy and the more thought they give to the implementation of their steps. This in itself is already quite important in our complex world, where a political mistake could cost everyone dearly. This is why I am in favor of broad all-around cooperation with all countries and, naturally, in favor of relations between our two countries also developing more successfully.

Back in 1984 we planned to increase commodity turnover with Britain by 40-50 percent. It seems that we are now approaching this level. This means that progress is possible given the appropriate will. It seems to me that both British business circles and the representatives of our industry are interested in cooperation. The last few years have taught us a few lessons. Both we and you are, of course, free to make our own decisions. But results will be forthcoming only when ties are mutually advantageous. I was told that over these last few years British firms missed opportunities to conclude deals worth R600 million. These are large amounts. I think that this is a lesson for both us and you.

In all probability, both sides were insufficiently active or maybe, on the contrary, too active: Each wished to gain more than its "fair share" under a realistic approach at the time. It is necessary to meet each other halfway. It seems to me that the last few months have shown greater constructiveness. I think that the fact that an agreement on the protection of investments was signed today should enable business circles to act with greater confidence when expanding ties with us.

But you are naturally interested in whether it is worth establishing ties with the Soviet Union now, when it is at the stage of restructuring and is going through profound changes which encompass the entire economy and politics and all spheres of society's life. How stable is this society for capital to be risked?

I do not think that such fears are justified. The pace of restructuring may vary, it may encounter its difficulties. But it is under way and will not be halted. It has had a substantial affect on the economy. Very substantial.

The essence of the changes is that we want to leave behind the administrative edict methods of economic leadership and move on to greater decentralization to the benefit not only of basic links, the enterprises, but also of regions and republics. And to use in this process economic methods which are typical of a market economy, levers like economic accountability, leasing, and others which are—as we perceive it—actually in line with the present stage of the country's development. We have moved into a zone that was formerly inaccessible to us—in property relations—and we wish to attain new forms of ownership and utilization of property through leasing, through economic accountability, through contracts. This applies to industry, to the construction industry, to the agrarian sector, to trade. This is not just wishful thinking. Everything we are now enshrining in legislative provisions which will provide a basis for further progress in the economy's restructuring is already a generalization of the experience we have accumulated.

We thus calculate on giving fresh dynamism to our enterprises and economic units and enabling man to display his enterprise and inventiveness and reveal his talent and abilities.

We probably will not avoid miscalculations and mistakes. Nonetheless, there is already movement in this very direction. And the enterprises and sectors which took this path earlier have already produced interesting and quite substantial positive results.

We are thus advancing firmly along the charted path. There are difficulties. Of some magnitude. This is how I would describe them: Something happened to the planned economy that apparently should not have happened to it; rather it is typical of an uncontrolled market economy. Namely—imbalances between different sections of the economy which have accumulated over decades. This is primarily the result of serious mistakes in structural and investment policy, whose result was that the sectors producing consumer goods were essentially kept down. The main thing we are doing now is to use the market's help, through a new structural policy and investments, to orient the entire economy toward man and his needs. In other words, we are intensifying its social orientation. Positive changes are already under way. Last year was the first time that our light and food industries developed faster than heavy industry. Trade, the services sphere, and much else is growing, and this helps satisfy man's needs.

This turnabout is pretty profound and significant. In order to prove how serious we are about this, let me say that now we have very powerfully turned our defense complex in this direction. Defense complex enterprises are producing many industrial goods for the population right now. We are assigning to the defense complex targets for the manufacture of domestic appliances, radio and television equipment, and other high quality output to high technical specifications for the population. We have also involved our defense sector in the production of equipment for the light and food industries. Yesterday's weapon, missile, nuclear, and aviation industry workers are today doing much to ensure the faster development of powerful and modern consumer goods production. We cooperate with Western firms but believe that a country like ours must rely primarily on its own base.

There is something else. Everything we have conceived demands the assimilation of new technologies and an organic combination of production and the achievements of scientific and technical progress. We are solving this task via in-depth remodeling of Soviet machine building. We have such a program, and it is being implemented. There is also a similar program for the electronics industry. Major sums have been appropriated for these purposes—about R10 billion. The turnabout here will also be profound. We want to use the modernization of Soviet machine building to attain a new technological level, produce new technologies, and thus raise labor productivity and achieve new output quality. Through the remodeling of machine building we will modernize our entire economy.

We are changing the forms of management and demolishing everything associated with edict methods. Therefore, the entire economy is of course on the move, in a process of renewal. But despite all the difficulties of this process, I would not say that its development has slowed down. No, our pace is faster in terms of both national income and labor productivity. But so far people have not felt this directly. Primarily because the domestic market was brought to a state of fundamental imbalance in previous years. A huge amount of money for which there is not enough goods is still "sloshing around." As yet we have been unable to halt the process of incomes growing faster than labor productivity. Inflationary processes have emerged. The budget deficit, about which we kept silent previously, has existed for several years already. Today we have told society about it. And we have elaborated short-term and long-term programs to impose order in the country's finances. On the one hand we are building up the output of goods and developing our economy in the direction of man and his needs, while on the other hand we must without fail couple this with measures to impose order in the market and the finances. Unless this is done, it is hard to expect that man, the consumer, will feel any benefit from the transformations which are under way.

I recall the late sixties. We had much less of everything at that time. Suffice it to say that the population consumed just about half of today's quantities of dairy products, eggs, and meat. But the store shelves were full. We even faced the problem of how to store the butter which was being stockpiled and going bad, just like it is going bad today in the EEC countries. There was the problem of where to store the meat, and some people seriously suggested building storage facilities in the ice of the north or Mount Elbrus. That was the result of low consumption levels because the population's incomes were different and purchasing power was weaker. Over the last 20 years incomes have risen sharply while goods production seems to have moved along a horizontal line. Demand has considerably outstripped supply. As we say, we have the scissors effect and the scissors must now be closed. This is hard, but our economy has tremendous potential. We have strong and mighty science. I know that the West eagerly chases the results produced by our science, and journals where our scientists' material is published are thoroughly studied.

People in America have estimated that hundreds of billions have been saved there thanks to the application of our scientific ideas. THE WASHINGTON POST recently carried a long article on how the Americans exploit our achievements in science and technology. Exactly the same is being done in Japan and other countries.

We will be smarter in the future. We will start "trading" our ideas and scientific elaborations. Indeed, why should our brains be used to enrich others while we are made to look like fools! Generally speaking, we are putting our brains to work, and substantially so.

The skills of the bulk of our working class make it possible to set and solve extremely complex tasks. Even though we still have weak links in this regard. But life itself quickly sorts things out: For example, people get smart quickly wherever lease collectives appear, wherever economic accountability is in operation, wherever all incomes are linked to the end product, wherever money has to be earned rather than being paid simply for reporting to work. Attitudes toward labor are changing, discipline is getting tighter, skills are being improved. When people realize that they are really working for themselves, you do not need any other methods.

I may not have been as brief as I intended. But I wished to share my thoughts with you, to give you certain information, to paint a realistic picture of our economy and the processes occurring within it.

M.S. Gorbachev then answered questions from representatives of British firms.

A. Gormley, "John Brown": In your opinion, in which specific sectors of the economy whose development you would like to accelerate, could UK industry make a greater contribution than at present?

M.S. Gorbachev: The light and food industries, the chemical industry, the electronics industry.

R. Henderson, "Imperial Chemical Industries": Our company has been operating in Moscow for 10 years now; we are therefore firmly established in your country. There are joint ventures in the chemical industry, but it is clear that some of them must be financed by the center. Are you prepared for this to help them get on their feet?

M.S. Gorbachev: You are right. We are prepared to utilize the center's potential as well, and it is of course necessary to pool the efforts of our enterprises. You can thus adopt a long-term approach toward these questions. As regards the actual complex of chemical enterprises, in other words the package of everything that we especially need now, we are actually working on this. We need polyethylene, for example. We will seek partners. Frankly speaking, we already have proposals but we will choose those who are more reliable, those who can offer more progressive technologies.

P. Holmes, "Shell": I would like to know whether Western oil and gas companies would be able to utilize their risk capital and technology on prospecting for and working gas deposits in the USSR?

M.S. Gorbachev: We are interested in this. If the pooling of efforts and the technical and technological methods for prospecting and identifying reserves could offer practical results, we are prepared to cooperate. But everything must be specifically worked out, mutually advantageous conditions of cooperation must be defined.

R. Forte, "Trust House Forte": I would like to ask you a question about the prospects for tourism in the Soviet Union. Namely, is a period of 10-15 years not too short for the duration of joint venture contracts?

M.S. Gorbachev: The first thing I would like to say is that there are tremendous opportunities for the development of tourism in the USSR. I discussed this with Mrs Thatcher today. By way of illustrating our unutilized potential, I referred to the example of Spain, which hosts over 50 million tourists a year against only 2.5 million in our country. Now we are elaborating a long-term program for the development of domestic and foreign tourism. We are also formulating a concept and methods for solving relevant problems. Therefore, this is the most suitable time. I would ask you not to lose any time, either. I think that the joint venture option is perfectly feasible here as well.

As regards time limits, I do not know why this question has arisen since legislation in our country does not lay down any time limits on joint ventures.

V.M. Kamentsev: We have always said that the longer a joint venture operates the better. For example, we have signed an agreement through the year 2005 with a U.S. trade consortium.

M.S. Gorbachev: Obviously, this problem deserves to be studied in greater depth. In any case, our comrades have made a note of this.

C. Hogg, "Courtaulds": Our firm can cooperate in the modernization of sewn goods and light industry enterprises in the Soviet Union. But it is experiencing difficulties in establishing contacts with suitable partners. What could you say in this context?

M.S. Gorbachev: First, we do have an association of enterprises in this sphere. It serves as a collection center for interests and it can brief any representatives of the Western business world on them. Second, we still have certain departments dealing with international trade operations. There is also an authoritative public organization—the USSR Chamber of Trade and Industry.

Furthermore, we think that the problem of light industry will become the target of direct attention by the State Planning Committee. This will make it possible to find active and effective solutions to all questions. I think that many of your ideas could be implemented now since we are modernizing both the food and the light industry.

K. Keeble, "Carroll": What is your attitude toward the setting up of a British trade center in Moscow?

M.S. Gorbachev: Positive. But you know, I think that much now depends on the question of finding a site for it. Comrade Kamentsev said that it has already been found. It is normal to raise this question. Since we intend to do business in terms of many years, such premises are necessary.

R. Hogbin, "Taylor Woodrow": Under what conditions could British construction companies participate in restoration work in the regions hit by the earthquake in Armenia?

M.S. Gorbachev: I find it hard to give an immediate answer to this question for one single reason. The restoration program for these destroyed regions has been approved by the government. All republics and their construction collectives are involved. It is a major program costing R10-12 billion. Therefore I now find it hard to say specifically how possible it is to involve foreign construction organizations in civilian construction work. But we will bear your question in mind.

'Successful Start' for Joint British Trade Month

LD1804203389 Moscow TASS in English 1952 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] Moscow April 18 (TASS)—A British-Soviet month of trade and economic cooperation is making an important contribution to the creation of a common European home, according to a top Soviet trade official.

Igor Kanayev, deputy chairman of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce and Industry, praised the outcome of the first week of the month at an opening ceremony of the second week at the Moscow World Trade Centre.

A total of 200 million pounds sterling worth of contracts have been signed, more than 5,000 Soviet specialists visited the exhibition and some 300 experts attended 20 workshops.

Kanayev hoped that agricultural, transport, power and chemical firms that dominated the exhibition during the first week will pass on the baton to Soviet and British firms engaged in instrument engineering, communications and health care.

British Overseas Trade Board President James Cleminson said in his turn that the successful start of the month reflects the interests British firms have in the Soviet market and their increasing involvement in bilateral cooperation.

The wide participation of British companies in the Moscow exhibition is a first step in the implementation of proposals to considerably expand bilateral trade and cooperation, forwarded by Mikhail Gorbachev at a meeting with the British business community in London in April 1989, according to Cleminson.

Swiss Military Chief Leaves Moscow for Home

PM1804085589 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Apr 89 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report: "Left for Home"]

[Text] On 14 April K. Villiger, chief of the federal department of the military of Switzerland, who was in our country on an official visit, returned to Moscow from Leningrad.

In the afternoon K. Villiger and those accompanying him left Moscow for home.

At Sheremetyevo airport they were seen off by Army General D.T. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister; Aviation Marshal A.N. Yefimov, USSR deputy defense minister; and other generals and officers of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Among the send-off party were F. Pianca, Swiss ambassador to the USSR; and Colonel Kh. Yubervaks [name as published], defense attache at the Swiss Embassy in the USSR.

The state flags of the Swiss Confederation and the Soviet Union were hoisted at the airport, a guard of honor was drawn up on the runway, and the two countries' national anthems were played.

Brutents, French Socialist Party's Mauroy Confer

PM1804125989 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 89 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Mutual Interest"]

[Text] Paris, 14 Apr—A meeting took place here between Pierre Mauroy, first secretary of the French Socialist Party, and K.N. Brutents, first deputy chief of the CPSU Central Committee International Department. Questions of mutual relations between the CPSU and the French Socialist Party were discussed, and there was affirmation of mutual interest in the development of interparty ties. The conversation proceeded in a friendly atmosphere.

Yeltsin Reportedly Not Visiting Finland

LD1704184189 Helsinki Domestic Service in Finnish 1800 GMT 17 Apr 89

[Text] It seems that the visit to Finland by Boris Yeltsin, former party leader in Moscow, and member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, will not take place. According to information obtained by Television News, Yeltsin has not received an official invitation to visit Finland. Yeltsin was due to come to Finland in a week's time. He announced at the end of last month that he would come to Finland if he received permission from the CPSU, and if both the majority and the minority of the Finnish Communists invited him.

Turkey's Interest in Changing Soviet Society Viewed

PM1304155189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 11 Apr 89 Second Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Stepanov dispatch: "When Stereotypes Are Smashed. Growing Turkish Interest in the Changes in Our Country"]

[Text] Ankara, April—It would be no exaggeration to say that the words "perestroyka" and "glasnost" have become firm fixtures in the vocabulary of the Turkish press. But more than that. For instance, a political party may claim that it is striving for more "glasnost" in the country, or, say, a state institution or a big company may publicly announce its internal "perestroyka."

The local fashion for these popular terms reflects the growing interest of Turkey's political and business circles, and of the general public, in what is happening in our country. And it is not just a question of curiosity about how their neighbors live. In an international atmosphere that is changing sharply for the better, not least as regards Soviet-Turkish relations, it is far easier and simpler to realize mutual trade and economic interests, which, judging by competent opinion, are considerable.

The usually conservative TERCUMAN newspaper, which by no means sympathizes with the Soviet Union, recently wrote: "The Soviet Union is an age-old historical and geographical neighbor of Turkey and, moreover, a great power. Consequently, Turkey has perhaps an even greater interest than its northern neighbor in good-neighborly relations. The radical changes currently taking place in this sphere have become possible first and foremost thanks to the policy of 'perestroyka' and 'glasnost' being pursued in the USSR."

Under the Soviet diplomatic onslaught and under the influence of correct information and the "new political thinking" stereotypes inherited from the "cold war" period are being smashed. The Turkish-language version of M.S. Gorbachev's book "Perestroyka" has been reprinted here several times, and each print run has quickly sold out. I saw the book on politicians' bookshelves, on the desks of businessmen, and even—something unheard of for Turkey—being read by vacationers on the Mediterranean.

The Turkish press has recently been swamped—there is no other way to describe it—with articles, reports, and sketches on life in the Soviet Union. Whereas initially these were reprints from the Western press, as Soviet-Turkish contacts have developed in all areas—from the military to the cultural and sports spheres—many original items have appeared, written by Turkish journalists who are accredited in Moscow or have accompanied the numerous delegations of Turkish businessmen. As a Turkish colleague of mine has noted, it is as if the Turks have rediscovered the Soviet Union. Not for nothing has "Soviet-Turkish Spring" been one of the most popular newspaper headlines of recent times.

Visits by officials are covered in detail, and Soviet foreign policy initiatives are commented on—and very positively to boot. There were many warm words about E.A. Shevardnadze's recent visit to the Near and Middle East—that is, a region on the resolution of whose acute problems Soviet and Turkish views are identical or close to each other. The Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan has been unanimously welcomed. Incidentally, the positive response to this step here has been such that President K. Even has expressed his willingness to assist in bringing about the return home of Soviet prisoners held by the Afghan armed opposition, and has offered his services as an intermediary in the Afghan reconciliation process.

Abiding topics are the concrete projects for commercial cooperation in fishing and preventing the pollution of the Black Sea, developing cross-border trade, and setting up joint ventures whereby Turkish firms would build cultural projects on Soviet territory.

Dispatches from the USSR are popular. What do they write about? About personal impressions, about the Arbat—known here as Moscow's Montmartre—about rock music and punks, about Soviet people's relaxed behavior, and about their good nature and candid statements, which never cease to surprise Turkish journalists accustomed to thinking of our country's population as a "silent, oppressed majority." They write about the new look of the Soviet press, about press discussions in the spirit of glasnost, about the progress of restructuring in the economy and politics, and about the election of people's deputies. While noting the undoubted positive changes, they do not sidestep the negative aspects of our life, such as the poor performance of the services sphere, the waiting lines, the shortages of goods, and housing difficulties. Bureaucratic obstacles hampering the development of Soviet-Turkish cooperation are often criticized....

The wave of interest in our country has swept over local television, too. An agreement was recently signed on exchanges of television programs and the expansion of cooperation in this sphere. It is proposed that a program called "Glasnost" will soon be aired regularly in Turkey, and the organization of Soviet-Turkish television link-ups is not far off.

Not for nothing are the mass media called the fourth estate (after the legislature, the executive, and the judiciary); it wields great influence over people's hearts and minds. And when restructuring—albeit in a rather specific form—is conveyed by the mass media to the widest sections of the Turkish population this cannot fail to influence general attitudes toward our country.

TASS Signs Agreement With Greek News Agency

LD1804125989 Moscow TASS in English 1158 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] Moscow April 18 (TASS)—The Soviet official news agency (TASS) and the Athens-based news agency ANA signed an agreement on broader information exchanges today.

The documents were signed by TASS Director-General Leonid Kravchenko and ANA Director-General Theodore Karzis.

Latin America & Caribbean

Communist Newspaper Editors Confer in Havana

PM1804132589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 89 Second Edition p 4

[Unnamed own correspondent report: "Conference in Havana"]

[Text] Havana, 14 Apr—A conference of chief editors from the central press organs of fraternal communist and workers parties in socialist countries was held here. In addition to the hosts of the forum—leaders of the newspaper GRANMA—delegations from the newspapers PRAVDA, RUDE PRAVO, NODONG SINMUN, SCINTEIA, NEPSZABADSAG, TRYBUNA LUDU, NHAN DAN, UNEN, RABOTNICHESKO DELO, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, and PASASON took part in its work. Representatives of the Angolan and Nicaraguan press attended the conference as guests.

The conference participants discussed questions associated with the role of the party press in contemporary conditions and its tasks in the processes of restructuring and renewal occurring in a number of socialist countries.

The delegations visited Pinar del Rio Province where they were briefed on the work of local party organizations. They also visited a number of science, health care, and cultural institutions in Cuba's capital. The chief editors met leading figures of the Communist Party of Cuba.

The PRAVDA delegation, headed by Chief Editor V.G. Afanasyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee, visited the fraternal newspaper GRANMA.

Continuing Fighting in Haiti Reported

PM1004122589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 9 Apr 89 Morning Edition p 4

[S. Mushkaterov roundup: "Firing Over the Haitian Capital"]

[Text] The situation in Port-au-Prince is still complex. Heavy machine-gun fire was heard on the night of Friday to Saturday [8-9 Apr] in the center of the Haitian capital where the presidential palace and the barracks of one of the mutinying battalions, the "Dessalines," are to be found not far from one another.

According to news agency reports, troops loyal to Haiti President General Prosper Avril also fought soldiers from another batallion involved in the mutiny, the "Leopards." As a result of these clashes 12 servicemen were killed.

The situation in Haiti deteriorated drastically last Sunday when soldiers from the "Leopards" batallion tried to effect a military coup. General Avril seemed to have succeeded in restoring control over the situation by Wednesday. However, the "Dessalines" battalion also mutinied. On Wednesday the president proclaimed a state of emergency in the country, and on Thursday he urged "armed fraternal soldiers" to abandon the uprising, which could, in his opinion, "lead to foreign intervention." Speaking on television, he stated that certain officers wanted a government that the people of Haiti did not want.

The insurgent soldiers refused to respond immediately to Avril's appeal. However, on Friday soldiers involved in the mutiny seized one of the capital's radio stations for a short time. "We still uphold our demand. We want Avril to quit the presidency," an anonymous soldier said over the radio. The mutineers accuse Avril of trying to reestablish dictatorship in Haiti.

News agencies report that thousands of inhabitants of Port-au-Prince still prefer not to go to work as they wait to see how events will develop. Stores and schools are still closed, state establishments and private offices are nonoperational, and public transport is paralyzed.

Political & Social

Central Committee Plenum Planned for 25 Apr

PM1904084689 Paris LE MONDE in French 19 Apr 89 pp 1, 4

[Bernard Guetta dispatch: "Repression in Georgia Has Repercussions on Soviet Leadership"]

[Text] Moscow—The violent repression of demonstrations in Georgia has opened a new phase in the struggle between conservatives and reformers within the Soviet leadership. On the evening of Monday 17 April, when TASS was announcing that the curfew in Tbilisi would be lifted on Tuesday, LE MONDE learned that a Central Committee plenum would be called for early next week, apparently for Tuesday 25 April.

Official circles refuse to confirm the convening of this extraordinary plenum, but they are not denying it either, and several well-informed prominent people are forecasting "important events" for next week. For instance, some of them expect that some Politburo members will be called to account, notably Mr Chebrikov, who was chairman of the KGB until the great operation to clear out conservatives last September, and who is now head of the Central Committee Legal Policy Commission.

Of course, the situation may change between now and next Tuesday, but, in any case, these reports confirm that Mr Gorbachev's team sees the inexplicable brutality used against demonstrators in Tbilisi as an attempt to destabilize the reform policy. Immediately after the events of 9 April, the government reacted in a totally inconsistent way.

Whereas Mr Shevardnadze and Mr Razumovskiy, two of the men closest to Mr Gorbachev, were urgently sent to Tbilisi and made many gestures of appeasement and goodwill toward the population and the various local political factions there, PRAVDA published a vengeful editorial which could be summarized in one main idea: enough laxness!

On one hand, people were talking with the nationalists and rejecting the practice of expulsion; on the other, they were being condemned in terms worthy of a prosecutor. On one hand, every effort was being made not to widen the gulf between the Kremlin and Georgia, which is characterized by violence; on the other, every effort was being made to fan the flames by accusing the demonstrators of being responsible for the deaths and injuries.

Appeasement

However, in the past few days it is the language of appeasement which has prevailed and, after heads began to roll with the resignation of Georgia's first secretary and prime minister last Friday, Mr Shevardnadze, speaking to students in Tbilisi on Sunday, pledged that "all the guilty parties will be punished." As far as we can tell from Moscow, that meeting was extremely stormy, and many serious accusations were made. Nonetheless, it was after that dialogue that the Tbilisi students agreed to resume classes on Monday and thus enabled the Georgian party Politburo to decide, in the presence of Mr Shevardnadze and Mr Razumovskiy, to lift the curfew.

The mission of the foreign minister, who is himself a Georgian, and who was formerly first secretary of the local party, seems to have been largely successful because it has only taken him 1 week to restore calm and a minimum of confidence. In view of the fact that 19 people died—most of them women and young girls—that result is better than could have been hoped, but the situation is still explosive and things had been extremely dangerous.

In other words, political lessons must be learned from this underhand blow which was plotted before Mr Gorbachev returned from his visit to Britain. Reports about his intention to take firm action may simply be aimed at publicly naming those responsible and thus undermining their positions.

However, it is equally possible that an operation to regain control is being planned. And, in either case, the atmosphere in the Politburo is not harmonious.

Gorbachev Speaks to Media Representatives

LD1804172789 Moscow TASS in English 1720 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev met at the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet today with heads of the Soviet mass media.

The meeting was attended by Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Vadim Medvedev and First Vice President of the Supreme Soviet Presidium Anatoliy Lukyanov.

Lukyanov read a report on the results of the election campaign and issues related to preparations for the forthcoming Congress of People's Deputies and the first session of the Supreme Soviet.

Gorbachev spoke at the meeting.

Gumbaridze Sees Off Shevardnadze, Razumovskiy

LD1804180189 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 18 Apr 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Comrades Shevardnadze and Razumovskiy left this evening for Moscow. They were seen off at the airport of the Georgian capital by Comrade Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, and by other leading party and state figures of the republic. [video shows officials at airport]

Reports on Georgian Republic Developments Continue

Toxic Gases Allegedly Used

LD1704223989 Rome International Service in Italian 2200 GMT 17 Apr 89

[Text] Toxic gases were reportedly used by the Soviet security forces in the recent troubles in Tbilisi, Georgia. This is stated in an article of the weekly IL SABATO, which carried a summary written by Irina Alberti in collaboration with editors from the magazine GLASNOST and EKSPRESS KHRONIKA of Moscow.

The article says that the health minister admitted on local television that toxic gases had been used in front of the government building. The information appeared to be so amazing that even the correspondents of independent publications, such as GLASNOST and EKSPRESS KHRONIKA hesitated at the beginning. [as heard]

The gases may have been tear gas, but very precise information has been received from the hospitals: People taken there have swollen eyes, their body is covered with a white pellicle, their lips are swollen and purple, and they are in a coma.

Student Mood Calmer; Rumors Denied

PM1904101589 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 89 p 2

[Own information report: Tbilisi, 17 April"]

[Text] As we approached Tbilisi State University, we saw two middle-aged people wearing the red armbands of volunteer militia. We asked who they were and why they were there. It turned out that they were staffers of the experimental planning scientific research institute. And they were here to keep order—they had come on their own initiative.

However, there is no special need to pacify anyone. The situation in the city is normal. The curfew in the city has been reduced by 2 hours. That is also a clear sign of stabilization. True, the troops return to the streets at night, but here too, there is a a significant extra detail: Representatives of the public are on duty with the soldiers now.

The area in front of the university today presents a completely different picture from, say, 1 week ago. One week ago it was seething with passions. Nevertheless, there is a fundamental difference. Then the young people came to the university to hold rallies. Today they have come here to study. More than 80 percent of the students are attending lectures. This fact is remarkable because until now the university was considered the center of passions which rapidly spread like waves across the entire city....

They have done everything themselves to ensure that life here returned to normal on Monday. Yesterday the students themselves telephoned their classmates and sent urgent telegrams to those who had gone home in the past few days. The meeting of the university's teachers and students with E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and G.P. Razumovskiy, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, also undoubtedly helped to normalize the situation.

"I believe that the discussion did the trick," Dato Turashvili, a philology student, told us. "I myself spoke at the meeting yesterday. We gave a promise that studies would be resumed today. And we have kept our word. What now? We expect that the tanks will be removed from Tbilisi's streets. We need time to reflect on everything and to calm down. We want to evaluate the situation soberly, realistically. But it is quite clear right now that any movement of whatever kind must be constitutional and parliamentary in character. Perhaps some people in the country are alarmed that a hostility toward the Russian people has appeared among the Georgian people since the tragedy on the square in front of the Government House. I am convinced that this is not true. Internationalism is in the Georgian blood. There has never been and will never be interethnic strife here. Our only demand is that those actually responsible for the tragedy that night be found and punished.... This is not a lust for revenge. This is the demand of basic human justice and our duty to the innocent dead...."

Each day the Georgian health minister appears on the republic's television to provide the population with up to the minute information on the state of the injured.

In addition to information on the condition of the victims the following fact has been given: As of April 16, the republic's Ministry of Health had received statements from the families and relatives of 14 people reported missing.

The most improbable rumors are circulating around reports of that kind. All kinds of action groups are drawing up long lists of missing persons. The implication is that these people are dead and are being concealed from their families. But this is what is actually happening: Take, for example, the persistent rumor circulating around town that 37-year-old father of three Z. Gzirishvili was run over by a tank on the night of 9 April and that his body was thrown into the Kura River. But Z. Gzirishvili, it turns out, was at home in the countryside all that time. Guram Kipiani, a student at Tbilisi commercial technical school, was also reported as killed. However, Guram was living peacefully all the time in his rented room in Tbilisi. Yet someone hit upon the idea of sending is mother a telegram...bringing news of his death. Who did that? And why? It is clear that such rumors in no way help to stabilize the situation.

Representatives of the public medical commission, which includes eminent Georgian physicians, appeared on television today. The commission was formed in response to public demand. The following report was made. Since the time of the tragedy on Government House Square, 257 people have been hospitalized. As of today 133 of those people have been discharged. Six remain in a serious condition.

All the patients are receiving thorough medical attention.

Disturbances Carry High Cost

PM1904100189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 89 Second Edition p 3

[Report by own special correspondents G. Lebanidze and A. Chernenko: "Curfew Lifted"]

[Excerpt] Tbilisi—[passage omitted] Students are hurrying back to the lecture halls of the university and institutes.

"Virtually all groups have started classes, and the entire professorial and lecturing staff is ensuring their normal running," said Nodar Amaglobeli, rector of Tbilisi State University and member of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Academy of Sciences. "True, some lecture halls are only 70-percent full. But it has to be borne in mind that some students went to relatives in other cities and villages and have not managed to get back yet."

Students from other city higher educational institutions have also resumed classes. Many Tbilisi inhabitants regard the return of students to classes and the uninterrupted operation of industry, transport, establishments in the service sphere, and schools as real steps toward the complete normalization of city life and the lifting of the curfew.

Meanwhile readers continue to ring the PRAVDA correspondents center, demanding an answer to the questions that worry them. They are primarily interested in the the state of health of the victims of 9 April and the fate of those being sought by anxious relatives, since some people have declared them missing. As we clarified with republic Health Minister Irakliy Menagarishvili, there were 121 casualties in city hospitals yesterday. Most of them were showing a clear improvement in their general condition, although six people are still in a serious state.

As for those "missing": Militia organs are indeed receiving appeals regarding the disappearance of relatives, quite often ones from out of town. Minister of Internal Affairs Shota Gorgodze informed us that a search is under way for them, but so far statements about missing persons have turned out to be rumors or yet another canard.

A typical example: Thirty-seven-year-old Z. Gzirishvili, inhabitant of the village of Chailuri, and, incidentally, father of three, was, "according to the testimony" of the authors of a provocative pamphlet, crushed by a tank and his corpse thrown into the River Kura. He meanwhile was at home during that entire period and did not go anywhere. Provocateurs sent a telegram to the Kipani family in Gali containing the news that their son, Gurami, a student at a Tbilisi Technical College, had been killed. Yet he was completely safe and sound. One can only imagine what his mother must have felt on receiving such dreadful news.

And another question arises here: How could such a telegram be accepted at the post office without a doctor's official stamp and death certificate? This is no idle question, since such mischief-making occurred in other regions too, and rumormongers do not always get punished.

"I can understand the impatience of people waiting for the results of the law-enforcement agencies' work," USSR Deputy Prosecutor General A.F. Katusev told us. "But I want to stress that only checked facts should form the basis of an investigator's work. Today I can say that the criminal proceedings instituted in connection with the tragic events of 9 April are being strenuously pursued, and our most experienced cadres are involved in the investigation. At the present time four citizens directly involved in organizing the disturbances have been arrested. They all have previous convictions for anti-Soviet propaganda. Rumors about hundreds of people in custody are nothing more than a provocative invention."

The lights go out at the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee only when it is virtually morning. E.A. Shevardnadze, G.P. Razumovskiy, and G.G. Gumbaridze are meeting with party workers and representatives of the intelligentsia and visiting areas of the city themselves. It should be noted that virtually all members of the Central Committee and the Tbilisi city party committee and rayon party committees have been assigned to specific industrial and social facilities. Staffs to maintain order, made up of workers, the intelligentsia, party and Leninist Communist Youth League workers, internationalist servicemen, and labor and war veterans, have been set up in all of the city's rayons. A city staff has also been set up. That is to say, Tbilisi will itself assume responsibility for stabilizing the situation in the city. And the need for normalization is acutely felt.

"This is the first time we have not experienced an influx of foreign visitors," Vakhtang Tskhadadze, director of the Iveriya Hotel, told us. "Georgia's hospitality is known throughout the world; we receive travel applications from dozens of states. And we are therefore extremely sorry that there are few visitors today, that they do not dare to come.... Restaurants too are closed. We are suffering enormous losses."

"The introduction of the curfew and related measures has already consumed millions of rubles," a representative of the military command reported at a session of the Georgian Communist Party Bureau.

And, in addition to the human tragedy and irremediable losses, there is also the economic aspect of the events in the city. It is distressing: These colossal resources are disappearing irretrievably from the state budget, while they could be put into solving social problems, of which Georgia has built up quite a few. Do not such events cost the state too dearly?

As we were informed at the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee, an enlarged session of the Bureau there examined numerous requests and statements from representatives of the working class, the intelligentsia, public organizations, and students regarding the lifting of the curfew established by decision of the republic leadership. The Bureau, in view of the fact that the city and rayon staffs have, together with local administrative organs, gotten down to strictly maintaining public order in Tbilisi, came to the conclusion that it was possible to lift the curfew. The relevant Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet decree comes into force as of 5 am 18 April.

Paper Ponders Tbilisi Events

PM1904095589 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 18 Apr 89 Second Edition pp 1, 4

[Special correspondent S. Karkhanin report: "Tbilisi, April"]

[Text] From competent sources: An unknown person called Vnukovo Airport to claim that explosive devices had been hidden on aircraft on flights 941 and 927 from Moscow to Tbilisi. A careful check by specialists showed that the report did not tally with reality.

We flew on one of those flights, and I can testify that the particularly rigorous control inspection that preceded departure was perfectly justified. As for the telephone call...it turns out that there is still no stopping those who dislike the calm that is returning to the Georgian capital. Such provocations are in sharp contrast with the bitter sorrow, the profound thoughts, and the sincere hopes now characteristic of the overwhelming majority of Tbilisi residents.

The granite slabs in front of Government House on Rustaveli Avenue have been clothed in a scarlet carpet of living tulips and carnations all week. Funerary candles are fixed to the trunks of chestnut trees and to stone steps. The pain of the tragedy played out here at dawn on 9 April will not abate for a long time. The 19 dead and dozens of injured city people, the 109 servicemen who suffered, according to the military medical staff's information, in incidents outside Government House and the republic television center—these, according to specific data, are its bitter statistics.

The investigation being conducted under the leadership of USSR Deputy General Prosecutor A. Katusev will name all the guilty persons from the law's viewpoint. But there is also a moral account, which does not always coincide with the juridical one and which is paid only according to the dictates of conscience. The Georgian Communist Party Central Committee plenum showed that the republic's leaders too have assumed their share of responsibility for what happened.

A few brief interviews:

A. Gogiya, electrician:
"In my opinion, the plenum decisions were difficult but courageous, helped to defuse the situation, and gave people back their faith in justice."

M. Khutsishvili, teacher:
"For 15 centuries our city did not know interethnic dissension, then suddenly such a flareup of passions. I myself heard anti-Russian and anticommunist appeals ring out 8 April from the crowd which blocked traffic in the avenue for several days. In my opinion, there can be no justification for this."

S. Shapovalenko, engineer:
"Evidently having heard about an operation being prepared, the leaders of the extremists brought several thousand more people to the square that night and persuaded them not to disperse under any circumstances. In general, they jeopardized innocent people, while they themselves want to make themselves scarce, as it were. It will not come off; let them bear their share of responsibility!"

It is true that I have also heard quite different views during these days. An unshaven man with a mourning band on his forehead, who had gathered a handful of curious people outside the Zion Cathedral, was heatedly trying to prove something to them, pointing at a leaflet on the wall. On catching sight of a militia patrol the "agitator" instantly melted into the crowd. A Tbilisi acquaintance shook his head: "What does he say? The same old thing again. He says that Moscow is to blame for everything, the hour of freedom will still strike, and the authorities must not be obeyed. But few people now believe this gibberish." And yet the leaders of informal extremist groups have not abated.

"Our public must also assume its measure of responsibility. Above all that section of the intelligentsia which, mindless of the consequences, has associated itself with irresponsible statements, extracting applause," the republic newspaper ZARYA VOSTOKA writes in an editorial entitled "Our Duty Is To Return Calm to Georgia," and these are fair words.

Kostava, Tsereteli, Gamsakhurdiya, Chanturiya, Sarishvili, Khukhunashvili—they were arrested recently, and the investigation will determine the degree of each one's guilt. But a question is already standing out clearly in the mosaic of events: How could they, while passing themselves off as "the people's benefactors," sow discord and panic, kindle interethnic dissension, and try to seize plants and factories? An eyewitness, D. Lomidze, shift chief at Rustavi Metallurgical Plant, speaks:

"I myself saw how the extremists operate. We heard their threats in the evening but, of course, we did not leave the open-hearth furnaces. But during the night a crowd of hooligan thugs tried to break into the shop to make us stop work by force. The steelworkers rebuffed them. Then the hooligans detained public transport and began returning buses to the pool."

In fact, demagoguery has frequently been just a cover to disguise far more prosaic, egotistic interests. At Tbilisi's "Elektrosvarka" Plant, for example, O. Gogeliya, chief of the painters' section, threatened the leadership: "If you do not give me an apartment, I will organize a rally on the national question."

And he really did bring approximately 100 people to the plant's territory. True, instead of the promised political discussion, the talk was of just one thing—Gogeliya's apartment....

This incident, reported by local newspapers, is not isolated. Someone reckoned on acquiring a new house by encroaching upon the friendship of the brother peoples, while someone else reckoned on getting undeserved authority and, given luck, power too.

Many people are now arguing whether the special measures associated with the bringing in of troops were really necessary to restore public order. Of course, the armored carriers in the streets have not beautified the ancient city, and the curfew inconveniences residents in many ways. It makes sense to heed the words of USSR People's Artiste N. Burmistrova, honorary citizen of Tbilisi, who went right through the war as a nurse in units under the command of Hero of the Soviet Union V. Dzhandzhgava:

"The combat hardware in the streets brings back memories of the hard war years. But the curfew is an enforced measure. We have been assured that it will be lifted as soon as schoolchildren are able to return to their classrooms, and students to the higher educational institutions. Thus, we city people must rise all together to the defense of public order."

What do the soldiers entrusted with serving in posts and security detachments think? Sergeant G. Davydov was drafted into the Army from Volgograd, and now he is here. He says that the tours of duty mainly pass off quietly. True, there are sometimes misunderstandings, although many absurd rumors and fabrications intensively being spread by disorganizers, by "radio voices" from the West, and by certain emigre publications from abroad died down after representatives of the public, including young Tbilisi residents who served in Afghanistan, began helping the Army patrols. The staff of former internationalist servicemen participate in tours of duty, resolve misunderstandings, and prevent conflicts.

It must be added that, when the republic's party and soviet organs were discussing the decision on whether to impose a curfew, the command of the military district objected, explaining that the Army has quite different tasks. However, the adopted decision had to be carried out, and probably everyone must know about this.

...The tolling of bells carries over the Kura—the city is burying those who died in the incident outside Government House. These days have been awaited with anxiety and alarm—will emotion prevail once more over reason? But the streets are calm. Practically all plants are operating normally. Over the past weekend many enterprises organized overtime working to repair the harm done by interruptions in production during the past week. Studies have resumed in almost all higher educational institutions. All public transport is functioning, and there is more food in the celebrated Tbilisi bazaars, although prices are exorbitant. The initiative of the aircraft-building association—to ensure public order by means of worker militia detachments—has been supported in all labor collectives. The republic's Communists are sparing no effort, each in his own place, to maintain calm in the city.

"We have all heard M.S. Gorbachev's address and the appeal by the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee plenum participants," V. Metsatunyan, team leader at Tbilisi's "Elektroapparat" Association, said. "In our team, just as in our republic, working amicably side by side are Georgians, Armenians, Russians, Osetians.... I will say this: We are all like brothers. It is no coincidence that the provocateurs who urged us to strike at a rally outside the plant gates went away empty-handed, as it were. Worker organization helps us to work and to maintain order in our own dear city. Only by being cohesive can we rebuff discord."

This thought is now acquiring more and more committed supporters and being realized in the stabilizing situation. Many reassuring circumstances are apparent. And, particularly importantly, the republic's new leadership is endeavoring to arrange a constructive dialogue among the party aktiv, workers, the intelligentsia, and young people. E.A. Shevardnadze spoke of the need for this at a meeting with Rustavi metallurgists. This dialogue leading to mutual understanding can be a reliable guarantee that what happened in Tbilisi will never be repeated.

Lifting of Curfew 'Sensible'

LD1804184189 Moscow TASS in English 1808 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] Tbilisi April 18 TASS—The atmosphere of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi, until recently electrified, has changed in the first hours after the lifting of the curfew.

Tanks and personnel armoured carriers have vanished from city streets, armed patrols are no longer in sight. They have been replaced by volunteers acting in close contact with the Militia (police) force.

People hurrying, vehicles moving along busy streets—the normal pace of transport operation has been reestablished. All shops are open, street kiosks are selling goods as usually.

Virtually all industrial enterprises began work since morning, classes at secondary schools and colleges were resumed. People discuss calmly and thoroughly things that are of concern to them.

As in the previous days, the square in front of the government building in Rustaveli Avenue remains covered with flowers and candles are alight as people mourn the deaths that occurred on the night from April 8 to 9.

The grief of the loss remains in the hearts of hundreds of people dressed in black who come to Rustaveli Avenue to pay tribute to the victims of the tragedy.

"No doubt, at a certain stage, when false guideposts confused some people and the disturbances leading to unnecessary bloodshed broke out, it was a sensible step to impose a curfew," G. Khukhuni, a leading research fellow at the Institute of the Language under the Georgian Academy of Sciences, told TASS.

"Now there is no need for the emergency measure," he went on to say. "The Tbilisi residents have realised that tranquillity in their city depends above all on themselves, on their weighed-out and sober assessment of the developments."

Between lectures at Tbilisi University, Givi Danelia, a student, said, commenting on the lifting of the curfew: "This is a sensible, clever decision. We all understood over the past days that politicking can bring nothing but harm."

Rumors Hampering Normalization

PM1904102389 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Apr 89 First Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Rumors...or Provocation?"]

[Text] Tbilisi, 18 Apr—Many of Tbilisi's inhabitants are asking the question in our headline as they read the pamphlets pasted on apartment blocks and trees and hear strangers giving allegedly authentic—but substantially in excess of official data—reports of the numerous casualties as a result of the dramatic events of the night of 8-9 April on Rustaveli Boulevard.

One of these pamphlets says that 37-year-old Zaur Vasilyevich Gzirishvili, an inhabitant of Chailuri village, Sagaredzhoyskiy Rayon, has disappeared without trace. An anonymous author surmises that he was mown down by a tank and his body "thrown into the Kura." Nothing of the sort, a TASS correspondent was told at Tbilisi's Internal Affairs Administration, where there was a meeting with "victims." All this time Z. Gzirishvili has been at home in his village. He was sincerely indignant to find out that he has been the victim of blatant disinformation.

The mother of Gennadiy Selepanov Gogiashvili, a student at the No 49 vocational and technical college, appealed to the Georgian Writers' Union saying that her son had disappeared and asking for help. But 13 April she calmly told the college director: Don't carry out a search, everything's OK....

Unauthenticated and sometimes malicious rumors are seriously hampering the improvement of the situation in Georgia. They whip up emotion, kindle passion, and often simply neutralize the efforts of all the people of Tbilisi who are striving to further stabilize the situation in the city following the lifting of the curfew 18 April.

The press has already reported on the "canard" started recently by DEUTSCHE WELLE to the effect that 60 bodies were allegedly discovered in the Vera River near Tbilisi and that this place is under increased guard and the authorities have denied all specialists' attempts to examine the corpses.

"I can take full responsibility for saying that this report is an utter fabrication," G. Kekelidze, chairman of Ordzhonikidzevskiy Rayon Soviet Executive Committee, on whose territory the Vera River is situated, told journalists. "There have not been and there are no corpses there. Everyone can see that for themselves."

What is the point of the claim circulated a few days ago by certain nationalist elements that Georgia's Academy of Arts has allegedly been the scene of antistate rallies. Students and teachers from higher educational establishments have irately rebuked the authors of these insinuations.

Clubs Used Against Ryazan Rally Participants

PM1804123589 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 15 Apr 89 Second Edition p 2

[Special correspondent S. Blagodarov dispatch as part of a two-dispatch feature under the headline "Tale of Two Election Campaign Meetings"—first dispatch is entitled "With Dignity"; Blagodarov's dispatch is entitled "...And Quite the Reverse"]

[Text] Ryazan—The whole city is talking about an event which occurred a few days ago in Ryazan.

...Neither of the two candidates who were running "got through" at the 26 March election in Ryazanskiy Territorial Okrug No 279.

Right after the first round, an action group started collecting signatures from Ryazan's residents. On 31 March group members A. Gavrilov, L. Tyutcheva, S. Romanov, M. Panov, V. Nikulin, and Yu. Rassokhin submitted to the city executive committee [gorispolkom] and the okrug electoral commission an application for permission to organize a meeting of voters at their place of residence to nominate new candidate USSR people's deputies.

The group proposed that "a decision be made by 3 April and the action group and voters be notified through the mass media of the procedure for holding the meeting."

The action group called for an answer 3 April. The okrug commission offices were again closed, and gorispolkom officials refused to accept the fresh application (signed by even more people) and give a decision on the first application.

"You can spend the night here if you like, but nobody will accept your application," Gorispolkom Chairman V. Lobanov sharply told the action group.

The second application now contained the following ultimatum: "We resolutely protest the dragging out of a decision on this matter. We give notice that voters from Okrug No 279 will assemble outside the gorispolkom building at 1800 hours on 5 April 1989 to obtain an answer to their applications."

On the face of it, people were not demanding anything supernatural. Quite the reverse—they offered the use of their initiative and assistance. And the gorispolkom...responded. A. Gavrilov was summoned 4 April and was warned that the Gorispolkom had RESOLVED:

"1. To ban the holding of a rally (meeting) outside the gorispolkom building at 1800 hours on 5 April 1989 since this is not conducive either to normal preparations for the holding of repeat elections of USSR people's deputies or to public order in the city's central square.

"2. To make it incumbent upon the Sovetskiy Rayon Executive Committee Internal Affairs Department, in the event of Paragraph 1 of this resolution being breached, to take the necessary measures to put an end to any unauthorized rally and to unlawful actions by individuals."

Militia detachments started taking up positions in Lenin Square at about 1800 hours on 5 April. Special vehicles lay in wait in Podbelskiy Street. Several persons in civilian clothing took up positions at windows....

"This is the spot from which they took photographs, and this is where two prosecutors from the Oblast Prosecutor's Office sat, observing the development of events and giving us advice," Executive Committee [ispolkom] Secretary L. Zhivopistsev informed your correspondent.

As soon as a crowd started assembling, street washing vehicles appeared in Lenin Square and started going round and round, sweeping the already spotless square. Generally speaking, the gorispolkom and the okrug electoral commission were thoroughly prepared for events. Their reply to the voters looked impressive.

Just after 1900 hours, action group members appeared outside the gorispolkom building and made their way inside past the militiamen. They were already expected by Okrug Electoral Commission Chairman V. Dryuchin; Deputy Gorispolkom Chairmen Yu. Larionov and R. Volodin; Ispolkom Secretary L. Zhivopistsev; and other officials.

About 1,000 persons had assembled in the square by that time.

Meanwhile, gorispolkom officials were arguing with the okrug commission as to who should see to the opening of a voters' club. They ultimately concluded that it was up to the party organs. This made things simpler, after all.... The gorispolkom was also totally unwilling to give an answer to the second simple and clear question: When can a meeting of voters at their place of residence be held (there were less than 10 days remaining until the deadline for candidates' nomination).

Meanwhile, downstairs the militia was giving those assembled instructions to disperse. Lieutenant Colonel G. Fedotov, chief of Sovetskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department, who headed the operation, announced through a loudspeaker that this was an unauthorized rally. But nobody was "rallying," people were awaiting an answer....

Finally, after 90 minutes of empty talk, the action group members appeared in the doorway. Prior to that, action group leader A. Gavrilov telephoned the party oblast committee and told them what was happening. But he was referred to the oblast ispolkom....

A. Gavrilov told those assembled that they had been given no answer at all, and he suggested that they assemble the next day at the Radio Institute Stadium to collect signatures to a petition to the Central Electoral Commission. In the meantime, two militiamen twisted his arms behind his back and dragged him inside a vehicle.

That was a signal. The militia advanced on the crowd....

"Women started screaming when the militia advanced. I burst into tears when that happened. After all, we had done nothing to provoke such actions," engineer-technologist Ye. Khomich told me.

There were 15 persons who stood before the Sovetskiy Rayon Court. The court sentenced 13 of them to monetary fines ranging between R50 and R150. Money for these fines has already been collected at Ryazan's enterprises. The other two were imprisoned for 10 days.

"Did you not examine the reasons which made people assemble outside the ispolkom?" I asked Yu.I. Klepko, chairman of the Sovetskiy Rayon People's Court.

"No," Yuriy Aleksandrovich replied, "that was, after all, an administrative hearing...."

Let us ask at least why it was that gorispolkom officials observed the dramatic events from behind their office blinds and did not go down to where the people were. Why was it that the situation was explained to the hundreds of voters by that selfsame A. Gavrilov and not by Okrug Electoral Commission Chairman V. Dryuchin?

"I am simply afraid," V. Dryuchin frankly admitted. "I am afraid that all these meetings of voters at their place of residence will ultimately affect the 14 May elections."

"Those who were rallying were detained and punished, but quite the reverse could also have happened—the gorispolkom chairman and I could have been summoned and asked: Why were preventive measures not taken? And I don't want to be punished," Ispolkom Secretary L. Zhivopistsev said.

One last point. The most widespread topic of conversation in Ryazan is the use of clubs to disperse those assembled outside the gorispolkom. Major General A. Makarov, chief of the Oblast Internal Affairs Administration, twice assured your correspondent that neither clubs nor any other special means were used at the incident—God forbid! The same was categorically stated by Lt Col G. Fedotov, chief of Sovetskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department.

These people are in an awkward position. The journalist's notebook contains dozens of witness statements.

Clubs are also clearly visible on photographs in the possession of the court and of Fedotov himself.

...Just before my departure, I went looking for someone whom I wanted to see without fail. Ryazan Militia Sergeant Andrey Blinushov, secretary of the Sovetskiy Rayon Internal Affairs Department Communist Youth League organization, party bureau member, and Communist who filed an application for discharge right after the Lenin Square events.

"I could not bear seeing how people, having done nothing to provoke such actions, were attacked with clubs," Andrey told me.

...After all this, a gorispolkom session resolved not to permit any meetings of voters at their places of residence at all.

Tretyakov Examines 'Boris Yeltsin Phenomenon'

PM1804155289 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 16, 16 Apr 89 p 10

[Vitaliy Tretyakov article: "The Boris Yeltsin Phenomenon"]

[Text] "Why does a party committee's dislike of a deputy whom the apparatus doesn't sympathize with, suddenly give rise to powerful support from the people (B.N. Yeltsin's example)?"

(From the article "The People Have Made their Choice," "Pravda," 1 April, 1989.)

Re the problem of popularity. It didn't happen out of the blue, all at once, but suddenly became obvious even to those who used to shut their own and other's eyes to it.

The problem of the popularity of politicians and political leadership, which has always existed everywhere, has always been studied everywhere in the civilized world with care and without servility towards those who laid claims to this popularity or leadership. For dozens of years we excluded ourselves from the civilized world on this count as well. Life, however, takes its revenge. The interests of perestroyka demand that the phenomenon of Yeltsin's popularity should no longer be ignored.

In the above quote from a Pravda editorial I was surprised by the word "suddenly". No, it's not all of a sudden. The situation which existed on March 26—the election day—offers a logical confirmation of the fact that the Yeltsin phenomenon has not only been born of perestroyka, but is part of it. That is why I would like to find the reasons for his popularity and examine some components of "Yeltsin's image" in the masses' social awareness.

It stands to reason that this image does not coincide with either the political or everyday reality of Boris Yeltsin. It is better for someone else who knows Boris Yeltsin well to judge the extent of these discrepancies. The overwhelming majority of electors, whose votes ensured Yeltsin's land-slide victory in the elections do not have a good and intimate knowledge of him either. The electors decided on the basis of the candidate's "image" that generated the most sympathy? In an attempt to answer these questions I shall try—to the extent to which this is possible—to avoid introducing my own evaluaton of the "Yeltsin image" which has taken shape in mass mentality.

Yeltsins's birth as a political leader, enjoying, according to Pravda, "powerful support from the people", has been recorded with absolute precision. It was that moment on February 26, 1986, at the 27th CPSU Congress, when he uttered the following words, with the accent on the last phrase: "The untouchability of authorities, the infallibility of leaders, and the dual-track morality are intolerable and impermissible in present-day conditions. A system of periodic accountability must at last be worked out at the CPSU Central Committee for leaders at all levels.... Delegates may ask me: why didn't I say this when addressing the 26th Party Congress? Well, I can reply and do it frankly: at that time apparently I still lacked courage and political experience."

Having said this, Yeltsin was one of the first to accept responsibility for the "accomplishments" of the stagnation period, although he was by far not the first among the culprits of these "accomplishments". The initial stage of any revolutionary process is a period of searching for answers to the question "Who is to blame?" Whoever found the courage to say "I am to blame" immediately received powerful moral support in the eyes of millions of people eager to hear precisely from "above" the words about personal, and not only collective responsibility for what happened.

Since Yeltsin's example was not followed by the majority of those who needed to do this, in the people's opinion, he retained moral leadership, specifically in the right to reply to the next question of perestroyka: "What is to be done?" And people started listening to his replies, the more so that, in his post as the leader of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU, Yeltsin passed over more quickly than the others from words about perestroyka to real perestroyka as he understood it.

First and foremost, he constantly accentuates the problems confronting perestroyka, using examples from everyday life which are easily understood by the ordinary person.

Yeltsin honestly exposed the "techniques" of perestroyka, especially in the methods of work with people. The idea of cutting down the party apparatus was still only being discussed, but he got down to business in Moscow's City and District Party committees which came under his jurisdiction. While yet another discussion of the food supply problem was going on, the First Secretary of the Moscow City CPSU Committee used his own power and authority to bring about abundance at Moscow's fairs and collective farm markets. He took perestroyka—and he is not alone in this—literally. Glasnost? He speaks about everything. Struggle against red tape? He looks for it at all institutions. The electoral struggle? Yeltsin straightforwardly seeks to win support from the people, as did certain other candidates. And he succeeded where others failed.

Lastly, Yeltsin constantly serves as a reminder about the slow pace of perestroyka, saying that people don't want results tomorrow, but today, that tomorrow will possibly be too late.

These are some of the methods which, to all appearances, Yeltsin tried to use in his actions. At times he succeeded, and he always had the support of those who, during the stagnation years, became fed up with promises instead of actions.

As a result, the majority feels that Yeltsin speaks on behalf of at least those who are still powerless to affect developments. When in 1987 Yeltsin, having quit the "upper echelon", found himself back up there, the crest of his popularity rose so high that his planned exile into the political wasteland did not materialize. This was also corroborated by the March 26 elections, as a result of which Yeltsin became a people's deputy of the USSR.

Before this, the impression of Yletsin's personal unity with the people was daily reinforced in popular opinion both by the deeds of Yeltsin himself and by the words and deeds of those who criticize him.

He exists in popular opinion as a normal person and as a man of action. Yeltsin was the first to tear from himself the shroud of secrecy which usually veils personal acts by representatives from the "upper crust". The image of a destroyer of secrets always has a great appeal to people. It is also satisfying to confirm what I guessed a long time ago: the shroud of secrecy hides no secrets at all. He delivered many of the insulting meaning imposed by the tradition of secrecy: that the actions of those on top are inaccessible to rank-and-file persons in both meanings of the word "inaccessible"—no access and none of your business. Yeltsin made access free and showed that the same human beings sit "at the top". They are like all the others—they argue, err, make rash steps, get excited and furious, disagree with each other on small and occasionally big things. By so doing, as it seems to people, Yeltsin brought big-time politics down from the Olympic heights and put them at the feet of rank-and-file citizens.

Moreover, Yeltsin himself tried to come down from these heights to his rank-and-file co-citizens, and risked departing from the bureaucratic traditions: he was the first to go by streetcar, give up rations and sign up at a district polyclinic. Some said that all of this was done as a pose. But so far there are simply no other leaders who would have done the same even as a pose.

He started addressing the broadest audiences not with speeches, but with answers to hundreds of questions—moreover, any questions. He started giving interviews to journalists, telling them not only about his decisions, but also his doubts, failures and the personal threats against him. It is, of course, possible to be ironical. It is possible to assert that after exposing the storerooms of food stores overstuffed with goods, Yelsin did not solve the problem of shortages, but merely created an illusion that the solution was around the corner. But just recall the name of Caliph Harun al-Rashid. He is remembered because he studied the real life of rank-and-file people of Baghdad without any suite and in ordinary dress.

In his speeches Yelstin calls for solving not all the problems facing society, but precisely those which have a direct bearing on the ordinary life of ordinary people: food, housing, social justice, and crime—especially in trade. Needless to say, in so doing he does not touch upon the strategic track of perestroyka along which the entire load of problems must be pulled without getting stuck in the past of any of them. He owes his strength to his accuracy in hitting the sorest points. And it is this that has a hypnotic effect—it's the same as Dr. Kasyan, working with the strength of his fingers and hands, who attracts thousands of patients who have lost faith in the miracles of modern medical science.

Moreover, in his numerous statements—especially those made after his departure from the top echelon of the leadership—Yeltsin asks people to understand and support him. The feeling that remains after hearing such statements is unusual and gratifying: it is not us, the people, that a leader helps find the right road. It is he who asks us for help in the search for this road.

Thus, people identify with Yeltsin. He is a victim of dislike on the part of higher-ups—who of us hasn't been in the same position? And he is being slighted for refusing to look for their approval—who hasn't dreamed of doing this? And the main thing—he speaks with everyone, those below and those above, in a similar way and on equal terms, crushing the hierarchical barriers which everyone, especially those below, is fed up with.

The overall impression is that he is not fighting for power for his own sake: he resigned from his post in 1987, and announced his readiness to give up his ministerial post in the event of his being elected a people's deputy. He is accused of being power-hungry, but everyone is accustomed to believing that the most logical thing to do in this case would be not to resign and not to publicly express his disagreement with colleagues at the top, but something precisely the opposite. True, this is the logic of common sense. A subtle political strategy, however, can be built on much more intricate tactical manoeuvres. This is all quite hypothetical, but the fact remains that we strongly miss people behaving like he does.

Is it really the case or does it only seem that he is not fighting for power for his own sake? One thing is self-evident—Yeltsin is fighting for himself, for his honour: he demands political rehabilitation during his life-time in defiance of tradition. He doesn't confess his sins, but stands up for himself everywhere. He may have delusions—but his own, not borrowed from someone else. He is expelled from the highest political circles but, refusing to resign himself to this, comes up again and again to the rostrum becoming a target for criticism. Glasnost is his assistant, but after all he uses it to the fullest—something which many others do not dare to do. He proves to be right more often than it may seem. Yesterday he alone said what everyone is discussing now. When the verbatim report of the October 1987 Plenary Meeting of the CPSU Central Committee was published at long last, it became clear that the rumours we heard were false. Readers even ask: "Hasn't the verbatim report been cut?"

Of course, this may be the "effect of being late" to which political documents are very sensitive. In March 1989 we read what was said in October 1987. The 19th Party Conference shifted a number of accents in the CPSU Central Committee's activities and introduced changes into the Secretariat's work, which had been criticized by Yeltsin. The September 1988 Plenary Meeting of the Central Committee modified the composition of the Politburo, which we know today but which we couldn't have anticipated in 1987.

Ironically, even those who criticize Yeltsin never tire of mentioning his positive features and businesslike qualities, and his ability and desire to work. Whatever he is accused of, and whatever he is guilty of, can be said about any Soviet boss—everything down to his difficult character. But then his positive qualities are unusual, they betray a figure which may even be contradictory, but is likeable in a human way even in its errors and delusions.

Relations with the apparatus are a special component of the Yeltsin phenomenon. This phenomenon could originate only in the apparatus because so far the apparatus has been a real and stable part of power—people need stability. But the stability and strength of the officialdom irk people and restrict their freedom. Therefore sympathies are given to those who shatter this apparatus. However, any serious shattering of the apparatus is feasible so far only on the part of those who themselves constitute its part and therefore are a real force. The circle closes—the Yeltsin phenomenon moves in this circle. I am sure that had Yeltsin run for the post of director of some research institute or factory, his success could not be guaranteed. On March 26, 1989, Yeltsin was voted in by the overwhelming majority not as a "boss for the people", but as a "boss for the bosses". The unanimity in voting for Yeltsin was the people's reply to the apparatus for its arrogant use of power.

A mishap and a lucky one—he falls and rises again. This is Yeltsin—personalized glasnost and perestroyka with their advances and reverses. For long people have wanted such a leader to make an appearance. And he did appear. People said: if a man like this comes, he will be removed. And he didn't hold out.

The usual collapse of an ideal. It not only frightens us, but makes us rise to defend it, because faith in the ideal remains.

Of course, an element of idealization is in evidence here. An additional proof of this is the rich campaign folklore from the election period associated with Yeltsin. The main thing, however, which attracts people's sympathy is the fact that he has been doing everything which perestroyka and glasnost permit, but which dozens of people above him and millions of others below him have not dared to do. He is a product of perestroyka, which is why he is so popular. Each time, he continues whatever Mikhail Gorbachev begins. He continues it, sharpening it to the extreme and boldly throwing it onto the altar of "people's love" or into the face of those who were not yet prepared even for the delicate formulations of the General Secretary (or who hoped that words would not be followed by deeds). It is hard for a leader with a real policy to retain the sympathies of everyone, because a real policy never bears golden fruit all at once and for everyone. Of course, Yeltsin has the advantageous position of a "shadow leader", a critic of whatever is being poorly done as a result of that real policy. The majority of his admirers engage in the same kind of criticism, lacking—in contrast to Yeltsin—just one thing: the possibility of being heard. And they support a person who elevates their thoughts to the level of decision making.

His real value as a politician can come to a head only when he gets real political responsibilities instead of the portfolio of a sectoral minister. They say that he had one during the period of his Party leadership in Moscow and he couldn't cope. That may be. But the other less open people must still prove that they cope better. Until they prove this, even Yeltsin's failures will be blamed not on him, but on the command system or on some of his critics. Moreover, if perestroyka takes a turn for the worse in comparison with the present-day situation, Yeltsin's popularity will increase. If for the better, it will diminish because of success will then be attributed to other active leaders of perestroyka as well.

Yeltsin himself, of course, may not even last in political life. But as long as perestroyka is alive his place will not be vacant. It shouldn't be consigned to the back of the hall. There is a need to understand why many want Yeltsin to be their spokesperson in discussing the country's problems.

Politically this phenomenon arose thanks to the Party, but today it exists thanks to the people—and it's impossible not to reckon with this. Supporting perestroyka as a whole and in its separate parts, people take an extremely critical attitude towards its slow (or seemingly slow) pace. In this Yeltsin is at one with the people.

More on People's Deputy Elections Results, Process

26 Mar Leningrad Elections Viewed

LD0704212889 Moscow TASS in English 2101 GMT 7 Apr 89

[Text] Leningrad April 8 TASS—A joint three-day plenary meeting of the Leningrad regional and city committees of the CPSU ended on Friday. It discussed the results of the March 26th elections to Soviet people's deputies. Speakers were not required to keep within a time-limit for the first time and Leningrad newspapers started printing the plenary meeting's verbatim record already next day.

Alternate member of the CPSU Central Committe Politburo, first secretary of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU Yuriy Solovev, who failed to win the ballot needed to be elected, had this to say to explain his defeat: "One believed that one's prestige was the guarantee against any unexpected development. One has to blame himself, since one did not foresee and could not withstand such a development of events". Speaking at the close of the plenary meeting Solovev reaffirmed he did not intend to advance his candidacy once again, but he called for support to the recent losers who would decide to start again from the very beginning.

Leningrad Mayor Vladimir Khodyrev, who was not elected either, said that the main cause of his failure was underestimation of the enhanced level of the popular social consciousness, the desire of the people to be masters of their future and their state.

Participants in the plenary meeting said that people voted against above all because there was a shortage of commodities at shops, because the housing problem still existed, the ecological situation was the cause of concern, and the crime rate in the city was on the rise. People link these shortcomings with activities of concrete leaders of the regional and city committees of the CPSU and the Leningrad soviet.

Having analysed the election returns in detail, the plenary meeting stressed that these were no tragedy and the situation should not be dramatized. The victory in the final account went to Communists nominated by work collectives, most of them are members of elective party bodies.

The main conclusion of the plenary meeting is that the strategy and tactics of the party work should be changed and it is necessary to work hard for the Leningrad CPSU organization to be able to regain its befitting place in the country's social life.

Kiev Party Assesses 26 Mar Defeats

18000808 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 8 Apr 89 First Edition p 3

[Report by Mikhail Odinets (Kiev): "Is the Press to Blame?"]

[Text] The elections of people's deputies in Kiev on 26 March ended, as we know, with the defeat of the first secretary of the party gorkom [city party committee] K. Masik and the chairman of the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] V. Zgurskiy. A combined plenum of the Kiev gorkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the control and inspection commission of the city party organization convened the day before yesterday in order to figure out why this happened.

The discussion was more pointed and stormy than ever before. More than 20 people participated in it. A suggestion was even made to retire the city's mayor after such a result of the voting. Communists noted that Kiev leaders were separated from the workers and that an armchair style of management prevailed in their work, as a result of which many of the city's problems are being resolved slowly and with a great deal of difficulty.

But there were also other speakers who, taking advantage of the forum for their own aims, explained the defeat of the candidates by various fabricated causes. In particular, the press was a scapegoat. The department chief of the Institute of Electrodynamics of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Academy of Sciences L. Buslov alleged that the newspaper PRAVDA had printed a lie when it reported on how the pre-election meeting was proceeding in Kiev City National-Territorial Okrug No 33. Let us recall that one of the sections of the article (4 Apr 89) discussed the fact that this meeting took place under "strict conditions," as a result of which the PRAVDA UKRAINY correspondent A. Sokol was not allowed to pass through the hall to speak with the delegates. They themselves were "sifted" through four checkpoints, and "how do we know that the offensive artificial obstacles," it was stated later, "did not have an effect on the positions of the voters on the day of the elections, which were entrusted to the secretary of the Kiev Gorkom, K. Masik, who spoke at that meeting?"

And this is what was called a lie. But a little later, when speaking in the discussions, the chairman of the board of the Kiev organization of the Ukrainian Composers Union, A. Vilash, discussed the strict security measures that prevailed at the meeting, which could not but subsequently have an effect on the opinions of the voters. A milling machine operator of the "Arsenal" Plant I. Chub, who at that time was the chairman of the okrug electoral commission, stated that the strict measures were taken to ensure order. Thus the statement in the newspaper was actually corroborated at the plenum itself.

Nonetheless the desire to avoid objective evaluations of the causes of the defeat of the high-level leaders in the elections, and the fear of fundamental criticism which goes back to the times of stagnation, caused certain participants in the plenum, for instance the secretary of the aircraft plant party committee D. Bolgarov, to place the responsibility for the defeat on the press. They said that it had exerted pressure on the voters. This was asserted even when the article in PRAVDA had not been published until 9 (!) days after the election.

Unfortunately, certain speeches praised the city leaders so much that it even evoked a protest from one of those present in the hall: "Comrades, we are discussing the results of the elections and not the question of our confidence in Masik."

But this reasonable reminder, on the basis of which they should have seriously discussed why the city leaders had lost the confidence of a significant part of the voters and how to restructure the work of the party gorkom and gorispolkom, unfortunately did not change the course of the plenum.

One thing can be added: One should not only lose gracefully, but also be able to draw a useful lesson from it.

Lessons Drawn From Elections

18000790 Moscow TRUD in Russian
7 Apr 89 pp 1-2

[Article by N. Kishkin: "Elections and the Choice"]

[Text] The tense, sometimes dramatic electoral campaign, so completely unaccustomed for us, is now behind us. (True, it has not ended for everyone.) The new Law on the Election of USSR People's Deputies has been proven in practice; it is one of the first steps in the reform of the country's political system. Ahead is the in-depth analysis of the experience acquired and, it seems, work on improving the law in areas where its weaknesses were revealed. But now is the time to analyze some results, without pretense as to the indisputability of conclusions and observations.

In evaluating the current electoral system as a whole, we can simply say that this is not only an improvement on the previous one, but a breakthrough to a new quality; this is a great step in the democratization of society, which will leave its mark on all of society's political and moral atmosphere. Even the strongest critics, if they are honest with themselves, cannot deny the obvious: The new electoral law, despite its defects, brought the broadest masses into political activity, and awoke the political thought of those who had not considered themselves to be political participants. Perhaps for the first time in many decades people felt that something depended upon them, that it was they, and not someone on high, deciding the country's fate. Even if this were the only result of the new election system, we would have recognized that it had justified our hopes, but the results are broader. The newly elected body of deputies will allow for the formation of a competent Supreme Soviet, which broadly reflects all shades of public thought, meaning that shoulder to shoulder they will resolve the complex tasks of restructuring.

Let us look back at the past 4 months; we will see what withstood the test of practice, what has to be considered, what has to be improved.

The critics most often speak out on the issue of representation of public organizations. We do not speak of the idea itself; there is nothing wrong about that. Such representation expands the base of the soviets, enabling them to reflect a broad palette of public interests. Incidentally, the idea itself was born not at high levels, but was expressed in the press long before the adoption of the the new law, and it brought no objections. The objections appeared only during the course of the legislative formation of this idea; they were primarily connected with deviation from the principle of direct elections. Fears were expressed that all of this was thought up in order to ease the access of functionaries to deputies' seats. Were these fears justified? I would not hastily answer in the affirmative. Experience has shown that it is within their own organizations that leaders are in the most complicated situation, for the demands upon them in these organizations are much heavier than the demands made of the average members. Thus, in the elections for the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], not a single one of the leaders received a seat, and only a few representatives from central committees and republic trade union councils. There are analogous examples in several other organizations as well.

And all the same, we must admit that the path toward a deputy's seat was in many cases easier through a public organization than through a territorial okrug. In the latter, one had to win the support of hundreds of thousands of voters, and in the public organizations, only a few hundred participants of a plenum or other meeting. Of course, here too, the candidates had to travel about the country and speak before rank and file members of their organization. But after all, the final phase of the voting is quite different. And a mechanism which would have bound the plenum of the public organization to consider the opinion of the masses turned out not to have been developed. Whether in the future the principle of representation of the public organizations is to be rejected or some other cardinal change is to be made in its practical application is to be decided by the USSR people's deputies after careful analysis.

But of course, the attention of voters was attracted to the okrug elections, which forms two-thirds of the body of deputies. Let us go through several basic stages of these elections; we will see what practice has shown, and to what conclusions this leads us.

Electoral okrug commissions were formed during the 2 weeks after the announcement of the date of elections. On the whole, this phase elicited little interest. People knew from past experience that these commissions would have no influence on the course of the elections. Therefore, the nomination of representatives to the committee took place quietly and peacefully and, as a rule, not at the meetings of the labor collectives. A very short time had passed when people suddenly realized to their surprise that a great deal depended on the members of the okrug commissions, their principles, their democratic nature under the new conditions: the organization of free nomination of candidates, meetings with them, the publication of pre-electoral posters. There were complaints on the actions of several commissions: One prevents meetings in residential buildings, another seeks to nitpick on formalities of meeting protocol if it nominates an "unplanned" candidate, a third does not assist candidates in finding space for meetings with voters.... This, perhaps, was the first lesson. People began to understand that these elections could not be run with old measures. One thing is certain: In future elections, the voters will control the staff of the commissions more closely.

But of course, the main phase was that of the nomination of candidates. We recall how this used to be done. Somewhere very high up a model of the future personnel of the Supreme Soviet was composed. The percentage of workers, kolkhoz [collective farm] workers, women, youth, Communists, non-party members.... And then all of this was divided up by republics, oblasts, and rayons. And then, at your enterprise, you had to nominate a woman, non-party member, worker. The party committee offered several potential candidates, presenting their personal backgrounds, and one was chosen by the raykom [rayon party committee]. And we promoted here with full unanimity. If at such a meeting someone were to stand up and propose another candidacy, or even worse, his own, this would be considered rattling the foundations. But no one would stand anyway; a game is a game. We would nominate as told and they would agree with us. And if in the morning you open the paper and read that the nominees from some factory in your okrug will be Brezhnev and the worker Ivanov, you already knew that the worker Ivanov would be on the ballot. And Brezhnev was nominated as a pair only as a demonstration of "all the people's love." Then he will give consent for balloting in another okrug, where the way is closed for worker Ivanov.

The new law opened principally new opportunities. While we used to go to the meeting in order to find out who we were nominating, now we go to decide who we ourselves want to see in the highest organ of power. I say frankly that people were not ready for this in all locations; the load of habit is not cast off so easily. At the Saratov State Ball Bearing Plant No 3, the party committee of a "quadrangle" of shops gathered and said that there is an opinion that so-and-so should be nominated. And so they nominated. The workers found out about this...from an oblast television program. Before, people would have acquiesced in this, but not now. They demanded that a conference be called for public discussion of the candidacy.

But such cases were perhaps the exception. At the pre-electoral meetings, passions boiled, opinions clashed, the platforms and positions in life of candidates were evaluated. Here, every participant in the meeting had more to do than to raise his hand without thinking; active thought was required. Thus, the nomination phase had already turned into an invaluable school of political education for the participants of restructuring!

But this was not without its costs. There were also attempts to pressure the labor collectives, and attempts to erect obstacles to the nomination of this or that candidate. There was nothing unexpected in this, and we should not wring our hands about it; after all, the local party apparatus was also approaching the elections with a load of old habits. And, unfortunately, not everyone managed to understand in time that while yesterday everything was decided by orders of the "allowed-forbidden" type, today demands political resources and open conversation with people. For example, the journalists of the Sochi newspaper CHERNOMORSKAYA ZDRAVNITSA who had nominated a candidate were summoned to the gorkom [city party committee] and given an angry dressing down for their "immaturity," for the fact that they had done this without agreement. The candidate did not suit the city fathers.

The workers of the Rostov-on-Don CPSU gorkom did everything within their power in order to prevent the nomination of the "unplanned" (by them) nomination of V. Zubkov, chief of medical staff of a maternity hospital. The collective, however, stood its ground (our newspaper described this). Moving ahead, we will note that it was Zubkov who won the people's deputy seat as a result of the elections. Thus democracy claimed its own, and the elections showed that this process cannot be stopped.

One other circumstance of this phase attracted attention. The list of nominees dazzled the eyes with general directors. What was going on here, why were they given such high preference at the expense of other categories of workers? Obviously, the view taking root of the deputy as a pusher, who will get things done for his rayon, played no small role here. And this is where the lathe operator or teacher loses to the director on all counts. And all the same, during the final phases, other evaluations of the candidates came out: his political positions, his relation with people, his sense of the new, and his ability to fight for it.

The nomination of candidates was finished 2 months before the elections, but in practice, they continued to be widely discussed among the voters in the majority of okrugs for 4-5 more weeks. This seems to show a weak point in the law, which does not require that the nomination results be made known to the public. The electoral commissions are required to do this only after registration. And this took a month, primarily in the preceding okrug electoral meetings; during this time, the voters did not know who had been nominated in their okrugs at this stage, and as a result, were not actively engaged in the electoral campaign.

We must make a special pause for the okrug pre-electoral meetings. This was perhaps the most worrisome, most cutting, and most disputed phase. Such meetings were also conducted under the previous law, but were of a purely ritualistic nature, as they decided nothing. Now, who will be named on the voters' ballots depends on the meetings. I am not mistaken if I say that the masses perceive the okrug meetings to be a sieve called upon to screen out a portion of the candidates. We note that the law does not require that these meetings be held; it only states that they may be held. But with the exception of several regions, they were held. Why? Perhaps for the preliminary discussion of candidates? Perhaps not. After all, the law does not stipulate that such meetings be held where only one or two candidates have been nominated. Thus, the discussion is not the important thing, only the desire to reduce the number of candidates. As this mechanism for the formation of such meetings remains unimproved, the authorities had opportunities to influence their content by means of screening out candidates unacceptable to the local leadership, which in a number of cases was morbidly received.

But the most important thing lies elsewhere. The participants of the okrug meetings represented no one other than themselves. They did not know what the voters thought of the candidates nominated, for, as we recall, the voters themselves had not yet become acquainted with the candidates. A significant portion of the meeting participants were delegated to voters' meetings at their places of residence, which in practice is a fiction. There is nowhere for people to gather in a city microrayon, and they do not know each other; they hardly know the people on their floor. And what was the result of this? In Moscow National Territorial Okrug No 1, 10 candidates were nominated. Their fate, leaving two on the slate, was decided by fewer than 900 okrug meeting participants—with more than 6 million voters in the capital!

It is no accident that in many okrugs, crowds gathered at the buildings where the okrug meetings lasted into the night, their only demand: that all of the candidates be left on the list, don't decide for us! I think that this is a demand which should be closely attended. And there is also postponing the okrug meetings, which would double the time for the discussion of the candidates, their meetings with voters, that is, for the very work whose meaning in the development of the masses' political activism simply cannot be overestimated.

The election results allow this conclusion to be drawn: We should not fear a large number of candidates on the election ballot, nor should we reduce this number by artificial, semi-democratic means. Throughout the country, there must be repeat elections in 195 okrugs, even where there were one or two candidates. In the capital's Tushinskiy district, the okrug meetings left all five candidates, and the deputy was elected in the first round; in the Sverdlovskiy okrug, the candidates were reduced to three, and there must be repeat elections. How can one know that perhaps among those screened out is someone who would have won right off? Who now can answer that question?

So, 1 month before the election, 2,895 candidates were registered in 1,500 okrugs. The pre-electoral campaign evolved among them. What did this phase show? First and foremost, the enormous interest of voters. We had never known anything like it. Ask the first person you meet whom he voted for in the last elections. Nine out of ten times he cannot remember the name. But now we want to know everything, because it is for us to decide. Every candidate had dozens of meetings with voters, spoke before television cameras and radio microphones. Academician and teacher, worker and director, major party leader and ordinary engineer stood side by side under a hailstorm of questions. They were all on an equal footing, and all had to prove to the voters their right to represent the interests of the voters.

There appeared at this phase something that had never been seen before: initiative groups and support groups in which thousands of people passed through the school of real democracy. It turned out that the proxies, which had always formally existed, had something to do. This was also an education for them. Tens and hundreds of thousands of people were drawn into concrete pre-electoral work.

Was everything satisfactory during this phase? No, not everything. For example, it is worth thinking about the lawfulness of the term contained in the law, the "candidate's program." The word itself would seem to presuppose that the candidate promises to do something in the event that he is elected. It is literally understandable that this led to a mass spreading of attractive but ill-considered promises. Is there anything we did not hear? In 2 years the region's ecological problems will be solved, all women will be freed from work, and basic pensions will be raised to 150 rubles. There is only one thing which we did not hear: How, and how will it be paid for? The more correct thing to say in this case is not program, but platform or position of the candidate. The voter must know the candidate's attitude toward society's concrete problems, and the paths he is proposing to their resolution. He must know what position the future deputy will take when considering one question or another. Many promises were made about the next street, but not about the country, even though an all-union parliament was elected. A TV screen promise from one candidate, a Moscow raykom secretary, made one smile: If elected I will see to it that a clinic is built, and that some other amenities are provided. And if not elected, the party secretary need not concern himself with that?

The even chances for the candidates must be considered. The military district commander who was nominated as a candidate prints thousands of pamphlets and Women's Day greeting cards at his printing press. The factory sets aside a large sum of money for its director's campaign, and covers a car with a loudspeaker with multicolored posters, circling the district days on end calling upon people to vote for the owner of this car. And the other candidates see this—a teacher, a doctor, an engineer, and a worker, who managed to get together some pleasant little posters. I must frankly say that the workers' candidates did not receive the support from their collectives to which they were entitled. Nor did initiative groups always show initiative, and the visual campaign was not on the proper scale. It could be that this lack of attention is one of the reasons why the specific density decreased among the nominees and even more so among the candidates.

Incidentally, another thing which was noticed was that in the beginning, according to the old way, workers were nominated without consideration of their personality; it was considered a reward, a public post. And now, a campaign cannot be built on that alone.

All of this must be reckoned with. In particular, candidates cannot be made to be dependent upon the material resources of their labor collectives. The okrug commission must allocate funds for their pre-electoral campaigns, in equal amounts. If a rich factory wants to raise the level of the campaign, it may. Transfer the amount of supplementary funds to the okrug commission, but remember, they will be equally divided among all of the candidates of the district. And then, within the limits of equality of funds for all, you can fantasize and invent.

It should not be thought that there was no concern over the creation of equal opportunities. There was, both in the procedures for meetings, and in the selection of space for meetings with voters, and in the allowances for pages in the press and television access. But this or that step was sometimes perplexing. For example, at the okrug meetings, each candidate was given 10 minutes to answer questions. It would seem that these are even chances, but what if one is asked 5 questions, and the other 25? And this already infringes upon the rights of voters; they are deprived of the chance to get to know the candidates better.

Nor did everything work out well with television, although we must note that nothing else did more for our familiarity with the candidates. I judge this by the Moscow channel, where over the course of a month, televised debates attracted millions of viewers to the screen. True, these televised debates could be called too conditional. Each candidate had 5-7 minutes to describe his program and 1 minute to answer each of an equal number of questions. The moderator capably halted any of the attempts by candidates to enter into a dialogue. Eldar Ryazanov tried to supplement an answer given by Yuriy Chernichenko, and was quickly stopped: The broadcast conceptualization had not envisioned an argument. This was in vain. It is in arguments that the civic qualities of candidates are best displayed. At times the broadcast was more reminiscent of the famous quiz show "Who? What? Where?" as the main character here was the second hand ticking away. Worker V. Pletnev was cut off mid-sentence. Would it have been a tragedy to let him take up another 15 seconds? I am not reproaching the moderator. This is a new thing, glitches are inevitable. But this is precisely why they should be analyzed.

We must say that the level of political culture in the pre-electoral campaign was not always sufficiently high. Someone, in campaigning for "his" candidate, would have some offensive thrusts at another candidate, toss around some cooked-up "facts" in order to sully his rival. Some "informal" groups of an extremist bent raised their heads, trying to trot out their little anti-socialist concepts. All of this happened, and we will not shut our eyes to it.

And then the elections were held. Even the early results held many surprises. We suddenly learned that being the only candidate on the ballot does not guarantee election—by the old measures, such a thing was completely unthinkable. Several dozen party committee first secretaries remained unelected. We are not going to make a sensation over this—such a turn of events is programmed by our democracy, by restructuring itself. And anyone who sees tragedy in this does not understand the essence of the profound changes which are occurring, summoned into life by the party itself. But having understood this, conclusions must be drawn. I am convinced that the people put their trust not in the party, but individuals. The party apparatus did one disservice by zealously clearing the way for the bosses. Another was the local press, which overdid the propaganda of the oblast or city leader. People perceived all of this as pressure, and reacted to it in the spirit of the times. Several paid the price for the slow development of processes of restructuring in the region. After all, this is what people use to judge their leaders.

I think that after these elections, a new concept will appear in our lexicon, the popularity of the party worker. In olden days no one thought of popularity at all—it was enough that those at the top were satisfied. Now it must be considered: more frequent meetings with people, knowing their concerns, responding to their demands with action, not fearing to publicly acknowledge your errors. Without this, you cannot win popularity and become a deputy. Incidentally, all that is said here applies to other leaders and managers as well—soviet, economic, trade union, anyone.

One number in the results did not inspire joy. Among those elected as deputies, only 18.6 percent were workers, that is, the representatives of society's leading class. Their influence in the highest organ of power cannot be allowed to weaken; we have repeatedly been convinced of its strength and efficacy. Perhaps it would be right for the workers' deputies to have preference for elections to the Supreme Soviet from the very first congress, and retain it throughout the term of their authority. This would markedly raise the authority of the Soviet.

Repeat elections or repeat voting must still be conducted in a number of okrugs, but the main conclusion may already be drawn. The people have voted for the party, for the restructuring which it has proclaimed, and for the democratization of all public life. Restructuring itself became the main slogan of the electoral campaign. This was the slogan which received a mandate of trust.

Peace Committees' New Candidates

18000789 Moscow TRUD in Russian 7 Apr 89 p 2

[Text] Having discussed the minutes the Electoral Commission received from the plenum of the Soviet Fund for World Feace in conjunction with the leading electoral agencies of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Countries of Asia and Africa, the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation, the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Peoples of Latin America, the Soviet Committee "Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War," the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Nuclear Threat, the Soviet Pugwash Committee, the Soviet Committee of the movement "Pedagogues for Peace," and the Soviet Committee of "World Architects, Designers, and Planners for Preventing Nuclear War" concerning the nomination of candidates for USSR People's Deputies and also the statements of the deputy candidates concerning agreements to vote from the date of social organizations, the Electoral Commission established that the nomination of candidates to USSR People's Deputies was done in keeping with the USSR Law "On Elections of USSR People's Deputies." At the meeting of the electoral commission, for the two deputy mandates that were still free, they registered candidates for USSR people's deputies from the Soviet Peace Fund and eight Soviet social committees that are in favor of peace, solidarity, and international cooperation:

Goldanskiy, Vitaliy Iosifovich; born 1923; director of the Institute of Chemical Physics of the USSR Academy of Sciences, chairman of the Pugwash Committee; Moscow.

Kapitsa, Mikhail Stepanovich; born 1921; director of the Orientology Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; chairman of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Countries of Asia and Africa; Moscow.

Academy Prepares for Runoff Elections

18000825 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 13 Apr 89 p 2

[Report by T. Yakhlakova: "Repeat Nominations"]

[Text] Repeat nominations have been held for candidates for people's deputies from the USSR Academy of Sciences: For 12 mandates left free after the first elections, members of the presidium selected 28 candidates by open voting.

These include: S. Averintsev, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, sector chief of the A.M. Gorkiy Institute of World Literature of the USSR Academy of Sciences; G. Arbatov, academician, director of the USA and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V. Bolshakov, academician, director of the Institute of Ecology of Plants and Animals of the Ural Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences; P. Bunich, corresponding member, department chief of the Moscow

S. Ordzhonikidze Institute of Management; Yu. Buslayev, academician, academic secretary of the Division of Physico-Chemistry and Technology of Inorganic Materials of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V. Ginzburg, academician, adviser under the directorate of the P.N. Lebedev Physics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; N. Dobretsov, academician, chairman of the presidium of the Buryat Scientific Center of the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V. Zharikov, academician, Director of the Institute of Experimental Mineralogy of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V. Ivanov, doctor of philological sciences, sector chief of the Institute of Slavic Studies and Balkan Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V. Ilichev, academician, vice president of the presidium of the Far East Branch, USSR Academy of Sciences; V. Kalinnikov, corresponding member, chairman of the presidium of the Kola Scientific Center of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Yu. Karyakin, senior scientific associate of the Institute of the International Workers Movement of the USSR Academy of Sciences; G. Krymskiy, corresponding member, chairman of the presidium of the Yakut Scientific Center of the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences; G. Lisichkin, doctor of economic sciences, sector chief of the Institute of Economics of the World Socialist System of the USSR Academy of Sciences; N. Logachev, academician, chairman of the Irkutsk Scientific Center of the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences; I. Lukinov, academician, vice president of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences; N. Petrakov, coresponding member, deputy director of the Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; R. Petrov, academician, vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Yu. Pozheli, academician, president of the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences; B. Purin, academician, president of the Latvian SSR Academy of Sciences; R. Sagdeyev, academician, department chief of the Insitute of Space Research of the USSR Academy of Sciences; A. Sakharov, academician, member of the presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences; A. Spirin, academician, member of the presidium of the USSR Academy of Sciences, director of the Institute of Protein of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V. Stepin, corresponding member, director of the Institute of Philosophy of the USSR Academy of Sciences; S. Shatalin, academician, department chief of the Institute of Economics and Prognostication of Scientific and Technical Progress of the USSR Academy of Sciences; N. Shmelev, doctor of economic sciences, department chief of the USA and Canada Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences; V. Shumnyy, corresponding member, director of the Institute of Cytology and Genetics, Siberian Branch, USSR Academy of Sciences; and A. Yakovlev, doctor of juridical sciences, sector chief of the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

The repeat elections are scheduled for 19-21 April. As G. Marchuk, president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, explained, the norm of representation is the same as before—one person for 150 scientific associates. But while before the last election the number of the latter included everyone working in academic institutes—right down to the laboratory assistants—now it has been decided to narrow the concept of "scientific associate," excluding those who are not engaged directly in scientific work. As a result, the number of delegates at the conference will decrease by approximately 100-150.

Estonian 26 Mar Election Results

PM1804142389 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 28 Mar 89 pp 1, 3

["The Results of Elections of USSR People's Deputies (From Data From Okrug Electoral Commissions)"—SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA headline]

[Text]

For Territorial Electoral Okrugs

For Tallinnskiy City Electoral Okrug No 747

There were 382,455 voters registered on the electoral roll, and 319,153 people participated in the voting. The candidates received the following number of votes: M. Mikiver—for 171,147 (53.63 percent), against 141,479; B. Moronov—for 123,990 (38.85 percent), against 188,636. Some 6,527 ballot papers were deemed invalid.

Thus Mikiver, Mikk Arnoldovich, chairman of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Theatrical Workers' Union and CPSU member, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy.

For Tallinnskiy Rural Electoral Okrug No 748

There were 301,404 voters registered on the electoral roll, and 261,014 people participated in the voting. The candidates received the following number of votes: Yu. Kraft—for 136,593 (52.33 percent), against 119,152; V. Vakht—for 104,166 (39.91 percent), against 151,579. Some 5,269 ballot papers were deemed invalid.

Thus Kraft, Yuriy Andreasovich, first deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR Goskomprom [expansion unknown, possibly State Committee for Industry] and CPSU member, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy.

For Pyarnuskiy Electoral Okrug No 749

There were 240,282 voters registered on the electoral roll, and 221,712 people participated in the voting. The candidates received the following number of votes: Kh. Kiyk—for 5,571 (2.51 percent), against 212,501; V. Vyalyas—for 205,752 (92.8 percent), against 12,320. Some 3,640 ballot papers were deemed invalid.

Thus Vyalyas, Vayno Iosipovich, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy.

For Tartuskiy Electoral Okrug No 750

There were 241,025 voters registered on the electoral roll, and 212,481 people participated in the voting. The candidates received the following number of votes: M. Lauristin—for 177,562 (83.57 percent), against 31,610; V. Toots—for 24,839 (11.69 percent), against 184,333. Some 3,309 ballot papers were deemed invalid.

Thus Lauristin, Maryu Yokhannesovna, chief of the department of journalism at Tartu State University and CPSU member, who lives in Tartu City, was elected USSR people's deputy.

For National-Territorial Okrugs

For Tallinnskiy-Leninskiy Electoral Okrug No 449

Nugis, Yulo Yokhannesovich, general director of the "Estoplast" production association, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 56.98 percent).

For Tallinnskiy-Kalininskiy Electoral Okrug No 450

No candidate received the necessary number of votes in favor. There will be a runoff between the following candidates:

Kogan, Yevgeniy Vladimirovich, chief of a heat technology laboratory at the "Estrybprom" association, who lives in Tallinn City (for 48.9 percent);

Veydemann, Reyn Akselevich, chief editor of the journal VIKERKAAR—RADUGA, who lives in Tallinn City (for 21.46 percent).

For Tallinnskiy-Lasnamyaeskiy Electoral Okrug No 451

Yarovoy, Vladimir Ivanovich, director of the "Gosudarstvennyy Soyuznyy Zavod 'Dvigatel'" production association named for V.I. Lenin, was elected USSR people's deputy, who lives in Tallinn City (for 59.92 percent).

For Tallinnskiy-Matrosovskiy Electoral Okrug No 452

Kyabin, Tiyt Reynkholdovich, scientist and secretary, Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences Presidium Social Sciences Section, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 77.61 percent percent).

For Tallinnskiy-Morskoy Electoral Okrug No 453

No candidate received the necessary number of votes in favor. There will be a runoff between the following candidates:

Ninnas, Toyvo Adolfovich, chief of the Estonian shipping line, who lives in Tallinn City (for 34.65 percent);

Panfilov, Pavel Nikolayevich, second secretary of the Tallinn City Estonian Communist Party Committee, who lives in Tallinn City (for 17.49 percent).

For Tallinnskiy-Mustamyaeskiy Electoral Okrug No 454

Neither candidate received the necessary number of votes, and in accordance with the law on elections repeat elections will be held in this okrug within 2 months.

For Tallinnskiy-Oktyabrskiy Electoral Okrug No 455

Nurm, Khasso Erikovich, engineer at the "Estagrostroy" republic association, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 56.94 percent).

For Tallinnskiy-Tsentralnyy Electoral Okrug No 456

Lippmaa, Endel Teodorovich, director of the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences, chemical and biological physics institute, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 67.97 percent).

For Tallinnskiy-Yysmyaeskiy Electoral Okrug No 457

Khaug, Arvo Voldemarovich, chief physician at the Tallinn republican psychoneurological hospital, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 52.84 percent).

For Valgaskiy Electoral Okrug No 458

Otsason, Reyn Augustovich, deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, chairman of the Estonian SSR State Planning Committee, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 82.34 percent).

For Vilyandiskiy Severnyy Electoral Okrug No 459 Savisaar, Edgar Elmarovich, deputy director for scientific matters of the "Maynor" management systems planning and design bureau, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 72.78 percent).

For Vilyandiskiy Yuzhnyy Electoral Okrug No 460

Rayg, Ivar Khelmutovich, senior scientific associate of the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences Economics Institute, who lives in Saku Settlement, Kharyuskiy Rayon, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 68.4 percent).

For Vyruskiy Electoral Okrug No 461

Toome, Indrek Kherbertovich, chairman of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 91.24 percent).

For Yygevaskiy Electoral Okrug No 462

Tynspoyeg, Gustav Augustovich, first deputy chairman of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the Estonian SSR State Agro-Industrial Committee, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 52.86 percent).

For Yykhviskiy Electoral Okrug No 463

Pupkevich, Tadeush Karlovich, a walking excavator operator at the "Estonslanets" production association "Narvskiy" face, who lives in Sillamyae City was elected USSR people's deputy (for 74.57 percent).

For Keylaskiy Electoral Okrug No 464

Palm, Viktor Alekseyevich, chief of the organic chemistry department of Tartu State University, who lives in Tartu City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 55.44 percent).

For Kekhraskiy Electoral Okrug No 465

No candidate received the necessary number of votes in favor. There will be a runoff between the following candidates:

Pokhla, Vello Paulovich, member of the Estonian SSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting "Estonskiy telefilm" main editorial office's editorial commission, who lives in Tallinn City (for 45.26 percent);

Sirendi, Arvo Elmar-Martinovich, director of the Estonian scientific research institute for crop farming and land reclamation, who lives in Saku Settlement (for 36.9 percent).

For Kingiseppskiy Electoral Okrug No 466

No candidate received the necessary number of votes in favor. There will be a runoff between the following candidates:

Yalakas, Peeter Mikhkelevich, chairman of the "Saare Kalur" fishing collective farm, who lives in Kuressaare City (for 49.41 percent);

Khaavel, Ants Alfredovich, chief of the surgical department at the Kingiseppskiy central rayon hospital, who lives in Kuressaare City (for 42.29 percent).

For Kokhtla-Yarveskiy Electoral Okrug No 467

Kutashov, Nikolay Anatolyevich, laboratory chief at the slates scientific research institute, who lives in Kokhtla-Yarve City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 63.87 percent).

For Krengolmskiy Electoral Okrug No 468

Klushin, Oleg Gennadyevich, general director of the "Krengolsmkaya Manufaktura" cotton combine named for V.I. Lenin, who lives in Narva City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 84.65 percent).

For Narvskiy Electoral Okrug No 469

No candidate received the necessary number of votes in favor. There will be a runoff between the following candidates:

Golubkov, Gennadiy Nikolayevich, director of the Azeri ceramics plant named for the 60th anniversary of the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League, who lives in Azeri Settlement, Kokhtla-Yarveskiy Rayon (for 45.05 percent);

Andreyev, Vladimir Yakovlevich, electrical fitter at the electrical shop of the Estonian State Regional Electric Power Station named for the 50th anniversary of the USSR, who lives in Narva City (for 33.85 percent).

For Paydeskiy Electoral Okrug No 470

Aasmyae, Khardo Yulovich, sector chief at the "Maynor" management systems planning and design bureau, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 74.57 percent).

For Pylvaskiy Electoral Okrug No 471

Fyuk, Ignar Vladislavovich, chief of the Estonian SSR State Committee for Construction Affairs Main Architectural Administration, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 86.65 percent).

For Pyarnuskiy City Electoral Okrug No 472

Aare, Yukhan Yokhannesovich, commentator with the Estonian Television main propaganda office, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 85.79 percent).

For Pyarnuskiy Rural Electoral Okrug No 473

Gryazin, Igor Nikolayevich, chief of department at the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences philosophy, sociology, and law institute, who lives in Tartu City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 97.67 percent).

For Rakvereskiy Severnyy Electoral Okrug No 474

Kallas, Siym Udovich, deputy editor of the newspaper RAKHVA KHYAEL, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 63.23 percent).

For Rakvereskiy Yuzhnyy Electoral Okrug No 475

Made, Tiyt Raymondovich, lecturer at the republican institute for the further training of teachers, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 68.29 percent).

For Raplaskiy Electoral Okrug No 476

Vooglayd, Yulo Vakhurovich, scientific leader of the Raplaskiy Rayon agro-industrial complex information and training computer center, who lives in Tallinn City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 83.89 percent).

For Tartuskiy-Sovetskiy Electoral Okrug No 477

Bronshteyn, Mikhail Lazarevich, chief of the political economy department of Tartu State University, who lives in Tartu City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 73.61 percent).

For Tartuskiy-Universitetskiy Electoral Okrug No 478

Laak, Tynu Khugovich, first secretary of the Tartu City Estonian Communist Party Committee, who lives in Tartu City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 65.85 percent).

For Tartuskiy Rural Electoral Okrug No 479

Ryuytel, Arnold Feodorovich, chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, who lives in Tartu City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 90.33 percent).

For Khaapsaluskiy Electoral Okrug No 480

Vyali, Arder Ivanovich, first secretary of the Khaapsaluskiy Rayon Estonian Communist Party Committee, who lives in Khaapsalu City, was elected USSR people's deputy (for 89.04 percent).

Estonian Bureau Views Elections

PM1904093189 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 28 Mar 89 p 1

[Unattributed report: "In Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau"]

[Text] The 26 March elections of USSR people's deputies were one more piece of evidence that the policy of restructuring is meeting with full support among our people and that there is a constantly increasing number of people in Estonia who are not indifferent to their republic's future. The election results reflect support for the course of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee based on the decisions of the 19th party conference and the 11th and 12th Estonian Communist Party Central Committee plenums.

In the last weeks before the elections the sociopolitical atmosphere in the republic became more acute. This was influenced by a number of events which were interpreted in different ways by the republic's population, including the replacement of the republic's state flag with the tricolor national flag on the historic Pikk Hermann Tower in Tallinn, the content and tone of several speeches at the International Movement congress, and the subsequent 14 March meeting.

On the eve of the elections a number of public movements and organizations distributed appeals to the population in which destabilizing calls could be discerned alongside constructive approaches. In the party organizations and labor collectives meetings were held whose participants expressed concern at the state of affairs taking shape in the republic and for their future. Many saw in these events a danger to the development of the processes of democratization and glasnost both in Estonia and beyond.

The decisions of the 11th and 12th Estonian Communist Party Central Committee plenums which have been elaborated and art being implemented are supported by the overwhelming majority of the republic's party organizations and labor collectives.

At the same time there are also other approaches toward the assessment of the situation. The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, the Supreme Soviet, and the republic's government are often accused of dilatoriness or haste in taking decisions and also of the fact that the decisions do not take account of the opinion of all strata of the population. On the one hand they insist on the immediate convocation of a session of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet to examine the concept of an economically accountable [khozraschetnaya] Estonia (IME) and on the other they advise suspending the elaboration of some laws and acts, connecting this with the forthcoming CPSU Central Committee Plenum on interethnic relations. It is impossible to agree entirely with that, because the process of renewal cannot be artificially accelerated or suspended—it requires the adequate study of legislative initiative and proposals from below. That is precisely what is confirmed by the documents of the recent CPSU Central Committee March (1989) Plenum at which our vision of tomorrow's policy in the country's agriculture and our specific proposals on this subject met with understanding and approval. The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau adopts the stance that all the most important legislative acts and decisions should continue to be taken only after their nationwide discussion.

Under these conditions we should resolutely denounce any activity which contradicts the Constitution and legality of the Estonian SSR, wherever it may come from. People who kindle interethnic enmity or who engage in anti-Soviet propaganda and offend citizens should be brought to book within the established procedure.

The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau reaffirms the conclusions draw at the 11th Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum that the republic's economic and social development is possible only within the USSR and the political and economic reforms which are being implemented will be based on Lenin's understanding of socialism and aimed at benefitting each national group.

Some of the complaints leveled against the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee are perplexing, to say the least. For instance, the reception of a group of representatives of the Europarliament by some of the republic's leaders, in strict accordance with the USSR Supreme Soviet's line toward establishing foreign policy contacts at republic level, was misunderstood and interpreted in a distorted way by individual public movements. On the other hand, the alarm of a section of the population over the implementation of the law on language and the young people's receiving higher and secondary education in Russian is entirely justified, and is in need of further examination. The laws which are being adopted should in no way encroach on human rights.

The demand for a deadline for the republican party conference should be categorized as unrealistic.

There is no disputing the fact that during the years of restructuring in the republic much has been done, but to make successful headway what is needed is unity of action, and primarily in the party ranks, because an even more crucial period of work lies ahead. In the very near future the concept of economic accountability (IME) will be submitted for nationwide discussion. Other republican legislative acts are being elaborated. But it is the elaboration of the Estonian Communist Party's program of actions under the conditions of restructuring which will require the special attention and active participation of all party organizations.

To avoid sliding toward a one-sided assessment of the political situation in the republic, many questions raised in the documents adopted by party and public organizations and movement require collective consideration and in-depth study.

The Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau had decided to convene an expanded Central Committee plenum 12 April to analyze together with the republican party aktiv the sociopolitical situation which has taken shape and to pool and direct the efforts of all Communists and party organizations toward the solution of the real political and socioeconomic problems facing labor collectives in the republic's cities and rayons.

Recent Changes to Law on State Crimes Examined

Legal Expert Interviewed

18000822 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian 12 Apr 89 p 2

[Interview with USSR State Prize winner, Doctor of Juridical Sciences Aleksandr Sakharov by Tatyana Feoktistova; date, place not given]

[Text]**Changes have been made to the USSR Law on State Crimes. At the request of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA correspondent Tatyana Feoktistova, USSR State Prize winner, doctor of juridical sciences Aleksandr Sakharov comments on these.**

[Feoktistova] The article (in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Criminal Code—70) on anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation has been changed. Are these changes significant?

[Sakharov] Yes, of course they are. In the first place the new ukase does not contain the words "anti-Soviet propaganda and agitation," which previously had a broad interpretation. A more precise definition has been introduced: "public calls for overthrowing the Soviet state and social structure." In the second place, the limits of responsibility are narrowed for these now extremely concrete actions. And the punishment has been reduced in the spirit of more humane relations. While previously such an act entailed up to 7 years in prison, it is now up to 3 years or a fine of up to 2,000 rubles. There is a special category for actions committed by a group or using technical means—up to 7 years or a fine of up to 5,000 rubles.

[Feoktistova] The next amended article (in the RSFSR Criminal Code—74) concerns violation of national and racial rights. What is new here?

[Sakharov] Here again they have gotten rid of the words "propaganda and agitation." It is stated clearly: "Deliberate actions directed toward inciting national or racial animosity or dissension...." But the penalty is the same as it was before. There can be no lessening of this. We cannot but take into account all that is happening in certain republics because of the extremist actions of irresponsible people. The punishment is stipulated here—up to 3 years or a fine of up to 2,000 rubles. And the same actions involving violence, deception, or threats, and also those committed by officials, have a punishment of up to 5 years or a fine of up to 5,000 rubles. And if all these actions are committed by a group of people or entail the death of people, the punishment is increased to 10 years.

[Feoktistova] A new legal norm has appeared in the ukase: "Insulting or discrediting state agencies or social organizations." I who am not a lawyer can understand what insult is. But discrediting.... Will it not end up that discrediting will be understood to mean criticizing in the press?

[Sakharov] Of course, insulting—especially publicly—state agencies and social organizations is inadmissible. But what if in the press there are discussions of agencies or organizations whose activity is an impediment to restructuring or has long been discredited by its own actions? In my opinion this new legal norm requires immediate clarification so that the authors of critical articles will not be included with extremists and anti-Soviets and be punished by "incarceration for up to 3 years or a fine of up to 2,000 rubles."

Supreme Court Official on Law

18000828 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 13 Apr 89 p 2

[Interview with S. Gusev, first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, by Ye. Borisova: "Democracy Must Be Defended"]

[Text]**The ukase of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet "On Making Changes and Additions to the USSR Law 'On Criminal Liability for State Crimes' and Certain Other Legislative Acts of the USSR" evoked a number of questions from SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA readers. In spite of the commentary printed in the central newspapers and presented on television and radio, people are calling the editorial offices and asking us to clarify individual formulations of the ukase and to discuss who participated in its creation and how it affects the development of the democratic processes in our society. The editors asked the first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Court S. Gusev to answer these questions:**

[Borisova] Sergey Ivanovich! Some of our readers are concerned that the adoption of the new ukase will be a departure from the line of humanization and democratization of legislation. To what extent are their misgivings justified?

[Gusev] Today all spheres of life are included in the processes of restructuring and revolutionary renewal that are being carried out on the initiative of the party. And they are closely related to the development of socialist democracy. But still one must not forget that democracy is not the same thing as having everything permitted; it is rather discipline and organization and personal responsibility for the destiny of the state.

We must always remember that we have made our socialist choice. Some people have completely forgotten about this and try to take advantage of democratic rights, freedoms, and glasnost mainly for selfish interests—national, ambitious, and, finally, simply adventuristic ones. Covered by slogans of restructuring, they commit acts that stand in contradiction to it.

The severe consequences to which such activity leads can be seen from the examples of Karabakh, the Baltic area, Moldavia, and Tbilisi. The people are bothered by the situation that is developing in a number of places and, appealing to government agencies, they are demanding that they put an end to the actions of extremists. So I think that if the readers do have misgivings they are caused by completely different things.

[Borisova] The content of the four basic provisions of the ukase gives a broader interpretation to state crimes than the previous edition of the law did. But now is there not ambiguity in the evaluation, say, of critical speeches regarding the imperfection of the economic mechanism and the structure of state management agencies?

[Gusev] Democracy is unthinkable without substantiated, measured criticism that is backed up by facts and figures. The new ukase by no means cancels this, not to mention prohibiting it. It is directed primarily toward protection of the interests of the citizens and it contains a harsh warning only to those whose actions are directed toward undermining the Soviet state and social structure and those who violate national and racial rights, discredit state agencies and social organizations, and insult officials. The new document clearly determines that it is not having different ideas, which must be overcome by ideological methods, in itself that is the crime, but concrete actions.

[Borisova] So, Sergey Ivanovich, the programs of certain social organizations of our country which have set as their task to change the state structure in the USSR must either undergo revision or...the people who created them will fall under the effect of the law?

[Gusev] Quite true. If the leaders of the organizations you mentioned do not abandon programs directed toward undermining the socialist system, they will be responsible according to the law.

But I wish to emphasize once again that the liability is for concrete illegal actions. Recently my colleagues had occasion to visit a meeting in Luzhniki where the speakers were calling for the creation of a party as an alternative to the CPSU. Incidentally, similar proposals were heard in the pre-election statements of the candidates for people's deputies. The statements of the speakers in the form in which they were heard did not undermine the authority of the CPSU or its tasks, and they did not act against the processes of restructuring and democratization, being only the personal opinions of the speakers. Naturally, such appeals do not fall under the new ukase.

[Borisova] In one of his commentaries the director of the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Academician V. Kudryavtsev, noted that at the present time in the Soviet Union there are no political prisoners. In your opinion, will the situation remain the same with the adoption of the ukase?

[Gusev] The ukase in and of itself does not make anyone a political prisoner. But I would say that now certain people will give more thought and consideration to their concrete actions.

[Borisova] Preparing and drawing up such politically important documents as the ukase that has been published undoubtedly requires significant work and the enlistment of competent legal experts. How long did they work on the changes and additions and who participated in creating them?

[Gusev] The ukase was discussed for approximately a year and a half. It has been thoroughly worked out, it corresponds to international law and human values, and it is humane for society. Its draft was submitted both to the USSR Supreme Court and to other state and scholarly legal institutions. Remarks and suggestions were made.... It would be difficult to list the specific authors—it is the work of a large group of specialists.

[Borisova] Unfortunately, it is impossible to analyze in detail all the points of the ukase and to interpret the places that seem unclear to the readers—the space in the newspaper is limited and the ukase itself requires deeper interpretation. Incidentally, there is plenty of time for this. For the ukase will not become law until after it is discussed and approved by the new USSR Supreme Soviet. Sergey Ivanovich, do you allow for the possibility of significant changes in this edition?

[Gusev] As we know, there is no limit to improvement. And if the USSR people's deputies consider it necessary to augment certain provisions of the ukase, to reformulate some things, or to edit some more, this will demonstrate to all of us once again that the democratic processes are gathering force.

'Puzzling' Provision Questioned

18000826 Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian 13 Apr 89 p 1

[Letter from reader A. Berestnev in Moscow under rubic "Opinions" by A. Gasparyan and M. Sinonova]

[Text] The ukase of 8 April 1989 brings the USSR Law "On Criminal Liability for State Crimes" in line with the requirements of international law and provides real legal embodiment for the corresponding articles of the USSR Constitution. From now on the notorious "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda" will be replaced by an article of law which clearly defines precisely what actions create a threat to the state and, consequently, to all citizens.

But the formulation of article 11^1 "Insulting or discrediting state agencies and social organizations" raises questions. What does "discrediting" mean? On what basis will the courts determine where criticism of ministries, departments, their leaders, and social organizations ends and where discrediting them begins? Will this article apply to officials who through their acts discredit agencies of authority? So far there is little commentary on this article. I should like to know the opinion of specialists and USSR people's deputies.

Academician Discusses Criminal Code

PM1904081589 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Apr 89 Second Edition p 1

[Interview with Doctor of Juridical Sciences A.M. Yakovlev, sector chief at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law, by G. Orlovskiy under the rubric "Our Dialogue": "Democratization and Glasnost"—date and place unspecified; first six paragraphs are an editorial introduction]

[Text] We have all been striving to arrange our common home in such a way as to live in it justly Restructuring is therefore being seen more and more by citizens as a personal matter, which makes it possible for everyone to use their strengths, initiative, knowledge, and spiritual potential. We are learning to run the state, to use our civic rights, and to carry out our civic duties. The observance of the law by each one of us is a mandatory condition of a rule-of-law state.

It is no accident that the period of restructuring has prompted this development in legislation. Never have so many acts of legislation been adopted before—this is a clear sign of the desire to use the law to stimulate and determine new relationships in the economy and the social sphere.

The main criterion by which people judge a new law is the extent to which it serves the cause of restructuring. Interest in each norm of new laws has never been so great. The law is a real force which we can rely on to restore the genuine values of the socialist system and its still-undiscovered potential.

But we should not close our eyes to the fact that there are people who do not find the law to their liking. Some people perceive democratization as excessive license, while there are others who are maliciously exploiting democratic principles to achieve their selfish ends and undermine law and order. But we need law and order and readers demand its strict observance in their numerous letters.

New legal norms changing and amending the all-union law "On Criminal Liability for State Crimes" have just been published. On this basis a Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium decree has made changes to the republic's criminal code (these were published in our newspaper 12 April). This decree serves as a basis for bringing strictly to account those whose actions are aimed at undermining the Soviet state and social system.

Readers may find it useful to hear the opinion of Doctor of Juridical Sciences A.M. Yakovlev, sector chief at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law on what he sees as the essence of the changes to criminal legislation.

[Yakovlev] Freedom of speech is one of the most important constitutional rights of citizens. Can such a freedom be limitless? Of course not.

The RSFSR Criminal Code previously included the article "Anti-Soviet Agitation and Propaganda." This article no longer forms part of the law. Why? Compare it to the article which replaces it: It deems criminal "Calls for the Overthrow or Alteration of the Soviet State and Social System." Calls for the overthrow or alteration of the state or social system made publicly and aimed at altering the system in ways contrary to the USSR Constitution are considered crimes. Public calls for preventing the execution of Soviet laws with a goal to undermine the USSR's political and economic system are also crimes. The law's sphere of application has narrowed, but it itself has become more specific. Clear liability is envisaged for public calls to betray the motherland, or calls for acts of terrorism or sabotage (Article 70 (1) of the RSFSR Criminal Code). Can the narrowing of criminal liability be considered an infringement of citizens' rights and freedoms? The published laws provide no grounds for such doubts.

[Orlovskiy] Many articles in our newspaper make it possible to conclude that glasnost can be undermined in two ways. First, by punishing any criticism which leads to tyranny. On the other hand, glasnost is also undermined by those who call for violence, whip up base emotions, or leave people at the mercy of irresponsible demagogues. The law can be a guarantee against this dual threat, and the need for it is felt in society. Do you think this need has been realized in the decree?

[Yakovlev] It has to be admitted that there are still people who interpret criticism as "attacks on the foundations of society." But after all, the essence of restructuring lies in improving and altering many aspects of our life through principled and constructive criticism. The law removes any opportunity for real advocates of restructuring to be persecuted.

At the same time, everyday reality has shown that calls to undermine our state system play into the hands of the opponents of restructuring, and they exploit these means. By punishing such people, the law protects genuine democracy.

We have started living under the conditions of real democratic norms. The discussions before the elections and the elections themselves showed (albeit it with certain shortcomings) the reality of making effective use of constitutional rights and freedoms. Our laws protect precisely this democratic means of social action. Our criminal law, by drawing the line between justified criticism and incitement to crime, protects the people's genuine freedom of expression. Hence it is obvious just how wrong it would be to see the new laws as an infringement of glasnost. They protect our common democratic interests both from administrative tyranny and from extremist excesses. Everyone has an interest in that. Legislators proceeded on the basis that the illegal actions stipulated in the new articles are, of course, dangerous to people's well-being, but the punishments envisaged in the new parts of the law also pursue a humane line—the maximum terms of imprisonment have been reduced, and an alternative has been introduced in the shape of quite major fines.

The theme running through the new law norms on state crimes is the recognition of the fact that only calls for violence and the use of unconstitutional means made publicly and aimed at having a mass influence will incur strict criminal liability. Nobody intends judging ideas of the pluralism of views and opinions (this, incidentally, is attested by the repeal of Article 190 (1) of the RSFSR Criminal Code, which some people had used to combat dissidence), but the state must protect the healthy democratic process supported by all society from destructive political actions from whatever quarter. This should be understood by those who whip up ethnic or racial enmity or discord and belittle national dignity and the value of their fellow citizens. I would note that the law increases liability in the event of officials being to blame.

Democracy is not an edifice that can be handed over "on a turnkey basis." Democracy and the people's power constitute a process of constant interaction between citizens' freedom and their responsibility for their own actions; it is a combination of order and free expression, of firm state power and effective people's control of that power. I think that the published decree should be assessed from that standpoint.

[Orlovskiy] One question to clarify matters: Naturally, no practice has as yet been established in the use of the new laws. Probably the effect of the legal norms that are being introduced will have to be discussed and generalized. But can you tell us—would it be illegal if at a sanctioned rally citizens declared it necessary to change some article of the constitution?

[Yakovlev] Such proposals from citizens are a normal manifestation of democratic procedures. But if they call for the violent overthrow of constitutional authority or defame social organizations created under established procedures, then the criminal law will come into operation. In a civilized country it is impermissible to allow the defamation of representative organs and officials elected by the people.

[Orlovskiy] I know that around 50 draft laws are currently being drawn up. Some of them have been published for discussion. And, we have noted, many have already been adopted. Yet we often talk about shortcomings. To that end I would like to ask if there isn't a danger that the new regulations might be abused.

[Yakovlev] In order to prevent the new legislation being distorted in the process of its implementation it is necessary in the very near future to reinforce it by improving the criminal process—I envisage a need here to bring in a defense counsel as soon as criminal proceedings are instituted, to increase demandingness regarding objective proof in each case, and so forth. That is, to make actual judicial proceedings democratic. These draft laws are being drawn up, and no time should be wasted. In my opinion, we need a competent explanation of the term "discrediting" as used in the decree. [Yakovlev ends]

In concluding my talk with the scientist, I would like to say that any law cannot operate by itself. We are entitled to demand that soviets of people's deputies and law enforcement organs implement the new legal directives as strictly as possible.

Gorbachev Aide on 'Intellectual' Leadership Style

PM1904102689 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 16-17 Apr 89 p 13

[Paolo Garimberti report on interview with I.T. Frolov, "assistant" to CPSU General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev, in Moscow; date not given]

[Text] Moscow—"No political leader except for Kennedy has ever surrounded himself with a group of intellectuals, in order to govern, as Gorbachev has done. The climate in Moscow now is the same as that in Harvard after John Kennedy's election: The intelligentsia is in power." I was told this a few months ago by Marshall Goldman, a Sovietologist at Harvard University's Russian Center. I was reminded of that comparison, finding it extraordinarily apt, as I listened to a torrent of recollections of frustrated and regained hopes from one of these "wise owls" of restructuring, sitting in a spacious, sparsely furnished room on the sixth floor of the CPSU Central Committee building. The heart of Soviet power is here, on a long L-shaped corridor at the end of which is the office used by Gorbachev for party work, when he is not at the Kremlin.

Ivan Timofeyevich Frolov is 60, 2 years older than Gorbachev. He has the powerful build and flattened nose—on a peasant's face—of someone who has boxed in his youth. He has a philosophy degree, is a student of genetics, and is chairman of the USSR Philosophy Society. His title is "pomoshnik," assistant to the CPSU general secretary on scientific and social matters. He should be the next editor of PRAVDA, replacing Brezhnevite Viktor Afanasev, but he would not confirm it, though he did not deny it either: "I know this has been reported by L'UNITA and your own newspaper, but hitherto no decision to this effect has been conveyed to me."

His is the story of a generation that Frolov describes as "daughter of the 20th congress": young party officials—including Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, journalists, political scientists, who began their political activity amid the euphoria of de-Stalinization and Khrushev's thaw, in the belief that an era of freedom and changes lay ahead. Instead, less than 10 years later, as they were entering their maturity, they found themselves disillusioned, set aside, some even dissidents, amid the Brezhnev stagnation: "a sticky situation," he said, "in which everything bogged down. Nothing was actually forbidden but nothing was really permitted, and there was no way out of that bog."

Now, however, they have regained their lost hopes: "I honestly did not believe I would live long enough to see such a change. I was sure that sooner or later that system would collapse, but I did not know when, and did not believe it could happen in my lifetime." And they found themselves—having pursued different, sometimes even divergent, paths—gathered round a man they had barely heard of a few years ago. Some of them work here, on this exclusive corridor, as indicated by the white name plates on the pale wooden doors: A.S. Chernyayev and G.Kh. Sakhnazarov, also assistants to the general secretary; some from the Supreme Soviet, such as Vadim Zagladin, or the Foreign Ministry, such as Gorbachev's spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov; others from the leading newspapers of restructuring, such as Yegor Yakovlev, Aleksandr Bovin, and Len Karpinskiy; and others from the research institutes—the think tanks of reform—such as Yevgeniy Ambartsumov, Oleg Bogomolov, and Georgiy Arbatov.

Their Harvard was in Prague, on the editorial board of a journal called PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, which gathered together Communists from all countries and on which they all worked between 1958 and 1964. Their master was Aleksey Rumyanstev, who later became editor of PRAVDA for barely a year before being crushed by the Brezhnev regression in 1968. "I met him the other day at a meeting at the Academy of Sciences. He is 84. He patted me like a child. He regards us all as his children, even now.

"Rumyanstev," Frolov recalled, "had an extraordinary personality combining courage, consistency, and rigorousness. He had a very strong influence on us youngsters. It was the early sixties and he believed in it—I do not know what, but I feel we need something new: To hell with all this decay. This is what we wanted to hear. He gave us the impetus, and we gave him a constant stream of ideas and proposals in exchange."

The editorial office in Prague was an extraordinary source of talents for the CPSU Central Committee. Many of the youngsters of the "Rumyanstev group" were recruited by the party: Some of them went to work with Yuriy Andropov, just back from Budapest (where he had been ambassador in the tragic year of 1956) and now in charge of relations with the "fraternal countries" before becoming KGB chairman. The section headed by Andropov was another training school for future Gorbachevites, and it was Andropov himself, many years later, who introduced Gorbachev—newly arrived in Moscow from Stavropol—to some of those later to become his close aides, including Shakhnazarov, Bovin, and Arbatov.

Frolov, too, was taken on by the Central Committee. He was assigned to the section headed by Petr Demichev, who was in charge of culture: "Khrushchev had just fallen," he said. "However, I was still under the illusion that something new could happen, without Khrushchev's eccentricities. But as early as 1967 I realized that the climate was changing for the worse. My work brought me into contact with artists such as sculptor Ernst Neizvestnyy and director Yuriy Lyubimov and scientists such as Zhores Medvedev—Roy's biologist brother (all three later emigrated to the West—LA REPUBBLICA editor's note.) They were vigorous and creative people. However, we felt that our hands were tied. I myself published a book on Lysenko, which was initially well received, but later the newspapers started criticizing it. So I realized that under that leadership the hopes of renewal were finished. Rumyantev's expulsion from PRAVDA was a very loud and clear signal. I decided to relinquish my Central Committee job."

Ivan Frolov became editor of VOPROSY FILOSOFII. One of his closest aides was Aleksandr Zinovyev, who emigrated a few years later to Germany, where he published the extraordinary "Yawning Heights." This is a tangible and even frightening indication of how much this country has changed: A man now working a few meters away from the office of the CPSU general secretary himself had as colleagues and friends people who became outright dissidents, forced to emigrate in order to breathe freely, and the subjects of slander and excommunications from the Soviet press. Now Frolov is talking about about them with affection and admiration to a western journalist.

"Zinovyev made major contributions to our philosophical research, our studies of mankind. Then he died politically, for us. I do not want to judge, however. Life then was so difficult for everyone. I am only sorry that he became embittered, that he still talks about his country so critically and harshly. We all experienced very painful times. If I were to give my memory free rein I could tell you about some terrible things. Sometimes it does you good to unburden yourself, to let it all out."

"You see," Frolov continued, "the power system in those years was organized even better than in Stalin's era. There was no physical repression—or not much—but a structure had been built that defended the system even better than physical repression: It defended its survival so well as to exclude any change, ruling out even the replacement of someone in such a sorry state as Brezhnev in his final years. Some of us of my generation—the sons of the 20th congress—were within that system and went along with it. You are well aware who I am talking about. You cannot justify what they did, but you can understand it. Those who chose a political post had little choice. I was privileged, in a way: I dealt with philosophy and could build my own fantasy world of intelligent readers, people who wanted to understand."

Andropov, general secretary for less than 18 months, represented an initial step toward a change ("I took it as a sign," Frolov said, "when there appeared an article of his about Marx very close to my own stances.") However, it was too timid and above all too short to be classed as a real prelude to the Gorbachev revolution. So what explanation is given within the system, inside the Central Committee building itself, of that which Moshe Lewin has called "the Gorbachev phenomenon?"

"It is very easy to explain," Frolov replied. "As I have already told you, we are all of the same generation: we grew up in the years around the 20th congress. Many people say that the strength of the 20th congress was soon exhausted, but it was not so. That strength endured within each of us; we continued to hope for the same things, even though we took different paths. Some may even believe that many of us accepted the party line after Khrushchev, that we collaborated, and that this is the case with Gorbachev too. It is not so: If you look at his speeches and articles of those years you will realize that there is a basis that differs from the policy of the time. It was necessary to await the right moment." The moment arrived in March 1985 and the "sons of the 20th congress" experienced a wonderful reunion, as though they had all taken the same old college tie out of their drawers. "When I met Mikhail Sergeyevich for the first time," Frolov recalled, "he told me that he had been familiar with my work on the problems of mankind for some time. Immediately after the 27th congress in 1985 I was appointed editor of KOMMUNIST (the CPSU's ideological journal—LA REPUBBLICA editor's note) and our contacts were stepped up. So it was that one day he suggested that I work alongside him, in this room."

During his year as editor, succeeding the conservative Kosolapov, Frolov turned KOMMUNIST—the country's most forbidding and austere publication—completely inside out. If he becomes editor of PRAVDA he is very likely to do the same again, restoring to the party's official daily—which is losing readers to such outspoken newspapers such as IZVESTIYA—the human approach that it lost over 20 years ago when Rumyantsev was replaced.

"Of course our society is suffering a serious ideological crisis, a crisis of confidence. For too long there has been a yawning gap between words and deeds, and now it is very difficult to fill this gap. At least we had a key idea—the 20th congress. The new generations, however, have nothing to hang onto. It is a real tragedy. Ideological stereotypes still exert a strong influence on people's minds. There has been no school of thinking, and in our political journalism there are alarming leaps from one extreme to another. It will take a long, long time to educate people."

According to Frolov, this is an immature society and only a "human renaissance" can enable it to become mature: "For too long people talked about Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Now at last people are again talking about philosophy, period, and it must center on people." Not, however, in line with those who, seized by a kind of iconoclastic frenzy, throw the baby out with the bathwater and argue that while Marx may have been acceptable in his own time, he is now obsolete and finished: "Unfortunately the interpretation of Marx was long superficial. We must not forget, however, that it was the real Marxists, such as your own Gramsci, who first tackled mankind's problems in global terms. Now mankind's problems can only be resolved by means of a global approach. So, to be honest, why should we limit Marx?"

We had been talking for almost 2 hours without even noticing the passage of time. His most efficient secretary, Svetlana Alekseyevna, had silenced his impressive array of telephones, and nobody disturbed us. Frolov is a thinker rather than a man of action; he clearly loves to talk, especially now that he can do so so freely. But when we took our leave he became suddenly pessimistic: "See you soon, I hope, if I am still here." Was he referring to his new job on PRAVDA or to the difficulties facing restructuring?

Journal Publishes Excerpts From Khrushchev Memoirs

18300507 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 13, 1-7 Apr p 5

["Excerpt" from N.S. Khrushchev's memoirs: "Khrushchev Remembers"—part one of two; first two paragraphs are source introduction]

[Text] Today, interest is being shown in everything connected with the actions of our party and government leaders. In particular, the activities of N.S. Khrushchev in the post of CPSU Central Committee first secretary is undergoing complex evaluation. He made many errors and voluntary decisions. Yet there was civic courage as well. This was manifested during the debunking of Stalin's cult of personality, during the course of the preparations for and the conduct of the 20th CPSU Congress.

Below, an excerpt from N.S. Khrushchev's memoirs dealing with that period is being published for the first time. The texts of the memoirs, written during N.S. Khrushchev's years as a pensioner, were supplied to the editorship by his son, S.N. Khrushchev, and, of course, reflect the author's personal perceptions of events which occurred.

After Beriya's arrest and the investigation of his case, there occurred a disclosure of all the secret wires, hidden from us, which had generated abuse of power and caused the death of many people.

I had a need to raise the curtain, to find out exactly how the investigations were conducted, what kind of arrests these were, how many were arrested, what the grounds for arrest were, and what the investigations of these arrests showed. I raised these questions at a session of the Central Committee Presidium, and proposed that they be investigated and analyzed. These issues in particular troubled me because we had already begun to think about conducting the 20th congress.

Of course, neither Voroshilov, nor Molotov, nor Kaganovich tore into battle with the disclosure of these wires. I cannot now recall exactly the position of Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan. It seems that Mikoyan did not conduct a policy of activism, but he did not contain this process, either. In a word, after the debates everyone agreed that it was necessary to conduct an inquiry.

A commission was created. It was headed by Pospelov. Even before this, I had summoned the general procurator, Comrade Rudenko (as general procurator, he had already opened and reviewed many cases), and asked him, "How valid were the grounds for the accusations against Bukharin, Rykov, Syrtsov, Lominadze, Krestinskiy, and so many other people known by the Central Committee, members of the Orgburo and Politburo?"

Rudenko said that from the viewpoint of judicial norms, there was no information for the conviction of these people. Everything had been based upon personal confessions, and personal confession obtained by means of physical and moral torture cannot serve as the basis for the conviction of these people.

Then the question loomed before me: "How could this be?" Everyone knew about Stalin's role, his personality, his revolutionary nature, his merits and his qualities, which had been noted by the party. He had every basis to pretend to a special role because he did indeed distinguish himself from his circle with his capabilities and his mind. He did indeed stand above the others, and now, despite my irreconcilability in the judgment of his methods and abuses, I do acknowledge that.

However, if, for example, he were alive today and there were a vote, I would probably keep my position that he should be tried. But he must be given his due. At that time, this man did not simply come sword in hand and win our hearts and minds. No. He manifested his superiority, his ability to lead, his ability to subordinate people, his ability to promote people, and the other qualities needed by a leader of great proportions.

In everything concerning Stalin's personality there was both the good, the just, and the wild, which could not fit into any framework. All sides of this complex personality must be examined. I speak more of the darker sides, as there has been enough praise. The main thing is to draw conclusions, and not to allow such things to repeat themselves in the future.

I now have one single answer, and I think that it is absolutely correct. In order to understand the roots of abuse of power, to understand the reasons for these executions, Stalin's tyranny, we must return to Lenin's testament. Lenin, even at that time, in 1923, as he wrote his brief testament, already saw everything clearly: what Stalin could lead the party to, if he remained in the leadership and occupied the position of the general secretary. Lenin wrote that he should be removed from this post, although Stalin possessed all of the qualities required of a leader. But Stalin was coarse, and capable of abusing power, and therefore could not be maintained in such a post. The Central Committee did not heed Lenin's words, and the entire party was ruled by this same Stalin, his abuses, his destruction of the party and non-party inner core. There was something morbid in these actions of Stalin.

Once, in 1951, the last year that Stalin went on vacation to the Caucasus, I also vacationed in Sochi. Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan was then vacationing in Sukhumi. I was summoned by Stalin, and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan was there as well. Somehow, I was strolling around the cottage with Anastas Ivanovich, and Stalin stepped out. I remember exactly what he said. He was not speaking with us; no, it was a conversation with himself.

Stalin said, "I don't trust anyone, I don't trust myself. I am a hopeless man."

It could be asked, why would Stalin suddenly start saying such things, especially with others present?

I think that he apparently had an inner need to speak his mind. But he quite correctly stated that he trusted no one, that he was a hopeless man. That he trusted no one—this is all that anyone who worked with him could observe. Thus, the characteristics noted in Lenin's testament served as the cause of the great tragedy of the party and all our people.

The Pospelov commission's materials were completely unexpected by many of us. I speak of myself, to some extent, of Malenkov, Bulganin, and certainly Pervukhin, Saburov and others.

I feel that Comrade Mikoyan was best prepared for the possibility of the disclosure of the facts brought to light in Pospelov's record.

In particular, Anastas Ivanovich told me after Stalin's death that Sergo Ordzhonikidze had shot himself on a Sunday, after having strolled with him in the Kremlin on that Saturday. During this conversation, Sergo said that he could not go on living; it was impossible to struggle against Stalin, and that he lacked the strength to tolerate what he was doing.

Why did we create the Pospelov commission? This was my reasoning: We are approaching the party congress, the first party congress since Stalin's death. At this congress, we will take upon ourselves the obligations of leading the party and the country. For these purposes, it was necessary to know exactly what had been done, what had caused Stalin's resolutions on this or that issue. This concerned especially people who had been arrested. At that time, several million people were in camps. An enormous quantity of people were in camps before the 20th congress, and 3 years had passed since Stalin's death. During those 3 years, we could not break with the past; we could not gather up the courage, the inner need to open the curtain a bit and see what was behind the screen, what was back there, what happened under Stalin, the arrests, the trials, the tyranny and the executions by gunshot. We ourselves were fettered by our activity under Stalin's leadership, and had not yet freed ourselves of his pressure. We could not imagine that these executions had been groundless, and, in legal terms, criminal.

To be continued.

Second Part of Excerpts Published

18300519 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 14, 8-14 Apr 89 pp 6-7

["Excerpt" from N.S. Khrushchev's memoirs: "Khrushchev Remembers"—second and final part; first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] We are completing the publication of recollections by N.S. Khrushchev on the preparations for and work of the 20th CPSU Congress, which were given to the editorial office by his son S. N. Khrushchev; [the publication] was begun in issue 13 of ARGUMENTY I FAKTY.

To my mind, Molotov, Voroshilov, and Kaganovich were the ones who knew the most about the genuine scope and reasons for Stalin's repressive measures. I believe that Stalin exchanged opinions with them.

Stalin did not have to drag Kaganovich [into this]; he himself made more noise, bent over backwards being obsequious toward Stalin, had people arrested left and right, and denounced "the enemies."

After all of this hysteria, after the hunt for "the enemies of the people," we could not shed this burden psychologically until 1956; we still believed the version created by Stalin, we believed that we were surrounded by "the enemies of the people," and we had to fight these enemies in order to defend the revolution. Our stance was that of the aggravation of class struggle, and in this matter everything was theoretically justified and practically proven by Stalin.

However, we still came to a decision to set up such a commission. The commission turned up its documentation; at the time, the documents were considered secret. The issue arose of whether to report on it at the party congress. It turned out to be difficult to resolve this issue. This was done as late as in the course of congress proceedings.

The congress began. I delivered the summary report. The discussion began. I would say that the congress was going well. However, a thought tormented me: "So, the congress will end. A resolution will be adopted. This is just a formality. What next? Our conscience will remain burdened with hundreds of thousands of the people shot, two-thirds of the membership of the Central Committee elected at the 17th party congress. Very few were lucky and still survive. What next?"

A memo by Pospelov was drilling through my brain. Finally, I pulled myself together, and during one of the recesses, when only members of the Central Committee Presidium were in the room, raised the issue:

"Comrades, what are we going to do about Comrade Pospelov's memo? What are we to do about the shootings, and arrests? The congress will end, and we will go home without putting in our word. After all, we know now that those subjected to repressions were not guilty; they were not 'enemies of the people' in the least. These were honest people, dedicated to the revolution, dedicated to the Leninist cause of building socialism and communism in the Soviet Union. People are going to come back from exile, because we are not going to keep them there now. We have to think about how to bring them back."

As soon as I stopped talking, everyone set upon me, especially Voroshilov:

"What's wrong with you? How can we? This cannot be told to the congress! How will this effect the authority of our party, the authority of our country? You cannot keep it secret [after disclosure]. Then they will lodge complaints against us. What can we say [then] about our role?"

Kaganovich also began to object very heatedly from the same positions. This was not a position of profound party analysis but a selfish, personal position. This was the desire to avoid responsibility if a crime has been done, to hush it up, to cover it up.

I was saying:

"We are now reporting for the period after the death of Stalin. However, as members of the Central Committee, we should also talk about the Stalin period. After all, we were in the leadership together with Stalin, and for this reason how can we say nothing to the delegates of the congress? The congress will end, and the delegates will go home. Saying that we knew nothing would mean lying: there is the memo by Comrade Pospelov, and now we know everything, know that the repressive measures were not justified in any way, that this was Stalin's arbitrariness."

In response, very animated reaction came again. Once again, they did not agree with me.

"Do you understand what will happen?"

I saw that I would not manage to secure the decision of the members of the Central Committee Presidium, and tabled the following motion:

"A party congress is under way, and during it the party discipline which requires unity among members of the Central Committee and the Central Committee Presidium is no longer in effect. The summary report has already been made, and any member of the Presidium and the Central Committee has a right to speak at the congress and state his point of view, even if it does not coincide with that in the summary report."

I did not say that I was going to deliver such a report, but apparently those who had objected understood that I could take the floor and state my point of view concerning the arrests and shootings.

I do not remember now who personally supported me. I believe they were Bulganin, Pervukhin, and Saburov.

So, we talked all the way through to such a situation. Then someone showed initiative:

"Since this is the way the issue is, the report has got to be made."

Everyone agreed reluctantly. Then the issue arose of who was going to deliver the report. I suggested that Comrade Pospelov deliver the report.

"If you are not going to speak now, and Pospelov, also one of the Central Committee secretaries, delivers the report, the question will be asked: Why didn't Khrushchev say anything in his summary report about this?"

This was a valid argument, and I agreed. We set up a closed meeting during the discussion of the Central Committee report, at which I made a report on this issue. The congress heard the report in silence. As they say, you could hear a pin drop. People were astonished by atrocities committed with regard to party members, meritorious old Bolsheviks, and young people. This was a tragedy for the party, for the delegates of the congress.

This is how the report at the 20th Congress on Stalin's abuses was born. I believe that raising this issue was absolutely correct and timely. Not only do I fail to repent, but I am glad that I got the right timing, and insisted that this report be made at the party congress. After all, it could have happened otherwise; we were in shock; people were kept in prisons and camps. We created a version, roughly speaking, about the role of Beriya. He supposedly was fully responsible for the abuses committed by Stalin. This was also the result of a shock. We still could not renounce that Stalin is a friend of the people, father of the people, Stalin is a genius, and on, and on.

This is why after the Beriya trial we were all held captive by this version which we created with a view to rehabilitating Stalin: Supposedly it was not God who was to blame, but the saints who sat there and gave poor reports to God, and this is why God sent down on us either hail, or thunder, or other calamities.

Now, yet again, I run into people who put the question to me:

"Comrade Khrushchev, maybe you should not have talked about Stalin; after all, Stalin is such and such, and Stalin did this and that?"

These are not the accomplices in his evil deeds, but simple people: They got used to it, they worshipped Stalin, and now it is difficult for them. Usually it is old people who ask such questions. They grew accustomed [to Stalin], it is difficult for them to renounce old notions and old arguments of Stalin's times.

I believe that this is a result of shortcomings in indoctrinating party members. Stalin adjusted all methods of party indoctrination to himself, to his activities: obedience without discussion, absolute confidence. Of course, meeting your death without a doubt is good in the time of war, but this always has the other side, because a man who trusted you blindly, when he learns that his trust was betrayed, becomes your enemy. This is a very dangerous direction. I have always been, and am now, in favor of honesty, absolute honesty before the party, the Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol], and the people. This is the only inexhaustible source of the power of the party; only in this manner may the confidence of people be won.

It was not Beriya who created Stalin, rather it was Stalin who created Beriya. Stalin created Yezhov. "Yezhevika" [blackberry] and "yezhovye rukavitsy" ["iron-fist rule," literally "hedgehog mittens"]—these are Stalin's terms. Still earlier, there was Yagoda. All of them went off the stage in succession. One set of heroes created by Stalin was replaced by another, and this was also logical for Stalin.

Stalin destroyed honest people with someone else's hands, and he knew that they were blameless before the people and the party. These people perished only as a result of him having no confidence in them. This is why he had to eliminate these stranglers and select others. In this manner, three echelons emerged: Yagoda first, next to Yagoda—Yezhov, and next to Yezhov—Beriya. It ended with Beriya. More precisely, not with Beriya but with the death of Stalin himself.

Then we were still kept captive by the dead Stalin. Even when we learned a lot after the Beriya trial we gave incorrect explanations, and reduced it all to Beriya. He seemed to be a convenient character to us. We did everything to whitewash Stalin, unaware of the fact that we were whitewashing a criminal.

I felt the falsehood of our position for the first time when we came to Yugoslavia and talked to Comrade Tito and other comrades. When we touched upon this issue and referred to Beriya they began to smile and offer retorts. This irritated us, and we embarked on a major argument, which faded into a row, while defending Stalin. Later I publicly defended Stalin against the Yugoslavs. Now it has become clear that this was the incorrect position of a man who was not aware of the necessity to denounce all these crimes to the end so that similar methods could never be reinstated in our party.

This is why those who really want to establish the Leninist order in the party—Leninist rather than Stalinist—should spare no effort in order to denounce Stalin and expose Stalin's methods. It is necessary to rehabilitate the people, many of whom still have not been rehabilitated; it is necessary to condemn the lawless acts committed so that the ghost would not be able to rise from the grave.

Once when I was in Bulgaria, I quoted in one speech the words of Pushkin, from his work "Mozart and Saglieri." He describes this episode: Mozart and Saglieri are talking, and Mozart, who did not suspect that Saglieri was going to poison him, says: Genius and villainy are incompatible. This is also the case with Stalin. You cannot have a genius and a villain rolled into one....

The main achievement of the 20th congress was in the fact that it initiated the process of cleansing the party, of restoring in it the norms of life which Lenin and other best sons of our country struggled for.

Monthly Publishes 1974 Solzhenitsyn Essay

18120067 Moscow XX CENTURY AND PEACE in English No 2, Feb 89 pp 22-25

[Article by Alexander Solzhenitsyn: "Let's Not Live by a Lie!"; epilogue by Igor Vinogradov]

[Text] There was a time when we didn't even dare to speak in a whisper. Now we write or read Samizdat, and complain to one another to our heart's content, even in the smoking rooms of research institutes: "They're messing us about!" The unnecessary bragging about outer space when the country is ruined and poor; the strengthening of distant wild regimes; the stirring up of civil wars. They recklessly supported Mao Zedong (with our money), but it will be us who will be sent against him, and we'll have to go, there'll be no escaping it. They take legal action against anyone they like, and healthy people are driven to lunatic asylums—always "they" while we are helpless.

We already reached a limit, general spiritual ruin is threatening all of us and physical destruction is about to burn us and our children, but we go on smiling cowardly like before and babbling inarticulately:

"How can we prevent this? We have no strength."

We have become so hopelessly dehumanized that for a bit of food we're ready to sacrifice all our principles, our soul, all the efforts of our ancestors, all opportunities for our descendants, just so long as no one disturbs our frail existence. We have no more firmness left, no pride or fervour. We don't even fear universal nuclear death, World War III (maybe we shall hide in some hole), we are only afraid of taking steps of civic courage! If only we could not stray from the herd, not take a step on our own—and suddenly find ourselves without a long white loaf, without gas and without a registration of residence in Moscow.

In political study groups, they kept repeating the same thing to us, so often that it became deep rooted in us,—to live comfortably and well all our lives in the social conditions which cannot be overstepped. Being determines consciousness, but what have we to do with all this? We cannot do anything.

But in fact, we can do everything! We are cheating ourselves in order to be calm. It is not "they" who are guilty but us, only us!

Objections may be raised: Really there is nothing we can think of! We have been gagged, nobody listens to us or asks us anything. How can we make them listen?

To make them change their minds—but it is impossible.

It would be more natural to re-elect them! But usually there are no re-elections in our country.

In the West people know about strikes, demonstrations of protest but we are too downtrodden, we are afraid of them: How is it possible, all of a sudden, to give up work and go into the street.

But still, the other fatal roads, tested over the past century of bitter Russian history, are not for us either. We have had enough! Now that all the axes have done their work, and that all that was sown has sprouted, we can see how misled and dazed were those young and conceited people who thought they could make the country a just and happy one through terror, bloody uprising and a civil war. No, thanks, fathers of enlightenment! Now we know for sure that foul methods are bred in foul results. May our hands be clean!

So, the circle has been closed? And there is really no way out of it? And it only remains for us to wait: Something might suddenly happen of its own accord.

But it will never come off all by itself if we continue to recognize, glorify and strengthen it without departing from its most sensitive point.

From the lie.

When violence bursts into people's peaceful lives, its face is glowing from over-confidence, flying the flag and crying: "I am violence. Disperse, make way or I'll crush you!" But violence quickly grows old, a few years and it is no longer sure of itself and in order to hold ground, to look decent, it has to adopt Lie as an ally. This is because violence has nothing to use as a cover except Lie which may hold its ground only by means of violence. And not daily, not by laying its heavy paw on each shoulder—it demands from us only submission to the Lie, and daily participation in the Lie: Herein is its loyalty.

And here lies the simplest and most accessible key to our liberation, ignored by us: personal non-participation in a lie! Let the lie cover everything, let the lie possess everything but let's resist in very way: Let it possess but not through me!

And this is the slit in the imaginary ring of our inaction!—the easiest for us and the most destructive for the lie. People flinch from the lie and it simply ceases to exist. Like an infection, it can exist only on people.

We do not succumb to a call, we have not matured enough to march to the square and speak the truth out loudly, to speak aloud what we think—don't do that. That is too frightening but let's, at least, refuse to say what we do not think!

This is precisely our road, the easiest and the most accessible with all our deep-rooted organic cowardice, much easier (it is terrible to pronounce) than Gandhi-style civic disobedience.

Our road is: not to back the lie consciously; having realized where its foundry is (different for everyone) to give up this gangrenous boundary; not to paste the dead bones and scales of Ideology; not to stretch rotten rags and we will be surprised how quickly and helpless the lie drops off. What is naked, let it appear naked in the world.

So let each one of us choose: to remain a conscious servant of the lie (oh, of course, not because we like it, but in order to feed the family and bring up the children in the spirit of the lie!) or, to shake it off and become an honest person worthy of respect, both of our children and contemporaries.

From this day on he:
—will not write, sign or print a single phrase that distorts the truth;
—won't pronounce such a phrase either in private conversation or before a crowd, neither in the role of agitator, teacher or educator, nor in a theatrical role;
—neither through a painting, a sculpture, a photograph, technical means or music, won't transmit any false thought, or a single distortion of the truth;
—won't give, either orally or in writing, any "guiding" quotation to please, or to provide safety measure for the success of his work if he doesn't share fully the quoted thought.
—won't let himself be forced into a demonstration or meeting if it is against his desire and will; he won't take or raise a streamer, a slogan which he doesn't share fully;
—will immediately leave the session, meeting, lecture, play, or film as soon as he hears a lie, ideological nonsense or brazen propaganda;

—won't sign or buy from a newsstand a newspaper or magazine in which information is being distorted and the facts of paramount importance are being kept back.

We have not enumerated all possible and essential deviations from a lie. But the person who starts purifying himself—will easily discern other cases, too.

Indeed, at first it won't come equally for all. One person will temporarily lose his job. For young people who wish to live by the truth this will complicate their life in the initial period: After all, the lessons being answered are also stuffed with a lie, and they have to choose. But no loophole is left for anyone who wants to be honest: Never will any of us, even in the safest technical sciences, trample down at least one of the above-mentioned steps—either towards the truth or towards a lie; towards spiritual independence or spiritual servility. And the person who lacks courage even to defend his soul, let him not be proud of his advanced views, not boast of being an academician or a people's artist, honoured worker or a general. So, let him tell himself: I am a commoner and a coward, but am well-fed and warm.

Even this road—the most moderate of all roads of resistance—won't be easy for those who have been in this state too long. But it is much easier than self-immolation or even starvation: The flame won't envelop your body, the eyes won't burst from heat and black bread with pure water will always be found for your family.

The great people of Europe—the Czechoslovak people, betrayed and cheated by us—haven't really shown us that an unprotected person can stand even against tanks if a worthy heart throbs in their chest?

It won't be an easy road, but will be the easiest from the available. A difficult choice for the body but the only one for the soul. A difficult road, but there are people in our country too, even dozens of them, who stood for years all these paragraphs and who live by the truth.

So, let's not be the first to embark upon this road, let's join it! Then this road will become easier and shorter for all of us, with the more concerted ranks which embark upon it! If there are thousands of us, they won't be able to cope with any of us. If there are tens of thousands of us, we won't recognize our country!

But if we get the jitters, then no excuse, we are our own enemies! We shall bow our heads, wait a little longer and our brothers-biologists will help bring closer the reading of our thoughts and the alteration of our genes.

If we get the jitters even in this, then we are worthless, hopeless, and Pushkin's contempt is meant for us:

Why do herds need the gifts of freedom?
Their inheritance is passed from family to family.
A yoke with rattles and lashes.

February 12, 1974

Epilogue

This appeal of Alexander Solzhenitsyn to the intelligentsia, to the youth and all his countrymen was written shortly before his arrest and deportation in February 1974. Immediately after this disgraceful action it was passed on in dozens, hundreds and thousands of Samizdat copies. Those are difficult years—years when the Lie, the Evil and the Violence, which stepped back only half a pace during the so-called "Khrushchev thaw", came down again with all its weight upon the country, making it bow its head, strangling and dragging it into the abyss of inevitable rotting and disintegration. And there are no more hopes, like those which had begun sprouting in 1956, for renovation, for the success of any civic opposition to the triumphant carrion. But Solzhenitsyn didn't call for this—he appealed to each of us, to our conscience and to our sense of human dignity with a passionate reminder that if we do not take care of our soul, nobody else will. The liberation of the social organism from evil may and must being only from our own purification and liberation—from our firm resolve never to back the lie and violence, personally, by our own will and consciously.

Was this appeal heeded? Did it produce any results? Weren't the skeptics right even those pierced by the irresistible strength of Solzhenitsyn's appeal for whom the writer's hopes seemed Utopian? His personal example of the highest spiritual and civic courage—wasn't it only for individual heroes?

Let's ask ourselves: Would the changes started in our country three years ago have been possible at all if the general contempt and aversion for those who personified the reigning evil and violence, and also for their wretched yesmen who flooded the country with demagogy and lies had not matured during these years in all strata of society? And wasn't the role played by a few people really great? And haven't quite a number of them, especially among the youth, encouraged by Alexander Solzhenitsyn's appeal to radically change their lives, embarked upon the road of resolute and firm personal non-participation in the orgy of the official Lie? Even those who managed only by a pace or half a pace to depart from this disgraceful line of moral degradation.

That is why it was a great pity that Solzhenitsyn's appeal was not and could not be heard in those years by all, by the entire country and all the people. That is why it is so encouraging that, today, many more people will be able to hear it than in the 1970s. Even today, it has preserved its whole lively moral meaning, and it still remains the unconditional formula of that initial moral imperative, by following which we can firmly guarantee our civic renovation.

Igor Vinogradov, man of letters

Armenian Party Discusses Housing Shortage

NC1104132689 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0425 GMT 11 Apr 89

[From the review of SOVETAKAN AYASTAN]

[Text] The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee met and discussed the issue of speeding up the production of building construction within the framework of the sharp increase in industrial capacity.

Oleg Lobov, the second secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, in opening the session, said that serious problems have cropped up in resolving the housing problems in the republic, and in particular in Yerevan, due to the construction and rebuilding of houses destroyed by the earthquake. It was pointed out at the meeting that micro-combines, with the capacity to produce 10,000-20,000 square meters of habitable space, could substantially contribute to the rapid increase in housing construction. Such combines have been designed by the (?Dantroyek) Institute of Kaliningrad.

An ARMENPRES report on the session has been published on the first page of the paper.

Emphasis on Well-Constructed Buildings in Armenia

LD1004102689 Moscow TASS in English 0925 GMT 10 Apr 89

[Text] Yerevan April 10 TASS—A chart of the geological damage inflicted on northern Armenia by last December's earthquake, was compiled by Austrian researcher Manfred Buchroithner during his stay in this republic.

Manfred Buchroithner, a leading expert in space geology and head of the centre for processing of satellite information at Graz University, plans to compile a detailed tectonic map of Armenia. The scientist told TASS that he would pass his conclusions on to his Armenian counterparts for use in reconstruction work.

The Austrian scientist told journalists on his return home that reconstruction work in Armenia conducted in geologically dangerous areas, should be immediately stopped and planned anew. He said that territories allocated for development are in fact, quake-prone areas.

TASS asked Aleksandr Krivov, charman of the State Intersectoral Commission on Town-Planning in northern Armenia, to comment. "I believe that our Austrian colleague has not yet created a whole geological picture of the devastated area," he said. "There are no perfect territories for construction in northern Armenia from the seismic point of view. The entire region is quake-prone. Therefore, one can safely say that new construction sites are in quake-prone zones."

"However, this does not mean that all work must be stopped here immediately," Krivov noted. Construction in northern Armenia was launched after in-depth geological studies. The best Soviet seismologists and geologists studied rocks and the seismic situation in the region. The safest areas were chosen for construction.

"However, the main thing now is the quality of construction," noted the expert. "The earthquake showed that houses even designed for force 7 shocks, but well-built, withstood the tremors. As a result, much attention is now given in the republic to raising the quality of construction."

Construction Work Criticized in Disaster Areas

NC1504080289 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0425 GMT 15 Apr 89

[From the review of KHORHURTAYIN AYASTAN]

[Text] On the desk of (Semyonov), the chairman of the republic's State Committee for Labor and Social Affairs, there are many letters and official notices on the fact that diligent work is not being carried out in a timely fashion in the natural disaster areas, due to the absence of planning and specification documents. In an inteview with an ARMENPRES reporter, the committee chairman discusses the problems of the builders.

Housing Distribution Rumors in Armenia Discounted

NC1404063889 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0200 GMT 13 Apr 89

[Text] Rumors have been circulating to the effect that builders and specialists who have come here from different parts of the country to contribute to the reconstruction and revival of the cities and villages destroyed by the earthquake have been given the right to settle, if they so desire, in their present employment localities; that is, in Leninakan, Girovakan, Spitak, and elsewhere, and thus obtain homes in the buildings they are erecting. To what extent are these rumors compatible with the realities and with what ulterior motives are they being circulated?

An ARMENPRES reporter put these questions to Khrayr Oganesyan, deputy chairman of the Armenian Council of Ministers and chairman of the State Committee for Construction Affairs. Oganesyan replied: The rumors being circulated amongst the population are totally devoid of [word indistinct]. The republic's government and the relevant local soviets and other bodies have not discussed such an issue, made any decision, or authorized any document in this regard. This is the real picture. In the cities, towns, villages, and newly constructed or rebuilt houses and residential buildings, only the residents of a given region will be given houses; that is, those who are the permanent inhabitants of these cities and villages. Later, the prefabricated dwellings and newly created workers' towns erected for the builders in these regions will also be used for the benefit of the local population; that is, they will be left to the Armenian people. The workers from different parts of the country, whose brotherly assistance our people will never forget, are staying in our republic under supervision. After the completion of their tasks they will leave.

Arutyunyan Briefs Women on Armenian Reconstruction

NC1204115689 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 11 Apr 89

[Text] A meeting took place at the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee with the participation of the members of the presidium of the Women's Council [genants khorhurt] of the Armenian Republic and the heads of some of the city and regional women's councils.

Greeting the participants, Suren Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, briefed them on the progress being made in reconstruction and the problems being encountered with regard to the rebuilding of the cities and villages destroyed in the earthquake. With the help of all the union republics, 2.5 million square meters of space must be made habitable by the end of the current year to accommodate 63,000 families which will need homes. Soon thousands onf women and children who had been evacuated will be returning. It is necessary to provide shelter for them and to provide adults with jobs.

Suren Arutyunyan mentioned those (?areas) in which the women's councils will have to play an important role to help resolve important social, economic, ideological, and ethical problems. The women's councils must study comprehensively the needs and cares of women, protect their interests, and work to improve their working conditions and recreation.

Particular attention was devoted to the important endeavors which the women's councils are undertaking in the natural disaster zone. More than 100 charity groups affiliated to the women's councils are providing care to those who have suffered.

Other speakers referred to the affairs and problems of women of Armenia, and the need to provide assistance to needy mothers and to encourage young mothers. The speakers also stressed that benefits must be provided to orphans and the children who were separated from their parents as a result of the earthquake, as well as the need to find jobs for women.

Arutyunyan, Yerevan Students Exchange Views

NC1104055689 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 9 Apr 89

[From the republican press review]

[Text] We read in the newspapers that during a meeting held between representatives of Yerevan students and Suren Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, a frank and (?sharp) exchange of views took place regarding various socioeconomic, ideological, and political problems facing the republic, which distress the young people.

Suren Arutyunyan said that last year the republic underwent some difficult experiences. The exacerbation of interethnic relations and the destructive earthquake upset the normal rhythm of life. The effort and zeal needed to resolve these problems is clearly understood by all of us. Today, all the union republics and the whole country are exerting enormous efforts to help our people to rapidly eliminate the consequences of the natural disaster and to revive Leninakan, Spitak, Kirovakan, and hundreds of villages. National consolidation and unity are necessary today, more than at any other time. In this regard we are relying on you, the student body, the first secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee stressed. Youth is a tremendous creative power and source of strength. It is important that it be used for creative purposes.

During the meeting it was stressed that the main concern of the students has been and is their studies. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the training of well-informed, perspicacious, and open-minded experts should be added to the list of the most important national problems.

During the meeting, which lasted almost 5 hours, there was a substantial exchange of views on extending the scope for using the Armenian language, efforts concerning the refugees, and the elections for USSR people's deputies. Replies were given to the students' numerous questions, which concerned the trial connected with the genocidal crime in Sumgait, curfew hours, and the legal proceedings concerning the activities of the Karabakh Committee members.

Concluding the meeting Arutyunyan said that the exchange of views had been mutually beneficial and [word indistinct]. He expressed the conviction that the dialogue with the republic's students and youth would continue and become a regular occurrence.

Culture Minister Visits Armenian Earthquake Zone

NC1104060889 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 9 Apr 89

[From the republican press review]

[Text] According to the papers, Vasiliy Zakharov, USSR minister of culture, who is in our republic in connection with the formulation of measures for the revival and development of cultural life in the earthquake zone, visited Leninakan, Spitak, and Kirovakan. In cooperation with the republic's Ministry of Culture, measures were worked out for the elimination of the consequences of the earthquake and for the improvement of cultural services. The USSR Ministry of Culture will allocate almost R700,000 for 1989-1990 to underwrite the design expenses for theaters, concert halls, cultural centers, and work places for artists.

Zakharov met with the local party and soviet workers and leaders at the Leninakan and Kirovakan city committees and Spitak regional committee. During the meetings, they discussed the problems pertaining to the rebuilding of cultural centers in the disaster areas. Plans were made for an all-union music festival in Armenia in 1990, devoted to the work of Aram Kachaduryan and another all-union arts festival on Armenian songs. All this is being done to cater to the cultural needs of those who are participating in the reconstruction work.

Suren Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee, met with Zakharov. They discussed the questions related to the improvement of cultural services in the earthquake zone.

'Mass' Arrests of Armenian Students Denied

PM1204113789 Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 29 Mar 89 p 3

[Unattributed report: "At the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic"]

[Text] During March of this year internal affairs organs in Yerevan cut short a number of attempts to organize unsanctioned events. A number of people were detained under administrative regulations for the organization of, or active participation in, illegal actions. The population was informed about this at the time.

At the same time, with the aim of inflaming passions among young people and creating sociopolitical tension, certain individuals have been spreading provocative rumors and fabrications about alleged mass detentions of students during the past 2 days.

In this connection the Armenian Ministry of Internal Affairs has issued the following additional information: On 25 and 26 March of this year 14 people, including three Yerevan higher educational establishment students, were detained under administrative regulations for violations of public order: Araik Pargevovich Sarkisyan, born 1968, 2d-year student at the National Economy Institute, was detained 25 March for attempting to disseminate leaflets of an inflammatory nature; Nairi Grachevich Unanyan, born 1965, 4th-year student at the Yerevan State University Philology Department, and Sergey Volodyayevich Khemchyan, born 1965, 4th-year student at the Light Industry Technical School, were both detained 26 March for taking part in an unsanctioned march with slogans of a nationalist and anti-Soviet content.

The Armenian Ministry of Internal Affairs notifies citizens that all attempts to violate public order will be resolutely stopped, and draws the attention of the population to the fact that spreading rumors about alleged mass detentions of students is a provocation which pursues the aim of causing disturbances in the capital and destabilizing the situation.

Armenian Law Enforcement Measures Discussed

NC1404112289 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 0425 GMT 14 Apr 89

[From the review of KHORHURTAYIN AYASTAN]

[Text] The Armenian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau met yesterday. According to the report released on the meeting, the participants discussed the question of additional measures on the consolidation of compliance with the law, law and order, and orderly conduct in the republic. It was pointed out that the party city and regional committees and the law enforcement bodies must deeply and fully examine the situation that has evolved and undertake effective action against various types of anti-social manifestations.

The bureau advised the republic's Council of Ministers to set up a temporary group composed of responsible employees from the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers, [words indistinct], the [words indistinct] Central Committee, and the republican ministries of social security, finance, education, and culture. This group will coordinate the activities of the ministries and supervisory boards with the aim of providing assistance to those who have left the republic because of the earthquake.

Ideological, organizational, and party work and other questions pertaining to the socio-economic development of the republic were also discussed at the meeting.

Armenia's Catholicos Vazgen I Awarded Medal

NC0404132289 Yerevan International Service in Armenian 1530 GMT 3 Apr 89

[Text] As we have already reported, on the basis of a decree issued by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, His Holiness Vazgen I, Catholicos of All Armenians, received the Red Banner of Labor medal for his activities for peace, on the occasion of his 80th birthday.

Presenting the high honor, Grant Voskanyan, chairman of the Presidium of the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, stressed in particular: As one of the [words indistinct] (?personages) of the religious world, the Catholicos of All Armenians sets a valuable example for the strengthening of universal peace, and assists in deepening cooperation among peoples. It is difficult to overemphasize his efforts at gathering the diaspora Armenians around their motherland. Special respect should be expressed for his stand during the devastating earthquake, continued the speaker. In those difficult days, he visited the disaster areas and comforted the victims with his [word indistinct] words. He went to the United States to bring together the diaspora forces to assist Armenia. The people's great trust in him was manifested in the [words indistinct] of his election as people's deputy. Voskanyan expressed best wishes for his good health and (?copntinued) zeal, which will be to the benefit of Soviet Armenia.

Accepting this honor, Vazgen I reiterated his heartfelt gratitude for the high honor bestowed upon him. He indicated that he will continue to work with a great sense of responsibility and (?awareness).

Yerevan Commandant on 13 Apr Curfew Violations

NC1404101889 Yerevan Domestic Service in Armenian 1600 GMT 13 Apr 89

[Statement by the military commandant of the Special District]

[Text] The situation in the republic's capital and other areas of the republic where curfew hours are in force is under the full supervision of the troops and organs of the Interior Ministry.

On 13 April, 34 persons were detained and 15 cars were impounded in Yerevan for violating the curfew hours and for circulating without identity cards and personal documentation papers. Eight persons were detained and three cars impounded for violating the curfew hours in other areas of the republic where the curfew is in force.

No incidents or crimes have occurred in connection with the enforcement of the curfew requirements.

Baku Commandant on 9 Apr Curfew Violations

NC1004183689 Baku Domestic Service in Armenian 1000 GMT 10 Apr 89

[Statement by the military commandant of Baku City Special District]

[Text] The situation remains unchanged in Baku and elsewhere in the republic; it is calm. No incidents have been registered as regards the (?exacerbation) of interethnic relations and violations of public law and order.

Last night, 88 persons were detained and 18 cars were impounded for violating curfew hours. Appropriate proceedings have been instituted against them.

[Signed] Lieutenant General Kolesnikov, military commandant of Baku City Special District.

Customs Official Visits Azerbaijan, Meets Vezirov

LD0904124889 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 0104 GMT 9 Apr 89

[Text] Bazovskiy, head of the main administration of state customs control under the USSR Council of Ministers, visited Azerbaijan. He acquainted himself with the republic's foreign trade activity and learned at what level customs departments are prepared to control goods and other properties leaving the USSR in the new conditions.

Leaders of ministries and main administrations, enterprises, and organizations that are interested in developing the republic's foreign economic relations held a conference at the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Council of Ministers. They discussed the declaration of export and import products and other products, the application of new documents, freight customs declarations at the depot of the Institute of National Economic Management under the Azerbaijan SSR Council of Ministers, and provision for the special conditions at work. Duties were established in the sphere of perfecting these tasks.

Bazovskiy met Abdur-Rakhman Vezirov, first secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Central Committee. Positive tendencies in the foreign economic activities of the republic's enterprises and organizations were noted and ways of increasing the contribution of the Azerbaijan SSR to the development of the USSR's scientific, technological, and production relations with foreign countries were established.

Azerbaijan Komsomol Group Elects Officers

NC0404113889 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1600 GMT 3 Apr 89

[Text] The Azerbaijan All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol] Central Committee held a plenum today. The meeting examined organizational matters. (?Imran) Akipov, who was formerly first secretary of the Baku City Komsomol Committee, was elected as secretary of the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee. Sevil Gadzhiyeva was relieved of her responsibilities as member of the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee on the grounds that she has taken up party work. (?Indira) Gadzhiyeva, who formerly worked as an instructor affiliated with the All-Union Central Committee of the Lenin [word indistinct] Organization, was elected as a member of the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee.

Sahib Alekperov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Komsomol Central Committee, addressed the plenum.

Lenkoran Gorkom Plenum Critical of Health Care

NC0404112289 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1600 GMT 31 Mar 89

[Text] The Lenkoran City Party Committee [Gorkom] held a plenum today. The plenum heard and debated a report by Adil Rakhimov, first secretary of the Lenkoran Gorkom, on the tasks related to the question of improving the health of the people and consolidating the material and technical basis of the health services. The participants who addressed the debate noted that a total of 370 doctors, who have specialized in various fields, and 9 [words indistinct] are serving the rayon's people. They will carry out work to implement the program drawn up to maintain the health of the people until the year 2000. The deficiencies in that field were seriously criticized in the plenum.

(Ibragim Guseynov), deputy minister of health of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic, addressed the plenum. The meeting adopted a wide-ranging decision on the matter that was discussed.

Azerbaijan Central Committee Meets 12 Apr

NC1304121289 Baku Domestic Service in Armenian 0353 GMT 13 Apr 89

[From the republican press review]

[Text] According to the papers, the Azerbaijani Communist Party Central Committee met on 12 April. Members of the Special Administration Committee of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO] and directors of the republican ministies and supervisory boards were present at the meeting.

The progress of the implementation of the decision of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers as regards the acceleration of the socio-economic development of Azerbaijan's NKAO and the measures envisaged for the years 1986-1995 were discussed at the meeting.

Volskiy, chairman of the special administration committee of the NKAO, briefed the participants about practical measures concerning the prospective normalization of the situation in the NKAO, the development of economic and social life, and the solution of the problems of resettled people. Comrade Vezirov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, summarized the results of the discussion.

NKAO Administrator Holds Meeting in Stepanakert

PM1104082189 Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 24 Mar 89 p 3

[ARMENPRESS own correspondent A. Grigoryan report: "Through Renewal"]

[Text] Stepanakert—A meeting has been held between Arkadiy Ivanovich Volskiy, chairman of the NKAO [Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast] Special Administration Committee and candidate people's deputy of the USSR, and the party-economic aktiv and public representatives of Stepanakert city.

A.I. Volskiy informed those present about the work done since the introduction of the special form of administration into the NKAO by the committee to implement the extensive program for Nagorno-Karabakh's socioeconomic and cultural development elaborated by the party and government and briefed them on future plans. The speaker stressed that in the economic sphere the committee is pursuing a firm line of setting up autonomous, economically accountable associations. Oblast wholesale trade associations and an editorial production association, under the jurisdiction of the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply and the USSR State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade respectively, are already in operation. It is also planned to set up local industry and sewn goods associations and planning and construction, housing and municipal services, consumer services, agricultural produce processing, and other associations. The Stepanakert electrical machine building plant has been incorporated into the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] "Luys" Production Association. An accord transferring a furniture factory to the "Yugmebel" Association has been reached. Measures are being carried out to improve the state of affairs in housing, heating and water supply, and the public services provision of population centers.

The autonomous oblast's agriculture, the speaker went on to say, will be developed by breaking up into smaller units collective farms [kolkhozes] and state farms [sovkhozes] unjustifiably consolidated in the past and by setting up small, flexibly managed farms run on the principles of the lease contract and economic accountability. In view of the decisions of the last CPSU Central Committee plenum the committee considers it expedient to set up in the future agrifirms producing agricultural products to replace the oblast agroindustrial committee apparatus. In addition to the traditional sectors, the natural assets in which Nagorno-Karabakh is so rich will also be extensively utilized in the agrarian sector. It is planned, among other things, to export mulberry vodka. The construction of a mixed-feed plant and a fruit storehouse, the modernization of a meat combine, and so forth are also items on the agenda.

The structure of managerial organs will also be subject to change. Thus, the oblast main planning and economic administration will deal with all questions concerning the economy in the future. Comrade A.I. Volskiy drew the attention of those present to the fact that the USSR Council of Ministers had invested the committee with the functions of contractor for all production and social faciilities except those being constructed by means of own resources.

During the time the special form of administration has been in operation its committee has carried out substantial work to develop spheres of culture, public education, and health care. An autonomous writers organization and unions of journalists, artists, and composers have been formed in the NKAO. The first issue of the literary and sociopolitical magazine ARTSAKH is being prepared for publication.

The oblast Special Administration Committee, A.I. Volskiy stressed, will continue to assist the expansion and strengthening of cultural ties between Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian population and Soviet Armenia. A cooperation accord with the creative unions of the republic that provides for the organization of mutual visits, exhibitions, seminars, and so forth has been signed.

At the committee's request, the Armenian SSR has adopted a decision to organize an archeological and restoration expedition which will comprehensively restore historical and cultural monuments.

The speaker focused the assembly's attention on other important questions concerned with the autonomous oblast's all-around development, which have to be solved during the operation of the special form of administration in the NKAO. At the same time he urged participants in the meeting to erect a sound barrier to all kinds of provocative acts and the spreading of rumors regarding the committee's activity that bear no relation to reality.

Comrade A.I. Volskiy answered numerous questions from the assembly.

The meeting was also addressed by USSR candidate people's deputy G.A. Pogosyan. Briefly describing his election platform, he stressed that its basic provisions are in full accord with the objectives, tasks, and forms of activity of the Special Administration Committee. The speaker expressed a number of ideas designed to ensure faster implementation of the NKAO's political and socioeconomic development programs.

Nagorno-Karabakh 'Philanthropic' Society Formed

PM1204091789 Yerevan KOMMUNIST in Russian 15 Mar 89 p 4

[ARMENPRESS correspondent A. Grigoryan report: "News From Stepanakert: In the Name of Philanthropy and Charity"]

[Text] Stepanakert—The tasks of "Amaras," the Nagorno-Karabakh philanthropic society, were discussed at the constituent congress of this voluntary public mass organization, which was held at the oblast political education center.

The main speaker, Candidate of Psychological Sciences A.M. Mkhitaryan, and those who spoke in the debate emphasized that the establishment of this kind of organization has become possible thanks to the steady progress of restructuring, the further democratization of our society, and the firm establishment of glasnost and an atmosphere of free exchange of opinions everywhere. It was noted that the main task of the society, which currently unites in its ranks representatives of the working class, laboring peasantry, and the intelligentsia who have decided to devote themselves to the noble cause of philanthropy and charity, will be humanizing relations between people and promoting the successful implementation of the program of socioeconomic and cultural development for the autonomous oblast. At the same time it resolutely rejects any manifestations of nationalism and favors a strengthening of the friendship and fraternity of peoples.

One of the society's main spheres of activity will be promoting the development of national traditions, customs, and trades, and the preservation and restoration of the people's historical and cultural monuments. The range of the philanthropic organization's tasks also includes contributing to the complete stabilization of the interethnic situation in Nagorno-Karabakh and providing material and other assistance to migrants, victims of the devastating earthquake in Armenia, and to large families.

The congress adopted the statutes of the "Amaras" society.

Elections of members of the board of the philanthropic organizations were held. Boris Vartanovich Dadamyan, director of the Stepanakert transport production association, was elected its chairman.

The congress was attended by representatives of the public from the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic.

Taking part in the congress proceedings was V.V. Plisov, member of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast Special Administration Committee, and I.P. Dyatlov, deputy chief of a CPSU Central Committee department.

Moldavia Youth Poll Reveals 'Few Illusions'

PM1804150289 London DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 18 Apr 89 p 11

[Trevor Fishlock dispatch: "Soviet Youth Show Few Illusions"]

[Text] Moscow—Young people in the Soviet Union have few illusions about the communist system, according to an opinion poll.

For all the talk of economic reforms, almost nine-tenths of those questioned believed that their society would not enjoy general prosperity in the next 20 years.

Almost everyone asked—90 per cent—thought it was better to trade with a capitalist country than a socialist one.

The poll was conducted among 600 people, mostly aged 17 to 20, by a magazine in the republic of Moldavia.

Asked about careers, 24 per cent said they wanted to be self-employed, 52 per cent said they would like to serve abroad, two per cent said they would like to be teachers, 1.1 per cent scientists, and only one tenth of one per cent said they wanted to be in the services.

To another question about jobs, 93 per cent answered: "I am not ready to accept serious difficulties, let alone make sacrifices, for the sake of my professional career."

Asked what they feared most, 26 per cent said material hardship, 14 per cent said nuclear war and four per cent said a return of the "old times". At a time when the Kremlin has been worried about nationalist unrest and has urged people to reject nationalism and adopt "Soviet patriotism", the poll makes it clear that people value their own ethnic identity much more than the notion of a Soviet one.

Almost three-fifths of them, 59 per cent, said they wanted their children's nationality to be classified as Moldavian, or Russian, or similar. Twenty-four per cent said they wanted the classification "Soviet". They were reminded of the nationalist unrest in Armenia, the Baltic republics and other places and asked if they thought there would be similar agitation in future. The majority—78 per cent—answered "probably".

On love and marriage, they were asked to say what sort of domestic life they would prefer between the ages of 20 and 25.

Forty-four per cent said they wanted to be single; 28 per cent said they would like to live, unmarried, with someone they loved and without children; 12 per cent said they would like to be married without children, and 11 per cent said they would want to be married with one or two children.

Conference on Party Political Management Opens

LD0604182789 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1430 GMT 6 Apr 89

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpt] A republican scientific and practical conference, "The Political Nature of Party Management—Experience and Problems," commenced its work in Dushanbe today:

[M. Nikulin correspondent, identified by caption] The forms, methods, and means of implementing political management of the economy, solving social issues, and shaping public opinion—these and other topical questions of political life are on the conference's agenda. It can rightly be called an all-union conference, since senior officials of the CPSU Central Committee, of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, and of oblast and city party committees of the Russian Federation as well as leaders of the country's higher party schools are participating in its work. This is the first time that such a conference has been held in our country.

As Comrade Makhkamov, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, noted in his speech, the aim of the conference is to interpret theoretically and to make generalized conclusions about the experience of the work of the republic's party organizations in the conditions of restructuring. [video shows scenes from conference, including Makhkamov at rostrum] [passage omitted]

Historian on Limitations of World Revolution

18300520 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 14, 8-14 Apr 89 pp 5-6

[Interview with Prof I. Krivoguz, doctor of historical sciences, by I. Solganik: "The Fate of the World Revolution"]

[Text] The victory of socialist revolutions in all countries of the world was predicted by Marx, Engels, and Lenin. The first 20 years of the existence of the Soviet state have been marked by the world socialist revolution—people have waited for it and tried to bring it closer.

Why a world revolution has not and could not have transpired is discussed by our correspondent I. Solganik with Prof I. Krivoguz, doctor of economic sciences.

[Solganik] Igor Mikhaylovich, it is known that the concept of the world socialist revolution was developed by V. I. Lenin. As early as the 1920's he proposed the concept of peaceful coexistence of the Soviet state with capitalist countries. How are these two concepts, which are largely mutually exclusive, linked, and how did Lenin's views evolve?

[Krivoguz] As early as 1908 Lenin declared the need for a world revolution of the proletariat. When analyzing imperialism Lenin attached decisive significance to its negative tendencies and contradictions and the readiness of the objective prerequisites for socialism, and on this basis he estimated that imperialism was on the eve of a revolution. Taking into account the irregularity of social development, Lenin thought that the socialist revolution would triumph initially in one or several countries and that "socialism would be realized through the combined actions of the proletariat not of all but of a minority of countries that had reached the stage of development of advanced capitalism."

Having been victorious in even one country, Lenin wrote in 1915, its proletariat would rise "against the rest of the capitalist world, attracting the oppressed masses of other countries, inciting them to rebel against the capitalists, and if necessary even acting as a military force against the exploiting classes and their states." Although Russia was not one of the leading capitalist countries, Lenin, having analyzed the alignment of forces in the world after the February revolution, decided that the Russian workers could lay the foundation for the world socialist revolution. "We...have begun our work," wrote Lenin about the October Revolution, "counting exclusively on a world revolution." Its victory was perceived at that time as the creation of the World Federative Republic of Soviets.

Revolutionary socialists of all countries regarded the victory of October as the beginning of the world socialist revolution. "The Russian proletariat," declared the revolutionary socialists of Germany, "is perceived only as the vanguard of the world proletariat."

From October 1917 until the summer of 1920 Lenin imagined that the proletarian revolutions in the more developed countries would win out "either immediately or very soon," that the revolutionary forces were "close to a world proletarian revolution." In the summer of 1919 he expressed his confidence "next July we shall see the victory of the international Soviet republic..."

Lenin thought that Russia was only temporarily the vanguard of the world socialist revolution and that the last decisive battle would flare up when the socialist revolutions burst out in the most developed countries—they were awaited as the basic part of the world revolution. In 1920 after the disappointment of hopes for a revolution in Europe resulting from the Red Army campaign against Warsaw, which appeared to be a revolutionary liberation campaign, Lenin finally arrived at the idea that the world socialist revolution "will...continue for many years and will require much work."

In politics Lenin was a great realist and was very sensitive to all the changes in world development. He always thought that if the facts did not fit into the theory it was necessary to change the theory. Lenin's flexibility and sensitivity to the new made it possible for Lenin to be the first to see that the rates of the revolutionary movement were slowing down and the world revolution was being delayed.

Having been convinced that fate had doomed us to remain alone in capitalist surroundings—and Lenin saw this before others did—he managed to arrange for peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries.

The deep meaning of this Leninist concept, which corresponded to the new economic policy developed by Lenin, was that it directed our country toward cooperation and business relations with capitalist countries, the creation of joint enterprises, the granting of concessions, and so forth. If the proletariat of Western Europe had not yet won out, Lenin thought, it was necessary to enlist capital and have it serve to restore the country's economy.

As concerns the world revolution, at the 4th Komintern Congress and in January 1923 Lenin describes it already as in the historical perspective and not as a "developing revolution" (1919). Illness and then his death kept Lenin from revising his unjustified hopes for a world revolution.

[Solganik] After Lenin's death was there disagreement among the Bolshevik party leadership regarding the question of world revolution?

[Krivoguz] The forces were grouped as follows. On one side were Trotskiy and Sinovyev who thought it was impossible to build socialism in Russia without assistance from a victorious proletariat of Western Europe because of our country's backwardness.

Stalin objected to this very convincingly: If socialism could not be constructed in the country, what were Russia's prospects? Since the party demanded that the future be clear, the success of Stalin and Bukharin, who supported him, was predetermined in spite of all of Trotskiy's eloquence and the logic of Zinovyev's arguments.

These differences became especially acute because of the struggle for power and ultimately led to a schism and then to Stalin's destruction of his opponents—first political and then physical.

[Solganik] From the Bolshevik viewpoint what explained the fact that the world revolution had not taken place?

[Krivoguz] When explaining this circumstance Lenin very frequently blamed the treachery of the Social Democrats and opportunists. But the opportunists could not be traitors because they had never been in favor of a world revolution—as we know, one can be betrayed only by one's own and they were always in the opposite camp regarding this issue.

Let us recall Marx's statement: "No social formation will perish before the dissolution of all productive forces for which it provides adequate space...." I see in this the main reason why the world revolution did not and could not take place—capitalism had by no means exhausted its possibilities; it was very strong and still is strong both economically and politically. To such an extent that we are still unable to catch up in spite of the objective advantages of socialism.

[Solganik] Could you give us some examples of how our orientation toward a world revolution influenced our foreign policy?

[Krivoguz] Not everyone could master the great art of keeping separate the USSR state policy and the policy of the Komintern, the organization created for leading the world revolution. And certain eminent diplomats—Chicherin, Krasin, Rakovskiy—frequently protested against the fact that the Komintern was interfering in their negotiations with capitalist countries.

The statements of the Komintern in the spirit of damning all imperialists and their underlings, the Social Democrats, hampered very much the realization of Lenin's concept of peaceful coexistence.

For instance in 1924 Kh. Rakovskiy was in London conducting negotiations with the MacDonald government, and this government itself considered it its task to normalize relations with the USSR. In this situation very negative consequences were felt from the statement of Zinovyev, who was the head of the Komintern at the time, in which he called MacDonald an imperialist stooge.

Later, when the Komintern began to implement Stalin's policy, it was more and more difficult to distinguish where the Komintern left off and where Soviet diplomacy began.

[Solganik] Could you give us a general idea of how the personality cult of Stalin affected the world Communist movement? What was the Stalinist concept of world development and how was it actually different from the one which up until recently has been present in party documents.

[Krivoguz] Several generations of Communists not only in our country but throughout the world have learned Leninism at the hand of Stalin in his interpretation. And since in the second half of the 1970's we found that certain Communist parties in Western Europe spoke of the inadequacy and narrowness of Leninism, we should be aware that they were speaking against Leninism in Stalin's interpretation.

Apparently in the 1930's Stalin became very skeptical about the world revolution, although there is no precise information to this effect. Stalin always emphasized the Soviet Union's leading role in the world revolutionary process, and at the 7th Komintern Congress it was stated that the successes achieved in the USSR were a new stage in the world socialist movement. The fact that after the defeat of the republicans in Spain and the disintegration of the Popular Front in France all the hopes of Communists were linked only to the USSR contributed to the complete subordination of the Komintern to the Stalinist leadership. On Stalin's initiative, as we know, the Komintern disbanded the Communist Party of Poland because of false accusations. Hundreds of leaders of Communist parties of foreign countries were subjected to repressive measures in the USSR.

After World War II Stalin interpreted the concept of world development as the concept of a struggle between two camps—the democratic camp headed by the USSR and the imperialist camp. Stalin proposed defeating imperialism under the slogans of peace, democracy, and national independence. At the 19th party congress Stalin directly announced that the task of Communists is to raise the banner of the struggle for national independence and democratic freedoms, and the bourgeoisie, he declared, had thrown this banner overboard. This was a great underestimation of the bourgeoisie which made it difficult for the Communist Party to have a correct orientation, especially in the zone of the national liberation movement.

The concept of the struggle between two camps was schematic, and it ignored many changes that had taken place in the world. In particular, up until the middle of the 1950's we underestimated the significance of the victor of the national liberation and other revolutions in India, Indonesia, and other countries of Southeast Asia and the Near East. Nehru was regarded as a henchman of British imperialism and not as the leader of the liberation movement in India. Only in the second half of the 1950's did we revise these schematic ideas about world progress so as to return, it would seem, to the primary sources—to the idea of the world socialist revolution.

At the international conferences of representatives of Communist and workers' parties in Moscow in 1957 and 1960 they proposed the concept of a unified world revolutionary process and indicated its main motive forces. It was asserted that these forces merge into a single flow which will bury imperialism. This concept did not withstand the test of time and turned out to be inadequate for reflecting all the complexity and diversity of world development. Therefore, a new concept of world progress is now being developed as a basis for the new political thinking.

The revolutionary processes in the world are diverse. On the one hand there is a transition to socialism both from capitalism and from the precapitalist formations, but even more widespread is another process—the transition from precapitalist formations to capitalism. There is no justification for equating these two processes.

I think that it is necessary to revise our ideas about the general crisis of capitalism and evaluate capitalism realistically. Obviously, we cannot see in world socialism the main springboard for social progress in any country and reduce the essence of any regional conflicts to an antagonism between the two systems.

[Solganik] Finally, the last question. I have heard it said that the spread of fascism in Europe was a kind of defensive reaction to our attempts to spread communism.

[Krivoguz] Fascism gambled a great deal on this. But one can probably not assert seriously that our widespread propaganda of world revolution led to the appearance of fascism.

Fascism was the response of German imperialism to its defeat in 1918 and to the labor movement which was threatening its existence. But the labor movement in Germany had deep roots in its own country and existed independently of whether or not there was a Komintern or whether or not there was a Soviet Union.

The bugbear of world communism was very opportune for the fascists. One must say that up until now our concept of a world revolutionary process has been a kind of bugbear for those who do not wish to improve relations with the USSR. Usually they refer to articles of our Constitution where it says that we shall help any liberation movement, and on this basis they draw the conclusion that the USSR, under the guise of talking about peace, is ready at any moment to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries.

But the main reason why we should reject the concept of the world revolutionary process is that this concept is unrealistic and does not adequately reflect the processes taking place in the world.

Reform of Legal Investigative Procedures Delayed

18000779 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Apr 89 Morning Edition p 4

[Interview with Lieutenant General V. Novikov, head of the Central Investigative Administration, USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, by Yu. Feofanov: "Who Is To Do the Investigations"]

[Text] **"In the resolution 'On Legal Reform' adopted at the 19th party conference, the advisability of dividing the investigative apparatus into an independent structure was discussed. How will this be implemented?" These were the exact words preceding the dialogue of IZVESTIYA commentator Yu. Feofanov with head of the Central Investigative Administration of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD], Lt Gen V. Novikov, published in August 1988. Now the question is posed without the "will": how is it being implemented!**

[Feofanov] In our last discussion, we assumed that the investigation would be concentrated in the MVD, and transferred to you from the Procurate, at least. We began with that as if the issue had been decided. You said at that time, Vasiliy Georgiyevich, that the ideal would be the creation of a separate Investigative Committee, but for the time being, this measure will allow for regulation of the investigation. You mentioned an experiment conducted in a number of regions. Nine months have passed. How is the experiment coming along? What has it shown?

[Novikov] Let me clarify. We spoke of the creation within the MVD system of two independent structures: a police force and an investigative apparatus. They are parallel, free and independent of each other on the rayon, oblast and republic levels. Investigative subdivisions were derived from the subordination of heads of rayon and oblast internal affairs administrations [UVD], and ministers of autonomous and union republics, and both apparatuses subordinate to only the union minister of internal affairs. That is the reform.

Why was this necessary? The main flaw in the existing system is the subordination of the investigation to the organ of inquiry (the police), which is essentially in contradiction of the law of criminal procedures, and leads in practice to the affirmation of the administrative-command style of leadership by the investigative subdivisions. Unlawful orders on detention, searches, arrests, etc. entered into practice. The order of the head of the organ of internal affairs came to dominate day-to-day procedural activity. They began to use the investigators themselves as police workers: for passport control, code inspections, patrol, etc. These phenomena became chronic. The time was ripe for the restructuring of the investigative apparatus. We promoted the idea of its independent functioning at some stage in the framework of the USSR MVD system.

[Feofanov] Yes, I remember that. And how is this idea being embodied in life?

[Novikov] Practically not at all. Even though we did the basic preparation for this: the opinions of practical workers and judicial scholars were explained, and scientific-research institutions participated in this matter. The "fors" and "againsts" were tallied. With regret I must state that if there were not cutbacks, the delay of the realization of all the planned measures would not be at all acceptable. As early as December 1987, the drafts of the organizational restructuring of the organs of preliminary investigation were ready for the signatures of the leaders of all the law-enforcement departments directed at appropriate levels. The issue was postponed until the party conference, which approved these proposals. In addition, the resolution of the July (1988) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on the practical work in the realization of the resolutions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference determined the time frame: by mid-1989. We are prepared for the implementation of this resolution.

[Feofanov] Then what is the problem? It is understandable that every step in the development of legal reform has its ardent advocates, its cautious supporters and its declared opponents. What are we running up against here? Or more accurately, who? Is this hidden counteraction or doubt of the necessity of the reforms planned and approved by such an authoritative forum?

[Novikov] Both the one and the other. In any case, the investigative reforms not taken are being felt on the part of many managers of internal affairs organs and associates of operations services. It is clear that with the removal of investigation from their authority, the "regulation" of the indices of disclosure will become more difficult.

Along with this, the idea of the creation of an investigative committee received more approval. This is not a new point of view. In principle, I share it, as I already said during our last dialogue. I feel, however, that its realization today would be extremely complicated for many reasons.

During the entire course of the existence of investigative organs in the Soviet state, they were located in structurally different departments, as a result of which the problem of administration of investigation as an independent centralized structure was completely undeveloped. Nor can the problems of the interaction of the investigators and the police search-operation services be left out of the reckoning. Here, the state of affairs is complicated by the fact that this interaction is regulated by law only in a general form. Of course, some elements of the current practice will be preserved, in particular the creation of investigative operations groups. But there will appear new phenomena, connected with the autonomous activity of the the investigators within the framework of a single law-enforcement mechanism, which we must work on and plan, and regulate appropriately.

It is also necessary to create a material base for the Investigative Committee: office space, transportation, scientific and technological resources, etc. Without this, the matter of procedural independence will remain only on paper. There is no such material base. It must be created from the ground up, but this requires calculations which no one is making at this time. All this bespeaks the need for a temporary, transitional phase, during the course of which the problems mentioned would be resolved.

[Feofanov] Excuse me, Vasiliy Georgiyevich, but our bitter experience has shown that the temporary is the most enduring. Extraordinary measures were introduced as temporary in 1929, and what came of that? To this day, we have not yet extricated ourselves. I myself see the logic in the judgments of those who propose that the problem be cardinally resolved all at once. All the same, it seems to me that this will be the best thing.

[Novikov] This is a case where the best is the enemy of the good. I am also for a cardinal resolution. But I am afraid that everything is still limited to conversations and projects. Let's answer that question. The experimental program was developed and confirmed. Then tell me, why not take it to the limit? I am convinced that the only department realistically capable of creating the basis for the future committee is the USSR MVD. Why do they ignore this? It is a question of personnel. If we consider that the current investigative personnel is weak, then the creation of an Investigative Committee will not help us, for there is nowhere else to take personnel from. The creation of this committee in and of itself says nothing about the level of professionalism of the investigators; this means that it will not be a guarantee against violation of the law.

[Feofanov] But last time you said that the experiment had begun. That means that something had been done. Perhaps the experiment yielded negative results, or showed the inefficacy of the proposed reorganization?

[Novikov] The experiment began in September, 1987, in the Belorussian SSR and the Estonian SSR, Volgograd and Sverdlov oblasts, as well as in five Moscow rayons. In January 1989, the conditions of the experiment were extended to all other union republics, and six more regions of the Russian Federation (Tatar and Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics [ASSR's], Gorkiy, Irkutsk, Kuybyshev and Ryazan oblasts).

On the whole, the experiment yielded the desired results. In particular, we may speak of the improved quality of the preliminary investigation. If we take the total number of cases in the country returned for follow-up investigation to have been 7.4 percent, then in Estonia, Belorussia, and in Volgograd and Sverdlovsk oblasts, where the experiment was begun in 1987, this index is 6 percent. The situation is the same for investigation time limits. Throughout the USSR, the number of cases which exceeded the legally established time limit rose from 8.7 to 9.6 percent, while in the regions indicated, this index dropped by 1.5 percent. To a great extent, the timely manner of investigations has been ensured.

Yet the main result of this experiment is the substantial strengthening of socialist legality in the preliminary investigation. If in the country as a whole the number of citizens brought up on unfounded criminal charges was reduced by 6 percent, then in the experimental investigative apparatus, it was reduced by 27 percent; the total number of unlawful arrests in all subdivisions was reduced by 2.4 percent, and by 28 percent in the experimental regions.

[Feofanov] You know, Vasiliy Georgiyevich, the figures are so striking that they are almost...to be doubted.

[Novikov] It's not only a matter of figures, although I am prepared for any revision. The authority of the investigator is a significant issue. Of course, the new criteria for evaluation of crime revealed by the end result of the investigation play their own role. But the results of the experiment would have been more perceptible if it had been provided for as appropriate, and had not, as I noted, been of a conditional nature. First and foremost, the actual independence of the investigators and investigative subdivisions was not achieved, as the resolution of the majority of personnel, material-equipment, financial, and other types of issues remained within the competence of the appropriate heads of the organs of internal affairs. And after all, this is all in the system, and these are the same levers with which pressure is applied to the investigators. It became quite clear that an independent investigative apparatus cannot be born and exist within police circles. The investigators' procedural independence is impossible without their organizational independence. It is necessary to accelerate the implementation of measures to conduct this transitional stage on the road to the creation of the base for the Investigative Committee. Unfortunately, this has been slowed down.

[Feofanov] Then what is the problem? Or, more truthfully, we can guess as to the hidden motives for the opposition. And what is the official version?

[Novikov] The fear that the specialized investigative apparatus with the framework of the USSR MVD will violate the integrity of the organs of internal affairs, complicating the administration of subordinate subdivisions. Another fear is that all of the collisions and friction which could arise between the managers of the investigative apparatus and the internal affairs organs would have to be resolved at the very highest level. In addition, we were reproached that in becoming "fixated on observance of the law," we had put the issues of revealing crimes in the background. We cannot agree with this, however. There cannot be an "excessive aggrandizement of legality." This is exactly what we haven't had enough of until now. So, I feel that the experiment attained its goals.

[Feofanov] I wonder, how do the investigators themselves regard this?

[Novikov] They greeted the experiment with understanding. And its discontinuation created a nervous environment. Over 550 reports have been received from investigators requesting transfer to other services or resignation from MVD, although some of them had worked there for 5, 10 years or more. The most serious thing, I think, is the incipient process of erosion of the professional core of the investigative personnel.

[Feofanov] Yes, half-way, half-baked measures are restructuring's most dangerous enemy. I agree with you on that. Yet what should be considered a half-way measure? The rejection of radical reform? Of the immediate creation of an autonomous committee?

[Novikov] I have already expressed my feelings; I'm not going to repeat them. But such letters, for example, won't leave me, or the entire service, indifferent. In this case, the letter was addressed to the CPSU Central Committee, signed by D. Semonov, the head of the MVD Investigative Administration for the Sverdlovsk Obispolkom, and by V. Krasilnikov, secretary of the party organization: "The failure to fulfill the resolution of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, the termination of the experiment of restructuring the investigative apparatus, and its return to its previous organizational subordination have damaged the interests of socialist legality and the fight against crime, and will lead to the erosion of the core of investigative personnel and other negative consequences."

[Feofanov] Let's leave the organizational issue, on which you had your say, and which, in my view, is fairly clear. But you will recall, Vasiliy Georgiyevich, that we said back then that the framework of reform stipulates the elimination of inquiry as a form of preliminary investigation. Has anything been done about this? Has a position at least been determined? Letters continue to come in complaining about the complete lack of legal guarantees at this stage of the investigation.

[Novikov] Yes, I said that the reform stipulates the abolition of inquiry as a less democratic form of preliminary investigation, substantially curtailing the accused's right to a defense. The resolution of the problem was stipulated in the context of the reorganization of the investigative apparatus. Since the reform is not progressing, the issue of inquiry remains unresolved. All of this is interconnected.

[Feofanov] I listen to you and I think, legal reform has its own kind of stagnation. On admitting lawyers when the official approval had been stated—and nothing was done. Rumors are circulating about a draft law on the status of judges; the public knows nothing about this, we had only heard about it from someone. The question was raised on how to spare the procurator's supervision from the administrative management of the investigation—complete silence. I understand that you can answer only for your department. But the question arises involuntarily: Is it only your experiment which is being slowed down? I would like to know your opinion about that, Vasiliy Georgiyevich.

[Novikov] In my view, there are similar processes going on here, but this is only a supposition. At the same time, I must note that the law-enforcement mechanism is too complex to immediately determine its path of restructuring, to give a simple answer to a multitude of questions. But the frightening and cautionary fact is that there is practically no attempt to design reform in its entirety, to demarcate its stages, to determine its primary tasks, or to systematically analyze its causes, generated by multitudinous violations of human rights and the accusatory bent of justice, legal nihilism, the triumph of departmental instruction and order, and the decline in the authority of the law and the prestige of the law-enforcement organs.

I feel that it is necessary to create a workers' organ under the aegis of the USSR Supreme Soviet which would take upon itself the mission of bringing the legal reforms into life. It would be advisable to include in it the representatives of all of the law-enforcement organs, scholars, the public, etc. This organ must ensure the coordination of all work in improving the preparation and realization of the necessary legislative acts. It is time to stop the conversations about reform and to make a transition to practical actions.

Internal Affairs Ministry Cuts Discussed

PM1004110489 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 7 Apr 89 Morning Edition p 6

[Unattributed report including response by USSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Yu. Zhurkin as part of "Letters '...Not for Publication'" feature: "Apparatus Is Being Reduced"]

[Text] IZVESTIYA No 46 published a letter from L. Maksimov, "Fewer Officials—More Action." The author proposed that the USSR Minister of Internal Affairs [MVD] structure be reviewed and posts and components that were originally created artificially and yield no benefit in the struggle against crime be abolished. The resources thus freed, in the reader's opinion, should be channeled into providing incentives for those who carry out militia service especially conscientiously, at risk to their lives.

In response to this publication, USSR Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs Yu. Zhurkin reports that the number of subunits with management and economic functions in the central MVD apparatus is being reduced by 15 percent. Moreover some of the subunits and organizations attached to the ministry are being abolished. Similar work is in progress locally. Proposals have been submitted on differentiated labor remuneration on the basis of staffers' personal contribution to the struggle against crime and the maintenance of law and order.

Purpose of New MVD Media Unit Explained

PM0404133989 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 1 Apr 89 Morning Edition p 8

[F. Ivanov report: "In the Light of Glasnost"]

[Text] A media liaison department has been set up at the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD].

The tasks facing the new subunit were discussed by B. Mikhaylov, colonel of the internal service, acting chief of the department:

"Recently the USSR MVD has been consistently implementing a program to expand glasnost in the activities of internal affairs organs.

"The new department will mainly focus on studying public opinion and analyzing the influence of the press, radio, and TV on it. A special analytical subunit has been set up to that end. The provision of the information required by journalists will be sharply improved. There will be regular press releases and special information publications. We will hold more regular briefings and press conferences at the USSR MVD, and the subject matter will be set by the journalists themselves. We hope that in the very near future correspondents will be able to use our specially installed computers to obtain various types of information, including statistical information."

Leaders Sign Obituary of Ballet Dancer Liyepa

PM0404102189 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Mar 89 Second Edition p 8

[Obituary of M.-R. E. Liyepa]

[Excerpts] Soviet multinational art has suffered a grave loss. Maris-Rudolf Eduardovich Liyepa, USSR People's Artist, Lenin Prizewinner, and outstanding ballet dancer, has died suddenly at the age of 52.

M.-R. E. Liyepa was born in Riga in 1936. [passage omitted]

[Signed] M.S. Gorbachev, V.I. Vorotnikov, L.N. Zaykov, V.A. Medvedev, N.I. Ryzhkov, A.P. Biryukova, Ya.Ya. Vagris, V.G. Zakharov, A.S. Kapto, B.K. Pugo, I.K. Arkhipova, A.A. Belyayev, N.I. Bessmertnova, V.V. Vasilyev, O.M. Vinogradov, S.N. Golovkina, Yu.N. Grigorovich, A.Ya. Degtyarev, V.K. Yegorov, V.M. Kokonin, Yu.S. Karabasov, N.YA. Kezbers, K.Yu. Lavrov, M.L. Lavrovskiy, Yu.S. Melentyev, R.V. Pauls, M.M. Plisetskaya, M.T. Semenova, R.S. Struchkova (Lapauri), G.S. Ulanova, M.A. Ulyanov, and T.N. Khrennikov.

Zaykov Offered Condolences on Death of Son

PM1004105189 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 5 Apr 89 p 1

[Unattributed "Expression of Condolence"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat expresses its profound condolences to Comrade L.N. Zaykov and family on the sad death of their son Nikolay Lvovich Zaykov.

Mazurov Receives Friendship of Peoples Order

PM1004102589 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Apr 89 Morning Edition p 2

[TASS report under general heading: "Motherland's Awards"]

[Text] The USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium has awarded K.T. Mazurov, chairman of the All-Union Council of War and Labor Veterans, the Order of the Friendship of the Peoples for his services to the Soviet state and fruitful sociopolitical activity.

Biryukova Receives UNESCO Delegation

LD0804163789 Moscow TASS in English 1618 GMT 8 Apr 89

[Text] Moscow April 8 TASS—Alternate member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Biryukova on Friday [7 April] received the UNESCO delegation visiting the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Komsomol [Leninist Communist Youth League] Central Committee within the framework of the Youth Exchange programme.

In the course of their talk, Biryukova told the delegation about the process of implementing the policy of perestroyka (restructuring) and the guidelines for the Soviet state activity aimed at ensuring the rights and freedoms of young people. Aspects of further youth international contacts were also examined.

Official Discusses Nuclear Power Industry Safety

18610448 Moscow SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA in Russian 8 Apr 89 pp 1-2

[Interview with V. Malyshev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry, by G. Lomanov: "Trust But Check"; time, place not given]

[Text] **The situation in nuclear power engineering is now complex: People from various regions are speaking out against the construction of new AES [nuclear electric power stations] and the expansion of those already in existence. The arguments of both proponents and opponents in this sector are in general well-known. It is much less often that we encounter statements by workers in the inspection services, but it is precisely they who are called upon to monitor the level of planning, the quality of construction, and the skills of personnel. Our interview today is about the tasks of the USSR State Committee for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry.**

[Lomanov] Vadim Mikhaylovich, sociologists have been studying what concerns young people in the USSR and the United States. Young American men and women put accidents at nuclear power stations second to last on their list of fears, our young people place them fourth, after nuclear war, the death of their parents, and starvation. How can we explain this obvious alarm?

[Malyshev] A major accident occurred at an American nuclear power station in 1979. But despite the meltdown of part of the fuel it was localized within the containment building at the nuclear power station. The Chernobyl accident happened 3 years ago and was accompanied by the ejection of radioactive materials and led to the irradiation of the population and contamination of considerable territories. This is probably why young Americans are less emotional about it, and also because it occurred longer ago. But the pain of Chernobyl, a great pain, is still fresh in our memories. But in general, before these major accidents even the people living in the immediate vicinity of nuclear power stations had no worries and no curiosity about them. The public had no interest in how a station operates or what the risk of an accident might be and what its consequences may be.

[Lomanov] Well, this is understandable. We have for too long been lulling public opinion. A tragedy was needed to wake it up.

[Malyshev] Yes, the reaction to Chernobyl was shock. And in my opinion it was the result of a certain overlapping of the assessments. I worked for more than 20 years at an operating AES and lived less than 3 kilometers from it. Now my daughter's family lives there. I personally believe that an AES can and must be operated safely, even though we must step back a little here. In our times many technologies are extraordinarily dangerous but we use them and improve them and ultimately it is precisely thanks to those technologies that we raise the living standard and are conquering disease. Should we abandon production facilities that hold some threat for people's lives and live in a barrel like Diogenes? I doubt that this prospect would please many people. It is more rational and realistic to go down another path—reduce the danger in any particular technology to a minimum or to zero and make maximum use of the advantages accruing from its use.

In the same way it can be said that AES's are reliable but even then it is still possible that someone will be concerned. However, it is quite clear that these assurances are not specific and they have no elements for comparison. What is required is accurate quantitative criteria. Scientists now recognize risk assessment as the most perfect method enabling the clarification, and hence elimination of the most vulnerable points both in designs and in operating stations. This method, which makes it possible to compare the safety of different types of AES's, is already being used in a number of countries and are also being actively introduced here.

[Lomanov] But even when comparing it is possible to be cunning. AES proponents claim that accidents involving release of radioactivity can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Opponents cite dozens of cases. Here is a recent example: At the Swedish nuclear fuel production facility in Vestero there have been five leaks in recent times. The most serious was in January when about 200 kilograms of fluid containing uranium was spilt on a floor.

[Malyshev] As an expert I can remember cases when an usual situation associated with a digression from normal regime has been picked up by the mass media and exaggerated into the dimensions of a tragedy.

Yes, both at the plants and at the stations there are cases of release of radioactive products that, although not recorded as "normal operation" cannot be considered a tragedy or accident. Safeguards and localization procedures have been devised for such situations. The main thing is that there has been no danger to the public. Let us again take the accident in the United States. There was a partial meltdown and a huge amount of radioactive materials was released from the fuel phase, but everything was localized and the standards established for irradiation of personnel and the public in the region were hardly violated.

[Lomanov] Standards can vary....

[Malyshev] But they are extremely stringent. For example, for personnel the radiation dose should not exceed 5 rem per year. For comparison, just by having a single X-ray a person may receive up to 25 rem. Meanwhile, the average radiation dose for personnel in nuclear power engineering in the USSR was 0.6 rem last year—almost ten times less than the standard. Over the past 3 years this value has declined 50 percent; the progress is indisputable, but we should not become complacent or start flattering ourselves—radiation is radiation.

[Lomanov] Is the committee also involved with matters of radiation safety?

[Malyshev] Not yet. It is envisaged that basic monitoring for radiation safety will be done by a special administration of the USSR Ministry of Health. However, analysis has shown that the technical aspects of radiation safety are not today covered by this monitoring and our committee will start to resolve this task this year.

Obviously the overwhelming majority of readers know little about the tasks of the USSR State Committee for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry, and I think that it is worthwhile to briefly describe them. The committee was set up in 1984 as an independent agency of state control for work safety in nuclear power engineering. Our workers are obliged to insure compliance with all safety requirements as laid down by existing rules and standards. And at all stages in the life cycle of the AES—choice of site, design, construction, startup, operation, and decommissioning. We conduct inspections of the design and manufacture of equipment for AES's and monitor the selection and training of personnel. Several of our examiners work at the large plants, as, for example, there are more than 20 at the Izhorsk plant; there are 5 or 6 inspectors at each power station. The total for the entire country is more than 80 inspectors.

[Lomanov] Your tasks remind me somehow of the functions of state acceptance. It can—I am deliberately oversimplifying—carefully check that articles meet the standards and technical requirements but this still does not guarantee that the consumer will not receive an outdated suit with extremely well-made pockets, or a television set that is 15 years out of date in terms of its technical specifications, or machine tools that should be in a museum of technology. The question involuntarily arises about the level of the standards and rules by which you are guided. Who establishes them?

[Malyshev] Special organizations that have at their disposal a scientific and experimental base and possess a great deal of experience. When the standards are drawn up due consideration is given to the documents and recommendations of the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency]. However, I understand the real meaning of your question and I share your skepticism. If a standard is obsolete or fails to meet today's requirements or if it is oriented on some departmental interest, then what is the sense of complying with it? This is why since Chernobyl the approach to establishing the standard base has been fundamentally changed. It is no secret that there is at present no competitiveness in our work. A chief designer sets up a project, and then who will make an expert assessment of it? So now we are restructuring our work in such a way that the committee itself will conduct the expert evaluation, or order it to be done by another organization. In compliance with a government decision a scientific and technical center has been set up whose task is to analyze standards and revise them and propose work on new standards or itself develop them, and to conduct experiments and expert evaluations connected with safety at power stations. To put it more simply, the time has come to make "inspectors" into analysts.

[Lomanov] The more so since there are many reasons for this. Here is an alarming letter from a teacher about the Krymskaya AES: "The construction site has now become an old construction site, and the workers there are saying that all the duct work [provodka] must be replaced with new, that everything has already been useless for 10 years—it has all rotted and rusted and is no longer working."

[Malyshev] Alas! we still have to deal with poor quality construction. And the principled stance assumed by our inspectors sometimes causes a reaction of irritation among both contractors and clients. But compromises here are inappropriate.

Recently at a joint collegium of a number of ministries, at our initiative there was discussion of the quality of construction and assembly work and setting-up work. Now each construction project is strictly monitored. But it must be clearly understood that quality cannot be insured merely by the activity of the inspection agency. We are still dealing with a very strange situation: The managers of some construction and assembly organizations would like our inspectors to engage in the organization of work, personnel training, and other work that is not our concern. And even the designers and operators are suggesting that it is sufficient to agree to some deviation from the rules with the State Committee for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry in order to rid themselves of responsibility. This is fundamentally wrong. Direct responsibility always and in everything lies with the owner of the nuclear power station, the scientific leadership, the chief designer, the general project manager or contractor, and the manufacturing plant; in short, directly on the executors. The trouble is that sometimes they do not look for the party directly responsible among the correspondents and impose strict economic sanctions on him. We think that we must decisively abandon this approach.

[Lomanov] And so, your task is inspection. And who will be an opponent to the department because of departmental interests? This role is now most often played by the public or some independent organization, such as happened, for example, with the Krymskaya AES. If I am not mistaken the State Committee for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry gave its agreement for the site of the power station, but Ukrainian scientists expressed doubts about the advisability of locating an AES there, did they not?

[Malyshev] I understand that you and your readers do not agree with all my arguments. But the way I understand it is that our aim is not to please each other but to discover the truth so that the nuclear power industry can operate safely.

Even if there were no violations, inspections would still be needed. And today we are conducting the inspections under conditions of a considerable number of deviations and violations, with which, of course, not everyone always agrees. This means that we are already acting as opponents. This occurs with relatively minor facts. We are also opponents on major problems—the location of power stations, expansions, volumes of reconstruction, operating conditions, time periods, quality—everything that may have an adverse effect on safety for the population and the environment.

I tell you frankly that we have not always been successful, and probably not even with all mandatory issues.

With regard to the location of the Krymskaya AES, the site was chosen before the appearance of the USSR State Committee for Safety in the Atomic Power Industry. And when the debate started our committee immediately responded by asking for additional data from the evaluation of the seismicity of the region. Moreover, the committee has a number of criticisms on the design of this AES and its startup will depend on whether or not they are dealt with.

Let me note en passant that the committee has asked for additional material on the expansion of the Balakovskaya and Rostovskaya AES and has presented the government with proposals to shut down [ostanovka] a number of units (the Armyanskaya, Beloyarskaya, and Novo-Voronezhskaya AES's). The No 2 unit at the Ignalinskaya AES has been off line for several months while a study was conducted of the execution of some elements of that station. Last year the committee repeatedly banned the off-loading of equipment from manufacturing plants and delayed startup following repairs to several units until they have been analyzed and the reasons for the troubles found have been eliminated. We have the right to halt any work.

[Lomanov] I have no doubt that you could continue the list of such examples. For the committee's main task is to safeguard the health of personnel at nuclear power stations and the country's population, and to protect the environment. And of course the public is trying to do the same thing. What is your attitude toward actions by the public?

[Malyshev] I am impressed by this kind of activity by people. As chairman of the state inspection organ I can only welcome it. We regard it as an additional force that influences the quality of work and demands a comprehensively sound approach to problem solving. And we try to consider all arguments from the public and regard them as a public expert examination that should be given due consideration in our final decisions. However, I would like to make one stipulation—I am not impressed by outbursts of emotion and demagogic slogans.

We specialists do not agree with a significant proportion of the arguments from the public in some cases, but even then we do not regard the public as some opponent of the committee. To the point, those working in our inspection agencies often appear in the press to tell about various shortcomings and to try to get them eliminated. As a member of the government and chairman of the inspection agency I can only welcome such statements. And I can only regret that the central press is showing little interest in our work.

[Lomanov] Does this mean that you are not against glasnost in this sphere which, let us be candid, for a long time remained very secret?

[Malyshev] On the contrary, I think that people should be given access to more information, including negative information. However, while recognizing that public structures and movements are more independent and less centralized, we must also consider the fact that they are not always sufficiently competent.

[Lomanov] Well you cannot say that, for example, about the "USSR Nuclear Committee" whose creation was discussed by some of our major scientists, namely Academicians Ye. Velikhov, B. Kadomtsev, A. Aleksandrov and others....

[Malyshev] This is still the exception. Here is a more typical example—the debate on the Voronezhskaya nuclear power station. Protesting against its construction, the local inhabitants claim that it was an experimental installation, that there no others like it, and why did the department immediately start to build an untried station only 5 kilometers from a city? We agree with the opinion of the USSR Ministry of Atomic Power that this is not a test installation but a main unit that incorporates design decisions that have been tested many times on other installations. One can polemicize about this endlessly, but someone must be the arbiter in the dispute and someone must make an end to the argument.

In short, the debate must be conducted not on the basis of emotions and rumors but on the basis of knowledge, common sense, and competence. I am convinced that in the very near future we must implement an entire set of measures that would increase public trust in nuclear power engineering. In particular, we have proposed that the USSR Supreme Soviet set up in its chambers standing commissions on the use of atomic energy. They should include representatives of the different strata of our society. They should not simply consider technical or budget issues—this is already being done—but problems such as sites for AES's, acceptable safety levels, protection methods, and so forth.

In my opinion we also need constant information on AES operation and on shutdowns and the reasons for those shutdowns. Finally, we think that in regions where it is planned to construct AES's it is essential to hold extensive public debate.

In conclusion this is what I would like to emphasize. When you interview a department leader or member of the government you, and probably your readers also, probably think: This person is expressing departmental interests. Alas! this has become an evil tragedy for us. The departmental opinion is almost always interpreted as an anti-public opinion. For decades most of our leaders have lived in settlements close to the AES's and now they have children and friends who work at nuclear power stations. I assure you that all our inspectors and all the experts who establish the methodology for inspection all have a proper measure of party, criminal, and moral responsibility. I am convinced if the arguments of the experts cited by them as facts can be justified, that is, can be checked. Otherwise it is time to proclaim the age of total mistrust. But of course they must be checked. This is why I can only welcome broad public participation in the monitoring of nuclear power engineering. And of course, much here may be changed by the Law on Atomic Energy that should be adopted this year—after public debate.

Consumer Society Established in Alma-Ata

LD0604103789 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 6 Apr 89

[Text] A consumers' society—the first in the republic—has been set up in Alma-Ata. It's no secret that there's an acute shortage of consumer goods in the country and that their quality continues to be low. Essentially, the consumer has no rights and his voice remains unheard. It is the task of the new society to work in the consumer's interests and in defense of all his rights.

St Casimir's Remains Returned to Archcathedral

LD1004131089 Vilnius GIMTASIS KRASTAS in Lithuanian No 10, 8-15 Mar 89 p 2

[Article by Juozas Kuckailis, entitled "St Casimir's Remains—At the Archcathedral"]

[Excerpts] **St Casimir's remains were returned to Vilnius Archcathedral Basilica, on 4 Mar. They had been kept at the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul since, 9 Oct 1952, having been moved there following the closure of the Archcathedral. The remains had been escorted to the church by the, now deceased, Bishop Kazimieras Paltarokas.**

Casimir, who was the son of Lithuania's Grand Duke and King of Poland, Kazimieras Juogailaitis, was declared a saint in 1521, following his death. He died on 4 Mar 1484, at the age of 26—505 years ago. His canonization was celebrated in Vilnius, on 10 May 1604. [passage omitted] The cornerstone for St Casimir's Church was blest on 12 May, the last day of festivities. Shortly thereafter, King Zigmantas Vaza, began construction of an elaborate chapel within the cathedral. In 1636, the coffin, containing St Casimir's remains, was placed on the chapel's main altar, where it remained until 1952.

Festive farewell services were held at the Church of Sts. Peter and Paul. Mass was celebrated by Julijonas Steponavicius, Vilnius archdiocesan apostolic administrator. The guests included: Catholic Church representatives from Latvia, high church officials of the Orthodox Church, and expatriate [Lithuanian] priests from Rome—Father Antanas Liuima and Jonas Kazlauskas, prelate and doctor of theology. Thousands of the faithful filled the church and stood outside listening to the service, which was broadcast by microphones. A solemn procession made its way across the city. St Casimir's silver coffin and statue were carried by seminarians from the Kaunas Seminary. Vincent Cardinal Sladkevicius, chairman of the Lithuanian Bishops Conference and apostolic administrator for Kaisiadoriai Diocese, along with, Lithuanian bishops, priests, seminarians, and invited guests, headed the procession. As people filled the spacious cathedral, banners flew, church songs were sung, and the bells began to toll. [passage omitted]

St Casimir's relics have been placed in their permanent location for safekeeping and worship. [passage omitted] Much of the restoration work has been completed in the chapel. Now—St Casimir's silver coffin and statuette are occupying the place of honor on the altar.

Mosques Returned to Believers in Central Asia

LD0604123589 Moscow TASS in English 1156 GMT 6 Apr 89

[Text] Tashkent April 6 TASS—Muslims in the Soviet Central Asian republics and in Kazakhstan today went on a fast of the holy month of Ramadan. Prayers were held in mosques early in the morning, at which priests called upon believers to strictly observe the fast.

Imam Zakir Rakhbar-ogly Tadzhibayev offered a prayer in the Tokhta Baivatcha Mosque in Tashkent, capital of Uzbekistan, a Soviet Central Asian Republic. He devoted it to drastic changes which are now occurring in the life of Soviet Muslims. The mosque itself, which was built late in the 19th century, was closed by the authorities in the years of the personality cult and has been returned to the followers of Islam recently.

Another two Tashkent mosques, Koshkurgan and Kuilyuk-Ata, were turned over to religious communities in March. In the run-up to the congress of Central Asian Muslims the Uzbek Government made the decision to return to Muslim worshippers Khalifa Osman's holy Koran, which was kept in the history museum, and also several cult structures which are majestic monuments of architecture. These are the Abu Isa-at-Termezi mausoleum and the Bakhauddin mausoleum and mosque, the Kalyan and Dshami mosques, and others.

Uzbek Television Beamed to Turkmenistan
PM0404091589 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Apr 89 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report under the general heading: "The Country's Day"]

[Text] Ashkhabad, 2 Apr—This morning the population of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], on whose territory more than 200,000 Uzbeks live, received the chance to watch a new television program. Uzbek SSR television began to transmit it to the fraternal republic. PAKHTAKOR is published in the Turkmen SSR in Uzbek and the fraternal people's language is taught in a number of schools.

IZVESTIYA To Be Printed in Gomel, Belorussia
PM0704123089 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Apr 89 Morning Edition p 3

[Report by I. Kudryashov: "IZVESTIYA Is Being Printed in Gomel"]

[Text] Gomel has become the 59th city to print the newspaper IZVESTIYA. Copies used to be delivered from Minsk. Beginning with the 4 April issue, readers in the city and oblast will receive copies of IZVESTIYA printed at the GOMELSKAYA PRAVDA works.

Economic

Finance Minister Gostev Holds News Conference
LD1804051789

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 17 April broadcasts a report on a news conference held in the Ministry of Finance. The date of the news conference is not given. Reception is fair.

The video shows street scenes, and an unidentified narrator introduces the report, saying that the economy is the people's primary concern in these times of change. He says further that "a news conference was held for the first time at the USSR Ministry of Finance on measures for financial improvement of the economy and strengthening of the circulation of money." The video shows a crowded conference room with USSR Minister of Finance Gostev at the head of a table addressing those present.

Gostev says: "The problem of making finances healthy and strengthening circulation of money has in today's conditions acquired exclusive importance. It is dictated to a large extent by the disproportion in the development of our economy, which began to emerge noticeably as early as the seventies and the beginning of the eighties. As a result of the reduction in rates of growth of output, in the three past 5-year periods our growth of incomes fell behind the growth of expenditures, and hence great complications came about in finances. In general, we arrived at this 5-Year Plan, too, with serious financial problems. Well, the comrades may say, 'There goes the minister, talking about history. He is talking about what was, but what about now?'"

"But life is pretty complicated, and there is no present without a past. The transition to primarily economic methods of management and the transfer of enterprises to financial autonomy and self-financing has promoted an improvement in quality performance indicators. Progressive structural changes in the balance of industries have emerged and material and labor resources have begun to be utilized more rationally. Calculated for the year, enterprises have had an extra more than R11 billion left to dispose of. We have started leaving enterprises 70 percent of above-plan profit above and beyond the 5-Year Plan target for their own use. Why did we do this? Understanding the complexity of the situation with finances, the Ministry of Finances has primarily taken as the starting point the need to reinforce the economy of the lowest level, the foundation. The foundation means the labor collectives, the enterprises, and the economic organizations. That is why we have worked in this direction. That is, if we strengthen the lowest level, we will get further, and if we do not strengthen it, we will be limping on both legs.

"But that is the positive side. Of course, we have to have an objective approach to the results of our development, and we have to say plainly that there has not been any radical turnabout regarding the efficiency of public-sector production and, as a consequence, of the financial situation. We have not managed to completely solve the difficulties and disproportions which emerged toward the beginning of the 12th 5-Year Plan. Evidently, there has not been enough time for this. One could say that the negative moments are serious enough that they cannot be solved quickly and on the move. It is by no means as simple as is sometimes imagined: 'Let us get on with it, we will get it done quickly,' or 'There are some who don't want to do it,' or 'Some are unable to do it.' The problems are very complex, and of course, it does not work with a lot of problems when you just dive in.

"What are the reasons for the fact that we entered the 5-Year Plan with quite a serious financial deficit? We did not, so to speak, managed to formulate a 5-Year Plan without a deficit. Of course this has its effect. In addition, there were reasons, new reasons, ones that we did not allow for in formulating the 5-Year Plan. Well, I can only quote you a few figures, although they may be known to you. We lost R40 billion because of the sharp drop in oil prices. That was R40 billion. We lost R34 billion in taxes on turnover because of the above-plan reduction in production and marketing of wines and spirits. This has to be done, it had to be done, but unfortunately, while reducing production of wines and spirits, we did not compensate for it from other sources. That is, there was a one-sided approach, wanting to dive into it, doing one thing without thinking of the other.

Almost R20 billion was allocated in extra capital investment. Well, they may say, why are you allocating it? It is probably legitimate to ask such questions. But, evidently, there were needs. Because we are also thinking about the future development of the country, we will bear the expenditure on reinforcing health care and on enhancing our education. We cannot do without this. The figure of R8 billion has been quoted as the cost of the Chernobyl accident, and we continue to bear expenses for clearing up the consequences of bungling, to put it plainly. Afghanistan caused us expenses, immense expenditure, but now, thank heavens, as they say, this problem is settled. Concerning the earthquake in Armenia, according to our calculations the clean-up of the aftermath of the Armenian earthquake will cost R8 billion. That is the preliminary estimate. It could even be more, regrettably. So there are very many problems in the national economy, the immense national economy.

"What measures, specifically, are planned, first of all? First, the volume of capital investments is being reduced. That is, it is planned to reduce centralized capital investments by approximately R7.5 billion—R7.5 billion exactly, in fact. Is there a basis for this? There is. Our volume of incomplete construction has increased sharply. With the transition of the economy to the new methods of management, it has become particularly intolerable to have loss-making enterprises. You know that we lose about R11 billion a year on loss-making enterprises. It has now been decided to reduce loss-making in 1989 by at least 30 percent. The funds released will be transferred to the state budget. The next area is a reduction in the state's expenditure on defense costs. Defense costs are being reduced, as you know, by 14.2 percent. It is intended to reduce the costs of maintaining the apparatus of ministries and departments by 10 percent. Every ministry has been prescribed extra targets; the Ministry of Finance has to cut out R500,000 by reducing its present management apparatus. Over this year, we have to reduce expenditures by R30 billion. As you know, the budget deficit is R35 billion. So, while reducing expenditure, we also have hopes for one source: Profit indices have to go up. They are already on their way. We think that while over the last year we gained—how much was it, in the end?" Gostev turns to man next to him, who replies "11.6." Gostev continues, "Well, let us say, R12 billion above 5-year plan targets, then if we were able to repeat that this year, and gain something like R10 billion, or roughly R15 billion, that would be a great spur."

Several of those present are then shown asking questions of Gostev. Asked about the relationship between pay and productivity, Gostev says: "The population's money incomes have increased by R40 billion, and retail turnover only by R25 billion. In these conditions, and unfortunately there are no data (?apart from) 2-months of 1989, that is this year, industrial pay has risen by 12 percent and productivity of labor by 5 percent. That means that what we have is being eroded. If we do not halt this process, then all of society will have to pay for it and pay a bitter price. I can tell you that—all of us, including you sitting here today. If inflation takes off, then you will have your ruble, your money, and not be able to buy anything with it. Today we have already come across this and you have probably come across it personally, just as I have myself. So that is presently our number one task. I personally, for example, do not see any task more important than strengthening the circulation of money. If we strengthen the circulation of money, the whole of the economy will become healthier, it will start making progress, people will work, they will start earning their money. There is nothing easier than putting unearned money into your pocket, that is human psychology, there is nothing easier."

An IZVESTIYA correspondent asks about regulations linking pay and productivity, saying he thought they came in at the start of the year. He is told they applied from mid-March. Gostev quotes the Law on the Enterprise about links between pay and productivity. "If profit is not increased through efficiency, it can only be increased by raising prices," says Gostev, "leading to harmful inflation." Asked about priorities in cutting capital investments, Gostev says that "A reduction of R7 billion in volume of capital investment in 1 year is a very complicated job. Here are some figures for you to remember: It means removing 390 newly commenced projects from the plan, including 30 major facilities, and mothballing 277 projects as well." Asked about the future of the Ministry of Water Conservance and Land Improvement, Gostev notes that it is being reorganized as the Ministry of Land Improvement Construction. He says that in his personal opinion, land improvement is a vital problem, particularly in view of the population increases likely in Central Asia; but instead of spending too much on building new capacities, it would be better to maintain properly the existing facilities; up to 1 million hectares of land a year is lost through salination, he says. There follows an indistinct exchange on financing of water conservancy projects. Gostev then replies to a technical question on how the budget deficit is reckoned in relation to credits from the state bank.

Following another clip of street scenes, the video shows journalist T.N. Kashkarova seated in a room interviewing Senchagov and Monich. She asks V.K. Senchagov, deputy minister of finance and doctor of economic science: Who has been working on the budget program? Apart from the Ministry and the Scientific Research Institute of Finance, he says, specialists from other institutes have been involved, Abalkin and Primakov, included.

Asked what measures of economic influence are envisioned, Senchagov says that a principle measure is the issuing of shares. He explains that there are two types of shares: first, work collective shares, which function only within a given enterprise and the aim of which is to enable the enterprise to resolve its production and social tasks. Workers will now be able to invest their money in their enterprise and receive greater interest than in a savings account, and secondly, enterprise shares which can be bought by other enterprises.

Kashkarova then asks S.A. Monich, head of section of the Vladimir Ilich Factory about his enterprise's plans to introduce work collective shares. He describes how the resources acquired will be used, the terms of dividends, and complains about restrictions imposed by the State Bank which the work collective dislikes.

Recalling the view of the U.S. economist Vasiliy Leontyev that it will take at least 6 years for the Soviet budget to emerge from its present situation, Kashkarova asks Senchagov whether he is correct. Senchagov responds by expressing his own view that social problems being as immense as they are, the budget problem cannot be solved in 2 to 3 years. A preliminary figure for pensions of R20 billion is envisioned, he says, and these resources must be found somewhere. He agrees with Kaskarova that people need to feel things are improving, but stresses the need for a gradual and systematic set of measures to be strictly implemented, rather than the leaps and bounds which have been so unsuccessful in the past.

Following another brief clip of street scenes, the video returns to the news conference, where Gostev continues replying to questions. He says, "Previously the whole budget deficit lay on the shoulders of the union budget. This year we have a completely new phenomenon. The budget has been distributed, so to speak, evenly between the union budget, the republican budgets, and right down to the economic unit level." He jokes that using the old methods, he and his deputy could wipe out a R35 billion budget deficit in a couple of hours, but then goes on to say that workers have only a vague idea of what economic reform means because it has not reached down and affected them yet.

A journalist then asks Gostev what is being done to get the ruble on to the world market and give it some real value. Gostev dismisses this by suggesting that if the ruble has no worth then why bother to pay anyone's salaries and suggests that the journalist was wishing to ask about the prospects for making the ruble fully convertible. He does not, however, give an answer.

In response to another question about what priorities the Ministry of Finance will be putting forward at the first congress of people's deputies, Gostev stresses that the most important measure is the search for paths toward financial improvement in economic matters. He concludes, "Finances do not exist on their own. Take the decisions in the resolutions of the 11th party congress and read Lenin's formulation: The problem of resolving finances lies in the area of raising labor productivity and the development of production. Those were Lenin's words. We need to radically change our attitude toward finances and to achieve a balance of financial resources, and of state expenditure and revenue."

Article Opposes Tyumen Petrochemical Complex

18220088 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Apr 89 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Academicians B. Laskorin, N. Moiseyev, and M. Styrinkovich; USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding members Yu. Yaremenko and A. Yablokov; Doctors of Economic Sciences A. Nekrasov, M. Kamenetskiy, and V. Danilov-Danilyan; and candidates of economic sciences L. Gramoteyeva, G. Sychev, and V. Lopukhin: "Another 'Construction Project of the Century'?"]

[Text] **One can characterize the present situation in our national economy as dramatic. The increase in social optimism of society and the growth of its political activeness, resulting from belief in restructuring, are not accompanied by progress in resolving pressing economic problems. This cannot continue for long. We must decisively change the economic structure and purposefully use existing resources.**

It is from this point of view that we would like to look at the resolution adopted by the USSR Council of Ministers late last year on measures to build petrochemical complexes in Tyumen Oblast using hydrocarbon raw material deposits of western Siberia. In accordance with this resolution, in the 13th and 14th 5-Year Plans, they are to build simultaneously five large petro- and gas-chemical complexes, their support facilities, and also a feed protein plant in Surgut, Tobolsk, Nizhnevartovsk, Novyy Urengoy, and Uvat. Joint ventures with American and Japanese companies are viewed as future ventures. The press has already flashed reports about the truly fantastic horizons that construction of these complexes are opening up for the national economy: sharply increasing production of plastics that are in short supply today and improving the structure of their output; improving the raw materials base of polymer chemistry by replacing benzines with hydrocarbon raw materials; renovating the structure of exports; and shifting the emphasis in developing industry in western Siberia from extractive sectors to processing sectors. The unusual willingness and desire of Western firms to participate in accomplishing this project, the promised uncommon ecological cleanliness of the future enterprises, and the anticipated flows of currency earnings have caused special euphoria.

But what will the national economy actually receive as a result of implementing the resolution? The capacities being commissioned at the Tyumen complexes will provide a 20-25 percent increase in plastics production in the year 2000 compared with 1990. However, taking into account payments for foreign credits granted using a portion of the output, this percentage will hardly be more than 10 percent. The capacities being commissioned will make it possible to use only 70-75 percent of the light hydrocarbons that accompany oil and gas extraction.

What will all this cost the national economy? The cost of the projects included in the resolution is R41 billion (including 20 billion for construction and installation work). This is already 2.5-3 times more expensive than construction of similar capacities in other regions. But this estimate is way too low. Intentionally or due to carelessness, it does not take into account the increased costs of uniquely complex construction in the severe natural-climatic and permafrost conditions of western Siberia; ignores the high costs of creating the virtually non-existent production infrastructure; underestimates the costs for developing the non-production sphere; and does not include the high costs for project planning being conducted by Western standards. As a result, it will require at least R90-100 billion of capital investments to carry out the sum total of necessary work. Already today, the preliminary estimates for the amount of capital investments just for the Nizhnevartovsk complex have more than doubled compared to the level in the resolution.

Thus, the preliminary cost of the projects being proposed for construction is comparable to the cost of simultaneously building 6-7 BAM's [Baykal-Amur Trunk Line], and as everyone knows, the entire country built the real BAM and could not complete it.

The main thing is that the resolution undermines the development of the domestic chemical industry. Thus, according to a variant of distributing capital investments between national economic complexes substantiated by the USSR State Planning Committee [Gosplan] and the USSR Academy of Sciences, R88 billion of capital investments are to be directed to development of the chemical industry in the 13th and 14th 5-Year Plans. This did not provide for construction of the projects included in the resolution. As a result, receiving only one-tenth of the anticipated increase in plastics, the national economy is being deprived of necessary products which undermines the material base for reducing the metal- and energy-intensiveness of social production. This will inevitably delay the comprehensive modernization of established centers of chemical production and their conversion to modern technologies that make it possible to stop using very scarce raw materials, especially benzine.

The foreign economic aspects of the measures called for by the resolution are also raising serious questions. In particular, the orientation on preserving in the future the current level of world prices for plastics is doubtful. The planned wide-scale exporting of plastics, undoubtedly, will become a factor in the slump in prices for them on the world market, which can lead to losses of many billions of rubles. The Soviet Union will be forced to increase deliveries of polymers to the world market. Thus, an exclusive circle will be created, from which it will be virtually impossible to get out. Western countries will gladly cut back on their energy-intensive and ecologically dangerous production, turning the USSR into one of the main world suppliers of polymer raw materials and Tyumen Oblast into a world latrine.

However, the most scandalous blunder of the resolution's authors is ignoring the problems of infrastructure: building roads to transport large equipment, construction materials, raw materials, and finished products; construction of electric power transmission lines, bridges; and so on and so forth. Under conditions of Tyumen Oblast, these are very serious capital investments of approximately R20-25 billion (that is, amounting to 1-2 BAM's) financed exclusively by the Soviet side. We thus would be giving the Western countries a gift by creating at our own expense a system of projects aimed at serving joint ventures. Are we so rich that we can slice off such pieces from our already quite light pie?

Counting the costs for supporting oil production, exploring Yamal, and implementing a number of other decisions (in particular, for developing microbiology) in Tyumen Oblast between 1991 and the year 2000, it will be necessary to acquire R250-300 billion of capital investments. The oblast's share of production capital investments will increase to 20 percent, for an oblast occupying 6 percent of the territory of the USSR and comprising 1 percent of its population. Under conditions of a critical shortage of a construction base and production and social infrastructure, such a concentration will cause inevitable competition within the region for labor and investment resources (especially for construction and installation work) between chemical and fuel-and-energy complexes and subsequent missed quotas for both.

There are huge doubts that it will be possible to implement the resolution at the planned deadlines due to the lack of construction capacities capable of carrying out huge amounts of construction and installation work, particularly to create the production infrastructure, and also real possibilities of rapidly increasing the capacities of construction and installation organizations. This suggests the need to move and relocate about 1 million working people and their family members in Tyumen Oblast.

In diverting huge human and material resources, implementation of the resolution in its entirety with other large-scale projects will preclude any possibility of turning the domestic economy toward a social orientation in the 13th and 14th 5-Year Plans. The increase in plastics production in and of itself cannot in any way be viewed as that impetus which will help accomplish such a vitally important maneuver. The substantial Western credits could have made it possible to accomplish a number of really serious structural changes in the economy that would have given real dynamism to its development. Joint ventures in the production of various durable goods are quite a vital form of our economic cooperation with the West.

The migration of hundreds of thousands of people to Tyumen Oblast will signify not only an increase in the dangerous and still unsurmounted tendency in our country toward an increase in the percentage of our population whose vital activities take place in unfavorable conditions. It also delivers a blow to the long-term distribution policy, because it stimulates a mechanical increase in highly paid population groups that is not accompanied by an increase in labor activeness.

Concentrating polymer production facilities in the planned extent in one region will cause qualitative changes in the ecological situation in Tyumen Oblast and the entire north of the Asian portion of our country. References to the absolute ecological safety of the production facilities being located there are deliberately false. Massive construction will cause irreversible damage to the unstable ecosystems of this region and those adjacent to it and will make impossible the normal existence of small groups of peoples of our north.

All that has been said does not mean that we are against development of the chemical industry in Western Siberia. It is just a matter of needing to develop more effective alternative variants of its development. Even staying with positions of increasing polymer production capacities in Tyumen Oblast, it is more preferable to orient ourselves on variants such as locating the capacities in the southern areas of the oblast and transporting hydrocarbon raw materials from the northern deposits; alternate construction of petro- and gas-chemical complexes, making it possible to reduce sharply the demand for construction capacities; granting Western firms the opportunity to build part of the enterprises and simultaneously perform the difficult work of creating the production infrastructure.

However, we see as the most promising the variants of locating capacities for producing polymers from hydrocarbon raw material at existing centers of chemical production in the Center and in the Urals by technical re-equipping existing capacities using benzines as raw material. At the same time, this would solve the problem of increasing the ecological safety of existing chemical production facilities.

The resolution, adopted without the necessary technical and economic, commercial, and ecological justifications is another example of the thoughtless approach to resolving national economic problems and an attempt to secure for the future the faulty path of extensive development that has led the national economy to the brink of an economic and ecological crisis.

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From the Editor

After receiving this article, the editorial staff decided that it would be correct—objectivity demands it—also to listen to supporters of the Siberian project. For this purpose, we turned to A.I. Lukashov, deputy chairman of the USSR Gosplan and overseer of the chemical and forestry complex. He told us, first of all, that issues related to the "commercial secrecy" were not subject to public and, moreover, unauthorized discussion; secondly, all the necessary explanations are contained in the response of the six ministries to the magazine KOMMUNIST, which had raised this problem earlier.

Having turned to the just published issue No 5 of KOMMUNIST, each of us can indeed read in it the letter from the leaders of the sectors involved in production and refining of oil and gas. Leaving aside the directive tone of the letter, let us turn our attention to its, so to speak, businesslike and substantive part, where it states that as a result of creating large petro- and gas-chemical complexes in Western Siberia "The country will have a powerful production center for producing new materials having unique properties; this includes construction plastics, new types of synthetic rubbers and thermoelastic plastics, aromatic hydrocarbons, and non-toxic additives for automotive gasoline which will create prerequisites for accelerating scientific and technical progress in the machine building, electronics, and construction industries, and ensure the production of new types of consumer goods."

The letter further states that between 1989 and the year 2000 we will have to carry out construction and installation work in the amount of R20 billion, with phased commissioning of individual capacities 2-3 years after the beginning of their construction.

The letter also emphasized that in Tyumen Oblast, through progressive forms of cooperation with the leading companies of the U.S., Japan, the FRG, and Italy, it is planned to enlist the help of their financial capabilities, technology, and equipment to bring the chemical industry to a qualitatively new technical level and change the country's export structure.

In addition, the letter's authors state that the credits for the project will be repaid in 5 years, and the annual profit from implementation of the project will be R4-5 billion, including 30-40 percent in convertible currency.

The authors also consider a weighty argument in favor of implementing the project to be the fact that about 23 percent of the overall volume of construction will be directed at construction of projects in the social sphere, and that not only new settlements with a developed network of schools, hospitals, child pre-schools, and preventive clinics will spring up in the areas of the new construction projects, but also subsidiary farms and enterprises of the food and processing industry.

In short, it is clear from the letter that billions of cubic meters of gas, a most valuable raw material, should not be burned for nothing, inflicting irreparable damage on the economy and the ecology. The problem must be resolved!

Unquestionably, we agree, it must. But not secretly, not unilaterally, as in this case. Do we not already have enough sad experience of such solutions? Where is the guarantee that the next project is not from the same series? We can have such a guarantee only as a result of a comprehensive, broad discussion of the various variants.

They are proposing only one variant to us. They propose it, rejecting all objections as incompetent. Moreover, they are trying to cover everything related to the project with some veil of "commercial secrecy."

But, if I may, who can accuse scientists, the authors of the letter published above, of incompetence? Or, perhaps, the Academy of Sciences, where the question was not even discussed, is also incompetent? As far as commercial secrecy is concerned, we are for it and for observing it. But in this case we are talking about R100 billion from our budget, the deficit of which is equal to precisely this sum.

The Western Siberia project is one that must be considered, weighed, without brushing aside the press and the scientific community, and discussed competently, widely, and comprehensively. A problem affecting millions of people cannot be resolved without their knowledge.

Scientific

'Mir' Cosmonauts Conduct Medical Research

LD1804105189 Moscow TASS in English 1016 GMT 18 Apr 89

[Text] Moscow April 18 TASS—TASS correspondent reports from the flight control center: the new workday of the crew aboard the orbital complex Mir began with the medical research conducted under the plan of preparations for a return to earth.

Today, Aleksandr Volkov, Sergey Krikalev and Valeriy Polyakov will be engaged in the scheduled maintenance work on onboard systems and equipment and in taking stock of the available expendable materials. Geophysical experiments and two-hour physical exercises are also planned for today.

Under the schedule of work with the Progress-41 tanker transport vehicle, the cosmonauts refuel the base module's tanks with exodizer.

The flight control center continues to monitor the flight of the orbital station Salyut-7 which has been operating in near-terrestrial space for seven years. In August 1986, it was switched to a higher orbit to conduct resource tests. Telemetry about the state of the station's onboard systems regularly comes in to the flight control center for processing and analysis.

Arguments For, Against Space Program Cited

18660160 Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Apr 89 pp 1,4

[Vitaliy Golobachev article: "What We Are Finding, What We Are Losing"]

[Text] Yuriy Gagarin's 1 and ½ hour space flight around the earth was truly a breakthrough to the future. When I recall those bustling, beautiful days when people danced and sang in the streets, I also think of the great road that mankind has traversed to the stars and the complicated problems that have been encountered on that road. Not just technical problems. There has been a noticeable change in public opinion on space research. The letters to the editor testify convincingly to this. We have in recent times received only a dozen or so letters supporting the space programs and more than 100 demanding a sharp cutback in allocations for these programs; some readers are also suggesting that this research be halted completely.

There is just one argument: "What do we need with space if in the country we do not have sufficient means for priority needs here on earth and if millions of people are living below the poverty line and cannot even make ends meet?" The not so numerous proponents of developing the space programs answer thus: "Given our scandalous mismanagement, which costs the country many tens of billions of rubles, the amounts saved from the space program will not be enough to save the situation and would deprive us of our leading positions in a most important field and deprive us of our landmarks in the latest equipment and technology. As a result the country would be thrown backward and this would ultimately lead not to the saving of resources but to even greater spending—progressive lagging would cost the people dearly."

Who is right? Evidently both sides have arguments. But in my opinion, there is another more important question: Why has public opinion changed so sharply? Of course, the ecstatic enthusiasm was natural in the early years and could not continue forever. But why has it not been replaced by a calm interest in the exploration of space but rather the start of a skeptical attitude toward this important sphere to which, I am personally convinced, the future of mankind is one way or another linked?

I think that one of the reasons is a lack of information for our people and a lack of the data that would enable them to make knowledgeable judgments about things and judge the advisability of particular space programs as short-term or long-term goals, and the costs of such programs and the expected return from them (both in rubles and in the development of fundamental research), what degree of risk is entailed and so forth. A veil of secrecy has separated this sphere from the people, resulting in much more harm than might appear at first glance.

In our press the difficult and dangerous road into space, a road that demands true heroism and courage, has often been depicted as a smooth highway leading from one victory to the next. Even when dramatic complications have occurred along this "victorious" road we have tried not to talk too much about them. This kind of propaganda has not only failed to instill trust but, on the contrary, has distanced people from this sphere and deprived them of any sense of involvement....

And certainly it was not the journalists who were to blame for the fact that spaceflights seemed as easy as going out for a walk (not counting recent years): up into orbit, everything is very simply done, the return to earth, the awards are given out.... But it is a very rare flight that goes off, as they say, without hitches and problems. Behind the veil of secrecy was also hidden the courage shown in emergency situations by cosmonauts, and their shortcomings, and the mistakes of the experts—the designers, controllers, the people who prepared the equipment....

A cosmonaut takes a shower on the station, catches a cold, which is exacerbated by the cold air from the ventilators, and the physicians initiate a course of treatment.... What is secret here? How can telling about this event weaken our power?

There have been more serious events: The fire on the "Salyut-6," for example, which, true, was extinguished by Yu. Romanenko and G. Grechko right at the start when the first smoke appeared. Or the fire on a rocket right before its launch. It was precisely then that the capsule with cosmonauts V. Titov and G. Strekalov was "separated" in emergency regime from the rocket by the autonomous solid-fuel engines (located at the top), launched upward and sheered off to the side, after which the capsule landed on its parachute right there at Baykonur. Or the accident when a space vehicle was being inserted into orbit, when the third stage had not separated and during the uncalculated ballistic descent V. Lazarev and O. Makarov experienced unprecedented G-loads that would have been fatal for any untrained person.... We learned the details of this only some time after the event, but how many other facts from the history of cosmonautics remain "out of the picture?"

But these are details, even though important ones. Today we do not know the main thing: how much is spent each year on space research (hundreds of millions? billions?) and what the return is. Discussion of the size of allocations in the USSR Supreme Soviet and extensive glasnost in this matter would, I think, make it possible to change public opinion precisely in favor of the development of cosmonautics. But with one indispensable condition, namely, that its achievements be used extensively in the national economy. Knowing the true state of affairs the public would be able to ask: Why are many of the materials from space photography of the country's territory not being used by our experts? Or why are new technologies worked on during development of "Buran" not finding application in the national economy? (I remember that the cost of the American "Apollo" lunar program, which amounted to several tens of billions of dollars, was recouped a hundredfold through the use of technical innovations in the economy). Why is it taking so long to develop a microfactory for operation in orbit—a technological module in which it will be possible to obtain unique materials for radioelectronics and other sectors?

I think that being aware of the complete picture would makes things not just a matter of some mechanical cutbacks in allocations for the space programs but of the most rational use of allocations and of bringing other sectors up to the level of the space sector.

And of course, the debate should be about more efficient use of the possibilities of the space fleet in the foreign market. By launching foreign astronauts and various kinds of satellites on a commercial basis and selling space photographs (if the quality is good the prices are very acceptable—thousands of dollars per photograph), we should generate foreign exchange more actively. In my opinion we should only welcome the latest steps taken by Glavkosmos in this direction, including the agreement with the Japanese TBS [Television Broadcasting Service] Company for a flight for a Japanese journalist.

There are also other Glavkosmos initiatives worthy of attention. The American journalist F. Vreyzo has described one of them in the PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER. The article is so interesting that it is worth describing it in some detail. F. Vreyzo reported on the lawyer Art Dyuel, a successful law professor who has an office in Houston. He has become the trade representative in the United States for the USSR commercial space fleet. Art Dyuel's task is to convince American companies to launch American satellites from the territory of the Soviet Union using Soviet launch vehicles.

"Like any good dealer," F. Vreyzo writes, "Dyuel can offer low prices—so low that they threaten to cut the ground from under the feet of competing private rocket-building companies in the United States. Moreover, he is promising that the Soviets can cope admirably with this task....

"The fact that the Soviets now have a man in the United States trying to sell Soviet space rockets testifies eloquently to the present reputation of America in space—in a word it is damaged.

"People at NASA and virtually all the experts unanimously think that the main reason for this is that several years ago this U.S. agency made a fatal mistake when it decided to abandon the use of single-use rocket launch vehicles and switched virtually all commercial, military, and scientific payloads to the reusable space vehicle that was put into service in 1981....

"On 28 January 1986 the Challenger blew up shortly after its launch. And suddenly America discovered that there was virtually no single-use launch vehicle to carry on the space shuttle program, but that there was a long line of payloads to be launched into space, including many commercial satellites that somehow had to be put into space."

However, the journalist continues, the commercial payloads could not wait forever. By that time the Europeans had their own "Ariane" rocket and they grabbed a good proportion of the orders.

The American rocket builders, encouraged by the U.S. Government decision to cut back in the future the total volume of commercial payloads on the reusable vehicles, set about attracting clients for the new single-use rockets that they planned to sell directly to private individuals and to carry out the launches from launch sites rented from the government.

But before this actually happened the Soviet experts got into the game. They turned for help to people like Dyuel and his partner William Wayrin, a retired Air Force colonel. People working at the new USSR civilian space administration—Glavkosmos—behaved no better than capitalists greedy for money....

"The prices? No problem," Vreyzo writes. "There are reports that the Soviets are proposing to launch communications satellites and other payloads for about $20 million—less than half as much as the cost of using any of the new American commercial rockets....

"Some people are simply indignant at what Dyuel is doing. But not everyone thinks that launches with Soviet rocket launchers is such a bad idea. Two leading American companies—General Electric and Hughes Aircraft—also think that perhaps it is not so bad to launch communications satellites using Soviet rockets. But when they went to U.S. Government officials to explain the possibilities of doing this, the State Department announced categorically that such missions were banned."

Dyuel is hoping to convince the State Department to change this ruling. If he is not successful he proposes launching Soviet launch vehicles and American satellites in Australia....

The article by the American journalist is interesting not only because it talks about an unusual sphere of foreign economic business but also because it shows (even though on the basis of a local fact) what underestimation of the space programs can lead to. Of course, skeptics may say that we shall not die without this foreign market. Probably we will not. But the fact that we are lagging behind cannot be disputed. And lagging behind in world development means a loss of competitiveness in other spheres also, loss of foreign exchange, and enormous economic damage.... This is why, in my opinion, the space programs are necessary for us, but on sensible scales. They must be effective, and most important of all, drawn up and implemented publicly under the control of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

I understand that the ideas expressed here are certainly debatable and that this article is not a red-letter event and is different from those usually published on 12 April. But times have changed and they now demand directness, a businesslike approach, and the truth.

There is one graphic example that I would like to cite in conclusion. A lively debate is now under way regarding our immediate space plans. It was reported earlier in TRUD that after the completion late in April of the orbital shift of the "Mir" space station, A. Volkov, S. Krikalev, and V. Polyakov will be replaced by a new crew. But in these past days other proposals have been made. It is planned to dock new modules with the orbital complex only at the end of the year. Because of this, is it expedient to send a new crew to the station? What is more efficient economically—to abandon some of the experiments on the station and conduct others in unmanned regime so that when the new modules have been established on the "Mir" station crews can use them, or still send cosmonauts to continue the watch? Careful analysis make it possible to find the answer. But in and of itself posing the question in this way testifies to the fundamentally new approaches to spaceflight. And the fact that it is possible to conduct these debates openly in a newspaper when previously they were considered to be top secret is also a living sign of restructuring.

Of course, the problems that have been raised affect not only cosmonautics itself but all sectors of our industry. In the period of stagnation the unjustified secrecy (as opposed to any real need for it) and the tactics of silence and the use of half-truths instead of complete information were considered perfectly normal phenomena. So that cosmonautics is but one example of specific manifestations of secrecy in various spheres of our life. And the problems that we have been discussing should be resolved in the spirit of glasnost not only in cosmonautics....

Military

Roundtable Discussion Examines Army Reductions

OW1804055089 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2130 GMT 15 Apr 89

["Restructuring and the Armed Forces"; roundtable discussion in the Blue Room of the Central Soviet Army Club moderated by Valeriy Voloshin, military observer of Soviet television, with Army General Dmitriy Semenovich Sukhorukov, USSR deputy minister of defense and chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Personnel Directorate; Major General Yuriy Viktorovich Lebedev, first deputy chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; Comrade Yuriy Alekseyevich Kleymenov, chief of the Labor Resources and Personnel Training Administration of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems; Lieutenant General Leonid Veniaminovich Shumilov, first deputy chief of Construction and Troop Billeting of the USSR Ministry of Defense; and Air Force Lieutenant General Aleksandr Ivanovich Maslov, chief of a directorate of the USSR Army and Navy Main

Political Directorate; date not given—recorded; from the "I Serve the Soviet Union" program]

[Excerpts] [Voloshin] Hello Comrades. Today we again invite you for a talk on problems concerning the Soviet Armed Forces. As you may have guessed from the scenes at the opening of our program, the topic of this talk, the reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces, is of great concern to many Soviet people.

So now I would like to introduce the participants in our roundtable today: Army General Dmitriy Semenovich Sukhorukov, USSR deputy minister of defense and chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Main Personnel Directorate; Major General Yuriy Viktorovich Lebedev, first deputy chief of a directorate of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff; Comrade Yuriy Alekseyevich Kleymenov, chief of the Labor Resources and Personnel Training Administration of the USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Problems; Lieutenant General Leonid Veniaminovich Shumilov, first deputy chief of Construction and Troop Billeting of the USSR Ministry of Defense; and Air Force Lieutenant General Aleksandr Ivanovich Maslov, chief of a directorate of the USSR Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. [passage omitted]

My first question is directed to Army General Sukhorukov. Dmitriy Semenovich, a USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium decree has been adopted on a unilateral reduction of the Soviet Armed Forces by 500,000 men. This means a move to practical implementation of the reduction process about which Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev spoke about 4 months ago at the United Nations among other Soviet peace initiatives.

I would like to know what measures of a preparatory or organizational nature were carried out during this time, and what has already been done specifically, so that the reduction process—and to put it bluntly, this is a difficult and sensitive process—would not pass as painfully, both in the sphere of reliably ensuring the defense of our country and of member-countries of the Warsaw Pact and in the sphere of satisfying the requirements and needs of those people who will be dismissed from the Armed Forces?

[Sukhorukov] The Armed Forces are being reduced by 500,000 men, 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems, and more than 800 combat aircraft. I would like to reaffirm most definitely—and the Minister of Defense spoke about this in the press—that retrenchment primarily concerns those comrades who have a right to a pension for the number of years of service in the Armed Forces and because of age. Besides this, apparently some reserve officers, who were called up for active service for a period of 2 to 3 years, will be dismissed from the Armed Forces.

Incidentally, if we talk about ensigns, then we have no special problems in this area. All ensigns of units and formations that are being retrenched or disbanded will be offered equal positions or even possibly positions with promotions in other military districts where we are experiencing certain difficulties in filling this category of servicemen.

[Voloshin] What about soldiers and sergeants doing their compulsory military service in units that are being retrenched? What is their fate?

[Sukhorukov] Soldiers and sergeants who at the time of the disbandment of formations and units have served the set period of active military service will be dismissed. Those who have not completed the set period of military service will be used to fill the manpower needs of other formations and units and will have to complete their service as provided for by the law.

[Voloshin] So we are ready to reduce our Armed Forces and have begun the practical implementation of these reductions?

[Sukhorukov] Beginning in May and until 15 August, the troops and divisions of formations that have been earmarked will be practically removed from the European part, from our groups of forces, to Soviet territory and will begin disbandment.

[Voloshin] A question for you, Yuriy Viktorovich. Insofar as we are reducing our Armed Forces, a number of our allies have followed our example. Can we expect any responsive steps from the NATO bloc countries? Presently, talks on the reduction of conventional arms are under way in Vienna. What can you say about this?

[Lebedev] It is indeed a very courageous act and a step leading to ensuring that our Armed Forces, in accordance with the military doctrine that we have adopted which carries a defensive character...these are steps taken to give our Armed Forces a level of sufficiency required for defense. In this regard I would like to stress that unilateral movement in this direction cannot be unlimited. Indeed, if the Western countries come out for the maintenance of equal interests of the sides, then I would think that they...that we could count on certain adequate actions following on their part.

[Voloshin] However, the Pentagon continues to advertise its new strategy of being in a position to compete, in a position of military rivalry.

[Lebedev] When the international situation in general has improved and when certain positive shifts have appeared on the path to eliminating nuclear arms—I have in mind the actions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate- and Shorter-Range Missiles; I have in mind coordination of the mandate on the talks on armed forces in Europe, and finally I have in mind improvement in the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the United States—nevertheless there is persistent talk continuing in the West about modernizing their tactical systems, about replacing obsolete missiles with new ones. Finally new concepts are being preached in the West, with particular force in recent times, in particular the concept of rivalry, as it is sometimes known, or the concept of competition, which envisages plans for the use of national resources of the United States for example, in order primarily to force the Soviet Union into spending as much as possible by introducing new technologies into the military spheres of construction

[Voloshin interrupts] Drawing us into an arms race again.

[Lebedev] Yes, exactly. In other words, concepts are being developed which attempt to begin an arms race in a new vein, I would even call it a qualitative one. [Video of various U.S. weapons systems in action briefly interrupts the discussion]

[Voloshin] Dmitriy Semenovich, in connection with this, insofar as certain circles in the West are nurturing aggressive aims and the threat of war remains, could our unilateral reductions not entail a weakening of the defense capability of the state and of the combat capability of the Armed Forces? This question is of great concern to our television viewers.

[Sukhorukov] The organization and composition of the Armed Forces should be such that they correspond with the new international policy of the Soviet Government and the Soviet State, in other words that of defense sufficiency. At the same time I want to say that undoubtedly a 500,000-man reduction of our Armed Forces—this is 12 percent of all personnel—will not make us stronger. This must be clearly understood. To some extent the Armed Forces will not become stronger. But we must compensate these reductions through qualitative parameters, as I have already said. Then, possibly, the alarm of our Soviet people would be considerably allayed as far as issues of our country's defense are concerned.

[Voloshin] But this alarm can be understood because we still remember 1960. You may recall the reduction of 1.2 million men, when tanks and aircraft were melted down and ships were cut up for scrap. But most of all there were people, many people who later could not find a place for themselves. How are these matters today? How did that reduction differ from the one under way today?

[Sukhorukov] I must say that the reduction of 1960 took place under completely different conditions, including the international aspect. If previously a reduction was carried out in a period when we were in so-called Cold War conditions and many unsolved regional conflicts were under way, today the situation in the world is completely different, as Yuriy Viktorovich mentioned.

Now, in this situation, our government and our party have found it possible to somewhat ease the burden that is carried by our Soviet people for military expenses and military needs. [video shots of an officer expressing concern for conditions after dismissal briefly interrupt the talk]

[Voloshin] As you see, people are very concerned. The process of reduction is difficult. We have received very many letters, particularly from officers who are dissatisfied with their work. [passage omitted]

Now what measures is the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy undertaking to ensure social justice and concern for people and their needs during the process of retrenchment?

[Maslov] We are not simplifying this problem and will not simplify it, because any retrenchment is of course not like receiving an order or an award. It is a drastic change in the life of a serviceman, and particularly of an officer. Presently a completely different moral situation has taken shape in all units, formations, and groupings. Of course, matters of service and life are being solved in a different way. Party organizations, political organs, and certifying commissions are presently engaged in very active work. They are working on what you could call a constant schedule. In fact, we call them permanently operating certifying commissions. If there is any controversial issue it is brought before an officers' meeting.

[Voloshin] In other words, an officers meeting is a form of work ensuring glasnost, openness, and a correct evaluation of an officer's service.

[Maslov] Its significance is presently undergoing a literal revival in the Armed Forces.

[Voloshin] So Yuriy Alekseyevich, as you can see, a large army is pouring into the national economy. Now it would be interesting for our television viewers to learn how it is planned to use the military specialists, and these are very good specialists who as a rule have a higher education and are disciplined. How can they be used in the national economy?

[Kleymenov] People who will be dismissed from the Army are generally a very good contingent, and the national economy is anticipating these people. In the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] alone about 1 million people are needed. Today, a broad network of labor organs and employment centers has been set up in our country, and generally we are getting ready to receive these people who will be dismissed and we are ready to offer them corresponding jobs, corresponding vacancies.

I would like to show you a bulletin—in fact, such bulletins are beginning to be released in all the republics—a bulletin of the RSFSR. [Kleymenov holds up a publication whose cover identifies it as "Bulletin, Issue No 1"] What is this bulletin about? The bulletin is about the availability of jobs and vacant positions at enterprises, organizations, collective farms [kolkhozes], and state farms [sovkhozes] of the RSFSR. Now if we open it and look, what is offered in this bulletin?

[Voloshin] Yes, it is very interesting.

[Kleymenov] Well, for example, if we begin with Novosibirsk Oblast, in industry you see the Sibtekstilmash plant. In Perm Oblast, too, there is the machinery plant. In Maritime Kray...the geography is very extensive. In Rostov Oblast there is Rostselmash, Myasomolmash, and so forth. The geography is very extensive. [video shows typed job and position vacancies in a number of regions filling the screen, briefly interrupting the discussion]

[Sukhorukov] The March plenum of the party committee was held recently. We were witnesses of all the decisions of this plenum. It appears that of these 500,000 people, that is, the number the Armed Forces is being reduced by, a significant number will enter the national economy, particularly agricultural production. Besides, part of the military production and defense branches of industry will be changed to manufacturing goods for the national economy, including manufacture of agricultural products. I wish simply to remind you that, in accordance with the March plenum of the party Central Committee, the Army will carry a certain load of road construction, in particular in the Non-Chernozem zone of the RSFSR.

[Kleymenov] There will be certain benefits for workers who will settle in rural areas. I would like to mention a few of them. More details about these benefits can be obtained from any employment organization. For example, a single payment of R300 is paid. There is even a chance that this will be reconsidered and the amount will naturally be increased. Further, the cost of transport of a family is paid with a 2 tonne weight allowance per family. I think that it is unlikely that our Army comrades will have more belongings than that with their nomadic lifestyle. Furthermore, credit for over 20 years to build a house will be made available. The amount of the credit is quite substantial, half of the value of a house. Presently, the cost of a house in a rural area is from R20,000 upwards. So, the credit facilities are quite good. One can build a free standing house for that.

[Sukhorukov] Yuriy Alekseyevich, this is a very important matter because the issue of housing provisions is undoubtedly the most difficult problem for all people in the country, including servicemen. What you have said should be of interest to the comrades.

[Kleymenov] Those enthusiasts who would like to tie their home life to agriculture can acquire cattle on credit, and after 3 years they need to pay back only half the value of the cattle. In other words, a fairly large range of benefits awaits those who will tie their lives to agriculture.

[Voloshin] Yuriy Alekseyevich, are the labor collectives, factories and plants, kolkhozes, and sovkhozes ready to accept our retired servicemen?

[Kleymenov] Before coming to this program we got in touch with various ministries and departments and asked them much the same question: Are you ready or not? We were told the following: Many enterprises are not just ready, but are waiting for them.

[Voloshin] What is really being done to ensure that every retired serviceman will have a roof over his head, will have an apartment?

[Shumilov] The minister of defense, fully understanding the complexity of the situation related to the forthcoming reduction of the defense forces, decided to build during 1989 and 1990, that is, during these 2 years, 100 apartment blocs with an average of 75 apartments per bloc. That is approximately 7,500 apartments.

[Voloshin] Has construction on these buildings started?

[Shumilov] Construction has begun, and during the current year 3,900 apartments will be ready for occupancy. So far as the regions are concerned, the most difficult ones in terms of providing for retirees are the central and southern parts of the European section of the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, the Baltic states, Belorussia, and a number of other regions where this problem is particularly acute today. Availing myself of today's television opportunity, I would like to address myself to the chairmen of the republican Council of Ministers and the chairmen of executive committees with a request to also facilitate the solution of this problem. We ask them that during the current 1989 year they fully satisfy our, that is, the Defense Ministry's share of new housing in the various regions and abolish the shortage that has accumulated up to 1 January 1989. It is a sizeable shortage, some 204,000 square meters of living space.

[Voloshin] Yes, that is a sizeable shortage.

(Sukhorukov] We are quite candid about these figures. During these 2 years we are capable of satisfying about 7,000 or 8,000 families. Meanwhile, those without an apartment will number some 45,000. That means that the problem is not being solved and must be dealt with in each region, oblast, and kray.

[Sukhorukov] This must be made perfectly clear. Otherwise there are those who think that if someone was a serviceman than the Defense Ministry should look after him. The government made this decision binding on the local authorities, and we call on them most persistently to find a solution to these problems.

[Voloshin] Viewers write to us to tell us that officers who were called into service from Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and other large cities cannot return to their own cities. They cannot get registered there. How can this be explained?

[Shumilov] A very difficult matter which often attracts a large amount of unfavorable criticism. I feel that complaints relating to problems involving people who, after completing their military service, cannot return to their homeland, are justified. There are two such places presently—Moscow and the populated areas near the mineral springs in the Caucasus. The Defense Ministry approached the Party Central Committee for help and was given support on this matter. Presently the government is considering the legal [word indistinct] of this issue and we hope that in the near future a resolution which lifts restrictions on people who were called in from these population centers, irrespective of the region or city of the Soviet Union, to have the complete right to return to these places on the completion of service.

[Voloshin] If we speak about the present reduction of personnel and equipment, it is unlikely that there will be that many who will return to Moscow on retirement. How many do you think?

[Sukhorukov] I would like to answer this question. Certainly it is difficult to give a precise number, but on the average some 200 people per annum. [passage omitted]

[Voloshin] The housing problem is a very acute one, and therefore it seems that the executive committees [ispolkoms] and local councils are incapable of resolving this problem. But they must show due attention to the Army and fulfill their responsibilities.

[Shumilov] It is very important that the shortage that has been accumulated up to the present—295,000 tonnes—be handed over to the families by 1 January 1991. This should be done over the next 2 years. This is what we are asking the chairmen of the Councils of Ministers and chairmen of ispolkoms to help. [passage omitted]

[Maslov] We approach the problem of fairness and objectivity with all seriousness throughout the whole period of reduction of personnel and equipment. We understand that behind each decision there is a man, his future, and often a large family. We are aware that words alone are not enough. That is why officers of the Main Personnel Directorate, the Personnel Directorate of the Main Political Directorate, are visiting districts, formations, fleets, and working things out on the spot as to how to deal with the retirement of officers in such a manner as not to cause loss in position, with due consideration to rank, and so forth. Such work is already taking place. [passage on Voloshin suggesting a greater role for television omitted]

[Kleymenov] It is equally important to make sure that the work selected should somehow correspond to previous experiences of the person as well as his inclinations and abilities.

[Voloshin] Do you have retraining in mind?

[Kleymenov] Retraining, too, but the most important thing is to convince him of the need for retraining. [passage omitted]

[Maslov] It should be remembered that many of our officers already have very solid professions. Some are engineers, others are in electronics. They are already specialists.

[Kleymenov] We will be offering a number of positions and professions and the retired officer, should he agree, can be tested for suitability. After all, mistakes can be made and wrong choices made on the spur of the moment. Another profession which is more suitable may be found. This is very important. The whole world is doing this and we should not discount this.

[Voloshin] You said something about making wrong choices on the spur of the moment. This brought me to the thinking of young officers. We receive many letters from officers who also write that they have made a hasty choice and regret going to a military academy; now that they have become officers they are disenchanted with their profession.

They submit requests seeking early dismissal, however, their requests are rejected. Dmitriy Semenovich, please tell us what the opinion and attitude of the Defense Ministry is on this matter?

[Sukhorukov] Well, I would put it as follows: Some of the young officers—I emphasize, not a large number—sometimes submit written requests asking to be dismissed from the Armed Forces after serving 1, 2, or a maximum of 3 years after completing military school. A graduate of a civilian higher education institution is obliged through allocation to work in a predetermined place for a certain period of time. So why should we.... [changes thought] If one completes our military school, why should he be allowed to submit after 1 year a request for dismissal saying: Please dismiss me, I have made a mistake in selecting my vocation. We do not consider this legal or correct. Moreover, because people enter our schools voluntarily, and—I would say—they consciously select their military vocation. Besides, by an order of the minister of defense, corresponding commanders of schools and other responsible officials are permitted to dismiss students if they do not want to study at the school at any time during their studies. So why should students be allowed to receive a military diploma—and it is an all-union diploma—and with diploma in hand, be allowed to say goodbye to the Armed Forces?

In contemporary conditions, professionals and competent people are needed as never before, but experience and competency come with time. A graduate of a military school is not completely prepared to fulfill his service obligations, to train subordinates, or be a first-class specialist himself with military equipment. He needs a certain amount of time to master a specialty. This is why we cannot agree with opinions and unfortunately the occasional criticism in the press that we do not permit young officers to resign. [passage omitted]

Very often these resignation requests are submitted somewhat hastily. Therefore, taking advantage of this program, I would advise young officers not to be hasty in determining their own fate, whether or not to stay in the Armed Forces.

[Voloshin] We have many letters from military school cadets about whether military schools will be reduced and what will be the fate of students studying in them?

[Sukhorukov] Cadets now studying in military schools, graduates of this and subsequent years, will all receive officer ranks—of course those who pass their examinations and complete their studies—and will be assigned to officer positions in the services. There will be no problems. [passage omitted]

[Voloshin] In this connection, Aleksandr Ivanovich, I would like to ask you: As far as the reductions are concerned, do you think that the negative manifestations that are present in some military collectives will strengthen? Or will the opposite happen, will a kind of moral improvement take place?

[Maslov] One of the tasks being set precisely in connection with the reductions is to achieve much higher qualitative parameters in the personnel sphere. Reductions will permit this major task to be carried out. I think that the prestige of the Soviet Army and Navy, despite some pressures from indiscriminate authors, will undoubtedly not only remain but the prestige will definitely go up. This prestige rests on a reliable basis. Throughout its long history the Soviet Army has never sullied itself in any way. Quite recent events such as Afghanistan, Chernobyl, and Armenia, not to mention the Great Patriotic War, have shown this. Who was first on the scene? It was always the military man, the man in military uniform. [passage omitted]

Now we have mentioned Afghanistan. Many officers served in Afghanistan, as well as ensigns. We will take care of them, too. Statistics have shown that they were mainly young people, young officers. Mainly young people fought there and the commander, Comrade Gromov, a very good commander and a good general, was himself only 45. Therefore in practice, officers who served in Afghanistan, officers with experience under fire, will remain in the ranks.

[Sukhorukov] I would like to add that, as you know, all Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Afghanistan. Most units have been disbanded and the officers have received new assignments and have already moved on to their new places of service.

[Maslov] In other words, they already have jobs.

[Sukhorukov] They have jobs.

[Voloshin] If we round off the topic of Afghanistan, we all found out recently—the USSR Minister of Defense visited us at Gosteleradio [USSR State Television and Radio Committee] and in his address he cited this example: 50,000 people were supposed to be withdrawn from Afghanistan, but in fact 60,000 were withdrawn. Now these 10,000 people who brought the figure to 60,000 were people who were supposed to have been dismissed or replaced and should have left Afghanistan prior to the withdrawal of troops. They remained of their own accord—nobody forced them—to help the others withdraw with honor.

[Sukhorukov] And because they had the greater experience.

[Voloshin] Now, there are many officers, scientists, designers, and teachers whose experience is of value to the Armed Forces. Will there be any exceptions for them in connection with the reduction of the Armed Forces?

[Sukhorukov] Well our position in this regard—as far as the scientists working in our scientific research institutes, academies, and schools and in medicine are concerned—is that we view everyone individually. It will depend on his personal contribution, his work, and of course his age, but each one will be viewed individually.

[Voloshin] Comrades, we have very little time left and all of you have some letters from television viewers that we have not answered.

[Shumilov] Comrade Klimov from Voronezh writes: Is the pacifist argument that the Army is the main source of thermonuclear war and military conflicts fair? Well, if we are objective, then to a certain extent the answer is yes because the main arsenals of weapons are concentrated in the Army and the Army is the first to come into contact with the armies of the opposing sides. But here we must remember and take note of whose interests an Army protects. In other words, we must remember the social basis of the Army....

[Voloshin interrupts] And whose policy it serves.

[Shumilov] Yes, and what policy the Army serves. Well, our policy, the policy of a socialist state, is a peace-loving policy. We have no territorial pretentions on any other state. We declare at the highest level that we will never start a war against any other state, and we would generally like to see the Armed Forces brought to a minimum. But as we have discussed here, this depends not on us alone; it depends on the other side as well. [passage omitted]

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